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RE: RHS Design Theory: Battle of Ichang Follow Up
Posted: Sun Dec 02, 2012 6:28 pm
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: Natali
I am interested in the China Area, but don't know much detail about it. Francois Charton is pushing me to understand more about China and has given me some books to read and website forums to go to.
I think Francois (fcharton) is an excellent resource. He is simply a historian and has no agenda. He would be a good sanity check.
btw, on his recommendation, I'm learning Chinese. So far, so good (still don't know how to order Peking (Beijing) Duck at a restaurant run by Taiwanese).
I have an international email list of China scholars and students - academics, intelligence officers, soldiers and others interested in the country. A majority are either ethnic Chinese - or married to ethnic Chinese - but there is no such requirement.
It is very diverse, but includes no one sympathetic with the regime, and no one with any illusions about all being rosy and wonderful. One of the members is a PLA historian professionally. We have lots of materials, and people who can help reading them if not in English. The problem in game terms is not so much getting the information as knowing what information needs to be looked up? China is vast - so are the orders of battle - and it would take a lifetime to check every detail. My approach is to investigate any time a question comes up - and I welcome questions. I also will happily provide anyone with sources if they want them. But never mind I spend a lot of time reading, I do not pretend to have read the 30,000 pages of materials in files, or the 30 feet of bookshelves I have on the subject. One is always learning more. And one always wants more than we have - situation maps for every date - and on a small scale instead of Continental - revealing more detail for example. Then there is the problem of contradictions - and mere confusion - even when one does have the material. But therein lies the fun, perhaps?
RE: RHS Design Theory: Technical Sitrep
Posted: Sun Dec 02, 2012 10:05 pm
by dwg
ORIGINAL: el cid again
garrison requirements for the Allies in India are backwards - you cannot tell from AE that India tied up 160 battalions of occupation troops for the British! [India was in a state of rebellion, and the entire unified Congress party - then it included Moslems - was in prison.] Instead of needing more Allied garrison than Japanese, it was the other way around. The panic the Indian National Army had on the British is not hinted at by such a structure.
Be careful not to exaggerate this, by the same measure much of India is still in a state of rebellion against its central government, just take a look at the number of ongoing insurgencies and the size of the Indian internal security forces, in addition to which a considerable part of the pre-WWII garrison was actually holding down the North West Frontier. There are ongoing insurgencies in Punjab, Assam, Kashmir, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Karnatka, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Bodoland, Nagaland, Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Manipur. If we look at the current Indian paramilitary security forces we have: 245 battalion Central Reserve Police Force, 186 battalion Border Security Force, 55 battalion Indo-Tibetan Border Police, ? battalion Sashastra Seema Bal (significantly larger than ITBP), 132 battalion Central Industrial Security Force, 60,000 strong Railway Protection Force, 5 battalion National Security Guards, 46 battalions of Assam Rifles, 6 battalions of Special Frontier Force, and that's not counting Army units deployed for internal security such as the 36 battalion Rashtriya Rifles. So since British withdrawal and the Partition of Pakistan and Bangladesh (and turning the North West Frontier into quite literally somebody else's problem), the internal garrison needs of India have increased from the 160 battalions you report to somewhere in the region of 780! India has never been a cohesive nation in the Western sense, there has always been the potential for very serious inter-communal violence and the internal policing needs reflect that.
In Burma we have a perfect example of what happens when you replace British government with Japanese occupation, some cooperation (Burma had its own version of the INA), most people just try not to be noticed, and a very significant minority engage in active resistance. For that matter much of India, the Princely States, was under local home rule, to the point that India had to invade Hyderabad (Operation Polo, 1948) to incorporate it into the Union.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Formation issues with AIF
Posted: Mon Dec 03, 2012 12:36 am
by el cid again
Fortunately - Karachi or not - the unit in question was AIF
This is one of two Australian Armies - the other being CMF -
AIF = Australian Imperial Force.
The unit I noticed was part of 7th Division slot 5975.
Two of its sub units (only) need redefinition (in stock and anything using stock data):
5979 & 5980.
Similarly, the 6th Division, slot 2952
has two sub units (only) needing redefinition (in stock and anything using stock data)
5956 & 5957.
There is nominally also a AIF 8th Division, slot 5981
I am unable to show it will ever appear in the game.
I only find three sub units - all of them battalions - which point at it - but even without them - it never shows up on the reinforcement schedule. These are named battalions and were indeed part of 8th Division - but I think they probably should not point to it. The division managed to form in spite of at least one of them becoming POWs until 1946. There may be other sub units - but I didn't find them. That would explain the unit not appearing anywhere.
This is much better than if the Indian Army was messed up - and it is fixed - at least re 6th and 7th Divisions - which would combined improperly.
The parent formation - slot 2706 - points at slot 2710. This may be correct - but if so - it imposes a rebuild problem - changing devices en masse. It is probably better to leave the divisions as they are than to convert them to divisions of probably lesser value.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Technical Sitrep
Posted: Mon Dec 03, 2012 1:01 am
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: dwg
ORIGINAL: el cid again
garrison requirements for the Allies in India are backwards - you cannot tell from AE that India tied up 160 battalions of occupation troops for the British! [India was in a state of rebellion, and the entire unified Congress party - then it included Moslems - was in prison.] Instead of needing more Allied garrison than Japanese, it was the other way around. The panic the Indian National Army had on the British is not hinted at by such a structure.
Be careful not to exaggerate this, by the same measure much of India is still in a state of rebellion against its central government, just take a look at the number of ongoing insurgencies and the size of the Indian internal security forces, in addition to which a considerable part of the pre-WWII garrison was actually holding down the North West Frontier. There are ongoing insurgencies in Punjab, Assam, Kashmir, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Karnatka, Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Bodoland, Nagaland, Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Manipur. If we look at the current Indian paramilitary security forces we have: 245 battalion Central Reserve Police Force, 186 battalion Border Security Force, 55 battalion Indo-Tibetan Border Police, ? battalion Sashastra Seema Bal (significantly larger than ITBP), 132 battalion Central Industrial Security Force, 60,000 strong Railway Protection Force, 5 battalion National Security Guards, 46 battalions of Assam Rifles, 6 battalions of Special Frontier Force, and that's not counting Army units deployed for internal security such as the 36 battalion Rashtriya Rifles. So since British withdrawal and the Partition of Pakistan and Bangladesh (and turning the North West Frontier into quite literally somebody else's problem), the internal garrison needs of India have increased from the 160 battalions you report to somewhere in the region of 780! India has never been a cohesive nation in the Western sense, there has always been the potential for very serious inter-communal violence and the internal policing needs reflect that.
In Burma we have a perfect example of what happens when you replace British government with Japanese occupation, some cooperation (Burma had its own version of the INA), most people just try not to be noticed, and a very significant minority engage in active resistance. For that matter much of India, the Princely States, was under local home rule, to the point that India had to invade Hyderabad (Operation Polo, 1948) to incorporate it into the Union.
You are quite correct.
Although I would add that in Burma the Japanese were rather more welcome than they likely would have been in India, and got rather more support from the locals than they even dreamed possible. [Medical aid in particular, from possibly a majority of those who came across anyone needing aid - it is a religious thing - and "all live is sacred" means something to Bhuddists in Burma). In some ways, it may be proper to regard the BNA as the second most successful Axis regime in the world. [I regard Thailand as the most successful - the nationalist head of state managed to return to power after the war - and the details of how are truly a Thai demonstration of how to manipulate events to make the best of a bad situation?] Some of the Burmese colonial "soldiers" defected as units, and in the long run, their officers ended up running the country. So it wasn't really a case of being pro Japanese - and in fact in 1945 the BNA - in order to switch sides - ambushed the IJA - achieveing surprise - and also being allowed to change sides (for some of them, for the second time)!
It is a very difficult thing to model the Indian State Forces in AE. Leaving most of them off the board is certainly appropriate - and goes a long way to explaining why no garrison is required in many locations. They are "controlled" by these invisible forces - and not always in favor of the British crown - but rather some local regime with its own interests. Nor was it normal for Japan to get rid of local police or security forces. Japan never had anything approaching US type occupation government units in any numbers (IJN did run a few places directly, but that was exceptional, mainly related to oil).
It is safer to model the system by ignoring them than by trying to include them - not to mention there are not enough slots to even consider the idea. Yet SOME ISF units are included in every variation of the OB - because sometimes they served well away from their area of origin on several different kinds of duty. It is somewhat similar to China, where we have warlord units - some of them static - others (particularly cavalry) for hire able to move (but not worth very much even if you "hire" them). Numbers of local security elements on the map are not named as such - but are components of static units like "forts" and base forces. These DO count toward any garrison requirements too.
Nevertheless, the extent to which India was mishandled by the Imperial regime is impossible to overstate. The straw that broke the camel's back was, when crop failures led to starvation, there WAS sufficient food to solve the problem - and ALSO enough ships to send it -but the decision was made NOT to allocate the shipping anyway. This compounded the gross error made when Japan entered the war - and Congress Party propossed to support the war effort (admittedly with strings). The decision to lock up the domestic politicians INSTEAD of accept Indian support was foolish - and didn't prevent Indian independence at the same time it would otherwise have happened had a more graceful choice been made. The final complication was the "Red Fort Trials" of INA members captured in the field for treason: it outraged the country and made it impossible for the Raj to continue. The Indian Army was heavily involved in all theaters of WWII - well before Japan's attack - and the nation WOULD have supported the Allies in general - but the British were unable to let that happen with just a promise (similar to what they did in WWI Palestine - perhaps a good parallel as there were two factions in both places - Arab and Jewish in Palestine - Moslem and Hindu in India). The British got real volunteer Arab and Jewish brigades in WWI by making such a promise - and they already had Indian troops in WWII - so making a promise seems not so high a hill to climb IMHO. Congress wanted a promise of independence after the war. In the event, it happened anyway. What was gained by not making the promise? And what was lost? [India was a real security problem, barely under control, and there was a real chance the pot would boil over in certain circumstances. See The Encyclopedia of Revolutions.]
RE: RHS Design Theory: Technical Sitrep
Posted: Mon Dec 03, 2012 4:44 pm
by dwg
ORIGINAL: el cid again
Yet SOME ISF units are included in every variation of the OB - because sometimes they served well away from their area of origin on several different kinds of duty. It is somewhat similar to China, where we have warlord units
That's a misleading analogy. The ISF forces in the OOB are not functioning as mercenaries, but as the allied armed forces of a minor state - and some of them not so minor, for instance Hyderabad had a population of over 16 million in 1941 and several states had 1 or more brigades. ISF forces were organised and equipped on British lines, in practice quality varied, but the best were fully capable of serving in the front line, as the 15th Cavalry Brigade did in the Middle East in WWI. There were 5 ISF battalions involved in the Malaya campaign, for instance airfield defence at Kota Bahru was provided by the 1st Battalion, Mysore Infantry.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Battle of Ichang Follow Up
Posted: Mon Dec 03, 2012 7:47 pm
by Symon
ORIGINAL: el cid again
ORIGINAL: Natali
I am interested in the China Area, but don't know much detail about it. Francois Charton is pushing me to understand more about China and has given me some books to read and website forums to go to.
I think Francois (fcharton) is an excellent resource. He is simply a historian and has no agenda. He would be a good sanity check.
btw, on his recommendation, I'm learning Chinese. So far, so good (still don't know how to order Peking (Beijing) Duck at a restaurant run by Taiwanese).
I have an international email list of China scholars and students - academics, intelligence officers, soldiers and others interested in the country. A majority are either ethnic Chinese - or married to ethnic Chinese - but there is no such requirement.
It is very diverse, but includes no one sympathetic with the regime, and no one with any illusions about all being rosy and wonderful. One of the members is a PLA historian professionally. We have lots of materials, and people who can help reading them if not in English. ...
Hello Sid. How wonderful to see you once again. Nice to know nothing much has changed over the years. Sent a note to Sam with some history, so he won't be too disapointed.
As you know, I was with NSA in my early years. Matt was a green grunt and instructer at JTOC, Panama, before losing a limb and becoming a Mil History Professor at TAMU. Anyone and everyone we know who has info of significance, we identify by name and, if they are willing, by email address. That includes scholars, students, academics, intelligence officers, serving officers, and the majority of retireds who wish to comtinue to play.
I have provided tic after tic. You have provided nothing. One simple, ordinary, everyday, identification or email, from your supposed sources, would be helpful. So if you truly do know those peolpe, then a couple names and emails would go far in establishing your bona fides.
Or are you just one of those little people who make pronunciamento, with nothing to back them up? Show one, just one, and not from Wikipedia. PLease. just one, a single one , like all the rest of us have done over the many years. Just once, just one teensy, honest email. One, just one. That's all. You claim hundreds, but you can't name one, not one. Not a single one. Wonder why nobody believes you? Just one. One single solitary reference. That's all, just one.
Heck, I'm the unacknowledged love child of Kim Jong Ill and Immelda Marcos, and know more about the PI and Kwantung than any of you will ever guess, because my Uncle was the unknown, secret, Japanese keeper of the Alien technology and hid the Japanese advaned atomic bomb records in a cave by his home in North Korea. And one of my nieces married a guy who had a matertnal grandmother who was Japanese, so I must know everything about the Japanese, yeah? And then I was an honored guest, in 1987, at the wedding of Michael Hong and Sylvia Cheung (the unity, and increase, of the two largest shipping houses of Taiwan), so I guess I must know something about China, too. And it's all Bull, except I was at Michael's and Sylvia's wedding, and was treated like a guest, but made my deepest respects to all the Aunts and Uncles, tried to honor Mike and Sylvie by not acting the barbarian, and ate everything that was put before me and liked it.
But then, I really don't know squat about China. Mike and Sylvie are just normal everyday home folks, even though they are very, very Chinese. However, I learned, a while back, how to be be polite; especially when it effects my friends.
Ciao. JWE
RE: RHS Design Theory: Energy in China
Posted: Tue Dec 04, 2012 11:16 pm
by el cid again
Does anyone remember the "first oilwell" in Pennsylvania?
I also discovered the "second oilwell" in India - about the same time - and the
first oil refinery at the same location (Ledo hex) - and learned the ww2 production levels are significant (1700 oilwells by RHS standards)
Well - they are not "first"!
China was recovering oil AND natural gas from 800 feet more than 2000 years ago!
In the 13th century - a dark age in the west - a Chinese scholar predicted that one day oil AND natural gas would be the primary sources of energy for cities!
Seems that a lack of oil (or lack of discovered and developed major oilfields) did not entirely prevent industry from functioning (other than near Lanchow, which was well developed).
There was a bit of hydro power - the first dam dates from before WWI and is at Kunming. Another city SE of it gets 70% of its power from hydro. Then there is coal gas - something once important in the USA - and in one place, in Australia of WW2 -
a gas derived from coal. And in China, natural gas - long fed by pipes (not always modern metal pipes) - from significant depths. This is what permitted industrial growth during the war at Chendu - which didn't have oil per se. I also found a mature oil field in Szechuan not defined in modern maps - in the Oxford Economic Atlas - a bit west of Chunking. And the communist stronghold in the quasi desert has a small oilfield discovered in the 1920s, developed in the 1930s, just sufficient to feed the local industry at Yenan.
The combination of the major oilfields at Lanchow (and neighboring locations as far as Sian) - and some local production of coal gas, natural gas or hydro - means that China can get HI to function at least part of the time. [If it could move the fuel, there is enough at Lanchow to run it all - but moving it to the Szechuan basin or South China from Lanchow is quite difficult] Also adding a 2 or 3 of the Standard Oil river tankers on the Yellow river means movement of fuel and oil between Lanchow, Sian, Yenan (all sources large or small) and any other river port on the Yellow River becomes far more practical. Now any city with HI connected to any LOC of any Yellow River port becomes, in theory, able to get fuel and or oil. And the one oilfield in Szechuan is on the Yangtze - so river tankers already there can theoretically move oil - although the road system will do so automatically to locations in Szechuan itself.
As a result - Allied China is in the peculiar situation of getting SOME of the oil and fuel it needs - the fraction varies with the viability of LOC and the possession of locations. So it will never have totally useless HI everywhere. But it will also probably never get al the HI to produce all the time. This matters because HI produce more supply than LI do - because China can benefit from more supply than it can make - and because it appears HI points actually matter to the Allies in AE (never mind we are told otherwise - looks like they are used to make aircraft engines and aircraft).
I have decided a line by line review is warranted - there is a lot to discover about the many locations on the map or potentially on the map.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Technical Sitrep
Posted: Tue Dec 04, 2012 11:18 pm
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: dwg
ORIGINAL: el cid again
Yet SOME ISF units are included in every variation of the OB - because sometimes they served well away from their area of origin on several different kinds of duty. It is somewhat similar to China, where we have warlord units
That's a misleading analogy. The ISF forces in the OOB are not functioning as mercenaries, but as the allied armed forces of a minor state - and some of them not so minor, for instance Hyderabad had a population of over 16 million in 1941 and several states had 1 or more brigades. ISF forces were organised and equipped on British lines, in practice quality varied, but the best were fully capable of serving in the front line, as the 15th Cavalry Brigade did in the Middle East in WWI. There were 5 ISF battalions involved in the Malaya campaign, for instance airfield defence at Kota Bahru was provided by the 1st Battalion, Mysore Infantry.
I don't think we disagree - exept possibly in expression. I completely agree with your wording - which is why I think a case by case analysis needs to be used for the exceptional appearance of local forces on the map. As you pointed out before - the total is vast - and pretty much absent. Still - there are numbers of cases where units should be added. And a few (as with a brigade that spent the entire war off the map) that should be deleted.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Battle of Ichang Follow Up
Posted: Tue Dec 04, 2012 11:29 pm
by el cid again
Dear Symon
I do not grasp what you are trying to say. This is a thread for RHS mod design. It is not a scholarly paper and it is not a debating society.
I take every constructive comment seriously - and here lately accepted the criticism that the movement of Ichang to the location which appears to be correct does not mean the ROC units in that hex control it. I asked a PLA historian for an opinion - and got it.
It is not a good idea to post email addresses or names on the web - another suggestion I took from the forums - because of what automated crawler malware will do with them. However, I do reply to every pm and will send you the email from the historian I used to settle the matter if you wish. He would confirm I knew him since the 1990s, and he visited me in my home when I lived in Tacoma - and he in Portland. He has been on my email list every since - as indeed anyone interested in China is welcome to be (unless they become hostile - the group threw out one hostile user in 20 years - and I myself didn't agree with that decision - but respected it).
I only say things I think are true. But there is entirely too much to know to always be right. So RHS is (and always was) OPEN to criticism and suggestion. I admit, at least half of the stuff we use came from suggestions in the forums. Stuff I didn't know up front and needed to be told to get right. If you think it is easy to know every fact about every unit, place, machine - try defining it all.
This is as close as I will come to arguing. And a violation of the principle suggested by Matrix at the top - do not be drawn into debates. Just post and let the ideas stand or fall in the individual view of each reader.
If you have a suggestion for RHS - make it. I and the others on the RHS team will consider it. Every time. Even if we think you are wrong - we will check it out. It is the best I can do.
If you are interested in China, you are welcome to join the list. You are not required to agree with me either - it is a free discussion group. You are required to be civil - no exceptions. It more or less dates from my web published paper Prognosis for China, in the 1990s. It is probably still found on the FAS site. It was once published by The Red Team Journal, a Jane's spin off - but they no longer exist.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Energy in China
Posted: Wed Dec 05, 2012 8:21 am
by fcharton
ORIGINAL: el cid again
Also adding a 2 or 3 of the Standard Oil river tankers on the Yellow river means movement of fuel and oil between Lanchow, Sian, Yenan (all sources large or small) and any other river port on the Yellow River becomes far more practical. Now any city with HI connected to any LOC of any Yellow River port becomes, in theory, able to get fuel and or oil.
Yenan is not on the Yellow River, but about 75 km inland, over very bad roads. Back then, it was pretty much isolated, and that was the reason why Mao chose it as his base (and also the reason why Japan didn't bother to go there). I don't think there was any industry there. To my knowledge, the only industrial centre in the northeast would be Taiyuan.
Sian is not on the Yellow river either, but on the Wei, and before 1950, only the lower course of the Wei (usually up to Weinan, 50 km downstream from Sian) was navigable to small flat boats. This was one of the purposes of the building of the railroad. But even then, navigation from Lanzhou to Weinan seems like a doubtful prospect. You can check the Hukou falls in any atlas, I don't think the standard oil tankers would appreciate it. The Yellow River is not one long navigable axis, like the Changjiang. Some sections of it can be used, around Lanchow, in Mongolia, downstream (but not all year long)
On the subject, you might want to look at this book.
http://www.amazon.com/Economic-Developm ... 0521115434
On a more general note, northern China is replete with coal, which is traditionally used to heat, cook, and for industrial use (light industry in the game, I suppose). Coal is typically produced in small bricks, made of dried "coal mud". I am pretty sure this is what local industry used back then. In any case, I doubt local industries would import fuel, or that oil would be needed. The oilfields in Lanchow, Sian or Urumchi were probably less important in reality than the game make them (which might explain why the Japanese didn't bother to conduct the "northern expedition" which looks like such a good idea in this game.
Francois
RE: RHS Design Theory: Monsoon Effects
Posted: Wed Dec 05, 2012 8:53 pm
by el cid again
Have you ever had the impression "monsoon effects" as described in the manual were minimal?
There is a reason for that: the data set is defined in such a way every location defined by stock says to the program "do not use monsoon effects for this location"!!
Since how to make them happen was revealed, I assumed that because this was understood, the people entering data were told how to do it. They apparently were not. Nor did any review of the data catch that it is missing in every location - from India to the Philippines at least - where it happens.
It is tedious to correct this when you manage more than one file set - but I didn't buy the program not to use its features. So I spent the night correcting this issue.
Otherwise, just dotting i's and crossing t's.
FYI RHS does have some original monsoon effects - built into its pwhexe.dat files. These mostly take the form of erasing trails (which RHS adds prolifically where there is a minor LOC so units and supplies will prefer these routes) in the monsoon area. There is also the counter-intuititve loss of the Irrawaddy as a navigable river in its Northern section DURING the monsoon! This because increased water flow - through rugged canyons - makes navigation impossible at that time of year. Other places - say the upper Mekong - you get more navigable river during wet seasons - but on the upper Irrawaddy - less.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Energy in China
Posted: Wed Dec 05, 2012 9:10 pm
by el cid again
ORIGINAL: fcharton
ORIGINAL: el cid again
Also adding a 2 or 3 of the Standard Oil river tankers on the Yellow river means movement of fuel and oil between Lanchow, Sian, Yenan (all sources large or small) and any other river port on the Yellow River becomes far more practical. Now any city with HI connected to any LOC of any Yellow River port becomes, in theory, able to get fuel and or oil.
Yenan is not on the Yellow River, but about 75 km inland, over very bad roads. Back then, it was pretty much isolated, and that was the reason why Mao chose it as his base (and also the reason why Japan didn't bother to go there). I don't think there was any industry there. To my knowledge, the only industrial centre in the northeast would be Taiyuan.
Sian is not on the Yellow river either, but on the Wei, and before 1950, only the lower course of the Wei (usually up to Weinan, 50 km downstream from Sian) was navigable to small flat boats. This was one of the purposes of the building of the railroad. But even then, navigation from Lanzhou to Weinan seems like a doubtful prospect. You can check the Hukou falls in any atlas, I don't think the standard oil tankers would appreciate it. The Yellow River is not one long navigable axis, like the Changjiang. Some sections of it can be used, around Lanchow, in Mongolia, downstream (but not all year long)
On the subject, you might want to look at this book.
http://www.amazon.com/Economic-Developm ... 0521115434
On a more general note, northern China is replete with coal, which is traditionally used to heat, cook, and for industrial use (light industry in the game, I suppose). Coal is typically produced in small bricks, made of dried "coal mud". I am pretty sure this is what local industry used back then. In any case, I doubt local industries would import fuel, or that oil would be needed. The oilfields in Lanchow, Sian or Urumchi were probably less important in reality than the game make them (which might explain why the Japanese didn't bother to conduct the "northern expedition" which looks like such a good idea in this game.
Francois
Actually, I wasn't guessing - I was reporting. I found that major oilfield development at Yenan began in the 1920s and proper refining began in the 1930s. [Technically tiny scale refining began in 1910 - the "birth of China's oil industry" according to one reference - but I don't count 12.5 kg / day!] Because of this local availability, the area - which otherwise produced food and other raw materials - was remarkably self sufficient. This combined with its distance and isolation to make it attractive to Mao, I assume.
As for being a port - our hexes are rather large - 4310 sq km if they were circles instead of hexes - and 74 km across. Unless you allege it is in the wrong hex (which it might be - I accept stock data unless there is a reason to check it), we have to include all the locations along the river as part of the hex. Hexes are named for the largest town (or sometimes most significant facility, as an airfield) in them, and are not merely that one place - but everything in the entire area.
It is quite true that coal was used by industry as a fuel. At that time, as well, coal was often reprocessed chemically to make "coal gas" - and I have even seen (at least in Japan) cars and trucks powered by it (with a gigantic baloon suspended above, full of fuel, in some cases). [Japan had a law requiring all vehicles be "self fueling" and so, essentially, all civil vehicles did not use gasoline. Some military ones also carried wood burners to make alcohol fuel, and other "self fueling" technologies. These are almost unheard of outside Japan, except in extremely remote places in Siberia or Canada.] Coal is abundant in China - and also there is some in the Yenan area. That is independent of the (then) small local oil industry. [It has grown a great deal since and isn't small any more].
RE: RHS Design Theory: Energy in China
Posted: Wed Dec 05, 2012 9:35 pm
by fcharton
ORIGINAL: el cid again
As for being a port - our hexes are rather large - 4310 sq km if they were circles instead of hexes - and 74 km across. Unless you allege it is in the wrong hex (which it might be - I accept stock data unless there is a reason to check it), we have to include all the locations along the river as part of the hex. Hexes are named for the largest town (or sometimes most significant facility, as an airfield) in them, and are not merely that one place - but everything in the entire area.
Actually, Yenan might be one hex "inside" (ie 8836). I believe (and hope that those who designed the map will correct me if I'm wrong) that it was set next to a river to improve its "defensiveness". In a clear hex, without rivers to protect it, Yenan would be too easy to capture. This seems fair.
On the other hand, making it a port, and accepting the Yellow River as a possible waterway connecting Lanchow, to Yenan, to Luoyang, to the Pacific, seems a bit strange. Those areas were very isolated.
ORIGINAL: el cid again
It is quite true that coal was used by industry as a fuel. At that time, as well, coal was often reprocessed chemically to make "coal gas" - and I have even seen (at least in Japan) cars and trucks powered by it (with a gigantic baloon suspended above, full of fuel, in some cases). [Japan had a law requiring all vehicles be "self fueling" and so, essentially, all civil vehicles did not use gasoline. Some military ones also carried wood burners to make alcohol fuel, and other "self fueling" technologies. These are almost unheard of outside Japan, except in extremely remote places in Siberia or Canada.]
There were such vehicles in Germany, and England, and France, and even the United States, throughout the war. The French call them "gazogènes", Wikipedia (yeah, I'm lazy) tells me they are known in English as "wood gas generators".
But that's not the point. As far as transportation is concerned, you wouldn't find those in China. Rickshaws would be the most common, and mules in richer areas (just to give an idea, in the early fifties, in Northern China, owning a donkey would make you a landlord (dizhu), and get you in a lot of trouble). And for industry, I don't think coal gas ever was an option. During the Great Leap Forward, in 57, they still used those coal bricks to produce iron.
Finally, and I think that was my point, you have to consider that all northern china, from Tatung, to Sining, is very rich in coal, so yes, they might have had some oilfields, and refineries, but the industry used the cheapest local production, which were those coal bricks.
Francois
RE: RHS Design Theory: Energy in China
Posted: Wed Dec 05, 2012 11:10 pm
by el cid again
It appears that there is a river feeding the Yellow River called the Yan Ho
On this river - between Yenan and the big river - is a city called Yanchang.
It also appears THIS is the actual location of the oilfleld, and refinery company (Shanxxi Yanchang) - which dates to 1906.
It appears that for projection reasons Yanchang and Jinan share the same hex. If you go inland from there - the projection at
this point makes the distance too small to the other side of the Yellow River loop. More technically, there is no road - not
even secondary - feeding the hexas "inland" from there - so logistics would not work. As well - the river art for the Yan Ho
still makes it seem the city is on the river.
At the moment, being in the process of doing an update, I would change the hex. On balance, I think the present location is the
best compromise. We could put in Yanchang in the present Jinan hex - and run a road from there to Jinan's new hex - but it would
not show in map art - and that might confuse players not using the reveal codes. And then it would not look quite right either
being too far across the gap between the Yellow River loop. So I will leave it alone. But if I get to the point of doing map art,
I might revisit the matter.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Location Update Report
Posted: Fri Dec 07, 2012 2:31 pm
by el cid again
I have been processing a couple of hundred locations a day. I have found a great variety of matters affecting at least half of them.
Nominally this was about reviewing victory points per location, and revising the calculation of that. Partly, as the new system is based on then year population, it required checking the data. Often the data was wrong, with population centers where there are none, or more often, understating population - and when grossly so - garrison requirements. Other issues involve reverse victory point ratios - possibly caused if a location was assigned to the other side - or if the copied record was from the other side. There were also locations with improper garrison requirements. For example, not a single location in Japan requires a Japanese garrison of any size. That makes no political or military sense.
Nominally, even before the victory point system was taken on, this was also about reviewing resource point requirements in major HI areas - because of the change in the demand for HI - reflecting the way coal works in the model. It turns out, however, there were lots of other economic matters, and starting inventories of various things were not at the nominal levels. This is a complex subject, but the base line runs something like this:
for a "standard location" in a functional economy,
inventory is 10 days of production at the daily rate for resources, fuel, oil and/or supplies
for a port which exports for itself and other locations,
the inventory of the things exported is doubled
a location with HI gets fuel for 10 days of the fuel demands of its HI centers
a location with a port gets 300 times the port level (standard) - or 1300 times the port level if a major significant economic location - or typically 100 if truly minor (unless zero)
if a location has an airfield, and a base force, and is part of a functional military command situation (not isolated for some reason unable to get supplies) -
the supplies are increased by 1000 times the developed airfield level
There are special cases, for giant inventory centers.
Other issues detected include
locations in the wrong hex (Launceton in Tasmania, for example - deliberately I think - so it could be a seaport instead of a river port - which it really is)
locations with special historical significance of interest
For example, the place the PETA (Anti Dutch Army) trained its (brigade sized) divisions - and where they should appear?
The location of specific industries and infrastructures go a long way toward explaining why the starting deployments are as they are? You might wonder "why did they defend that" before - but not any more. You can see why?
Some missing units. The biggest cantonment in NE India had NOTHING in it at all!
It was the command center for the Burma campaigns - but it had zero assets! A similar case in Southern India. Sometimes the units in question never appear at all.
There is the general matter that consistent data is worth having. And testing indicates it works a great deal better - go figure. The new vp system is, by design, going to start with the same relative score - and it does. But changes in position are more rationally reflected. Also, the foundation of those scores (starting or at any point in time) is more rationally related to the value of the locations under control. No longer are numbers of locations in India worth 0 to the allies. Or major places worth 1 point to either side. If it is important, it is worth more. And if it is truly minor, it is a 1, not some bigger number. If there is a special case - an otherwise minor location becomes a 3 - slightly outranking a small population center - which is a 2. [So either a 1 or a 2 can be made a 3 if it has vital infrastructure or a truly key positional significance] But to get a 10 or 20 (base value) takes more than a handful of population centers. And if it is a megaopolis - a big center can be a 30 (base). Now if it was enemy held, and if there is a multiple for capturing in that region, than these values multiply by 2, 3, 5 or 10 - for the other side. But never more than 10. No 25, 50, 100 or 250 multiples. The differential (the points one side loses plus the points the other side gains when it changes hands) is, however, quite similar: because a major place is no longer a 0 or 1 to start with - so losing 20 points and gaining 200 points = 220; 30 and 300 = 330; 10 and 100 = 110 for big places - in the extreme cases where the vp ratio is 10 (places the enemy should never capture to begin with, and which are going to be very hard to achieve). For the 1:1 ratio area - differentials vary from 2 (1 plus 1) to 60 (30 plus 30) - depending on the significance of the location - with other values including 4, 6, 20 and 40. These are all quite similar to the original differentials possible - which ranged from 2 to 251 or so - but with more points for major locations to the original owner - and a compressed ratio between sides that never exceeds 10. It means you have to earn the score by capturing more places of significance. It also means you get credit for what you own if it is significant - all those 0's and 1's for big places are gone.
To all this add that monsoon effects are added where appropriate everywhere they apply.
This process is nearly completed, really it is!
RE: RHS Design Theory: Location Update Report
Posted: Sat Dec 08, 2012 7:45 pm
by el cid again
Babo, slot 1190, is correctly located on the map. It incorrectly has no resources or local light industry. It incorrectly
has no airfield and little airfield potential. And it incorrectly has no Dutch garrison.
Babo was the end of the KLM commercial air route - and the only commercial airfield in Dutch New Guinea. In 1941,
British engineers improved the airfield to military standards for contingency use, and from then on, a small Dutch
base force was there. It suffered casualties in a bombing run by Mavis flying boats early in the war.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Version 3.0 Release Plan
Posted: Sun Dec 09, 2012 8:30 am
by el cid again
The new release will be called RHS 3.0
because the changes in victory points change the nature of the contest,
because the changes modeling coal and other kinds of power are now comprehensive,
and because for the first time we have consistent displacement data for ships.
Taken together this is a different ballgame, and justifies a version incriment.
While we will test and address eratta, I think this is the last major form for Level 1 RHS (using the stock map system).
There will follow some documentation changes.
These reflect
changes to the construction of rail lines which will appear in out year pwhexe.dat files (mostly - we lose two hexes in the early files in one case)
and the addition of two plane types for KLM - the oldest airline in the world, and the first to run intercontinental routes (and we also add its terminus location properly - with an airstrip which is rated 0 in stock - at Bobo on Dutch New Guinea)
Next will come the installer
for those who get files separately, only aircraft, group, location, ship and class files will have to retransmit.
Then will come a revised set of pwhexe.dat files.
I am validation testing the file set now.
But it is safe to release documentation - so it follows at once.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Seasonal Construction
Posted: Sun Dec 09, 2012 8:31 am
by el cid again
Spring 1942
Reactivation of minor RR on New Caledonia (1 hex NW from Noumea)
Monsoon 1942
Fall 1942
Winter 1942
Completion of Iranian National RR spur (2 hexes E from Abadan/Khorramshahr)
Completion of ALCAN highway as pioneer road (segments of 10 trail hexes, 8 trail hexes, and upgrading of 4 winter tail hexes to year around trail in 3 segments between existing road and rail lines in Canada and Alaska)
Spring 1943
Upgrading of Whitehorse & Yukon RR to main line completed (2 hexes NW from Skagway)
Monsoon 1943
Road along Burma-Siam RR line completed (5 hexes SE from Ye)
Winter 1943
Completion of Burma-Siam RR (5 hexes SE from Ye)
Completion of ALCAN highway as secondary road (segments of 10, 8 & 4 trail hexes upgraded to minor road)
Spring 1944
Upgrading of Bengal & Assam RR to main line completed (15 hexes from existing line near Jessore to Ledo including major river bridging; 8 hex spur to Chittagong)
Monsoon 1944
Ledo Road completed to Myitkyina (upgrading 4 trail hexes to minor road)
Winter 1944
Ledo Road completed to existing Burma Road near Lashio (upgrading 3 more trail hexes between Myitkyina and Lashio)
Spring 1945
Completion of the Longhai Railway to Tanshui
Fall 1945
Completion of Sumatra RR (aka 'the second death railway')
Winter 1945 and Spring 1946 and Summer 1946 (OPTIONAL)
Completion of Burma-Yunnan RR
Upgrading ALCAN to primary road (25 minor road hexes upgraded IF construction not suspended as IRL)
Completion of the Longhai Railway to Lanzhou
Completion of Sovietskaya Gavan Railway (from Komsomolsk na Amur)
Special Case: The Copper River RR is present in ALL versions of the pwhex files. It runs from Cordova, Alaska to Kennicot, a wholly undeveloped dot location. This RR was abandoned in 1938 when the copper mines were closed due to low copper prices. Other copper mines were reopened in WWII (for example in Michigan and in Montana). This copper mine can be reopened IF an Allied player moves engineer to the dot location along with lots of supplies – in which case the RR will function. The Million Dollar Bridge remained in tact until the 1964 earthquake. This location and RR may be ignore by any player who does not want to use them – and NOTHING will move along it – since there will be no production unless the damaged resources are repaired.
Special Case: The RR tunnel to Whittier Alaska is considered completed if you repair the port (it starts at zero). Because there is no way to have the rail line incomplete and still run its route - we simply have the Whittier hex not function as a port unless you fix it. There is an engineer unit in the hex to do that.
RE: RHS Design Theory: KNIL Section of Art Cross Reference
Posted: Sun Dec 09, 2012 8:43 am
by el cid again
This material reposted after significant updating at the end of the thread.
RE: RHS Design Theory: Energy in China
Posted: Sun Dec 09, 2012 10:15 am
by fcharton
ORIGINAL: el cid again
It appears that there is a river feeding the Yellow River called the Yan Ho
Yes, that's how Yenan got its name (Yan in pinyin, is Yen in Wade Giles). The Yan river (Ho=he means river) passes through Yenan, too (no suprise, pretty much every major chinese city in the north is build upon a river, that's what the Yin and Yang in their names are all about : Yin, side to the dark, ie south bank, Yang, side to the sun, north bank)
ORIGINAL: el cid again
On this river - between Yenan and the big river - is a city called Yanchang.
No, on three counts.
- The river isn't big, or, rather, like most rivers on the loess plateau, it is only big when flooded. Here a pic of the Yan at Yan'an.
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/med ... ina-in-the
- Yenan is on the river, the place you refer to is just downstream
- Yanchang is not the name of a city but that of a county (xian in chinese), modern maps give the county capital as Qilicun Zhen. Zhen means township, Qilicun : the village seven leagues away. As the name implies, we are certainly not talking about a city. In 2002, I'm told the whole county (3000 sq km) had a population of 150 000, and this is after the chinese population tripled, and those northern regions were developped under Mao. In 1941, I doubt it had more than a few thousand peasants there.
ORIGINAL: el cid again
It also appears THIS is the actual location of the oilfleld, and refinery company (Shanxxi Yanchang) - which dates to 1906.
I could find a modern company, named Yanchang petroleum, and there certainly was some oil there. But the lack of roads, canals, railways and other transportation means (which would exist if some serious oil exploitation existed there) suggest that production was certainly very low.
And this doesn't make Yenan (or Yanchang) a port, which would allow for tankers to load oil and fuel and deliver it up or downstream on ports on the Yellow River. Once more, I would be very prudent about the navigability of the Yellow River.
Francois