Matrix Games Forums

[8D]Sorry, but I have proof that Nagumo wasn't in the conservatory[:D]....

ORIGINAL: BLUESBOB

Nagumo did it in the conservatory with a candlestick.

The Japanese knew that it was a crappy plan. A really horribly bad plan that required perfect timing on their ships, perfect execution of all searches, perfect accuracy from their bombers, and perfect stupidity on the part of the OpFor, should any OpFor be present at all (which, it was assumed, would not be the case). Despite the fact that everybody knew it was a crappy plan, they attempted to execute the plan. It was rife with flaws, used woefully inadequate force, and was intolerant of any kind of error at all.

I may be mispeaking but IMHO it may be a cultural thing at work here AND one that manifested itself on quite a number of occasions in the war. Though a lively discussion might precede the commitment of a plan to paper amongst staff officers; once the plan had made it to the writing of orders stage, changes usually didn't happen. An example would be the failed attempt to reinforce Guadalcanal with the 38th division in Nov 42. Though the planned BB bombardment of Henderson Field didn't happen the Japanese just kept forging ahead with the plan even though the whole thing really hinged on that bombardment. The result was a disaster for the IJN and the IJA and their Guadalcanal Campaign as a whole.

I give up. *gasps* I am worn out. I don't have the endurance I used to...

*rolls over, plays dead*

I may be mispeaking but IMHO it may be a cultural thing at work here AND one that manifested itself on quite a number of occasions in the war.

I agree. And I think that an open eyed review of how historians, both Japanese and western, have treated those IJN commanders who did use their brains and show any flexibility in the face of altered circumstances indicates that Nagumo is in the "damned if you do damned if you don't" pickle.

After all, he's taken a drubbing for not hanging around Pearl Harbor on 7/8 December 1941, even though he could not realistically have accomplished substantially more than he already had. And Adm. Kurita has been basically accused of cowardice for turning back in the Samar battle of Leyte, even though (a) his objectives were nowhere near accomplishable, and (b) he'd already lost about half of his immediate command to one "Taffey's Worth" of TBFs, 2 DDs, and a pesty DE.

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I agree. And I think that an open eyed review of how historians, both Japanese and western, have treated those IJN commanders who did use their brains and show any flexibility in the face of altered circumstances indicates that Nagumo is in the "damned if you do damned if you don't" pickle.

After all, he's taken a drubbing for not hanging around Pearl Harbor on 7/8 December 1941, even though he could not realistically have accomplished substantially more than he already had. And Adm. Kurita has been basically accused of cowardice for turning back in the Samar battle of Leyte, even though (a) his objectives were nowhere near accomplishable, and (b) he'd already lost about half of his immediate command to one "Taffey's Worth" of TBFs, 2 DDs, and a pesty DE.

Well ... Yamamoto was pissed that Nagumo didn't "hang around" Pearl to finish the job, and Genda Minoru was mortified that he overstated the extent of damage in his afternoon report. What his staff (including Genda and Yamaguchi Tamon) was urging was a second strike against the naval facilities (drydocks and sub base) and especially the fuel oil storage tanks. Given that the BBs were sunk (albeit for a time), the Pac Fleet was still operative and also given that the CVs were still out there and there were more BBs in the Atlantic Fleet and yet more of both in the yards, Nagumo's failure to criple PH as a "fleet base", in order to gain a few more months for Japanese naval dominance, is indefensible. In his defence, I gotta say that good old Nagumo Chuichi was a charter member of the "fleet faction" (as opposed to Yamamoto's "treaty faction") and a card-carrying member of the Japanese chapter of the "gun club". His touchstone and holy grail was the capital ship, and once those were taken out of consideration, he was a happy man. Although Nagumo was a reasonably sufficient naval officer, he may have been intellectually challenged by the very recent revolution in naval technology; which had not been adequately dealt with by the Naval General Staff in terms of IJN doctrine.

JWE

Well ... Yamamoto was pissed that Nagumo didn't "hang around" Pearl to finish the job, and Genda Minoru was mortified that he overstated the extent of damage in his afternoon report. What his staff (including Genda and Yamaguchi Tamon) was urging was a second strike against the naval facilities (drydocks and sub base) and especially the fuel oil storage tanks.

And they were incorrect to urge that strike for several reasons. All Japanese accounts note that the flak was intense and accurate, and subsequent raids would have found the flak to be even more intense and more accurate. Moreover, most of the "other targets" were not within Kido Butai's capability to attack. So you'd end up battering the fine edge of the sword (by losing pilots and planes) in the accomplishment of results of dubious strategic value.

The fuel "farms" for example were neither soft targets nor the sorts of things prone to spectaular fireworks. They were in double hulled steel containers each surrounded by a huge earthen berm, with foam fire suppressers and water sprinkler coolers. Their contents: bunker grade oil -- at the ambient temperatures, roughly the consistency of cold hot fudge (or roofing tar) and incapable of being set alight short of incendiaries (which Kido Butail did not carry).

So you'd have needed lots of very big HE bombs very accurately placed to burst the containers, and then lots more of incendiaries to light the fuel on fire. To what end? To deny a bunch of already-sunk battleships access to fuel. The USN CVs, all five of them, could EASILY have been supplied by less than 1/2 % of the US west coast tanker fleet, so their mobility would have been unaffected.

The other targets weren't particularly vulnerable either. As the USSBS showed even massed bombs from a typical B-17 group on densely packed shops like the ball bearing plants around Schweinfurt could not easily damage machine tools. You basically had to hit the machine-tools directly with the explosive. Kido Butai did not have that sort of accuracy, nor the ability to deploy anything remotely like even on B17 group's worth of HE in a patterned bombing attack.

Kido Butai did on 7 December 1941 that which it was best at. Sinking ships and shooting up aircraft. Nagumo's withdrawal was the correct course of action given the intel available at the time (no US CVs in harbor, location "somewhere in the Pacific but otherwise unknown").

Given that the BBs were sunk (albeit for a time), the Pac Fleet was still operative and also given that the CVs were still out there and there were more BBs in the Atlantic Fleet and yet more of both in the yards, Nagumo's failure to criple PH as a "fleet base", in order to gain a few more months for Japanese naval dominance, is indefensible.

That's Fuchida's and Genda's spin. They were generous in heaping abuse on Nagumo in their postwar tomes. These accounts were self-serving and designed to make the locals feel good. "We coulda won that and shoulda but for that notoriously unreliable Nagumo." Easy to blame the dead guy. Especially since (a) he was nominally in charge for the subsequent debacle at Midway, and (b) no one was ever going to blame Yamamoto for anything.

Pac fleet's CVs and escorts would have remained operative and there was not a thing that Nagumo could have done to change that other than to sink the CVs. And they weren't around to be sunk. For all Nagumo could know, they were but a few hours away, massed together, and preparing to launch airstrikes against his aircraft-depleted and fuel-shy ships.

hijack, hijack...call the forum police!!! [;)]

I guess more on topic and in response to myself;

The trials and tribulations of operational imperatives will never really be known except to the participants themselves. All we have to go on are the analyses of many disparate authors who each have their own particular "take" on things.

Situational Analysis will always find fault in the conduct of an operation, no matter how successful. Imagine its content in the event of failure. I think every Officer of any service should have Clauswitz's admonishment tatooed on the inside of their eyelids so it is the last thing they see when they go to sleep.

On topic, though, regardless of Nagumo Chuichi's faults, or Kuritas' for that matter, the gamer is in control here. Wasting your assets in support of a Hakku Ichiu philosophy does not play well. Both sides are limited by economic and technical considerations, Japan more than the US, but this does not compel one side or the other to make bonehead decisions. Given that, the "strict" historical imperitive goes out the window. We all know how to climb the ladder in the Solomons. We all know how to "bypass" in New Guinea. We all know that the US naval build-up will be immense and practically invincible in late 44.

So ... there seems to little relevance to "strict" historicity after turn 1. Each gamer is going to develop an operational thrust and tempo based on their own proclivities and skill, that has nothing whatever to do with anything the Naval General Staff did or said in the 1930s and 40s. All that "historical accuracy" can do in a game is to insure that ships are named and armed properly, ground and air units have the proper mix of weapons, personnel and equipment, and that a rational system of providing for a national build-up is defined. Beyond that, it's up to us. We are, after all, Hirohito or Roosevelt.

JWE

Hi, I think all we can really hope for is the game provides the same Operational limitations and unit capabilities. I think it is totaly incorrect to look at what did or did not take (other then to arrive at capabilites) because the entire object of the game is to allow new Operations to occur (not recreate the actual Operations)

I would hope that should a player attempt to recreate the actual Operations that the results were close to historical but when a player "invents" a new war we should not instantly post "that never happened" what we should examine is "could that have happened"

Many problems have their origin when players base operations on game limitions or exploits.

I do not subscribe to the "if I was not supposed to the game should not allow it" because in everyday life we limit ourselves. Automobiles can exceed 100mph but most people obey speed limits because they have been taught to regulate themselves. If the game limits have been explained (and they have been posted since a year before game release and after) then these limitions should become part of the players understanding of the game.

There are many things a person can do that are not prevented by anything other then a warning. "Don't drink Draino" When you ignore the warnings and proceed I don't think it proper to post the game produces unrealistic results.

WITP is not about recreating history. It should when set up with same forces in same situation produce plausable results but they will not be exactly historical. when Operations in game have no historic counter part the results should be plausable. This will only occur is the data that is used to represent historic units and equipment is accurate. Much of this is opinion. (well meaning opinion) and can be edited by each player to match their opinion. The game engine only has to take this data and produce plausable results.

A bug is when the engine does not work according to design. It is not a matter of opinion. A bug cannot be used to prove a point about the engine other then it is not working according to design. Bugs must be fixed. This is not a matter of opinion.
Every bug ever posted where a before save that reproduced the bug was provided and the steps needed to reproduce decribed has been part of a patch to eliminate it. (not always successfully)

The main problem with a bug that remain is simple. They do not occur in everygame and the programers working on fixing it have not been able to reproduce it.

If we do not know what causes a bug we cannot fix it. Sometimes the problem manifested by a bug have no direct connection to it's origin. (a problem in one routine results in a bug that appears somewhere else and it is hard to trace. An exampel would be a parent LCU/Airgroup that experiances problems connected to a fragment somewhere on map
This could be linked to replacements or supply or movement or a host of other items that link the parts somewhere. Impossbile to trace without a before and after save that reproduces and directions on what exactly the player did that produced the bug.
We have had bugs discovered that werre only producable if a player entered his keystrokes in a certain order. (players that created TF and then set destination and retire don't retire orders before adding ships had a bug that players who created TF and added ships first did not. It was very difficult to track and repair before the exact order of entry was understood.)

OK I wandered off topic but I want to be understood that WITP results produced by bugs are not considered to be historic. If the engine works anyone should be able to tweek the editor into producing their version of historical results.

Very few players play "historically" we do this because we do not operate in the fog of war. we may not know where the enemy is located but before turn 1 we understand exactly what his ultimate war/scenario objective are . We know (or think we know) exactly his strengths and weakness. On dec 7 1941 no one planning operations for Japan or western Alliance knew a major battle for the Solomons would occur. every player in WITP knows that it is a very likely occurance and plans accordingly. The result is the battle when it occurs is much larger in scope then the historic. In WITP a single unprepared USMC division is unlikely to succeed in capturing Lunga. In WITP most Japanese players are actively building a defense barrier. In actual war the great Japanese base at Truk in Aug 1942 was not built near what it will be in WITP by May 1942. (Truk was an illusion in actual war. Japan had not commited the resources towards building it up and had the US not invaded Solomons it is unlikely they would have commited those resources before 1943. In WITP Truk is alloted a massive amount towards improvement in dec 41)

So building Truk in early war is unhistoric. but Japan did make a massive improvemnet later so question is could they have done so early on? The massive commitment (by comparsion with history) Japan makes in South/Central Pacific in WITP is not historical. The Japanese did not even think of defense in concrete terms prior to Apr 42 (Doolittle) and the historic response was not a major effort towards base building but a major offensive Operation. (most Japanese players in WITP do not contemplate major offensive operations after Mid 1942)

I willl not dwell on China/India/Soviets because these have OOB and other factors that produce results. I measure WITP results mainly on what the game produces in the Pacific from May 42 to late 43 and then after 1943. In my experiance the results are on the whole historical or historically plausable.

I would vote for being as accurate on deciding unit characteristics and capablities. But bear in mind often opinions on these differ. (But we do have the editor) So then the interaction of the combat and other routines needs to be "historically accurate"

I would not alter anything to produce "balance" ("Balance? we don't need no stinkin balance")

ORIGINAL: Nomad

I hope I don't get scorched too badly here. I thought that when the leaders of the first IJN Midway strike returned they wanted a second strike. What I remember is that Nagumo ordered the anti-ship aircraft on board to be armed for a ground attack on Midway. Then part way through that rearming came the reports of USN ships. This is where, I think, Nagumo ended up with some anti-ship armed aircraft and some ground attack armed aircraft. The initial idea was to rearm the aircraft on the CVs while the first strike force was landing. Then, the second ground attack would launch while the first group would be rearmed as anti-ship attacking reserve. Since no reports of USN ships had been received, it probably seemed like a good idea. Of course, the Midway based aircraft attacks and the sightings in the middle of all this really messed things up. [:D]

BTW, if you look at secion 2.0 of the manual, you fine the term "simulation" used to describe WitP. [8D]

You shouldn't get "scorched" for your observation..., the only obvious error is that the leader of the first Midway attack radioed his observation that a "second strike was necessary" as he was leaving Midway, not after he returned. Also pointed out in your observations is a truth SHATTERED SWORD made obvious but no one seems to have picked up and run with. KIDO BUTAI could only launch half it's A/C in any one strike. Even against PH with no opposition expected, there were TWO seperate strikes. Sorta makes the "strike coordination rules" in the game look rather unjustified. KB never launched more than about 180 A/C in a strike, even when all 6 CV's were available.

Hi, Except in WITP an airphase is 8 hours and KB could always launch all it's AC in 8 hours. In fact at a place like Midway in June 42 it could have launched and recovered and armed all it's aircraft several times in 8 hours. (And still have PM airphase)
In WITP a "strike" is everything a CV TF or airfield could ready launch and recover in just 1 phase. WITP has alimit of 1 non naval strike per day that really has no historical foundation. (It is a player requested limit)

ORIGINAL: Mogami

Hi, Except in WITP an airphase is 8 hours and KB could always launch all it's AC in 8 hours. In fact at a place like Midway in June 42 it could have launched and recovered and armed all it's aircraft several times in 8 hours. (And still have PM airphase)
In WITP a "strike" is everything a CV TF or airfield could ready launch and recover in just 1 phase. WITP has alimit of 1 non naval strike per day that really has no historical foundation. (It is a player requested limit)

A rational observation. So based on the fact that the single most effective carrier airstrike ever launched (the US at Midway) had coordination problems, ALL US Carrier Airstrikes are limited by the game? There don't seem to have been any problems at Coral Sea (except in finding the right target), but the Allies are hit with a "rule" making "lack of coordination" a permanant fact of life in much of the game. Could we also have a rule stating that "the most potent portion" of the Allies "uncordinated airstrikes" gets in clean and uncontested and achieves "miraculous results"? That would also seem justified by taking the Midway example out of context.

OK..., I'm pulling your chain a bit here. I've just always found this "rule" pretty hard to swallow. Saying one side is physically incapable of doing what the other side can do with no other justification than a single example doesn't really "ring true". Now Japanese carrier A/C WERE capable of launching strikes at longer ranges than Allied ones (provided their pitiful "scouting doctrine" gave them a "spot")..., and I have no problem with that. But the "co-ordination rule" has a certain "fan-boy/balancing" flavor that brings up my "gag" reflex. Everybody had some trouble with air strike coordination. The bigger the strike, the larger the problems..., even if the mission was only CAP. Might be one answer to the "large air-to-air" combat results being skewed problem..., as well as the "massed bomber raid effectiveness" problems.

Hi, If I had to vote I would make the Japanese use the same formula the Allies do rather then have the Allies use what the Japanese currently use. I would also make it more leader dependant as opposed to a national charactoristic.


However in WITP I have had Japanese strikes all piecrmeal and USN strikes of the massive type. (usally my Japanese are piecemenal and opponents USN are well delivered and my USN strikes are screwed up while opponents Japanese are massive....the game hates me.)

However in WITP I have had Japanese strikes all piecrmeal and USN strikes of the massive type. (usally my Japanese are piecemenal and opponents USN are well delivered and my USN strikes are screwed up while opponents Japanese are massive....the game hates me.)

You must have the same version of the game I have.... Mine also seems to think that my fingers touching the mouse is automatically grounds to proceed to the far end of the probablity table and jump up and down on the law of averages.

So if its historical then there is no grand first turn movement or Zero bonus ?

If we have all the historical senarios we need, why cant we have one fun scenario that isnt historical but makes the game less lopsided?
A scenario where it would be fun to play either side and was fair for both sides.
Each side would have an equal chance of winning.
Playing the big campaign must be fun for the Jap player, but how fun is it later in the war when The allies are overwhelming him with greater numbers of everything?
Many players quit PBEM games as soon as they start losing and know its hopless.

I have no problem with someone making fictional scenarios.
In fact, I would love to play this game with random fictional maps and both sides have equal strength right from the start. Kind of like playing Space Strategy games, like Galactic Civilizations.
We always will have many historical scenarios that are accurate, which I love, but it wont hurt to have something not so historical as long as both sides have equal chances of winning.

If we have all the historical senarios we need, why cant we have one fun scenario that isnt historical but makes the game less lopsided?
A scenario where it would be fun to play either side and was fair for both sides.

ABSOLUTELY NOTHING would be wrong if we had ANY historical scenarios. That's what this thread is all about. We want the BASIC scenarios and game to be historically accurate (even if that means the Japanese are going to get the crap beaten out of them eventually).. .. Then the folks that want some kind of physical "ballance" to the sides can USE THE EDITOR to make whatever fantasy trips their trigger. No one is saying we can't have both; EXCEPT those who want the BASIC game and scenarios to be "balanced". Once you corrupt the BASIC data, everything you build on it is corrupted....

Ugggggggggghhhhhhhhhh. Something resembling history would be nice to build on. After that, add any M&Ms or Lucky Charms anybody wants.

Hi, Except in WITP an airphase is 8 hours and KB could always launch all it's AC in 8 hours. In fact at a place like Midway in June 42 it could have launched and recovered and armed all it's aircraft several times in 8 hours. (And still have PM airphase)

Hi

I do not think that assessment, that Kido Butai could launch and recover all its airraft several times in 8 hours, is remotely correct. Even if Kido Butai did not have to cycle any CAP whatsoever, for example in a training exercise, you're looking at about 1.5-2 hours to arm and spot a 60 plane strike, and another 2-3 hours to land, rearm, and respot the strike. The Japanese did not do flight-deck arming so every plane that lands has to cycle down to the hangar decks for rearming and maintenance. Apart from the Zekes, all the a.c had to be carted from below decks to flight deck one plane per elevator at a time.

So maybe a given CV could cycle its complete 60 plane complement 2.3 times in 8 hours. Much less if it has to cycle CAP as well. You'd have one exhausted pool of service personnel by the end of that second launch and your op loss rate would climb during the second launch and soar if you made an effort to work in a third complete cycle of the CVs a.c.

If the game is allowing Japanese CVs to launch their entire complement in one coordinated package or conduct more than 2 launch cycles per 8 hour phase then you have perhaps identified one of the key reasons why WitP combat is so bloody bloody and why airstrikes are so unrealistically large.

So if its historical then there is no grand first turn movement or Zero bonus ?

Not necessarily. The "extended Move" on the first turn IS necessary to put Kido Butai
in range of PH. The game generally puts it in the wrong place, and it doesn't pay the fuel costs needed to get there, but that particular "bonus move" is historical. It was made through the veritable "wasteland" of the North Pacific in December to avoid the possibility of being spotted during the trip. When a player uses it to take Kido Butai into the more heavily travelled waters to the South, THEN it starts getting "ahistorical".
And when it is used to make all sorts of landings all over the place days or weeks ahead of schedule, then it gets abusive.

As to the "Zero Bonus", the basic concept is not "ahistoric" Virtually none of the Allied Pilots that the Japanese encountered during the first couple months of the war were prepared for the performance capabilities of the Zero (or the Oscar) in a "Dogfight". Far too many had to learn "the hard way" that you "don't Dogfight with the nimble Jap fighters". Once they learned, they could start to "even the playing field" by avoiding what the Japanese did well and making them engage in different forms of combat. Problem in the game is that many see the Zero as still having a "bonus" even when the "Zero Bonus" evaporates..., but far too much ink has been spilled on that to get it started again.