Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Cid,

I think that your points on the planes are, generally, good but there are a few flaws:


REPLY: And one omission: I should have said your opposition to the ASW Kate was flawed - because it is the ONLY CARRIER ASW plane! And YOU have ASW carriers which use it in EOS (vice the Ki-76 in other scenarios). It has MAD and you WANT this plane - trust me.

1. All of this upgrading etc costs supplies... supplies you want us not to waste and which I'm trying to conserve by delaying upgrading until September 42 when we can do a single upgrade of Ki-36s ( and others) instead of two upgrades ( costing twice as much supply).




2. If we have planes in the pool then we might as well use them up so long as we can find niches in which they can survive and achieve goals.

REPLY: You are not considering pilot costs. Nor the efficiency of fewer types. Different types are not nearly as easy to manage. Even so, there are niches: I mentioned training units - which if used as such (and not doing so is gamey - and probably unwise for pilot skill reasons) are both survivable and have no need for line planes. I usually use civil air transport the same way briefly - downgrade to Ki-34s and never use them in combat - UNTIL I have more better transports than I can use. [This was historical practice on both sides early war].


3. The strategic strike model focuses on number of bombs dropped, not their weight such that planes carrying many bombs are more effective than planes carrying fewer but heavier bombs.

REPLY: To the extent that is so, it is gamey to exploit it. The Ki-36 carries the smallest bombs in the game - 5 of them. If you are not attacking a light target - it is not permitted under the RHS general house rule: a real commander would not use it as a strategic bomber (your term). We don't do things like that. I don't think this is as so as you think it is - I tampered with the bombs. In RHS these tiny bombs have very little value except against soft targets. And the value 9 is incorrect: it is only 5. [verified]


E.g. The Ki-32 carries 9 bombs and is thus three times as effective at resource attacks as the Ki-21. Sure the Ki-21 has more range and more durability BUT over China there are more than enough bases within 6 ( or even 8 hexes) to make the Ki-32 ( of which we have about 500, including the pools) a really viable bomber for the anti-resource campaign. Obviously we should expand production of the Ki-21 BUT we shouldn't do so and think it is the answer to all our problems. The Ki48, 32 and 36 all have excellent niche roles, albeit mostly over China.


4. Ki-36 and Ki-51 being junk.I have 93 Ki 36s in the pool and 60 Ki-51s. I won't upgrade from them to Kates and Vals ( which are rare) until the Ki-36s and Ki-51s are used up.

REPLY: I want priority for naval bombers. But I want an IJA dangerous to ships: here is the deal: I will upgrade these planes when I think I have naval bombers to spare for them. I also want IJA pilots to survive. You have over 40% of our airpower - and I don't want you to run out of pilots as soon as I will.

I am just arguing that you need to be open to the benefits of the older planes in China and other subsidiary theatres in the first few months while production of the necessary replacements is ramped up.

REPLY: We must use some planes (notably Ki-27) far longer than I like. I want you to optimize to minimize that time.


6. As regards the Me-264... I think your maths as regards comparing the Me-264 to a Ki-21 is flawed. A single Me-264 costs 90 HI ( 4 engines + 1 airframe x 18 HI ). A single twin-engined plane costs 54 HI ( 2 engines + 1 airframe x 18 HI). So the Me-264 only costs 66% more than a Ki-21. It doesn't mean that one should immediately stop the Ki-21 obviously though but it does mean that the Me-264 isn't quite as expensive, relatively speaking, as you seem to believe.

REPLY: Per the manual, your math is flawed. It says the ONLY cost of an aircraft is engines. Engines indeed cost 18 HI each. Airframes cost 18, 36 or 72 HI - period. No airframe cost. So it say.


Your analysis of Me-264 production vs fighters is flawed. A fighter costs 36 HI ( 18 for the engine, 18 for the airframe) so a single Me 264 costs the same as 2.5 fighters, not 4. As to the 115 planes per month. That was illustrative of the relative cost of an Me-264 vs a CV so as to provide context for the discussion. It wasn't intended to justify production of 120 per month .

REPLY: I would prefer your analysis to be correct - and I disagree with the Matrix system. They refused to use the system I gave them when WITP was proposed - or they used it and grossly simplified it. They ignore lots of costs in the aircraft cycle. Even so - a full blown system would make the ratio WORSE than 4:1!



8. Transports.
Looks like we are in substantial agreement as re: focussing on a mix of L2s and G5s for the army... I understand what you are saying about using Mavis and Emilys flying boats as extempore transports so as to maintain the maximum recon capability BUT there is a 42 plane flying boat unit. Surely that could be equipped with the transport version as it is massive overkill for a patrol unit. As to all the other units, sure, maximise your patrol capability. That makes sense.


REPLY: Note in RHS a TRANSPORT FLYING BOAT DOES have recon capability. What it lacks is armament. [Curiously - they sometimes depth charge submarines! So do wholly unarmed recon planes! Some code. These may be rationialized as improvised attacks.] The transport flying boats actually are unique: they may deliver troops or supplies to an undeveloped airfield! They have great range as well. If they were only cheaper - or if I only had more airborne troops...

9. Floatplane fighters...
Well every time you lose a Pete you lose a 70 Exp pilot... Its your navy you can do with it what you wish... I prefer to risk a bit of minor damage to a few DDs than continue to lose my precious pilots in this way. You draw the line in a different place, that's fine. it is your navy after all.

REPLY: DDs are not pawns for Japan. They are the minimum "major warship" for cause. And who says I am protecting DDs? I am protecting capital ships, transports laden with IJA troops, even aircraft carriers: stuff like that.


10. Kamikazes.
LOL! So under no circumstances would you use kamis EVEN in the face of uebercap where your only chance of getting a hit was to sneak a few Oscar IIs in above their CAP ceiling and dive down into their elevators?

REPLY: Well - that was Adm Yamamoto's position. It was not an option while he lived. Perhaps AFTER I am killed we can consider it! [I AM Adm Yamamoto - so we can tell.]


Well, in that case I think we might see the army becoming the kamikaze wing of Imperial Japan in 1944 . I love kamis... Obviously I prefer conventional attacks so long as they produce results. Once they stop producing acceptable results though I will switch over to kamis.

REPLY: I posted that somewhere already. But it is foolish use of pilots and planes (you realize they don't come back, right?).


11. Fighters.

Ok I'm quoting from V6.15 ( latest version I have). The Ki-44 III is listed as having a top speed of 394. The A7M2 is listed as having a top speed of 390. Sure the A7M2 has a 2 mph advantage in cruise speed but surely it would make more sense to base air intercepts on top speed as I would imagine most planes trying to intercept another plane making for a precious CV would use top speed for the intercept.

REPLY: Oddly - code considers cruise speed a factor. And possibly rightly so: a flight being intercepted may not know it is being intercepted, so it is at cruise speed. The faster that is, the less likely it is to be intercepted. I can't read the code - I only know I was told (by Mike Wood I think) it matters. I am guessing how.


Maybe you can explain the A2A model a bit more as I always thought top speed was the most important thing. Now you seem to be saying it is cruising speed ( which seems a bit unlikely to me).


REPLY: Well - I posted just that - and got corrected (partially).

Ground combat issues:



13. Aleutians.
Ok, we agree on this.

REPLY: Except YOU should do it! Northern Command is YOUR flank IMHO. And it gives your naval planes a job. And you love strategic bombing - from the North you can do it.


14. Pearl.
It appears we agree here. The only question is whether you charge into the guns on December 11th or go for the more gradual approach of taking Hilo and Kona and blockading, running down supplies and the defending coastal defences with concentrated bomber raids before landing sometime in February or March.

REPLY: It is necessary to have all nearby air bases and ports. Too many problems if you don't.


15. Oz.

Not to mention I NEVER will build a base in NORTHERN Austraila that the Allies can use (when captured) to bomb Java.

I think this is short-sighted. The Allies will be able to build these bases up with their engineers + bulldozers in almost no time when they take those bases.


REPLY: That is what Joe says. It is too bad - and a flaw. Doesen't matter - every week of production unmolested and shipping unmolested matters to us. It is unwise to build up bases for the enemy. This is my fundamental principle:
most of what we take that we don't need is NOT built up - we just hurt them retaking it - AFTER which they START to build things.


OTOH if we take some of these bases we can unleash our strategic bombers on their resources, repair shipyards and HI.


REPLY: We have the range. Bases are not a big problem. And the one thing we don't want is enemy bases in range of Java.

16. China.
The vital strategic goal of clearing the rail-lines can be achieved once Chinese troops begin to starve and troops begin returning from India


REPLY: You don't understand this. This is a fundamental priority. It grossly frees up shipping and it grossly messes up an enemy strategy focused on sinking transport ships. You can not achieve this soon enough. Soon enough would be about Dec 10, 1941 in my view. [Deliberate exaggeration - but you get the idea]

( minus the troops left there as a garrison force... not all that many troops since they aren't expected to hold India, just conduct a fighting retreat to Ceylon and the southern coastal ports and then be evacuated from there... while Me-264s bomb as many of the resources as possible.


Sid, I'll post an economic analysis later... I will assume a 50/50 split initially with aircraft production split 50/50 between us as totting up who was producing a given plane and using it would just be too much of a headache on a per turn basis.

REPLY: I start with a bigger air force. I get more additional air units. 50/50 is not going to work. I will send you the data (roughly - it is CHS era when I created it).

We must use some planes (notably Ki-27) far longer than I like. I want you to optimize to minimize that time.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Sid,

1. ASW Kates... Ok, good point. In any case it is a navy choice to make.

Does this mean you do not want to run ARMY ASW forces? That you want me to run Grand Escort Command? EOS assumes this formation dates to the start of the war - and that it is allocated closer to adequate resources. It is actually (in USN and RN theory) an OFFENSIVE naval command - but most people think it is defensive. This command HUNTS enemy submarines.

2. Training etc. Precisely, once the Ki-36s etc have fulfilled their niche role ( strategic bombing over China)

REPLY: This is not permitted. I pointed out above it violates the primary house rule: real commanders would not use it as a strategic bomber - so we cannot. Further - I tried to say it won't be as effective as other bombers would be. I am skeptical of the whole idea of "strategic bombers" in China. But if you are going to try it might it be germane to point out we have almost no plane the Chinese CAN shoot down often EXCEPT the Ki-36? Moot: we can't use it in that role. But still - I don't think we should use it in that role if we could. I do not see any niche role for the Ki-36 - but if you want one here it is: two units in your rear - Korea and Japan - fly tiny numbers of this plane. Central Command Unit and Korean Command Unit. They are supposed to patrol coasts - and they can do that. I always turn them into Kates.

I would intend to send them to one of the training centres

REPLY: That is allowed and possible - but rather silly given the vast numbers of much better Ki-32/30s we have - and are trying to get rid of EXCEPT for the training role. If you have enough in inventory - why not use the better plane? Seems a no brainer. And this better plane ended production before the war began. The Ki-36 is mostly a spotter plane - and also a trainer - and neither is allowed to us as such (with some wierd exceptions - CHS politics before my time - and now a tradition - you get these few training units - none of them with the Ki-36). It also is used by two "ground support units" - as TACTICAL bombers - and was almost utterly useless outside China in this role. Inside China it was marginal and hurt badly by the Chinese.


( I will be planning the invasions of DEI/Malaysia/Burma etc with a view to creating many of these training centres) where I will try to train them to as close as 99 Exp as possible.

REPLY: Joe says he spends MOST of his time training pilots. I disapprove and think we should ban the practice. This is not the way the game is to be played. Further - it breaks a major RHS technical mechanism:

we LOWERED experience ON PURPOSE as a device to be more realistic and to reduce air air combat losses. No designer ever intended the exp to be as high as it got anyway - and the entire WITP system and the RHS reforms of it are at risk if we get gamey in this way. You cannot evaluate a "typical" unit UNLESS its experience is based on its - experience! Further - history suggests that focus on excessive training DEFEATED JNAF - and a EOS "reform" is to REDUCE JNAF training by half - doubling output.

They are the sentai and chutai I plan to convert to the Me-264 first.

REPLY: Again - this is a total misapplication of the system. We are supposed to be commanders - not tactical trainers - doing what Joe says he does - which he also says is no fun. IRL you would not run a major offensive of this sort and NOT commit major squadrons - which then were used as training units - only to turn those into your first line units later. I am not interested in that sort of play - and I suggest we post this publically in some form. It may be the WITP traditions have become entirely too gamey for words and people have forgotten what simulation means?

I think we see eye to eye on this more than you initially thought. Use them in their niche and then send them for training while upgrading the line units ASAP.

REPLY: If you contemplate Ki-36 for ANY mission at all - we do not see eye to eye. It ought to be tied for first place on the way out - with E8N and Ki-34.

3. My bad re: bombload of the Ki-36. Was thinking of either the Ki-48 or Ki-32. As to using it as a strategic bomber... Well, once no enemy bases exist in range of my bombers elsewhere I will transfer those bombers to China.

REPLY: You begin with bombers in China. You should be transferring some more to China day one - out of Home Islands, Korea and Manchuria. You are not giving China sufficient priority. I want that RR in the shortest possible time. You can never reduce the problem of shipping losses too low: the less we need to move by sea - and the sooner we need to move it less by sea - the better. Further - this will cause Chinese industry to become a significant factor in our favor. With a bit of oil added we will have fantastic production in Manchuria, Korea, China, Indochina, Malaya - and maybe eventually Russia.

So pretty much every bomber type will be involved in the air war over China, almost all of them as strategic bombers. So, using the Ki-36 in a similar role is consistent.

REPLY: I am alarmed at your consistent focus on strategic bombing. This is not going to work for JAAF. It is not big enough and, attempting to do so with too many objectives, it will not be focused enough. Worse - such a many country target of my strategic bombing focus means you are not going to support land forces with full power - and then spend every EVERY possible sortee hunting submarines with whatever is not required. My secret of naval warfare is to kill subs early and often: the sooner you kill a sub the fewer successes it has.

I also have a strategic focus - and a Russian one. A "strategic target" is "a target it is important to sieze or control - not destroy." [Soviet Encyclopecia of Military Science] Strategic bombing has failed in every campaign in history - measured in cost benefit terms. The British statistical analyst for Bomber Command was Freeman Dyson - then a masters degree math guy - later a Cold War era physicist of some proportions. See Weapons and Hope for the extent of the failure: "It cost the Germans about a third as much to repair what we damaged as it cost us to inflict that damage." I witnessed strategic bombers with B-52s - a long way from a Ki-36 - and was most unimpressed. Finally - I much prefer to capture a resource center with less damage rather than more. Suggest re-evaluation of methods. For me air power is to be used operationally. [I regard strategic bombing as illegal as practiced in WWII - and both my parents were in USAAF in bombers - although neither believed in or participated in USAAF strategic bombing campaigns. My father ran tennis shoes and peanuts to Mikhalovitch in Yugoslavia - sort of like our bombers on supply runs - in B-17s. My mother trained gunners and bombradiers - and was a backup photo analyst in case the country got invaded.] USAAF didn't like using bombers to drop naval mines - yet did more damage to Japans economy in a few months of mining than all the rest. I think using bombers as strategic bombers is wasteful - and diverts them from effective military applications - sort of the opposite of classical bomber theory (the ONLY planes should be bombers, doing ANYTHING but strategic bombing is ALWAYS a waste of effort).

4.

We must use some planes (notably Ki-27) far longer than I like. I want you to optimize to minimize that time.

Agreed. In addition my focus is also on getting the most out of the planes I do have while I'm waiting to upgrade them. I also want an IJA which is capable of destroying enemy shipping. So, I think we see eye to eye on this in general except that, obviously, as IJA commander I'm also trying to see how to use what I have as best as possible while waiting to upgrade. Believe me though when I say that I won't be turning down any upgrades to Bettys ( or, perhaps a better way to simulate this would be the IJN giving the IJA its Nells as it upgrades to Bettys? I think that might be a realistic way for this to happen.... with one or two Betty Daitai for special targets... the Betty is a clearly superior plane in-game in RHS. I find it suffers far fewer losses in the early stages than the Nell.)

5. Hmm, everything I've ever read about production says the airframe cost is included also and that's certainly the view on the forum. I'll look into this and revert with the answer.


6. Transport flying boats. In RHS I have 3 airborne units at game start. 2 Yokosukas (1st and 3rd IIRC) and the IJA Raiding Bde. I'd be happy to give you one of the Yokosukas if you want in the initial period of operations. Later on I'd be prepared to consider giving the 2 Yokosukas if requested. Paras will give you an important additional string to your bow. Let me know if you want a Yokosuka.

REPLY: Boy are you misreading the game. I did the airborne - with Joe - his variation is in CHS. We spent too much time - got declassified documents - a new British book - and had lots of fun. See the prefix of each unit: IJA means ARMY - IJN means NAVY. Also - SNLF is a hint - it is navy. There are are three NAVY airborne units: Yokoska 1 and 3, and Sasebo 2nd. These are little guys. You have a different situation entirely.

The First Raiding "Brigade" is a binary unit - two battalions IRL - and thus the WITP code is right for it (it divides into two units too). BUT you get a good deal more: there is for example a Second Raiding Brigade, a Glider unit that is a heaver version of these guys, and some special stuff. The two "Brigades" will gain a bit in strength too (tricky we are). The special units include a "tank raiding unit" and a wierd native Formosa unit of commandoes - the only one in Japan. Both are two companies. You have the ONLY flying tank unit in the game! Finally - you should note that the GROUND elements of the Brigades are ALSO combat units in a sense.
They have the AAA unit and some other elements - and are meant to operate a forward airfield with some effect. These are called Raiding Base Units or some such thing (depending on how I translated it). Thus you get three big units (6 bn in 2 bn packages), two small units (2/3 bn sized - very specialized - one armor - one commando), and two ground support units (that support planes and other ground units, and have organic AAA - by JAAF standards). Note that ALL your airborne is NOT IJA - it is JAAF! Most of the reinforcements appear in 1943 or 1944.
This stuff is all very light by Western standards - its name is perfect - raiders - and it is not going to survive unsupported against anything much. It is very specialized stuff - and it is not quick to replace. It should not be used like US or UK airborne would be. Way too small, almost no heavy weapons, issues like that.



7. LOL! Admiral Yamamoto's death in-game is not guaranteed. Come 1944 I foresee the IJA demanding Yamamoto gets in an MSW and makes an unsupported raid on CONUSA [:D]


8. Aleutians. Excellent ! I thought you'd want this theatre... If you are willing to cede it then consider it accepted by the IJA. I do think you need to look at making at least some of the supply in Kodiak come from on-map resources though. The way it is modelled now it is a supply cow for the Allies 250/day and gives the Japanese ZERO supply or resources once they take it. They may not get 250 but surely they'd get something?

REPLY: This is treeless, barren grassland - full of bears - possibly the only source of supply! The biggest bears in the world - even bigger than in the rest of Alaska (which has the 2nd Biggest - Polar Bears - and 3rd Biggest - a variant of the Grizzly - as well). ALL you have there is canneries that shut down if the fleet - based in Oregon - retires or is sunk. What you gonna get resources from? It has SUPPLY POINTS rather than resources for this reason. Lots of food - no resources - ever - even for its owners. Capture it - you got a nice air base - and no supply. Plenty of supply to the North though. And resources. You can feed ANYTHING in the Mat Su Valley - so capture of these resources does NOT require a sink. [The vegtables in Alaska belong in a cartoon. They are the size of - what - small tables? Our losers would win in any fair in the world. Related to ultra long growing daylight.]


9. Pearl. Agreed. I'll be doing this in my current AAR. A few errors in TF orders have F'ed up my plans and so it will be messier than I had wished but it will be attempted in that game.


10. Not building up.... Hmm, but not building it up lessens our ability to FLY the bombers which will do much of the hurting... I think this is a flaw.

REPLY: OK - first - near the DEI not building up is an extra layer of protection - delaying the day of uber bombing raids. Elcewhere - you may build selected points - but we have VERY FEW units to operate such points - so we will get VERY FEW bases - and we better worry about them being used in reverse when they come back. For example, you don't want to build a base in range of Japan - make em build their own. Costs us MORE than them anyway - don't give it em free.



11. Division of resources for plane production... Ok, we can talk. If 50/50 doesn't work for the air force you may need to look at cutting shipbuilding more or, probably better, expanding HI even more ( which would be my choice).


REPLY: Just sent spreadsheets for CVO air forces. Not much different in EOS except a few carriers - CVS show up as CVL - stuff like that.


A key question which occurs to me is this:
How many bettys and A6M2s would you like to be producing in February or March 42? To give me some idea of what your re-equipping goals are.

Moot: we can't use it in that role.

IRL you would not run a major offensive of this sort and NOT commit major squadrons - which then were used as training units - only to turn those into your first line units later.

If you contemplate Ki-36 for ANY mission at all - we do not see eye to eye. It ought to be tied for first place on the way out

I am alarmed at your consistent focus on strategic bombing.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121



2. Ki-36

Moot: we can't use it in that role.

Sid, playing nice with others involves an element of going "Well I wouldn't do that BUT if they want to then I'll let them. Hopefully once they begin to fail for all the reasons I've outlined that they will fail they will see sense."....

Nemo: You are confusing what I can negotiate with a ruling as a mod designer. I am responsible for the Ki-36 in its present form. I came up with it under the supervision of Joe Wilkerson in a different era - when we were working on planes for CHS. If you cannot come to terms with the reasons I changed the plane's classification - and created tiny bombs for it - then I screwed up big time and need to change it back - or take it out entirely. I mean - literally - "we can't use it in that role" - whatever that may require. Probably it means returning the plane to pure recon status. Maybe it means killing the thing and all its associated units (freeing up slots)? Maybe we can keep it as it is - IF it turns out to be possible to grasp that this advanced trainer with a secondary observation mission only carried bombs for a tirtiary mission - and those only for tactical applications in the most ideal of operating situations. But I didn't stutter - we do not have the option of misusing this plane or these units in a strategic bombing role as a team - not because I (as IJN) don't want to do so - but because it is ahistorical and not possible IRL for this plane to have been used in this role. I fear I created a monster - and I did so in spite of being warned about it by people like Mike. Maybe I must undo the damage? Maybe you can come to terms with the idea this limited data change was only intended to be used in a way representative of real history - or not used at all (which is my preference) - and the plane upgraded? But it isn't an option - and the sooner you come to terms with this and move on - the better.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

As to where we divide things...

Would operations vs Australia be an IJN or an IJA thing or should we leave it up for discussion when the in-game opportunity arises. I am asking because if our goal is to prevent attacks into the DEI - which I think should remain an IJA area of operations -  then wouldn't it make sense for the job of taking those northern bases to be an IJA operation since IJA is going to be very motivated to keep them in Japanese hands to protect its DEI assets.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

4.

IRL you would not run a major offensive of this sort and NOT commit major squadrons - which then were used as training units - only to turn those into your first line units later.

In real life I would view it as extremely sensible to use squadrons with obsolete aircraft in a tertiary theatre ( China)


REPLY: We really are not yet of a mind about China. It is anything but a tertiary theater. It is not even a secondary theater. It is the PRIMARY THEATER OF WAR. That is - were it not for China - there would be no war at all. IF IJA regards China as "tertiary" - cut a deal and end the embargo - and we don't have to Strike South at all.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

4.

IRL you would not run a major offensive of this sort and NOT commit major squadrons - which then were used as training units - only to turn those into your first line units later.

In real life I would view it as extremely sensible to use squadrons with obsolete aircraft in a tertiary theatre ( China) and, when targets in China had dried up, commit these squadrons to training ready for conversion to the Me-264. I do NOT like committing my best planes to the front until I've built up a critical mass of this new plane.

REPLY: We have a very brief period of operational initiative. And - in your words - the Me has a great force multiplier in its range. You are going to cost us the greatest of justifications for building it if we cannot use the very first handful for recon. [USAF says "the primary mission of an air force is to gather information about the enemy"] You are going to cost us significant opportunities to hit the enemy while he is still weak and fragmented if we cannot use the very first squadrons (12) in strikes against targets not possible for any other plane.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121


4.

IRL you would not run a major offensive of this sort and NOT commit major squadrons - which then were used as training units - only to turn those into your first line units later.

In real life I would view it as extremely sensible to use squadrons with obsolete aircraft in a tertiary theatre ( China) and, when targets in China had dried up, commit these squadrons to training ready for conversion to the Me-264. I do NOT like committing my best planes to the front until I've built up a critical mass of this new plane. This plan achieves this effect. IN any case Sid getting involved in which squadron upgrade routes I take is getting far too involved in IJA policy. Best you concentrate on the IJN and let me focus on the IJA. You may not agree with my policy on upgrading BUT the whole idea between having multiple players was to allow different command styles. Efforts to turn me into a mini-Sid are doomed to fail. I have my own ideas and practices and while I'm willing to compromise and even give in on really major stuff... as I did over India... this discussion on my upgrade choices is meddling too much in IJA issues. There is no disrespect or anger there, just a wish to set some boundaries which can be adhered to for the good of the game and our respective blood pressures [:D]


REPLY: The issue of upgrading Ki-36s to Me-264s in a single bound was a secondary issue. The real problem was to use the Ki-36 to run up 99% experience ratings and then convert that for use with the big bomber. It is an entirely gamey approach to play and absolutely worthless in terms of simulating what might happen with either units or planes?
I have only minor technical interest in how you upgrade units? I have much more serious concerns about how you play - and how it might prevent a proper evaluation of anything? I now am becoming concerned you do not grasp what "reasonable non-gamey play" means?

ORIGINAL: Nemo121


5.

If you contemplate Ki-36 for ANY mission at all - we do not see eye to eye. It ought to be tied for first place on the way out

It is in first place to be phased out BUT while I don't have the numbers of modern planes to replace it I WILL use the Ki-36 for such missions as I think it can achieve with a suitably low loss rate. Again though, this is my style of play. While we SHOULD discuss STRATEGY I do not think it is helpful to try to change eachothers STYLES and outlooks. I am not mini-Sid.

REPLY: The idea we won't use a too slow aircraft - but will immediately replace it with a plane more likely to survive - is a strategy of play. Speed matters in WITP air combat. The Ki-36 sufferred horribly and had to be withdrawn from non-trainer duty. You said you might do the same thing AFTER suffering horrible losses. I am saying "skip the horrible losses part" of that as a strategy.


6. Use of all bomber types over China...
Well here we DO see eye to eye... Essentially once Malaysia, DEI and Phillipines are taken I will be switching most of the bomber force to China + India in order to mount really massive strategic bombing offensives. My first priority is to establish the Malaysia/DEI/Phillipines/Northern Oz/Ceylon/Burma line though and support that as fully as possible. The instant that is done it will be China's turn though.

REPLY: Again - if you see JAAF bombers as strategic bombers - and strategic bombing as a way to win wars - we don't share strategic concepts. I think there are ONLY TWO strategic military forces: field armies and fleets.
I deny the theory of air power advocates in the early 20th century - quoting Norman Friedman here - 'that air forces represented an independent means to victory.' They are inherently costly - and if there might be salvation for the concept using nuclear explosives - that would be illegal, immoral and beyond the means available for Japan. I see bombers as tactical assets - exactly as the Axis air forces did - and also as the Soviet air force did. You may use them to empower your field armies - or the fleets - but not to kill an enemy power outside that context.


7.

I am alarmed at your consistent focus on strategic bombing.

I am, at least, a competent player. I know when to focus on non-strategic missions. My view, however, is that this is so self-evident that it doesn't even warrant discussion as an objective. It is simply assumed. I am prepared to discuss this further but ONLY in the presence of an actual strategic outline of what we want to do and when. Discussing it now is simpy discussing it in too much of a vacuum to decide anything concrete.

REPLY: I am concerned at your idea of (a) don't attack China day one; (b) when you do attack it - use bombers;
I don't hear any focus on the critical strategic objetive - the rail link between NE Asia and SE Asia - nor see how bombers can sieze or hold it? I don't hear any response to my twice repeated call for that stretegic objective to be achieved truly ASAP - in the absolute minimum number of days/ weeks? Instead - once again I hear about transferring bombers (alone ) to China -AFTER other ops are over with. It does not sound like we have any sort of strategic sense of priorities in common here. Maybe we do - but I have not heard a hint of it yet.




8. Paras... Ok, you get the two Yokos and I get the IJA Raiding Bde. That's fine. Also there is the 2nd Sasebo.
Regretfully - all the other units that will appear are IJA - and none of them in the year that matters -- 1942.

9. Kodiak Island and Alaska.
Ok, so you would support the capture of Kodiak and other Alaskan bases in order to mount strategic bombing raids against CANADA and CONUSA? As you know I wish to use the Me-264 for this from these bases.


REPLY: I support the capture of the Aleutians to deny bases to the enemy. I might support taking Kodiak. I don't mind raids on the US with bombers - but I am alarmed at a focus on that. We cannot afford the logistics nor the plane losses entailed. I see taking Kodiac mainly as a way to insure they attack Kodiak - and if we WEAKLY but cleverly defend it - we might tie em up big time in a battle we don't need to win? If you must try a bomber campaign - take ALL of Alaska and eat its supplies - which at least cuts down on the shipping them from Japan.



10. Fighters etc..
Sounds fine to me. 180 Zeroes and 120 Bettys sounds good. Remember the Nells auto-upgrade to bettys in January 42 so that's about 60 Bettys guaranteed from January 42. 120 per month would give us deep enough pockets to hit Indian resources from Ceylon even in the face of some losses.


REPLY: Nells do not auto upgrade. Not sure why - but in 1943 they still are being made.



Division of Duties:

IJA-Owned:
Kwanting Army
China Army
Burma Army
Southern Area Army
Northern Command.
Home Army.

Those are fine by me....


IJN
4th Fleet
Combined Fleet.

Again, fine by me.


As far as the Grand Escort Command goes I think it makes sense to have that operated on a per region basis...

REPLY: Except it doesn't. Ships don't change command when they cross the line. And GEC should allocate resources by operational needs of the escort/submarine war - not some theater needs. In a sense the merchant marine and GEC are strategic commands: they move supplies and resources and oil and fuel BETWEEN theaters for grander objectives than theater commanders have. IF you make GEC theater dependent - theater will say "I need this more than you do" - and GEC will lose every time. Even its ships and planes will be robbed "just for this crisis." No one will be watching the patterns of the subs and planning "lets kill those bases, cut their access off at this point with mines, air patrols, surface patrols, name it" etc. And no one is looking at shipping triangles (etc) for economic efficiency (If we go that way we are in the wrong theater - so lets go this way and avoid that).



When ships are in the DEI or near China and the Home Islands I think it makes sense for the escorts and hunter-killer groups to be commanded by the same player who is running the convoys and the ASW aircraft patrols.

REPLY: Yes it does. And so the question is - who should be running the convoyas and the ASW aircraft patrols? Does not have to be the player defending the Home Islands from invasion (by whom? Russia?). And the DEI might be defended by me - if you ever come to terms with what I proposed above. I sure don't see how you are going to change command for a convoy from Java (IJA) past the Philippines (IJN) to Home Islands (IJA again?). I see how you easily can take over everything - Army and navy though. You got IJA - JAAF - and now all the ships to do Malaya, DEI - Philippines- (India? Australia?) - AND the GEC? What is left - besides Kiddo Butai and scrap? - You even get most of JNAF.

When convoys are going into your regions ( mostly the Pacific territories) then you are responsible for them and you should be assigned the necessary escorts.

As for division of the SRA between IJA and IJN. I think that is a disaster waiting to happen.


REPLY: And the Army is well suited to fighting amphib invasions?

What I am concerned about is the eventual British and Australian counter-attack. If we have a divided command ( e.g. Burma and Malaysia are under IJA control but Sumatra under IJN control)

REPLY: Not what I posted: I said SUMATRA was IJA. And - IRL - it was! But Borneo was not.


then we are prone to costly errors. Once these territories would be taken (+ Ceylon) I really wouldn't see much need for any major naval detachments and would be happy to give most of the naval forces under my command back to you.


REPLY: I never heard about IJA controlling naval forces taking Ceylon. IF we go to Ceylon I will do it - with Kiddo Butai covering. And no divided command nonsense. It is a major naval op. If you take over that sort of thing - and also apparently Australia - what exactly do I do - and with what? Not much.


I'd need just enough to cover convoys running to Ceylon from Malaysia and another TF to act as a quick-reaction force against any sudden Aussie raids. I would see most of my defensive strength coming from army and naval air units under my command, not actual surface combat TFs.

Oh one other thing I should make clear. As China and the Soviet Union come under control I would be more than willing to send a few of the divisions thus freed up in order to bolster the garrison of islands in the Pacific.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

REPLY: Nells do not auto upgrade. Not sure why - but in 1943 they still are being made.

but because it is ahistorical and not possible IRL for this plane to have been used in this role.

Makes me sort of junior auxiliary nothing for the resource free open ocean areas - more or less.

We really are not yet of a mind about China. It is anything but a tertiary theater.

You are going to cost us the greatest of justifications for building it if we cannot use the very first handful for recon. [USAF says "the primary mission of an air force is to gather information about the enemy"] You are going to cost us significant opportunities to hit the enemy while he is still weak and fragmented if we cannot use the very first squadrons (12) in strikes against targets not possible for any other plane.

I deny the theory of air power advocates in the early 20th century - quoting Norman Friedman here - 'that air forces represented an independent means to victory.' They are inherently costly - and if there might be salvation for the concept using nuclear explosives - that would be illegal, immoral and beyond the means available for Japan. I see bombers as tactical assets - exactly as the Axis air forces did - and also as the Soviet air force did. You may use them to empower your field armies - or the fleets - but not to kill an enemy power outside that context.

I am concerned at your idea of (a) don't attack China day one; (b) when you do attack it - use bombers;
I don't hear any focus on the critical strategic objetive - the rail link between NE Asia and SE Asia - nor see how bombers can sieze or hold it? I don't hear any response to my twice repeated call for that stretegic objective to be achieved truly ASAP - in the absolute minimum number of days/ weeks? Instead - once again I hear about transferring bombers (alone ) to China -AFTER other ops are over with. It does not sound like we have any sort of strategic sense of priorities in common here. Maybe we do - but I have not heard a hint of it yet.

If you must try a bomber campaign - take ALL of Alaska and eat its supplies - which at least cuts down on the shipping them from Japan.

REPLY: Nells do not auto upgrade. Not sure why - but in 1943 they still are being made.

You got IJA - JAAF - and now all the ships to do Malaya, DEI - Philippines- (India? Australia?) - AND the GEC? What is left - besides Kiddo Butai and scrap? - You even get most of JNAF

I never heard about IJA controlling naval forces taking Ceylon. IF we go to Ceylon I will do it

I intend to WITHDRAW from the Pacific.