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The claim that the Zeke, Oscar &c were faster than early war P40s in level flight & that p40s could only outpace them in a dive is dead wrong.

P40 a/c ratings of course vary with the model. Let's take the P40E as an example since it's used in GGPW:Matrix. The P40E's air speed (level flight) was 346 m/h at 15000 feet. This compares with the A5M4 "Claude" top rated speed of 297 m/h at 9800 feet, the Ki-43 "Oscar" top speed of 308 m/h at 13000 feet, and, as I recall, about 340 m/h for the A6M2 "Zero." For P40Es vs Zekes, a 6 m/h difference is not all that helpful if you let a Zeke get on your tail... then, rather than trying to maneuver, you dive out because the Zero's control surfaces get very mushy (the pheno was called "flutter" by Japanese test pilots) at speeds above 380 m/h. If you put the Zero into a high speed dive and maneuvered radically the control surfaces (sometimes even the wings) would rip loose from the plane, which is why diving out was a very good move even for slower US a/c like the F4F and SBD.

The information is widely available but even Heiferman's old "Flying Tigers: Chennault in China" offers the basic stats. Late war P40s were faster still.

Chennault's admonition "don't dogfight with the zero" was an admonition not to attempt to *turn with a zero* or otherwise attempt to maneuver out of a bad situation when facing a zero. It was not an admonition against attacking zeros. The idea was, basically, don't sacrifice superior airspeed in a vain attempt to pursue an evading zero and don't waste time with maneuvering when a zero has you in his sights. Break off and come around for another pass. The same rule applied to F4Fs except that they had a much harder time getting back into teh battle once they'd disengaged because it took them longer to climb to a favorable altitude to make a high speed diving attack.

The key was keeping airspeed up...P40 had crappy acceleration and rate of climb due to its weight/power ratio and generally lousy aerodynamics. It could be used successfully against the Zero using "boom and zoom" tactics...which is the point Chennault was trying to make. Getting caught in a "low energy state" against a Zero (of whatever flavor) was suicide.

http://home.att.net/~jbaugher1/p40_8.html

Only twenty-two P-40Ds were produced. An order dated February 18, 1941 increased the armament to six guns in the wings, and subsequent aircraft equipped with this armament were designated P-40E (Model 87-B2). The cannon mounts (which were never used in any case) were deleted.

The P-40E was powered by one 1150 hp Allison V-1710-39 twelve-cylinder Vee liquid cooled engine. Maximum speed was 335 mph at 5000 feet, 345 mph at 10,000 feet, and 362 mph at 15,000 feet. Initial climb rate was 2100 feet per minute. An altitude of 20,000 feet could be attained in 11.5 minutes. Service ceiling was 29,000 feet. Maximum range was 650 miles (clean), 850 miles (with one 43 Imp gal drop tank), 1400 miles (with one 141.5 Imp gal drop tank). Weights were 6350 pounds empty, 8280 pounds normal loaded, and 9200 pounds maximum. Dimensions were wingspan 27 feet 4inches, length 31 feet 2 inches, height 10 feet 7 inches, and wing area 236 square feet.

The Kittyhawk IA was essentially the export equivalent of the P-40E. 1500 were built, primarily for the RAF, but many were diverted to Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

http://www.csd.uwo.ca/~pettypi/elevon/baugher_other/a6m.html#RTFToC8

Specification of A6M2 Navy Type 0 Carrier Fighter Model 21:

One Nakajima NK1C Sakae 12 fourteen cylinder air-cooled radial, rated at 940 hp for takeoff, 950 hp at 13,780 feet.

Performance: Maximum speed 331 mph at 14,930 feet. Cruising speed 207 mph. Initial climb rate 4517 feet per minute. Climb to 19,685 feet in 7 minutes 27 seconds. Service ceiling 32,810 feet. Normal range 1160 miles. Maximum range 1930 miles. Radius of turn with entry speed of 230 mph was 1118 feet. Entering a 180 degree steep turn with an entry speed of 230 mph, the fighter could complete the turn in 5.62 seconds, with an exit speed from the turn of 189 mph. At slower speeds, the turning radius was 612 feet. Normal positive g-load factor was 7g, with a safety factor of an additional 1.8g. Normal negative g-load factor was 3.5g, with a safety factor of an extra 1.8g.

Dimensions: Wingspan 39 feet 4 7/16 inches, length 29 feet 8 11/16 inches, height 10 feet 0 1/16 inches, wing area 241.5 square feet. Weights: 3704 pounds empty, 5313 pounds loaded, 6164 pounds maximum. Fuel capacity: Internal fuel capacity was 114 Imp gall. One 72.6 Imp. gall drop tank could be carried underneath the fuselage. Armament: Two 7.7-mm Type 97 machine guns in the fuselage decking and two 20-mm Type 99 cannon in the wings. Two 132-pound bombs could be carried on underwing racks.

Regarding the armament of the Ki-43-I, we were both wrong. The larger production model, Ki-43-Ib had 1x 7.7mm MG and 1x 12.7mm MG. So its canon value should be 3 (not 2 or 4).

We are looking at possibly redoing all of the aircraft cannon ratings.

Regarding the P-40 and A6M debate. We are going to leave the manuverability of both planes as they are. There were two very opposite debates going on (one long previous) about the difference between the two aircraft. This debate stems on the belief that the gap between the P-40 and A6M wasn't that large, so the A6M should lower its manuverability. The other debate stated the gap wasn't big enough, and demanded the manuverability of the P-40 to be lowered.

Where the early war IJNAF and IJAAF aircraft suffer is in cannon and durability ratings. Even the tough little A6M has only a 10 cannon rating and an 8 durability rating, which gets shredded by the P-40's 12 cannon and 24 durability. These factors are taken into consideration during air-to air combat. The reason for the massive one sidedness is the extreme experience difference.

At the beginning of the war virtually every Allied air group in the Pacific had ZERO combat experience. No matter how many hours of flying time, nor how many mock dogfights they were in, nothing equals pure battle experience (evem the USN Carrier groups). Most A6M squadrons start off with 80 experience, most Allied squadrons start off with 50 experience. This experience gap will result in a load of allied losses.

Many complaints stated that once P-38 squadrons appear and have mediocre experience they should shredd IJNAF squadrons. This isn't true. By the time a US Player gets P-38 groups with around 70 experience, many IJNAF groups still have around 80-90 experience! Even with obsolete aircraft they can still cause havoc if they are experienced enough. The experience level of the IJNAF groups was never stated in any of these complaints. Most likely they were remnants of the highly skilled airgroups (there are many of these to start the game with). It is relatively easy for an IJNAF player, even the AI, to keep some good A6M groups out of the Soloman shredder (where most of the LB IJNAF groups were destroyed) and use more IJAAF aircraft.

Cannon strengths are heavily modified. The 'rule' of 1, 2, 4, etc. is only a rough extimate. Many weapons had their power increased by positioning (all guns in the nose are better than having them spread out along the wings).

Anyway, Chennault never experienced fighting A6M's. All that the AVG saw were Ki-27's and Ki-43's. Possibly he created this doctrine after the war began?

In my experience with P-38 v A6M2, an exchange ratio of about 3:2 in favor of the P-38. This is May/June '43, experience ratings of mid 80s v 70s. Air leader ratings 8 or 9 on both sides. A really good thing for the players to have would be the formula for air combat resolution. In mid '43, the A6M2 pool is empty, along with the G3M and G4M pools. The allies are maintaining their pool levels...

If the IJNAF has the same experience levels in early/mid '43 as 12/41, something is wrong. The attrition of the IJN aircrew began in earnest in late '42, and by mid '43 the American air forces gained parity in terms of proficiency.

Battle experience... Yes, nothing compares to being actually shot at; but, realistic training can come a long way. The IJN aircrew did have experience in China. However, this was somewhat akin to low intensity combat training. I would argue that the proficiency of the IJN aircrew was due primarily to the rigorous training regime that was imposed upon them. They spent the entire 1930s training at a rate equal to combat tempo.

Case in point... The USAF/USN/USMC aircrew in the early 1990s, i.e. 2nd Gulf War/Desert Storm, would rate about 80, IMO. The USAF tended not to deploy with lieutenants with less than 18 months aircraft experience, so the quality of the deployed aircrew would be about 85. The 80 average experience level was gained by flying at least 20-25 hours per month; over 3 to 14 years. The 'rating' for the aircrew post Gulf War would be in the low to mid 90s. The interesting thing is that in competitions/exercises 3 to 4 years after the war, aircrew that didn't participate in the war had the same scores as the aircrew that did, controlling for total flight hours. This leads to two conclusions, 1) Combat experience gains will be diminished over time, 2) Regular training can maintain a relatively high proficiency level. Combat operations will give an expected 20% increase in capabilities over expectation - 80 to 95 exp. levels. I can't remember the exact source for this information, but it was a defense journal.

My rationale for the experience ratings... 10 hours of flying time would equate to 1 experience point. So aircrew would take 3 years of peacetime training to achieve a 80 rating. This training regime could obviously be accelerated in wartime, maybe 33-50%. Combat would increase experience levels by 1-2 points a week, as PacWar does, if the aircrew survives. Experience gained as a result of combat would gradually be eroded if the aircrew wasn't involved in combat operations. Because of the relatively short time horizon, experience erosion in PacWar is unnecessary, the aircrew usually is killed or rotated out before this can happen.

The IJNAF on 12/41 had a small cadre, 1000 to 1500 pilots, that had between 700 and 2500 total flying hours each. The parallels between this force and the current USN are striking. If the current USN were involved in combat operations with loss rates like the IJNAF, its striking power would show comparable declines. The Japanese were faced with a situation much like the current one; any war entered into must be won quickly with low loss rates, or stalemate will ensue.

I found a couple of websites that illustrate the problems of fuel consumption, and aerodynamic performances...

http://142.26.194.131/aerodynamics1/default.htm
http://naca.larc.nasa.gov/reports/1938/naca-tn-654/index.cgi?thumbnail1#start

Hopefully these will help to illustrate my contention that published 'range' figures for aircraft must be taken with a large amount of skepticism, when considering combat radii.

[This message has been edited by Ricochet (edited October 24, 2000).]

Originally posted by Major Tom:

Regarding the P-40 and A6M debate. We are going to leave the manuverability of both planes as they are.

Major Tom,
I agree with your decision- there is no debate for me. I agree with the above gentlemens posts with ONE exception. The Posted speeds are MAMIMUMS,war emergency speeds that were only used in emergencies. most P-40's if I recall correctly, operated about 70% power (heavier airframe slowed speed considerably compared to Jap airframes) cause of this is Fuel consumption AVG's main problem was getting supplies to bases-no large stockpiles of fuel, ammo etc.
So rarely did the fight ever start on even terms, the dive rate for the P-40 was like 1.5 times the max dive rate of known Japanese fighters at the time

Anyway, Chennault never experienced fighting A6M's. All that the AVG saw were Ki-27's and Ki-43's. Possibly he created this doctrine after the war began?[/B]

Yes, but Chinese War was 39-45 Avg was 41 til P.H. Chennault was already teaching and preaching by then! <g>
AND VERY TRUE about Ki-models I went back to the trusty Time-Life books and your right!
I thought it was early claudes by the time the disbanded.... I was wrong again (apologies offered )
Jim

The question isn't what happens in the game, but rather how the game should work. If the game rewards maneuverability over speed then it's completely at odds with every conclusion by every aircraft designer and military strategist for the last 50 years. If the game gives Zekes of any kind a favorable kill ratio in combat against P38s or even F4Fs then it is again at odds with history. Whether this means that the game designers stop thinking of "maneuverability" as the only relevant quality in air-air combat, fix the experience ratios or adjust the IJN aircraft durabilities downward is really up to the game designers. But in the end P38s flown by *any* American pilot ought on average to beat Zeros flown by *any* Japanese pilot.

By the way, the vast majority of Japanese naval air flotilla pilots had no more air *combat experience* in 1941 than their American counterparts. They *had* unquestionably logged more hours of training time. Most of the *veteran* Japanese pilots in 1941 were IJA pilots stationed in China. *Their* combat experiences were limited to flying against really outdated planes (Polikarpovs, if I recall correctly, and some Italian mfr biplanes). The rest of the *veterans* were stationed on Kaga & Akagi having flown against targets in China in the late 1930s. Most of the other IJN carrier pilots had no combat experience prior to Pearl Harbor.

It is really significant that the only western Allied air units against which the Japanese pilots scored favorable kill ratios were units that flew the F2A, some of the "used up" Hurricanes that had been retired from the Battle of Britain, and P400s, or when the targets that they attacked were incredibly outnumbered (the F4Fs operating from Midway Island for example) or parked (as at Pearl Harbor and CLark Field).

One point you all seem to forget about the IJNAF air combat experience, is, by the Coral Sea the Carrier TF has been in countless engagements, and lost numerous pilots. At Pearl Harbor alone they lost 29 planes, with their expert pilots (resistance was minimal!). When they raided the Indian ocean, the RAF on Ceylon put up a great fight and shot down a number of IJNAF carrier aircraft. Many historians state that the death of the pre-war IJNAF Carrier aircrew happened BEFORE the Coral Sea, as most replacements weren't of the same calibur as those lost.

Even still, the two fleet carriers that took part in the Coral Sea were the Shokaku and Zuikaku, whose air crew were not as trained as the other, older carriers.

The IJNAF Carrier TF was lost at Midway NOT due to a fair, one on one engagement, but, rather the US achieving total surprise when the dive bombers hit the carriers. Remember, the TBD's were SLAUGHTERED by IJNAF CAP while USN CAP let in a lot of IJNAF planes to nail the Yorktown (even with the benefit of numbers and radar). When it was just down to the Hiryu on the second day she performed better than the entire three USN Carrier air groups.

If the Japanese player is smart they will not follow history. The main reason that the Japanese aircrew's were so slaughtered was the friction between Army and Navy. The Soloman Islands was a Naval District, with only Naval Planes providing cover (a few Army Planes were allowed to go to New Guinea). IJNAF planes were notoriously weak when compared to IJAAF planes. The IJNAF would have been better served to be used in the Central Pacific (to make full use of their long range) and leave the close regions of the Soloman Islands to the tougher, albiet shorter range IJAAF planes.

This is how the IJNAF can still have multiple fighter and bomber groups of 80+ by 1943. If it had to follow history EVERY single time, then why bother playing the game?

An even better tactic is to have mixed Army/Navy bases, each relying on the strength of the other to cover their own weaknesses. Have A6M's, G3M's along with Ki-45's and Ki-49's and your bases will be protected against just about anything the USAAF/USNAF can throw at them.

Also, remember that the Pre-War USAAF is totally uncomparable to the present day USAF. It was a very laxed organization, without the rigorous training. The US were outclassed by the Japanese, but, due to attrition, they were better capable of replacing their losses. I have played multiple test games, and, it ALWAYS turns out to be that the US average experience rates get up to around 70-80, while the japanese get to be around 60-70. With the massive numerical and qualitative superiority the US will have no trouble in getting to Japan by 1945.

Remember, the US didn't start making good headway in the Pacific unitl 1944. 1943 was the period in which the IJNAF and IJAAF were ground down, not 1942.

My roomate is a Pilot, and the number of hours flying does not determine the exact quality of the pilot. After a certain point you reach a level of competence, the rest of the flying time is to just get yourself into the routine of flying. Flying another 10-20 hours does not make you 10-20, or whatever factor, better than you were before. Plus, there is also a difference between FLYING time, and COMBAT TRAINING time. A person with 40 hours of flying time will be no better than a person with 10 hours of flying time and 10 hours of combat training time. Sure, they know how to fly, but, can they shoot down anything, or not get shot down themselves?

Jeremy

ACM ability is terribly over rated in determining a planes fighting ability, primarily because tactics dictated that it be avoided if possible.

The vast majority of kills made on either side came off of hit and run attacks. It makes zero sense, no pun intended, for a pilot to turn with another plane if it can be avoided. Why risk battle with someone who is possibly better than you?

The method was to hope for a height advantage and dive through the enemy formation. I believe airframe strength and firepower are the deciding factors.

Major Tom -

My point isn't that Zekes couldn't slaughter droves of TBDs. Indeed, the observation that they did so is consistent with the general historical observation is that speed gives the big advantage. The TBD crews at Midway had been flying operationally for variously 4-16 months and had completed training in 1940-41, and they should have experience ratings in the 75-80 range in game terms. They were slaughtered in droves at Midway because their aircraft were so slow that they could not get out of their own way, and because there were no escorts with them to fend off the Zekes. ANY unescorted slow bomber or flimsy bomber (like Betties)was vlunerable to almost any pursuit craft. Even the P35s, P36s and F2As would have run up impressive kill scores had they run into unescorted Vals, Kates and Betties. (Indeed, the Finns did quite well with F2As against Soviet bombers).

My comments have been directed at fighter vs. fighter engagements. It is true that large numbers of Zekes were destroyed at Midway with their carriers, so maybe the "data point" for Midway is not a valid one. Nonetheless the Zekes got mauled at Coral Sea. *That* data point is interesting because most of the F4F losses there went down with Lexington. Had the Lex not sunk, the Zekes's kill ratio would look extremely poor. Now, those were combats between the USN's best and the IJN's best.

In 1942 according to most sources (see Frank's "Guadalacanal" and also a recent pub "Fire in the Sky" I forget the author) USAAF aircraft broke the back of IJN naval air flotillas. These land-based IJN air flotillas were the highest trained units in the Japanese force pool other than the carrier pilots, yet they suffered attrition rates that they could not sustain, leading to degraded pilot quality, while at the same time inflicting fewer casualties on Allied fighters than they themselves sustained.

These encounters involved USAAF and USMC pilots trained primarily in 1941 and early 1942 (most air group commanders had been trained in 1937-1939 so some of the pilots and commanders were extremely trained) flying primarily P40Es, P39s and P38s, and for the Marine squadrans, F4F4s. These combats occurred *prior to the huge degradation in IJN pilot quality* because *these were the engagements that caused that degradation.*

In GGPW it is almost impossible to cause said degradation in IJN pilot quality through attritional losses during 1942 using land-based USAAF and USMC units. In GGPW when attritional losses *do* occur, the proportional combat losses are all out of alignment with historical ones, with kill ratios on the order of 4:1 (often much greater) favoring the Japanese. These results indicate that the basic assumptions of the way GGPW resolves a-a combat are very flawed.

What I want to see is a little realism. When IJN Zekes from Rabaul make a fighter sweep against Port Moresby or escort a Betty raid to PM, a typical American PG comprised of P40s based at Port Moresby should kill about 1:1 in enemy aircraft.

The Japanese player naturally should have the option not to get into such attritional situations. If he chooses to force the issue however he should suffer historical attritional losses, rather than the bizarre results provided by the current version of the game.

You can argue till the cows come home...but you're still limited to the parameters the game will allow you to model. Unless an A/C is totally outclassed in almost every respect, "experience" is what will make the difference. The P40 vs. Zero debate is a case in point...the P40 was NOT totally outclassed by the Zero with a skilled and experienced pilot at the controls who had LEARNED TO USE HIS A/C's STRENGTH'S against the Zero weaknesses. Pre/early war US training and doctrine (and mindset) emphasized the "cult of the dogfight" instead of slashing attacks and promptly "running away to live and fight another day". Or, to put it another way; tactics=experience...the Allies had lousy tactics, and being a highly trained and experienced pilot wasn't enough, knowing how and when to fight was more important. This came with combat experience and the evolution over time of doctrine suited to actual war conditions. However highly trained and skilled a pre-war trained Allied pilot was on paper (or even in fact), he was still a novice with a low experience rating in the "new" school of warfare (being taught by the Japanese with a pass/fail grade) until he survived long enough to learn or be taught the rules of "real life".

[This message has been edited by babyseal7 (edited October 24, 2000).]

You can argue till the cows come home if you like. Historically the P40s P38s and F4Fs obtained 1:1 kill ratios or better against the highly trained expert pilots flying IJN Naval Flotilla Zekes, so obviously something is wrong with the GGPW combat system if it turns out otherwise. Either the assumptions about air unit experience are incorrect or the assumptions about relative merits of aircraft are incorrect or, quite possibly, both at once.

The previous post is a classic case where the "theory" is assumed to be better than the data. The Conventional Myth says that IJN pilots were generally superior to Allied pilots (by virtue of training and or experience) and that their a/c were as good as or better than Allied a/c. Yet the actual historical kill ratios from 1942 show that the Allies inflicted higher loss rates. In most rational circles the data would require that one junk the Conventional Myth.

Air-kills are one of the most difficult things to determine. You almost invariably increase the number of enemy aircraft shot down in an engagement, sloely on the basis that nobody is just out there to count kills (but rather to score them themselves). Many kills were counted multiple times, as 4 pilots might have claimed 4 separate kills, when in fact there was only 1 total kill.

Stating proposed air-kill ratios are the most innacurate ways in determining air force quality. They are almost never counted correctly and should not be guaged to effectively determine the value of one airforce over another.


The reason that the F2A's did so well in Russia, was that they were piloted by experienced men, plus they were up against extremely inferior aircraft I-15 and I-16 fighters.


REMEMBER! Manuverability isn't the only factor that is taken into account in fighter to fighter encounters. Durability and Cannon rating are as well. Virtually all of the Allied aircraft have much greater cannon and durability ratings. Put up a couple A6M's against some P-38's of equal experience and the P-38's will win out through power and durability overcoming the discrepancy in manuverability.


Regarding The Coral Sea. Many IJNAF aircraft were lost (ie. counted as lost) because they were forced to ditch. When the Shokaku was caught and bombed it was incapable of landing aircraft, and the Zuikaku couldn't take on both carrier's aircraft. Plus when the Shokaku was damaged, many of its aircraft were destroyed in the bombing. So, using the excuse that the USNAF suffered losses primarily due to the loss of the Lexington is nullified to the fact that the IJNAF suffered equal losses primarily due to the crippling of the Shokaku.

Regarding the TBD's, I wouldn't put their experience at 80. As, if they were at 80, they would either have got a hit on an IJN Carrier, or, determined any attack would have been pointless suicide. In PacWar, put up a fairly inexperienced group of Allied obsolete aircraft (P-35, P-36, F2A) against any IJNAF or IJAAF bomber and you will get a slaugther of the bomber formation. The reason that you generally don't get this happening in the early stages in PacWar, is, that the Japanese usually put up enough Fighter cover the allied planes never get through in any strength, and the fact that Allied preparation levels are so low that CAP tends to be very small.


I already covered why the IJNAF was wiped out in the Solomans (over a period of about 1 year). They were flying flimsy planes built solely for achieving long range and manuverability over that of durability and hitting power. The IJAAF was better suited for this role, and if the IJAAF sent groups to Rabul and the Solomans the USAAF would have had a harder time. In PacWar, when the P-38's show up, in late 1942, the tide against the IJNAF begins to turn, as, the P-38 beats the A6M2 in almost every aspect, except for 1 or 2 points of manuverability, and 2 points of range. P-38 success won't happen over night, but, given time to wear down the A6M, to gain experience, the IJNAF will enter a meatgrinder if it stays the sole defender of the Solomans. THIS is what historically happened. Eventually, the poor quality of the A6M will spell the death nell for the experienced IJNAF groups.

AGAIN, I STRESS THIS FACT, the IJNAF wasn't bled to death until 1943!!! You point out that it is impossible to do this in 1942. That is true, because the IJNAF had enough good pilots to sustain itself for an attritional war for approximately 6 months (as the 1st 6 months was more of a blitzkrieg operation with very few LBA losses).

mdiehl
What exactly is a 'typical P-40' Air Group? 60 experience? 50 experience? 70 experience? This did not happen historically. During mid-late 1942, the IJNAF and IJAAF repeatedly bombed out Port Moresby, suffering proportionately less casulaties. Much of the transport aircraft used to supply the American and Australian attempt at crossing the Owen Stanley Mountains in late 1942 were lost in a series of successful IJNAF raids on Port Moresby.

The reason that the IJNAF fell in 1943, is that the USAAF got better aircraft on the field, and more replacement pilots out there before the Japanese could. If you play a game against a PBEM opponent, unless they do some really daring or brilliant moves, you will undoubtedly have knocked down the IJNAF to only a mild threat by 1943.

I take the air kill ratios in Fire in the Sky and Franks Guadalcanal to be very important resources on this subject because they are very current and based on recent translations of Japanese documents and heavily dredged USAAF and USN historic records. They are notably NOT based on air group after action reports (claimed kills by combat pilots) but rather on the respective sides' logistical documents counting operational and combat losses. So they are the best that data can be in terms of accuracy, though doubtless not likely perfect.

Another measure is aircrews lost but that one is obviously imperfect because the US pilot recovery effort was far superior to the Japanse, and because much of the 1942 combat occurred close to Allied bases. The range thing again. The US didn't for example suffer huge pilot losses among fighter aircraft downed over Rabaul for the simple reason Allied fighters could not reach Rabaul from Henderson or Port Moresby.

Major Tom

As to the rest of your post. Yes, the IJN air flotillas were not "bled out" (i.e. the corpse was cold & moldy) until 1943 but the hemorraging began in April 1942 and it did not let up. I never said the job should be *completed in 1942,* I said that if the Japanese player in GGPW sends IJN air flotillas comprised of Zekes & Betties to Rabaul against "adequately trained" (meaning the USAAF has deemed them ready for combat, whatever the heck that represents in terms of GGPW experience ratings) then the Allies should inflict 1:1 combat losses on the Japanese. As far as I'm concerned "Ready for Combat" means that a USAAF unit on the map should be able to inflict that kind of attrition against Zekes under similar circumstances.

In the extant version of the game, the IJN player can send those (as you and I have both pointed out) extremely flimsy aircraft from Rabaul to PM, engage the P40s stationed at PM and reliably count on destroying 20-40 aircraft per combat with very few losses, if any. You get no argument from me that there are better ways to attack PM, for example combining te long range flimsy IJN a/c with heavier, more durable IJA bases nearby. But if the Japanese player handles an air assault on PM using Bettiers & Zekes he should get a real shark bite as his reward. I say this because that is EXACTLY what happened historically. The game does not do a decent job replicating history even if both players choose exactly the historical moves.

The TBDS should be 80 experience ratings. The reasons why they scored no hits at Midway are that, as best one can tell from Japanese after action reports and George Gay's report most of the TBDs were shot down before they could launch or were forced to launch at extremer range because their a/c were in extremis. Then of course there was the problem with USN aerial torpedo depth settings. Nonethelss had those TBDs attacked, say, a transport group with no air cover most of the TBDs would have scored hits. It is noteworthy that in the post-Midway withdrawal combats one PBY torpedoed a Japanese auxiliary. A PBY!! 1 shot 1 hit and 1 badly damaged auxiliary. Wierdly enough, the only other time (that I am aware of)that a PBY attempted to torpedo an enemy ship it succeeded... that was at Guadalcanal. Now, a PBY was absolutely the wrong a/c to be making the attempt, so I suspect that TBDs under similar circumstances would have done very well indeed.

There is no way to represent pilot recovery.

I just don't buy into the fact that the USNAF should have equal experience with the IJNAF. One was an operational force, with YEARS of combat experience, while the other was a force being activated, still working in a relative peacetime order. Most pilots from that era say that an hours worth of combat experience is worth more than all their previous training combined. You just can't get that experience anywhere else. Sure, the TBD's could have been very good at hitting target tugs, but, what about carriers moving at high speed, while being shot at! Midway and Coral Sea are prime examples of this!

The USN did not score many air-torpedo hits on surface warships. Now, this can be said to be solely on the fault of the TBD, but, the B5N was also an extremely obsolete aircraft, and the IJNAF scored many torpedo hits with it.

Had those TBD groups attacked a transport group, experience 60 OR 90 they would have made some hits. Heck, I have Vildebeests with 45 experience sinking loads of IJN AP's and MCS's! It doesn't require an ace in a state of the art aircraft to sink an unarmoured, big, and slow merchant vessel.


Adequately trained for what the USAAF commander could deem is anywhere between 1-99. A group of P-40's with 50-60 experience should not slaughter a group of A6M's and G4M's of 80-90 experience, nor should they get a 1:1 kill ratio. The reason these (extremely flimsy aircraft ) kill all those P-40's is because the pilots of these Japanese planes are much better at using their aircraft to kill their enemies aircraft. That is what experience gets you.

Put a kid out of highschool in a F-22 and put him up against a veteran of vietnam in a F4 and the F4 pilot will wupp the butt of the F-22.

The reason why the IJNAF got that bite was because of the implementation of overwealming Allied air-power, and new types of allied aircraft as well as a better influx of replacements. Gradually, as the Allied groups got better the IJNAF groups got weaker, and this DOES happen in PacWar. Look at those P-40 groups at PM, they are slowly, yet surely, gaining experience (since all they can do is go up!). Put more fighter groups there with them and the change of a few getting through to the bombers will increase drastically.


So, what you would like to see is that the US aircraft groups to recieve greater experience rates or do you want their planes to be better?

Observations so far...
Jeremy seems to be contend that "accumulation of flying hours doesn't determine pilot quality"; and "after a point, further accumulation of hours becomes routine." Then something to the effect" that after a 20-40 hours of training, further flight time has little effect on pilot proficiency." This begs the question; "Why did the USN increase the number of flying hours required to qualify pilots for combat from 300 hours in 1942 to 500 hours in 1943?" In order to refine landing technique and radio procedure?? I don't think so. The USN, and the IJN and everyone else knew that intensive training for aircrews provided returns far greater than could be expected in any other circumstance, even combat experience. If this wasn't the case, the USN would have absolutely no logical reason to expend the time and resources on giving their aircrew an additional 200 hours of flight time. With this logic, these aircrews would've been put into combat in 1943 with their 300 hours of training and then let the 'cruicible of combat', complete their training. When faced with a circumstance like that of 1942, this is what had to be done. But in 1943, the USN had the option of giving it's aircrew additional experience, and it did so.

Jeremy's paragraph on "My roommate is a pilot..." This reminds me of a humor page in the back of 'Air Force' magazine a number of years ago. A very young 2nd Lt. was catching a transport hop, in order to receive a physical at a distant base. This 'butterbar' was non-rated, but held a private pilot license. Before departure, the Lt sought out the aircraft commander. Upon finding the aircraft commander, the young Lt. gleefully showed his PPL to him. The aircraft commander scrutinized the document, "Hmmm... Single engine land..., well son, if we have three engines go out, I'll call you forward." Every pilot thinks that they are the greatest; or the best they possibly can be, and additional flight hours are solely routine. I recall JFK Jr. thought the same thing. This same phenomena applies to most automobile drivers. "Just give enough money to buy a car, and I too can drive in the Indy 500 or Grand Prix series!" Yea, right. My intention is not to flame, but rather vividly illustrate the point that flying training cannot be dismissed as being ineffectual, or not comparable to actual combat time.

The Japanese realized that when aircrew were given a large number of flight hours to perfect their techinque, and more importantly to become consistant in their technique, that they could deliver tremendous results when finally committed to combat. Military history has demonstrated that training given to men before they enter combat is the key to success. Combat experience does indeed complete the training process, but the realities of combat tends to erode any great gains in combat experience due to the level of casualities suffered by the combat unit. Men need to 'see the elephant', as the Romans said, but it was more important to adequately train the men before they saw the elephant, lest they flee in terror, and be slaughtered at the enemy's leisure. The combat effectiveness of armies is usually the greatest right after the first battle of the war, because the lessons of that battle can be incorporated before the mounting causalties of combat start to eliminate the 'veterans'. Line infantry companies of US divisions committed to offensive operations in WWII suffered casualties every 3-4 months equal to the number of men authorized for that company. The way that combat effectiveness was maintained was by 1) Adquate preparation of the replacements, and 2) Identification of the natural fighters and leaders and placing these men where they could have the greatest effect. Combat can give a miliary unit an increase of about 20% in combat effectiveness, but the training that a unit receives before it enters combat accounts for 80% of the total effectiveness that the unit will ever have. No one should dismiss training as being a poor replacement for actual combat experience. Mistakes in training can be made good, mistakes in combat are made dead.

All of this is just to illustrate that training does have tangible effects on a unit's combat performance. Men often don't realize the effect, or belittle the training process; but without that process, those men would not have been alive to make those boastful statements. While some individuals might learn tremendously from the combat process, military units tend to make the greatest gains in combat effectiveness outside the combat process, in a training environment. That is why armies spend tremendous sums in training. Its not to keep the officers busy, but to keep the effectiveness of the force as intact as possible.

[This message has been edited by Ricochet (edited October 24, 2000).]

With all the talks about the Zero vs P-40 slaughter, remember PACWAR does not show the number of aircraft damaged or destroyed (which it should IMO).

So although it may look as if the Zero's are slaughtering the P-40's, 10:1, the majority of the P-40's are likely to be only damaged, where most of the Zero's that are hit in dogfight's are likely to be kills, so the kill figures are likely to be more even.

The challenge of accurately modeling air to air in the Pacific theatre is that, unlike the European theatre, where the aircraft design "philosophy" of the opponent nations closely followed one another, in the Pacific the priniciple opponents had radically different philosophys.

Japanese design practice (early/mid war) favored the attack over all else (hence the emphasis on maneuverabilty and firepower at the expense of armor and structural toughness) while US practice favored a balance between attack and defence.

Depending on how the individual pilots would approach each other would be a large determinant on who gets to walk away from the matchup. Even more so than in the ETO

An experienced P-40 or F4F pilot who tries to dogfight a zero in the 'classic' way (ala WWI) is going to lose 9 out of 10 times. The same pilot, savy in the ways of his enemy's machinery, who utilizes hit and run tactics will have a much better chance of success.

How can PacWar represent this situation? it cant. PacWar is a strategic level wargame , the game has to be able to represent the full spectrum of combat situations that can arise. As a result, some 'generality' is bound to happen.

Still, by utilizing the basic rules of wargaming, a decent portrayl can still be established. Experience ratings above all else should be a dominating factor. Look at it this way. The difference between a P-40E group with 60 experience and a P-40E group with 93 experience (like that FG in China (Flying Tigers i assume) are that the pilots there just dont have alot of logged flying hours but actual experience fighting the enemy and hence intimate knowledge of their opponent's strengths and weaknesses. The elite P-40 group will know not to dogfight a Zero wheras the more green group (even if instructed contrary on the ground)
might in the heat of battle tend to lose their 'battle plan' and allow themselves to be put into the type of fight that the zero will have the advantage of.

I am firmly opposed to the idea of downgrading the Zero's stats. I'm aware of the 'official' stats as presented by USN and USMC sources and they may be accurate, however as others have better explanined than myself, there are many other circumstances that affected the alleged kill ratio's than cant be represented by PacWar. If one is going to 'force' a 1 to 1 kill ratio for certain plane matchups, then what point having all the different stats and even more importantly, experience ratings for the squadrons? some examples of add'l factors not represented;

Coral Sea; many IJN planes were forced to ditch due to lack of landing facilites

Midway; well we all know about midway

Solomons: one thing not mentioned (I believe) that would have affected kill ratios was time in transit for the IJN pilots. Try being at your best in a dogfight after flying all the way from Rabaul to Guadalcanal and back (and repeat the process continously)

Despite being a strategic level game PacWar has a surprising level of detail when it comes to aircraft in particular.

The Zero had phenominal maneuverabilty and climb rate and in the early years good speed. Based on that alone it justifies a high MN rating. Combine it with high experience and yes, a zero group "should" be able to slaughter most early war allied groups. But even the most experienced Zero group still has an achillies heel. The A6M2 has a durability rating of a mere 11. Roughly this means that the Japanese will suffer a complete loss at more than twice the probability vs a typical Allied plane. So whereas you may see in 42 10 P-40's getting hit for around 2-3 A6M's ,chances are that most of those P-40's say as much as 7 out of 10 will only be damaged and those pilots will come back to try again later, wheras on average of those 3 A6M kills, 2 out of 3 are going to be permament.

Expand this picture to the attritional battles around the SW Pacific and you begin to see inevitably what actually happened in real life, that in a sustained combat intensive environment, even in victory, the exp levels of the engaged IJN units will steadily drop wheras, depending on loss rate, the Allies will actually remain stable or even increase as even tougher machines are introduced.

I cant claim to have played the most # of PacWar games, but i've played enough to see this borne out in actual playtesting. In my last full length game, the IJN groups ran rampent in the first full year of the war. But inevitably, once the allies were able to pull sufficient airgroups into the area to begin contesting control of the skies, errosion of that IJN exp superiority began to make itself felt. The low durability of the Zero being the culprit. So one can see clearly that the plane is not a 'superweapon' in the game anymore than it was in real life. It had great strengths but it had glaring weaknesses as well.

Taking away the A6M's strength while retaining the weakness is paramount to an unforgivable bias on the part of USN/MC fans.

If anything i believe the plane that needs adjusting is the P-40. Think its MN rating should be reduced to 18, as it seems to me that the plane tends to hold its own a little bit too well against the Zero. The P-40's only real tactic against the zero was to bounce it, hope for a lucky hit and dive out of combat. Another reason being that by having a two point MN advantage over the P-39 invites the extinction of the latter plane vs the historical reality.

sorry for the ramble and apologies again if i've overstated the obvious or repeated arguments. its hard to post a long thought from work with continuous interuptions and all that.

[This message has been edited by Nikademus (edited October 25, 2000).]

The American Volunteer Group consisted of very experienced American officers given a sort of 'leave of absence', in order to help the KMT counter the Japanese air attacks. At the time of Pearl Harbor, the AVG was actually in Burma training, before committment in China. The AVG fought the IJAAF in Burma before relocating to China, and spent about 6 months fighting the Japanese as the AVG.

The press found out about the AVG in late December 1941, and christened them the 'Flying Tigers'. The press at the time was given the notion that these individuals were merely motivated pilots, wishing to help the 'poor' Chinese. This misconception still continues to this day. The US government organized the AVG and equipped the AVG in an attempt to stem the Japanese advance, without becoming involved directly with the war. Sort of a plausible deniability situation. The men that were assigned/volunteered to the AVG were very experienced USAAC/USN/USMC aviators. These men, although some of the best in the US, had no previous combat experience. Nevertheless in a few short months of existance, they managed to amass extremely high kill rates on the IJAAF. Once the US became actively involved in war, and the urgency of early '42 subsided, the unit was absorbed into the USAAF and the men gradually dispersed into newly forming fighter units. Sort of shoots down the contention that pilots need large amounts of 'combat' time before they can be effective in combat...

There were parallels for this behavior at the time. Putting aside any political considerations, the German Condor Legion in Spain was much like the AVG. Some of the best aircrews in the Luftwaffe were sent to Spain to help achieve a political solution favorable to Germany. The Soviet Union did the same thing for the Republican side in Spain. In Korea, it is stated that the USSR secretly sent some of it's best pilots to fight in that conflict. The Russians even go as far to state that in Russian piloted MiG-15 v F-86 combat, the kill ratio was 1:1 rather than the 12:1 achieved for the war as a whole. It seems that the arguement over kill ratios is a old one.

Even the 'good guys' will use back door methods to influence the course of war, but thats nothing new.