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You might try the Olympic Club... [:'(]

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

I do not dispute that Iowa's FC system is superior to Yamato's but I think you are missing the point. You are basing your assumptions on two ships in an open sea, operating independently, firing at each other without any of the other interfering elements and factors. That scenario would never happen. These ships would have had CAs, CLs and DDs in company that would have complicated any battle, not to mention the probably of allied air power being on scene.

well the title of the discussion is "Iowa class BB vs Yamato Class". In an one-on one, Iowa wins the battle (real life is different, I'm not saying Iowa will ALWAYS win, I just say that Iowa winning is the most likely outcome of such a battle).

With CAs ,Cls and DDs in company the quality balance goes still to the US ships. Baltimore was an excellent CA while the japanese ones were quite troublesome (serious structural weaknesess), the japanese CLs were nothing but oversized DDs while the US CLs were excellent, etc. If allied air power is in scene, there simply will be no battle (as it happened IRL)

You're also assuming that the radar works infallibly, which it does not. Radar systems of the time were extremely sensitive to shock and vibration.

Those would be early sets. Latewar centimetric radars weren't that sensitive to concussion as the early models. The old BB line at Surigao kept an accurate and continuous fire over the japanese incoming ships and there was not a single radar casualty in the whole battle. Is a limited example, but it is an example.

There are many noted circumstances of US FC radars being knocked offline by the concussion of their owns guns.

I know they happened. From memory I know of three cases of US radars going offline, but all happened prior to mid 1943, and none of them happened aboard a battleship.

Is that "Many noted circumstances"?. I would like a list ,if you don't mind putting it here, of US/British centimetric radars going offline because concussion of their own guns, and in special, of those aboard of battleships.

They were also subject to misinterpretation. USS Blue's failure to detect the Japanese fleet at a range of less than 10,000 yards led to our defeat at Savo Island.

I should've put it more clear but I thought it was still clear enough. I'm speaking about centimetric wavelenght fire control radars here, not the early metric or decimetric radars usual in 1942 which suffered much more with ground and sea clutter. Had Savo Battle happened in 1944, the incoming japanese ships would've been clearly identified as such right from the start. Centimetric radar had an amazing resolution (for the era), to the point that it was used as ground-mapping and navigation radars aboard allied bombers. And they weren't easily cluttered by rough seas or nearby land.

Not only must radar detect the enemy, the operator must also realize that it is the enemy.

By november 1942 (Tassafaronga's battle) there were still few capable radar operators in the US navy, as the sets were still something new. By mid-1943 (Iowas in-service date), radar operators were, without exception, well trained for their duty.

Having a fair amount of experience operating search radar systems, I can tell you even today they are not perfect, far from it.

Much less they were in WW2 in absolute terms. But in a modern battle field you must count with EW interferences, something the japanese never used.

It is true that shell splashes can be observed on certain radars... under optimum conditions.

Centimetric radar offered almost proof-fool splash spotting capabilities except in the rough seas. Early decimetric radar was much less capable in this regard. But Iowa's FC radars were always of the centimetric wavelenght.

One of the early issues with Iowa's FC system was that it wasn't gyro stabilized. That meant if the ship rolled, the radar no longer on the target but pointed into the sea or into the air. The other issue is that if more than one ship is firing at the target, there is no way to distinguish whose shell is whose which negates the ability to use them for spotting.

Multiple firing ships at the same target are only a nuisance if their shells are of similar calibers. With different calibers the radar can perfectly discriminate between bigger and smaller shell splashes, it's not an issue. And if more than one ship is firing with same caliber weapons to the same target, tha means exactly the same problem wether you're firing under radar FC, or if you do with exclusive optic means.


About the Iowa¡s FC system not gyro stabilized, I agan must ask for sources...never heard Iowa's radar had this kind of handicap...

Using shell splashes for spotting was one of those WWII ideas that works great on the gun range, not so well in the heat of battle.

Good-working or not, it was the ONLY way of properly set a fire solution correction in battle ,and was the standard way of targetting for battleships.

AFAIK, there were no over-the-horizon surface naval battles during WWII.

Thats just because the only BB battles which happened in WW2 were limited in scope. BBs were the only ships able to hit targets that far from the firing ship, and so, the only chance for such a combat will be if a battleship is present.

Given that all battleship battles of WW2 happened either prior to 1943 (and thus, before the confirmation of air naval power as the main naval force projection too, and before working blind-fire centimetric radars were in operation), or at night at restricted waters (Surigao), there was no real BB-to-BB battle we can talk about. But it was well established that, after centimetric FC radars such as the US Mk.13 were introduced that the range of the engagements in open sea, had they happened, would've been over 20.000 yards without exception.

That there was only one BB vs BB battle after 1942 (and that one happening at the narrow surigao straits) was the only reason why there never was a BB vs BB over-the-horizon battle ever. And that happened because air power.

In fact, the longest hit of the war was by Scharnhorst on Glorious (IIRC) at a range susbstantially less than 30,000 yards. So it can be reasonably assumed that a battle between these two goliaths would take place under 30,000 yards at which point the Yamato's optical FC system should be effective. But again, that depends on weather. If visibility is poor, Yamato is at a major disadvantage. If visibility is good, Yamato is still at a disadvantage however she should be able to give a good account of herself.

For the record, the longest range hit of history is a tie between Scharnhorst on Glorious and Warspite on Giulio Cesare. Both events happened at ranges between 26.000 and 26.500 yards. Both hits were achieved in the first volley.

The hint about that after the introduction of centimetric radars those ranges would turn to be usual is what I said before. Radar FC offered a 400% improvement of changes of hitting the enemy over the optic FC at the longest ranges. If with optic fire control hits at 26000 yards were possible, it's clear that with radar, hits at 30.000 yards or above would be well within the capabilities of battleships. And certainly the Iowa was perfectly capable of both fighting effectively at those ranges, and keeping the distance for as much time as she wanted to.

Yamato also had her own radar FC suite which is less capable than Iowa's but adequate for the job. It is not as automated as is Iowa's nor can it provide automatic train information, something that Iowa's Mk-8 system could do after being upgraded in January 1945. Prior to that Iowa also had to manually pass train information to the guns. The Japanese were also still using A-scan scopes, Iowa's Mk-8 was using PPI displays.

not only that, Yamato's radar was of decimetric wavelenght. It was used as search radar with limited firing assistance (it couldn't adequately discriminate shell splashes, so it couldn't be used for blind fire). Also, it was less powerful than the Iowa's FC radar, so the longer the range of the engagement, the lesser the accuracy of said set's readings.

The bottom line is that during late 1944 and 1945, the Japanese were not just at a techological disadvantage but also at a training one. They did not have the fuel to conduct fleet or gunnery drills so could be expected to be far less efficient in battle than the Americans. If the battle is fought in 1943, things are much more even.

Well, Iowa entered service mid-1943. At that stage Yamato has no radar whatsoever and the Iowa already has its Mk.13 set in place...for me the conclussion is obvious.

But as I said before, I would not want to have a front row seat on either of these ships during a battle. I don't think either one would come away unscathed. Should the Iowa win this battle.... on paper, absolutlely. Would she have won? Who knows... Kind of like saying which football team, with one hundred percent certainty, is going to win any given match.

I fully agree with this. You can never know for certain what will happen in real combat. But as you said, on paper, Iowa has got such advantages over Yamato that it's pretty plain to see that IN MOST (not all) real life engagements, the winning ship should be the american one.

That's, at least, my opinion .

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Good analysis RAM. The only time the Yamato fired her guns in anger was at the Battle Off Samar. She had the disadvantage of firing armor piercing shells at unarmored targets, so they tended to sail right through. However, I don't believe the Yamato's shooting was all that accurate in that fight. I haven't read up on the battle lately, but I seem to recall that only a few 18" shells hit anything.

Bill

I've never seen anything that points at a single hit by those guns on enemy ships, ever. The only surface action they saw was during Leyte Gulf battles, and as I said, I'm still to see anything that proofs that 18.1'' shells hit anything at that battle.

If someone has documented proof that says otherwise I'd be very interested in seeing it .

ORIGINAL: wdolson

Good analysis RAM. The only time the Yamato fired her guns in anger was at the Battle Off Samar. She had the disadvantage of firing armor piercing shells at unarmored targets, so they tended to sail right through. However, I don't believe the Yamato's shooting was all that accurate in that fight. I haven't read up on the battle lately, but I seem to recall that only a few 18" shells hit anything.

Bill

ORIGINAL: RAM
I've never seen anything that points at a single hit by those guns on enemy ships, ever. The only surface action they saw was during Leyte Gulf battles, and as I said, I'm still to see anything that proofs that 18.1'' shells hit anything at that battle.

If someone has documented proof that says otherwise I'd be very interested in seeing it .

The Battle Off Samar is what the engagement where the Japanese surface force attacked Taffy 3 during Leyte. The Yamato was chasing a much slower task force than a surface fleet built around an Iowa would have been and Taffy 3's escorts were much lighter armed than any BB surface task force, yet Kurita had trouble scoring hits with his 18 inch guns. The carriers were hit and one was sunk by gun fire. I don't know who hit what and couldn't find anything in a quick seach of the web.

This would make an even better argument for the Iowa mopping the floor in a battle with the Yamato. If the Yamato struggled to hit anything at Samar, where the deck was stacked in the Japanese's favor, then it would not have fared well against a well equipped US surface force.

If Halsey had left his fast battleships behind to guard the San Bernadino Strait, as everyone else thought he did, then the Yamato may have had a chance to engage not one Iowa, but all the Iowas, as well as the other fast battleships. It not only would have prevented the disaster off Samar from happening, but it would have settled this issue forever.

Bill

You might try the Olympic Club...

That might work.... except I'd probably fall into one of those huge, man-eating urinals!

Chez

I did a midshipman cruise on the Iowa in the 50's. The accuracy of the Iowa's 16" guns is hard to beleive. We did a firing exercise at a target sled. The sled was over 20,000 yards. The Iowa fired one salvo of 16" blind loaded (solid shot) at the sled. Exercise over, no more sled. This was without explosive rounds, direct hit.

The analog computer on the Iowa was extremely accurate and much more advanced than anything the Japanese had. The radar was better than anything the Japanese had but the computer capability would have given the Iowa an significant edge.[X(]

I think that in the 50's Japanese also had a better radar and computers than Iowa in 1944...

The fire control computer for the main battery in the late 50's was the same mechanical analog computer on the ship when she was commissioned. I think the radars might have been improved by that time but I know the comuter was the same.

ORIGINAL: Monter_Trismegistos

I think that in the 50's Japanese also had a better radar and computers than Iowa in 1944...

Not so sure about that - they Japanese didn't start really developing their electronics industry until the early 1960s, iirc. Of course, they probably did receive radar from their NEW allies - the Americans...

wow what great replies!!!i learned alot from you all thanks..so i guess its determined who the kings are!!

Im surprised by the faith in radar, from my experiance as a radar operator it isnt perfect and plotting shell spashes in anthing above a Sea state 3 is today is almost impossible due to de-clutter processing early radar did not have that the screen would have been full of clutter.
 
additionally modern radar FC isnt always that good for example any of you remeber the video camera footage of the Ticonderoga trying to shoot a boghammer in the gulf (the incident which led to the shooting down of the Iranian airbus) the target was clearly visible on the camera zoom but the shells were 30 - 50 ft off the mark, ok the target was manouvereing and at short range but the radar in use was at least 70's design, if they were only using the SPQ-9 (could be wrong here but I belive the SPQ-9 is used for FC). 
 
Shipborne search radar and surface FC is very dependant on weather primarily due to SS, cloud/rain less of a problem choppy seas mean cluttered screens 
 
by the way, I read the forum  a lot but been in and out of the gulf 6 months every year for the last 5 years so havnt had chance to start a PBEM game yet.  [:)]

Just about every history I've read has said that using radar for targeting was a vast improvement. The late war systems being much better than early war ones. At the Battle of Surgio Strait, 3 of the old BBs had up to date radar and FC systems, and the other did not. The ones with modern FC systems were devestatingly accurate. Only one of the older BBs got into the fight and that was because her radar picked up the returns from the splashes of one of the other BBs and she targeted that. Between the torpedos from the DDs and the BBs big guns, Nishimura's force was completely crushed. Only a single DD escaped.

Though Surgio Strait was an almost textbook setup for the USN. Even at Guadalcanal, the USN had an advantage in surface fights when they had radar and competently trained people to use it.

At the end of WW II, the US was still a ways from being able to target individual aircraft with AA. Surface combat radar was fairly advanced though. At least from all I've read. I have no first hand experience, though I have some familiarity with the technical details of radar (I'm an electronic engineer).

Bill

A fairer comparisson would surely have been Montana vs Yamato, after all, BB67 saw a return to the traditional battleship, rather than the glorified carrier escort that the Iowa's were originally designed as.  Montana was designed throw a heavier broadside than Yamato, 12 x 16" vice 9 x 18.1", the secondary batteries were also better with 20 x 5"/54 cals. 

Bottom line is, I think the career of any Iowa class Captain would have been rather short if he left his station by the flat-tops to go off glory seeking, rather than providing the close cover for the CV's like he was supposed to.  Pity the Montana's weren't built, great that the stats for them are posted all over the web, so it's easy to model them into the game.
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ORIGINAL: bsq
A fairer comparisson would surely have been Montana vs Yamato, after all, BB67 saw a return to the traditional battleship, rather than the glorified carrier escort that the Iowa's were originally designed as. Montana was designed throw a heavier broadside than Yamato, 12 x 16" vice 9 x 18.1", the secondary batteries were also better with 20 x 5"/54 cals.

The Iowas were designed for old fashioned BB to BB gun battles. They were laid down before Pearl Harbor when the old battlewagon admirals still controled the Navy. The fact that they could keep up with the fast carriers was an added bonus. As things turned out, the fast battleships were much more useful as giant flak platforms and escorts than their intended role. The only time fast battleships were able to engage surface ships was in one of the battles off Guadalcanal where the Washington and South Dakota were thrown in as a stop gap to stop a large Japanese bombardment force. The South Dakota had a power failure a few minutes into the battle, but the Washington's performance was outstanding. (The South Dakota was able to get into the fight at the end.) Admiral Lee had drilled the crew of Washington so extensively it was probably the best BB crew in the Navy at that time.

Bottom line is, I think the career of any Iowa class Captain would have been rather short if he left his station by the flat-tops to go off glory seeking, rather than providing the close cover for the CV's like he was supposed to. Pity the Montana's weren't built, great that the stats for them are posted all over the web, so it's easy to model them into the game.
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Halsey did exactly that at Leyte. He formed TF34 which had all the fast BBs, as well as a bunch oruisers and DDs. He left Nimitz and Kincaid with the impression that TF34 was guarding San Bernadino Strait while the carriers went hunting for flat tops up north. In reality, he sent TF34 (with him on board New Jersey) ahead of the carriers to catch the Japanese carrier fleet in a surface action just after the carrier air power struck.

Because he had left the door open on the San Bernadino Strait, Kurita was able to slip through with a very large force with Yamato as the flag ship. On the morning of October 25, 1944, as he was closing on Ozawas carriers in the north, the IJN's Center Force with Yamato blundered into Taffy 3, a CVE task group (TG 77.3). Kincaid started asking where was TF34. Halsey initially ignored him. Nimitz, listening to the radio traffic from Hawaii, decided to nudge Halsey and sent the message: "Where is TF 34?"

Here US coding practices and the decision of the guy who coded the message changed the course of the battle. To confuse Japanese decoders, all messages had a garbage phrase at the beginning and end separated from the body of the message with two letters right next to one another.

The message sent to Halsey said: "The turkey trots RR Where is TF 34? QQ The world wonders." The person decoding the message on the New Jersey should have deleted everything before the RR and after the QQ. He deleted the first garbage line, but not "QQ The world wonders." When Halsey got the message, he didn't notice that the two sentences were separated by QQ and he thought Nimitz had lost confidence in his command and was being sarcastic. Halsey was so upset, he actually began to cry.

He was way too far away to arrive in time to save Taffy 3, but he turned TF 34 around anyway (just getting to within range of the enemy) and went south. If he had seen that "The world wonders" line was filler, or the decoder had removed it as he should have, Halsey's TF 34 would have closed on Ozawa's carrier force with something like 8 battleships. The only heavy fire power Ozawa had were the Ise and Hyuga which had been converted into hermaphrodite carriers and only had their forward guns remaining.

If Halsey had kept TF 34 at San Bernadino Strait, as everyone thought he was doing, Kurita's force would have exited the Strait right into the guns of the US fast battleships.

Bill

Don't get me started on Halsey

If Halsey had kept TF 34 at San Bernadino Strait, as everyone thought he was doing, Kurita's force would have exited the Strait right into the guns of the US fast battleships.

Actually the battle would have been more interesting than it might seem today. The result of Halsey's "interesting" deployment of the 23rd and 24th was that at sundown of the 24th the ships of TF 34 (6BBs) were spread over 100,000 square miles of the Philippine Sea. It was after midnight before the ships were actually assembled, and at that time Kurita was already transiting San Bernardino Strait. It would have taken Halsey another 3-4 hours at least to intercept Kurita and bring him to battle. This would have occurred with the US ships silhouetted against the lightening eastern horizon, and the Japanese against the shore of Samar to the west.

Halsey would indeed have had the advantage in radar as well as in heavy guns (6BBs to Kurita's 4), but the advantage in cruisers and DDs would have been with the Japanese force. I never bothered to count up the long lance torpedo tubes deployed with Kurita, but I'm sure there were over 100, plus reloads. This battle would have been no gimme for Halsey.

Just took a quick count of guns and torps:

Halsey:

54 x 16"
18 x 8"
60 x6"
286 x 5"
192 x 21" TT

Kurita:

9 x 18"
8 x 16"
16 x 14"
66 x 8"
46 x 6"
18 x 5.5"
90 x 5"
239 x 24" TT, plus 146 reloads

Some clear advantages to each side I think.

ORIGINAL: irrelevant

Don't get me started on Halsey

Did ya know that Spruance, watching the battle unfold with Nimitz and looking at a map, would have placed TF 34's battlewagons precisely where Kurita passed his force the night before Salamar?

[;)]

ORIGINAL: wdolson

The Iowas were designed for old fashioned BB to BB gun battles.

I'd have to disagree with that. When the escalator clause was invoked....that extra 10,000 tons could have been used for better protection against Iowa's own armament (usually a standard US practice) but instead it was decided to 'spend' that tonnage on extra speed so that the BB's could operate with the CV's as well as hunt down fast raiders (and of course the more traditional BB duties) Thus Iowa's protection remained close to the preceding treaty bound South Dakota's which itself was not designed to counter the new superheavy 2700LB shell.

Montana....was classic US old fashioned BB design in my opinion....slow, powerfully armed with protection trumping speed.

ORIGINAL: irrelevant
Actually the battle would have been more interesting than it might seem today. The result of Halsey's "interesting" deployment of the 23rd and 24th was that at sundown of the 24th the ships of TF 34 (6BBs) were spread over 100,000 square miles of the Philippine Sea. It was after midnight before the ships were actually assembled, and at that time Kurita was already transiting San Bernardino Strait. It would have taken Halsey another 3-4 hours at least to intercept Kurita and bring him to battle. This would have occurred with the US ships silhouetted against the lightening eastern horizon, and the Japanese against the shore of Samar to the west.

Halsey would indeed have had the advantage in radar as well as in heavy guns (6BBs to Kurita's 4), but the advantage in cruisers and DDs would have been with the Japanese force. I never bothered to count up the long lance torpedo tubes deployed with Kurita, but I'm sure there were over 100, plus reloads. This battle would have been no gimme for Halsey.

Halsey initially sent a message saying he was planning on creating TF 34 before Ozawa's carrier force was spotted and before he sent his forces haring off to the north. At the time he told Nimitz about TF 34, the only forces spotted were the Center Force and Southern Force. When Ozawa's carriers were spotted late in the day, he decided to believe the exagerrated reports from his strike pilots and believe that the Center Force was out of the fight and retiring. He was a big believer in concentration of force and believed that all of the 3rd Fleet forces should go north together.

He only informed the task group commanders of the 3rd Fleet of this change in plan. As far as Kincaid and Nimitz knew, he was leaving TF 34 behind to guard the SBS. In reality TF 34 didn't exist until the three carrier task forces converged and Halsey came up with the idea to initiate a surface battle after the carrier strike on Ozawa's force.

If he had formed TF 34 when he said he would, he would have been in position in plenty of time to greet Kurita.

I did a quick search and found this: http://www.chuckhawks.com/task_force_34.htm

It describes how the match up between Lee's TF 34 and Kurita would have likely gone. Lee's original list of ships for TF 34 only drew from two task groups, so only had 4 fast BBs. When TF 34 was actually created, it was formed from all 3 task groups and had 6 BBs.

One thing the analysis above doesn't cover is that it was discussed to leave two CVLs behind to give TF 34 cover in the morning of the 25th. The TBFs of those CVLs would almost certainly have joined the battle. At Samar, the planes from the CVEs caused Kurita considerable anxiety and may have contributed to his cutting and running. The planes at Samar were not armed with anything the could have seriously hurt any of the larger ships. Torpedo carrying TBFs from the CVLs would have been a different matter. The total number may have been small, but if Kurita's ships were maneuvering to avoid air launched torpedos, that would have hurt his ships' firing performance and given the US BBs another chance to take the heavies out of the fight early.

Coming out of the SBS at dawn would not have favored Lee's forces. As you said, they would have been silluetted against the rising sun. Lee would have been able to at least partially negate that by setting up in a crossed T formation. Kurita would have been hampered at the start by his ships needing to navigate a confined space before turning broadside, while Lee would have been prepared and waiting.

Olendorf the night before had the perfect terrain set up for his battle. The Japanese didn't stand a chance. Lee wouldn't have had as easy a setup and he was facing a larger force.

Another factor that would have counted against the Japanese was the lack of cohesiveness of Kurita's force. At Samar, Kurita's forces just charged in and attacked pell mell instead of cordinating their fire. By that time of the war, the US had a lot of practice cordinating large forces. The destroyer squadrons had been together for a while and the captais knew each other well. Long Lances were much better torpedos and the Japanese had more of them, but their crews hadn't had as much chance to practice as the USN crews.

As the article says, there are so many what if factors and so much chance that the Battle of San Bernadino Strait could have gone either way. The US had more factors in their favor though:
Better recon of the Japanese focre
Better damage control
Some trained air power that would have been on call
More total number of ships
Newer ships
Better radar and better fire control
Being able to wait for the enemy to come to them
Generally better rate of fire on most ships

This shows the actual composition of TF 34 when it was created on the 25th (scroll down a ways): http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Leyte/BatExp/Leyte-BE-78.1.html

I noticed some errors in the ships sunk, so I'm not completely sure of the accuracy of the OOB.

Bill

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
Did ya know that Spruance, watching the battle unfold with Nimitz and looking at a map, would have placed TF 34's battlewagons precisely where Kurita passed his force the night before Salamar?

[;)]

After the war, Halsey said that the US would have fared better at both the Battle of the Philipine Sea and Leyte if Spruance and Halsey were switched for those two battles. Spruance got criticized for being to passive at Philippine Sea and Halsey got criticized for being too aggressive at Leyte.

Bill