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The Japanese were playing for time.  Remember that they wanted an anvantageous negotiated peace gained from a position of strength.  As stated earlier in 1942 they still hadn't come to grips with the fact that they were fighting a war that they couldn't win militarily.  Their war plan was to gain the natural resouces that they needed so badly and building outer and inner defensive lines.  The problem was that the victories came to easy early in the war and they got greedy and reached for more than they could cope with or the plan called for.  Who knows what would've happened if the Japanese stuck with the original plan and there had been no atomic bomb?  Is it possible that the fighting could've continued past 1946, 20-20 hindsight causes shoulda, woulda, couldas.  There's just no way of knowing if the US would've tired of the war or avoided invasion and starved Japan by blockade, to many unanswererable variables.  So a line in the sand was drawn and it didn't matter where it was, it just happened on the 'Canal.  The US was very lucky to have the right people in the right places making the right decisions, huge production capacity and code breakers.

If the Japanese had stuck to their original plans, the Allied comeback would have just started closer to it's goal. They would have been in better shape to face it..., but the material avalanche would have been just as large. Possibly larger and later because without the additional Japanese pressure less might have been switched from "Germany First". But Japan was going to "get theirs"..., and if it came later they would have more Soviets and Brits to deal with sooner when it arrived.

So the old military axiom of not fighting a war on 2 fronts didn't apply to the US beacause it had the needed population base to draw on and the huge production capability to bury the opposition with.  WITP is a game and it can be played according to the parameters set forth in the program, as a history lesson or tool it can be in some ways and not in others.

ORIGINAL: TommyG

I don't question that the campaign was successful and brilliant (after all, my father had an SBD squadron on Henderson and went ashore in August), I do question whether it was as essential as history now proclaims. IMHO, the whole campaign came about because we drew an almost arbitrary line in the sand.

TommyG, I have a childhood friend whose father also flew an SBD on Henderson about that time. He was a pilot in a squadron off the Enterprise that was temporarily assigned to Henderson. The pilot's name was E.E. Rodenburg in VS-6. If you have any interest in contacting my friend Denny Rodenburg (lives in Reno, Nev) let me know. I will also mention this to Denny.

What was your father's name? What was his Squadron? Is he in the data base? At one time in the original game E.E. Rodenburg, his cousin with the same initials (who flew TBD's I think) and his good friend D. Byerly were all in the pilots rosters.

ORIGINAL: tocaff

The Japanese were playing for time. Remember that they wanted an anvantageous negotiated peace gained from a position of strength. As stated earlier in 1942 they still hadn't come to grips with the fact that they were fighting a war that they couldn't win militarily. Their war plan was to gain the natural resouces that they needed so badly and building outer and inner defensive lines. The problem was that the victories came to easy early in the war and they got greedy and reached for more than they could cope with or the plan called for. Who knows what would've happened if the Japanese stuck with the original plan and there had been no atomic bomb? Is it possible that the fighting could've continued past 1946, 20-20 hindsight causes shoulda, woulda, couldas. There's just no way of knowing if the US would've tired of the war or avoided invasion and starved Japan by blockade, to many unanswererable variables. So a line in the sand was drawn and it didn't matter where it was, it just happened on the 'Canal. The US was very lucky to have the right people in the right places making the right decisions, huge production capacity and code breakers.

Plans for the US/British invasion of Japan were well advanced by the time the nukes were dropped. Some have argued that the nuclear weapons were not the thing Japan feared the most, it was the USSR getting into the fight starting in early August, 1945. They were fully aware of the Soviets capabilities and the Soviets desire for revenge. Japan humiliated the Russians in 1905. The USSR wanted the territory back, plus a pound of flesh.

They knew that the US and Britain "played fair" and that they would get a better deal if they surrendered to the US than the Soviets.

As early as 1944, the Japanese embassy in Switzerland had been talking to the US embassy people. The sticking point was only one. Japan refused to agree to a completely unconditional surrender. The one point they held out on was that they wanted a guarantee that the emperor would remain. At the time, the US was considering trying Hirohito for war crimes, so it was a deal breaker. If the US had understood Japanese culture better, they would have realized that the Japanese emperor is more like the king on a chessboard with virtually no power beyond symbolic. The emperor is also considered a god, so whoever controls the emperor, controls Japan.

When McArthur was commander of the occupation, he came to realize this and allowed the emperor to remain. Since he was the one controlling the emperor, he controlled a god and controlled the country absolutely. The occupation of Japan was the most peaceful of any in the 20th century.

Bill

ORIGINAL: tocaff

So the old military axiom of not fighting a war on 2 fronts didn't apply to the US beacause it had the needed population base to draw on and the huge production capability to bury the opposition with.  WITP is a game and it can be played according to the parameters set forth in the program, as a history lesson or tool it can be in some ways and not in others.

The US also had several Allies that allowed it to fight a war on two fronts...

Consider though that the US was never totally mobilized.  The production was growing all the time and the armed forces never called up all those eligible for military service and I'm not including those working in war essential industries.  Having allies was very important and still is, but that war machine was something the world had never seen before and hopefully will never see again.

ORIGINAL: tocaff

Consider though that the US was never totally mobilized.  The production was growing all the time and the armed forces never called up all those eligible for military service and I'm not including those working in war essential industries.  Having allies was very important and still is, but that war machine was something the world had never seen before and hopefully will never see again.

Actually, the scary part is that the US actually began CANCELLING orders for military equipment during the second half of 1943. They figured (correctly) that the war was going to be won with what was already "in the production pipeline".

WITP as a history lesson?  Nah, it's just a game.  Don't get offended guys, it's a really huge game but still it's a game.  

I once visited a small city in Illinois, Kewanee. During that visit I saw a nursing school built in January 1945.
I wondered if any nursing schools, or any civilian construction was going on at the time in the UK or the USSR.
The remarkable thing is that the US had so much excess production capacity that, in the middle of a two front war, civilian projects could be started.
The point being that the US never actually mobilized its full potential into war production. The UK and the USSR did; the US simply did not need to.

ORIGINAL: tocaff

Consider though that the US was never totally mobilized.  The production was growing all the time and the armed forces never called up all those eligible for military service and I'm not including those working in war essential industries.  Having allies was very important and still is, but that war machine was something the world had never seen before and hopefully will never see again.

Actually the US did experience a shortage of shipyard workers later in 1944 into 1945. In a report to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral King expressed concerns over the decline in the number of such workers and the problems in getting vessels repaired and serviced.

In addition IIRC the US was having trouble in 1945 filling out additional Infantry Divisions.

Now granted the US never resorted to drafting children or the elderly, but the US wasn't a cornucopia...massive yes...cornucopia no.

The manpower was there but the draft system didn't work well enough and to many people were to smart to enlist after the first wave of volunteers.  Let's not forget that the US actually trained it's servicemen before throwing them into combat.  My father washed out of pilot training due to depth perception problems (landings could be tough) so he went to radio operator school.  If you were going to be assigned to B-17s you then had to go to gunnery school, which he skipped and went to B-29s instead.  Between basic training and everything else he didn't ship out for overseas for over a year. The problem for the shipyards was not building the ships, just that so many always needed repairs, refits, new this or new that and the capacity was stretched.  The point is that many combat formations actually had more than their TOE called for and yes casualties were always hard to replace in all wars so additional divisions became a problem.  A lower percentage of the population of the US was in uniform than most would think and most troops were in support roles rather than combat.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Actually, the scary part is that the US actually began CANCELLING orders for military equipment during the second half of 1943. They figured (correctly) that the war was going to be won with what was already "in the production pipeline".

I believe I read somewhere that in 1944, the US canceled more battleship tonnage than Japan had at it's peak.

Today the US would be incapable of gearing up for production like it did in the 1940s. In the late 30s, America's production capacity was beginning to reach its peak. It's declined so much due to foreign competition that it would be unable to gear up on that scale again. At least not within the time frame of a war like WW 2. Of course modern weapons are a lot more complicated, which would make the problem even worse.

Bill

ORIGINAL: tocaff

The manpower was there but the draft system didn't work well enough and to many people were to smart to enlist after the first wave of volunteers. Let's not forget that the US actually trained it's servicemen before throwing them into combat. My father washed out of pilot training due to depth perception problems (landings could be tough) so he went to radio operator school. If you were going to be assigned to B-17s you then had to go to gunnery school, which he skipped and went to B-29s instead. Between basic training and everything else he didn't ship out for overseas for over a year. The problem for the shipyards was not building the ships, just that so many always needed repairs, refits, new this or new that and the capacity was stretched. The point is that many combat formations actually had more than their TOE called for and yes casualties were always hard to replace in all wars so additional divisions became a problem. A lower percentage of the population of the US was in uniform than most would think and most troops were in support roles rather than combat.

The age range for US soldiers was narrower than most other nations. Especially the countries on the losing end. However, that pool had been pretty well tapped out by early 1945. Starting near the end of the Battle of the Ardennes to the end of the war in Europe, Eisenhower had to fill out infantry units with black combat troops who had volunteered from support units. It was very unpopular, but they fought well and eventually helped weaken the arguments against integration.

My father said he knew people after the war who had gotten college deferment to try and stay out of the military, but found those canceled in late 1944. Virtually all those people were sent into the infantry and few managed to get into OCS. The army needed riflemen, not officers, so lawyers were toting guns on the front line.

It is true that more people served in administrative and support roles than on the front lines. Except when things were completely collapsing or an emergency situation, this was true for most armies. All those support squads in WitP represent some of these troops. The US had a larger support tail than most militaries though. It also had longer supply lines than most militaries.

The US is the only country in history (at least since the evolution of the nation state) who has won a two front war. Especially two major fronts. Both of those fronts were a long ways from home. It kept American production safe, but required a huge support system to move men and material to the fronts.

Bill

The ammo would run out in 2 to 3 months time in a major conflict today and the armed forces would be bled white within 1/2 that time so production is a moot point.  We get better and better at killing but the rest of society seems to be slipping backwards.

The point being that the US never actually mobilized its full potential into war production. The UK and the USSR did; the US simply did not need to.

The US never actually mobilized its full potential because they were never invaded. They'd have to push to the edge if the war come on their grounds, like it was in the USSR... but neither Germans nor Japs never really were a threat to the States, there was no need to evacuate the industry to the inner grounds. That's why they kept their production capacity not at a full size. Just a remark.

Alex.

yes, but are the Solomons relevant?  is it necesarry for the Japanese to take them?  seems like an real over stretch for already stressed supply chains.  i think the Japanese would have been better off just taking the SRA with all its resources and just bunkering down.  form a ring of bases from wake down to kwajalein, gilberts, maybe take Rabaul as a satellite, but its pretty tough to get within truk as US without getting pounded.  then just build and build forts and supply,  keeping your navy intact to respond to any threats on the borders of the empire as they arise.  make the PI a central staging area for a mobile response force in case of any break throughs.  then concentrate on keeping your shipping lanes open with as much ASW as possible. 
 
just an idea i've been pondering for a new game.

Well, the thing about defending in the Solomons is that, they are more defensible. WitP does accurately portray the added security of interdefensible positions. The Solomons, in WitP just as in history, provide a multitude of potential bases/airfields that that, due to their proximity and mutual support, make capturing one and eventually all of them, more costly.

If you take the whole of New Guinea, the Solomons, and up to Truk, it took the Allies about 2 years to secure the area. That's quite a bit of time, considering the percentage of real estate of the entire Pacific theater that, that area represents.

If the "goal" is Saipan/Tianan/Guam = puts B-29s in range of Japan, and allows you to patrol NW and cut imports; then consider how much work you want the Allies to do in order to get there.

If don't even bother with New Guinea or the Solomons or New Britian, the Allies can use Rabaul as a huge staging base, wipe out Truk (it doesn't have much for mutually supporting bases within range). And then they're one step from S/T/G.

Each bit you go south, buys you a little more time. If you take only Rabaul, maybe New Britian, the Allies will pound you from the Solomons. If you take/build up New Britian (Gasmata etc), you can have some mutual support, to make their job harder.

But obviously the crown is to own the Solomons *and* New Guinea. This buys you the most time, perhaps indefinate. If the Solomns/NG are heavily fortified, it's a tough nutt to crack. Just like the SRA, there are multitude of mutual supporting bases.

Frankly, I think it's a little easier to go thru atolls (in game terms), because they're more spread out and easier to isolate (which is also true historically, altho nobody would say that atolls were easy historically).

I guess you could ask the question - If Japan captures all NG/Sol, and builds it up and it then acts a deterrent to Allies, to the point where they never go that way, and instead chosing to go thru Centpac. Were the Solomons irrelevant? You might say so. You've got 3 divisions or so cooling their heals doing nothing. But you might also say that it allowed you a bit of control by forcing the Allies chose a different axis of attack (as maybe you can put it to good use).

Whatever. Point is, I believe that historically, the Solomons -did- prove to defensible. The nature of the area lends to a mutually supporting network of airfields. It -did- provide a focus of Allied offense for nearly 2 years. The Japanese intent -was- to establish an outer perimeter that was suppose to buy time until a peace agreement could be reached after all. Unfortunately, that "buying time" was exactly what Japan couldn't afford. The two years it "bought' proved to be the attrition war that killed Japan, looking for a peace settlement that was never going to happen.

-F-

One aspect is that a campaign in the Solomons allowed the US to use its existing LBA effectively, as the distances between bases was within the range of much of our aircraft. Even Guadalcanal could have been approached via bases in the Santa Cruz islands as well as the lower Solomons (the direct move on Guadalcanal forced the cancellation of plans to build up Ndeni in the SC chain).

A mid to late 1942 offensive in the Central Pacific was almost impossible, as it would require the landings to be supported by carrier based air, which was in very limited supply at that time.

To understand Japan's thinking, you have to see things from their perspective at the time.  Historically, when an aggressor grabs a lot of territory, the enemy usually sues for peace to prevent more territory grab.  The wars in which an aggressor grabbed a lot of territory and then lost it over a long war of attrition are in the minority.  We remember them because they were some of the largest wars in history. 

Japan's military history from the 1850s onward was all victories.  They beat the Russians in 1905 and got territory, they took Germany's Pacific possessions in World War I, and they beat the Chinese at every turn in the Sino-Japanese War.  The limits on Japan in that war were more logistical than anything to do with the enemy.

All they had ever known were victories.  They grabbed territory, beat up the enemy and they begged to quit.  Quite a few planners in Japan thought the US was going to do the same thing.  Beliefs on this were not homogenous, but the prevailing opinion was that the US was a paper tiger who would collapse when punched in the nose.  After all, the fighting was a *long* ways from US home territory, and the US had a strong isolationist movement.  The Japanese failed to anticipate how the US reacts to having its territory attacked.

There were few precidents.  The last time a foreign power put any troops in force on US soil was the War of 1812.  (I don't count the minor border raids by Mexican guerillas because those were not organized military troops, they were more like outlaw bands, though the US did react in force to them.)

The predominant thinking in Japan was that if the Japanese siezed as much territory as possible, the US would be more likely to give up rather than slog it out island by island.

The planning also included an intack KB roaming at will within the empire to be a massive concentration of force where ever it was needed.  If the KB had survived 1942, it would have made the come back tougher.  Though the US still would have done it.

The Japanese also failed to take into account pilot training.  The US adopted the British training system from the start, which was ideal for a long war.  It preserved the best pilots and ensured a large pool of well trained pilots with ever increasing quality right out of training.  By the time Japan realized that their training program was inadequate, it was way too late.

If Japan had kept the KB intact and had a steady flow of well trained pilots, the US would have had a tough time doing much offensively until the US carrier force was built up.

Bill