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We also could make a house rule - no joint attacks - period.

Sorry for my poor English, I'm try to give more information for you.[:'(]
Generally say, the size of Chinese regular army is:
1938    49 Corps, including 182 Divsions and 80 Bdes.
1942    92 Corps, including 245 Divsions.
1945    124 Corps, inclusing 354 Divisions, 81 Ind.Bdes and 112 Ind. Regt. More than 4,000,000 men.
1946    113 Corps. Change to 89 Regroup Divisions when the civil war start.
I am doing a mod called "Blood War 43-46" with new Chinese OOB, I will release it in a few days.
[8D]

Regretfully, we lack the slots to add a lot of Chinese units. I did just create the first ROC reinforcement - but at the cost of a guerilla unit. The WITP design pretty much makes adding the units a bad idea anyway: Chinese units regenerate very fast - and so while they may have the wrong name - they will tend to always be around.

What we could attempt is to make the Chinese units get bigger. This just might work out as supply in China is so marginal that they would not do that unless

a) The Japanese withdraw a lot or

b) The Allies send a lot of supply in

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Regretfully, we lack the slots to add a lot of Chinese units. I did just create the first ROC reinforcement - but at the cost of a guerilla unit. The WITP design pretty much makes adding the units a bad idea anyway: Chinese units regenerate very fast - and so while they may have the wrong name - they will tend to always be around.

What we could attempt is to make the Chinese units get bigger. This just might work out as supply in China is so marginal that they would not do that unless

a) The Japanese withdraw a lot or

b) The Allies send a lot of supply in

Sid, if there are any zones(hexes) with stacked Communict units, and "if" they were made static, would it free slots to combine the unit, "HQ" or "base/fortess" style??

Since the communists were far more likely to seek out and engage the Japanese -

it would be better to make the ROC static than the Reds

And I do not see how making any unit static "frees up a slot"???

Static or not it needs a slot.

Further - in RHS it is the guerillas - ROC and Red - that are semi-static- being mobile is what distinguishes a regular unit from a guerilla (along with supply stuff - if that even works ).

It is far easier to forbid Red and ROC to stack together than to make either static.

IF you want more slots - combine divisions into Armies - I guess. Most "armies" have two divisions ("field armies") - the remainder have three ("group armies"). This is more or less traditional - and IJA used the same name - an IJA "army" is also 2 or 3 divisions as a rule.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Since the communists were far more likely to seek out and engage the Japanese -

it would be better to make the ROC static than the Reds

And I do not see how making any unit static "frees up a slot"???

Static or not it needs a slot.

Further - in RHS it is the guerillas - ROC and Red - that are semi-static- being mobile is what distinguishes a regular unit from a guerilla (along with supply stuff - if that even works ).

It is far easier to forbid Red and ROC to stack together than to make either static.

IF you want more slots - combine divisions into Armies - I guess. Most "armies" have two divisions ("field armies") - the remainder have three ("group armies"). This is more or less traditional - and IJA used the same name - an IJA "army" is also 2 or 3 divisions as a rule.

Yeah..I was addressing 2 challenges at the same time, combining forces to a higher level of organisation to free slots, and giving them a static component to prevent overt mobility.
Not sure if you meant to imply the ROC did not conduct active warfare against Japan,(if that is indeed what you seemed to imply in this post?)

You read that right. It might be better simulation to have most of the ROC absent - except it did tend to be in the way.

The active portion of the war for ROC Army ended BEFORE WITP begins. The ROC - unwisely - committed all 10 of its reformed and relatively professional divisions to the defense of Nanking - and lost the lot (along with a great deal more).
It is a source of some bitterness that afterward a gigantic portion of the ROC went over to Japan - under the number 2 leader of the KMT - and begins our game on the "wrong" side. [Had Japan not been hoodwinked by Chiang into not recognizing the Nanking regime sooner, China might have lost the war. Chiang "negotiated" at Hong Kong so long that the defectors came to be seen as something similar to Quislings - which in fact they were not. It was traditional in ROC to calculate which way the wind was blowing - based on Sun Tzu no less - and change sides based on that calculation. It even has a name in Chinese.] Anyway - after that the ROC was remarkably passive - and the ROC ALSO traded - big time - with Japan in strategic materials. Much of Japan's uranium - and a great deal of other minerals - came from ROC China - DURING the war! [Again - that is fairly traditional in China] The Red's were proud that they actually sought battle with the enemy - although this has been somewhat overstated by the regime since - it is based on a kernal of fact.

In RHS portions of the former ROC (and other "Chinese") armies are in IJA service - including static units at Nanking and Peking, the "Mongol Army" (also static) up North, and quite a sizeable mobile force of Mongol Cavalry (which also are present in all forms of WITP) plus several Manchurian units of various kinds - brigades - a cavalry formation - and even an ethnic Russian unit. [Many people today believe that Manchuria is "part of China" - wether or not it was then is a somewhat questionable idea - but I included it here for purposes of being complete. Similarly I included Inner Mongolia and a smaller "country" in Northeast China.] If the so called 'puppet troops' are considered Chinese - and indeed most are not only ethnic Chinese but official ROC formations with ROC leaders and uniforms - then I DO use the static concept for "Chinese troops" - just not on the Allied side. Only the Mongol Cavalry and the Manchu's are mobile.

Chinese ROC artillery units are only battalions. So in addition to combining divisions into armies, we could combine artillery battalions into groups - or also put one in some armies.

Good idea. Stands to reason the artillery would only be committed where infantry support was present.

More Japanese troops! More Japanese troops!![:D]

We cannot- of course - put Japanese units in former Chinese slots. But we could add Chinese units

What armies appeared after WITP begins - where - and of what size (2 or 3 division flavor)?

I have to say el cid's above mentioned understanding of the China theatre is largely flawed, to say the least. Wang Ching-wei, the number 2 leader of the KMT, never was able to get any significant part of KMT army followed with him to the Japan side. And to say afterward a gigantic portion of the ROC went over to Japan is a big overstatement. Actually there was some widespread conspiracy theory that Chiang Kai-Shek intentionally devised the plan and mislead Wang Ching-wei into the exile to the Japan side. As a result Chiang Kai-Shek's situation inside KMT was significantly secured and strengthened, since his long time competitor, Wang Ching-wei, now took the wrong side, and it turned out that even those former supporters of Wang Ching-wei inside KMT now had to join Chiang Kai-Shek's coalition to denounce Wang Ching-wei's betrayal and fight against him under the unchallenged leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek. That happened between late 1938 and early 1940.

Therefore, realized that his Nanking "Puppet" government had a military wing of virtually zero strength, Wang Ching-wei had to seek help from Japan. He made a plan to have an army of 10 divisions armed and trained. But that plan received little success till the end of the war on Aug 1945.

It was true that ROC army rarely took large scale offensive action after Nov 1937, the fall of Shanghai (not Nanking), where ROC army's 3(not 10) most well-equiped and well-trained divisions were largely depleted. The reason was simply lack of supply to support large scale offensive action, as it was showed in WITP. So after Oct 1938, the fall of Wuhan, throughout most part of China theatre, the war was carried out in such a typical way, that Japanese army launched a large scale attack, ROC army defended and inflicted heavy loss on enemy, then Japanese army had to give up and retreated to its starting line, and ROC army had to stop there due to supply shortage. So the positions of frontline remained relatively unchanged until 1944, but the battles were quite intensive.

ROC army was not capable in offensive action due to supply problem, but they were formidable in defence.

I am listing the simplified OOB of the Third Battle of Changsha, a Japanese attempt to capture Changsha from Wuhan, as an example. Starting from Dec 24, 1941, It was designed to keep ROC army from reinforcing Hongkong. But the earlier than expected capture of Hongkong made this one the main battleground.

Japan:
6th Division
3rd Division
40th Division
Mixed 14th Bde
Mixed 9th Bde
34th Division

ROC:
26A
79A
78A
72A
20A
58A
37A
99A
10A
73A
74A
4A

After bloody battles, Japanese army approached and started attacking Changsha from Jan 1, 1942. The attack failed with heavy loss and Japanese started retreating since Jan 4, 1942, and it took them 12 days to finish the 50 kilometers trip back to the starting line.

Talking about China Red Army, which means 18th Group Army (18GA, at first named as 8th Route Army) and "New 4th Army"(N4A), they did actively seek battle a lot with Japanese army, but most battles were in scale of regiment or even lower, in a semi-guerilla style. 18GA had only 3 divisions, 115D, 120D and 129D. N4A had 7 divisions in name, but the overall strength of N4A was roughly equal to one division of 18GA.

"Puppet" Mongolian Army, consisted of around 9 divisions, basically was disabled after crushed by the 35th Army of ROC led by its commander General Fu Tso-yi in Nov 1936. It was extremely low in morale, and very poor in equipment. "Puppet" Manchurian Army was nothing better, if not much worse. and it never stepped outside of Manchuria. Both were far from capable even used as police force.

There were just no instance of ROC Central Army switching side to Japan. And the only instance of significant number of ROC Army switching side to Japan, happened in May 1943. The commander of "New 5th Army"(N5A), General Sun Tienying, surrendered after defeated and captured by Japanese Army north of Henan. A large part of N5A surrended with him. N5A was an army of minor warlord, in other words, a ROC provincial army, in contrast to ROC central army, so it was smaller in size, consisted of only 2 small divisions(T3D and T4D). It kept the name of N5A after join Wang Ching-wei's puppet army.

After all, in early 1944, Wang Ching-wei's puppet army grew to around 280,000 people, organized in 7 Group Army. But these puppet army's morale was so low that their commanders explicitly refused being sent to frontline to fight against Chiang Kai-Shek's army, and throughout the war there were not any puppet army used in frontline. They were limited useful as police force against China Red Army's semi-guerilla war. but the usefulness were largely balanced by the fact that China Red Army acquired most of their weapons from attacking and destroying these puppet army.

In short, China Theatre was a theatre large and complicated but lack in thorough research and understanding. How to accurately simulate it is still an issue to be discussed.

(to be continued)

Zeke,

Not entirely accurate...

The third Battle of Changsha was launched by the Japanese as a pinning operation to divert Chinese resources from any potential drive on Canton while Hong Kong was being invested. Orders were issued to withdraw from Changsha on January 4, 1942 after the investure of Hong Kong and after most of Changsha had been captured by the Japanese not necessarily because the Japanese had been beaten in battle.

Most Japanese offensives that "failed" in China, "failed" because they had met their objectives and the Japanese ordered withdrawls to their original start positions because the start positions were the areas that had the best lines of communication in China - ie the Yangtze.

As an example - in Mid-1943 the Japanese launched an offensive and captured the town of Changte. Changte is located iirc 100 K or more to the W-NW of Changsha. The intent of this offensive was to divert Chinese reinforcement of the Yunnan area which was supporting operations in Burma. The Japanese withdrew from Changte in Dec 43/Jan 44 because they opted not to repair the road network at the start of the campaign due to experiences in previous campigns. Specific mention was made in the orders issued that ammunition and supplies would only be delivered to the Liui Shui Line a river approx 60-70 K north of Changte because the road network had been destroyed and there was no intention of repairing the roads.

In early 1942 the Japanese also launched an offensive in the Chekiang-Kiukiang (sp?) region.  After achieving their objectives (the destruction of airfields in the area) the Japanese withdrew from the region back to their start lines to reorganize not because their forces had been defeated in the field.

Throughout the period 1941 through 1945 the Nationalist government engaged in active guerilla warfare with the Japanese. They continuously infiltrated Armies/Corps into areas to engage in guerilla warfare. Supply in China was definitely tight and was a primary factor in the success of the Ichigo offensive compared to earlier Japanese offensives. 

In regards to chinese puppet armies increasing numbers of Nationalist Generals brought entire divisions with them to the Nanking Govt. as the war progressed. Including as late as 1945. I am currently at work and cannot quote the exact numbers at this time however I recommend Philipp S Jowett's Armies of the Rising Sun for a discussion of the units of the Nanking army and other puppet chinese factions.

ORIGINAL: treespider
{snip}

Most Japanese offensives that "failed" in China, "failed" because they had met their objectives and the Japanese ordered withdrawls to their original start positions because the start positions were the areas that had the best lines of communication in China - ie the Yangtze.
...

Ok, I'm not an expert on the Sino-Japanese war, but I must say that the description above, even though found in books, sure has the ring of "Japanese point of view".
It just seems suspect that the ANY army would repeatedly launch large incursions bringing on bloody protracted battles only to return time after time to their start line and then say "we weren't beaten at all - the mission was a success".
That has all the ring of WWI Allied "victories" on the Western Front - that were in reality bloody stalemates, and downright defeats that were never recorded as such in the western press.

Just my thoughts...

ORIGINAL: Zeke

I have to say el cid's above mentioned understanding of the China theatre is largely flawed, to say the least. Wang Ching-wei, the number 2 leader of the KMT, never was able to get any significant part of KMT army followed with him to the Japan side.

I am a sometime consultant to the ROC today - re military matters. And I have a Chinese historian as a mentor to help me get things strait.

Let us try to separate propaganda from reality. Read, for example, World War II Nation by Nation - for a sense of the numbers. The number of ROC (and ROC warranted) troops serving Japan was in seven figures: millions. The uniform of the "Reformed" military - the largest of all the so called "puppet armies" - was the unaltered ROC uniform itself - except Japan insisted an anti-communist slogan be added to the hat.

For a scholarly view of the politics of the era INSIDE ROC - see China and the Origins of the Pacific War by Yaouli Sun - published by Stanford Univesity Press - and based on declassified ROC archives. This material suggests that ROC intentionally - and successfully - engineered the US entry into the war - because it was "the last, best hope for China" to defeat Japan.

For lots of reasons, a lot of untruth was and is still spread around. We were not entirely honorable either: China was victim to the largest instance of biological warfare in modern history - we knew it - and we denied it - instead cutting a deal with the Japanese to get the technology for ourselves. A lot of Chinese were upset about it. Russians too. When the Russians held a war crimes trial at Khabarovsk for these criminals - we denounced it as a "show trial" - knowing full well EVERY allegation was true. Because we did not want to be forthcoming with evidence we feared would help Soviet bw programs.

Ironically, ROC was a charter member of the Anti-Comintern Pact - with Nazi Germany and IJA dominated Japan. In that period Germany trained and equipped 10 ROC divisions - and not one of these was fit for combat by the time we got into the war. I did write from memory however - but as I recall there were two different battles of significance - the one involving Shanghai was the first and only time Japan ever fielded a Marine (Naval infantry) division in history - and then later a movement that ended in the "rape of Nanking." The ROC army did attempt to stand and fight - but it did not turn out very well - both the Army and Air Force suffering terribly and the Navy being wiped out as an organization.

treespider,

According to materials released by the War History Research Institute of Japan Ministry of Defense in late 70's,
Japanese 11th army, the attacking army based on Wuhan had to issue order to withdraw from approaching area of Changsha because they suddenly found they fell into a trap set by General Xue Yue, and the entire attackking force were being encircled by ROC Army from all direction. Despite the objection from the 3rd division, General Anami Korechika, the commander of 11th army issued the order immediately. One more day staying in the vicinity of Changsha might mean the destruction of the entire attacking group. Japanese never captured most part of Changsha in the Battle despite its heavy loss. At Jan 4 most part of the city were still in the holding of ROC 10A. From Jan 1 to Jan 4, and through Jan 16 in retreating Japanese attacking group was beaten badly. Actually I can give you a list of lost Japanese high-ranking officer's name, position, plus date and place of loss in the Third Battle of Changsha, just to show how badly the attacking group was beaten.

Hongkong surrendered at Dec 25, 1941, when Third Battle of Changsha just started.

Generally books in english regarding China Theatre were not in abundance and lack in detail and accuracy. Much better resource exists in Japanese and Chinese.

ORIGINAL: Zeke

IROC army was not capable in offensive action due to supply problem, but they were formidable in defence.

(to be continued)

I concur with this assessment. Even ROC "guerilla" units - based on military units - were formidable and effective.
We tend to greatly underestimate the Chinese will of the era. It appears Chiang wanted to cut a deal with Japan - but it was not a political option due to Chinese popular anger with Japanese behaviors. He may have been a dictator, but he was unable to disregard widespread popular opinion of that sort.

ORIGINAL: Zeke


There were just no instance of ROC Central Army switching side to Japan.
(to be continued)

First of all - I was writing generally of Chinese military attitudes and behaviors - not just saying defection to Japan.
What we saw in 1948 - when most of the ROC went over to the Reds ("the best divisions in the morning would go over by nightfall") - was just a dramatic case. It is typical of Chinese behavior. They had corrupted Sun Tzu's "the greatest generals are not renowned because they do not fight battles but achieve the (objectives) of their prince by other means" into a system that justified changing sides (based on such things as "who has the artillery piece?").

Second of all - if you check your Osprey books on the Japanese puppet armies - you will find the view that they went over en mass - it isn't just World War II Nation by Nation.

Third - if you get the ROC historians to talk to you outside a situation deemed patriotic - you may learn some things not often put in print.

ORIGINAL: Zeke

IAfter all, in early 1944, Wang Ching-wei's puppet army grew to around 280,000 people, organized in 7 Group Army. But these puppet army's morale was so low that their commanders explicitly refused being sent to frontline to fight against Chiang Kai-Shek's army, and throughout the war there were not any puppet army used in frontline. They were limited useful as police force against China Red Army's semi-guerilla war. but the usefulness were largely balanced by the fact that China Red Army acquired most of their weapons from attacking and destroying these puppet army.

In short, China Theatre was a theatre large and complicated but lack in thorough research and understanding. How to accurately simulate it is still an issue to be discussed.

(to be continued)

This is not very different from my view - although I doubt we have good numbers. It is why I made this force static. It also should be noted that I rate it as a brigade equivilant in terms of practical unit value. Most of it "serves" as the supply sink for Nanking.

ORIGINAL: Big B

ORIGINAL: treespider
{snip}

Most Japanese offensives that "failed" in China, "failed" because they had met their objectives and the Japanese ordered withdrawls to their original start positions because the start positions were the areas that had the best lines of communication in China - ie the Yangtze.
...

Ok, I'm not an expert on the Sino-Japanese war, but I must say that the description above, even though found in books, sure has the ring of "Japanese point of view".
It just seems suspect that the ANY army would repeatedly launch large incursions bringing on bloody protracted battles only to return time after time to their start line and then say "we weren't beaten at all - the mission was a success".
That has all the ring of WWI Allied "victories" on the Western Front - that were in reality bloody stalemates, and downright defeats that were never recorded as such in the western press.

Just my thoughts...

There is a good deal of this on both sides. Reading Chinese unit histories makes the Chinese appear nearly as supermen and the Japanese as almost uniformly inept and unsuccessful.

Japan was its own worst enemy. There was no unified command in China. There were about five "nations" - if Manchuria, Lioning, Inner Mongolia, Peking China and Nanking China all count. The commanders of several of these areas were more interested in personal gain than national security. There was no national policy on China in a unified sense of the term - IJA hotheads often (usually) were ahead of policy and had not thought it through a bit. Until late in the war - when it acted to hurt returning White powers - Japan tolerated what amounts to slavery (pressed labor) and siezed properites. [Late in the war Japan became very liberal, releasing prisoners, pressed laboreres, returning property, and administration of Chinese entities for the first time since the Europeans had taken it away from the Chinese. The rights of colonial powers were never restored except in Hong Kong - where a British fleet went in 1945. But when it mattered Japan was not even honoring Japanese law - mostly.]

This was balanced by Chinese being almost more divided than Japan (which is probably impossible). China was a mess - and it was only unified by the Ruthless regime of Mao.