Matrix Games Forums

Hard to beat your enemy when he's not only bigger than you but your own family is fighting itself.

Actually, the relationship between MacArthur in Australia and... virtually everyone else in CINCPAC was little better... [:'(]

ORIGINAL: tocaff

Hard to beat your enemy when he's not only bigger than you but your own family is fighting itself.

I recall that Hitler's inner circle hated each other as well, which is significant in that they all headed various military departments like counter-intel, war production, the SS, etc.

All things considered, w/all it's mutual animosities, it's amazing the Axis got as far as they did, or were the Allies simply asleep at the switch?

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Actually, the relationship between MacArthur in Australia and... virtually everyone else in CINCPAC was little better... [:'(]

Long ago I recall a move where a US serviceman stationed "down under" was murdering Aussie women, which made the tense situation between the Allies there much worse.

I had the impression that the movie was based on fact.

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Actually, the relationship between MacArthur in Australia and... virtually everyone else in CINCPAC was little better... [:'(]

Long ago I recall a move where a US serviceman stationed "down under" was murdering Aussie women, which made the tense situation between the Allies there much worse.

I had the impression that the movie was based on fact.

It was; the movie was called Death of a Soldier

"Based on a true story, James Coburn portrays a military lawyer assigned to defend a confessed psychotic killer. Set in the context of WWII and the uneasy US-Australian military alliance. The accused killer claims to have killed 3 women in order to possess their voices. Despite the defense lawyer's concerns that the killer is not fit to stand trial, the US military presses forward with the case and its desire to have the killer executed in order to strengthen the shaky alliance."

"... This particular story was true, and is the event in military history that is directly responsible for the creation and implementation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) applicable to all the Armed Forces. The film is accurate and does not portray any Hollywood political bias. It's a great film and a good piece of history.

A little known fact: Gen. MacArthur came close to being court martialed for preventing Maj. Dannenberg from appealing Pvt. Leonski's death sentence and conviction, but political allies in Washington intervened."

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0092858/

All things considered, w/all it's mutual animosities, it's amazing the Axis got as far as they did, or were the Allies simply asleep at the switch?

Everyone gets along better when they are winning and what rivalries exist get smooth over. The real animosity comes up when things are going badly for a side.

Patton and Montgomery would have really been at each others throats had tanks been rolling down the streets again of Paris in 1945.

Same for McArthur and Nimitz had Japanese been landing in US west coast in 45´

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Actually, that's not entirely true. The Japanese Navy already had fairly good estimates of the numbers of US troops & engineers on both Tulagi and Guadacanal failry quickly

I'd be interested in seeing something confirming this, as just about everything I've read indicates the exact opposite.

For example:

Headquarters of the Japanese 17th Army at Rabaul, acting on orders issued from Tokyo on 13 August, had just assumed responsibility for directing ground operations on Guadalcanal,23 but its intelligence estimates were extremely inaccurate. The landing on 7 August had taken the Japanese by surprise. They had retaliated with surface and air attacks, but there were not enough troops under 17th Army command to permit the immediate dispatch of strong forces to Guadalcanal. The Japanese thought that a small force had been landed on 7 August. Some estimated that only 1,000 American troops had come ashore. The Japanese Army apparently based its estimates of the forces needed to destroy the American beachhead upon its experiences in China and Malaya.24 The officer who was later to become Chief of Staff of the 17th Army, Maj. Gen. Shuicho Miyazaki, was then in Tokyo. He wrote later that "at that time we had no means of ascertaining actual facts regarding the extent of the enemy counter-offensive."

Source: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/guadc/gc-04.htm

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: tocaff

Hard to beat your enemy when he's not only bigger than you but your own family is fighting itself.

I recall that Hitler's inner circle hated each other as well, which is significant in that they all headed various military departments like counter-intel, war production, the SS, etc.

All things considered, w/all it's mutual animosities, it's amazing the Axis got as far as they did, or were the Allies simply asleep at the switch?

i think thats a typical problem for a democracy. most of the democratic states go unprepared into a war.

the situation at guadalcanal would be ironic if it were not that serious. prior PH attack, the allied underrated the japanese (some british sailors from force Z thought even that the japanese planes are made of bambus) and at guadalcanal, the japanese did the same with the allied and sent regiment after regiment there to do the job of a entire division.

quote:

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Actually, that's not entirely true. The Japanese Navy already had fairly good estimates of the numbers of US troops & engineers on both Tulagi and Guadacanal failry quickly

I'd be interested in seeing something confirming this, as just about everything I've read indicates the exact opposite.

The invasions of Guadacanal and Tulagi caught the Japanese by surprise, to be true. On the 'canal they only had technicians and civilian engineers, who fled into the jungle at the first sight of the US navy, whilst on Tulagi there was a small army regiment or unit of about 1,500 men who were slaughtered to a man in a short but bitter defence of the smaller island.

I will try to find out more about the intelligence availalbe to the Japanese when the US turned up in force in August, however the problem is (as highlighted above) that the IJN may have had a fairly good idea of numbers of troops and shipping, but they didn't bother to tell the Army much if anything about them.

The Guadacanal Campaign was littered with horrendous mistakes by the Japanese (the US were little better, to be said), but they were definitely caught on the hop when the US invaded on 7th August (I think that's the right date). The invasion was met with complete and utter panic in Rabaul, who immediately ordered the raid they had primed and ready to go for Port Morseby to be redivered SE to the Solomons. However, such was the degree of panic that the Betty's were sent out still loaded with ordnance suitable for attacking an airfield and not either torpedo's or SAP bombs, which would have been far more effective against shipping. It would have taken no more than 90 minutes, 2 hours at max to change the load, but no somebody panicked and sent them off with ineffectual munitons.
THen, to cap off an outstanding burst of brilliance, they then sent a squadron/flight of Vals SE to attack the ships, even though they had insufficient fuel to get back. The official high command response was to have a destroyer loiter around the Shortlands area and watch for Vals crashlanding there in the sea, as it was one Val made it back and ditched, and the crew was picked up - 3 men saved, the rest lost either over the 'canal (it was an unescorted raid) or else in the sea when they had to ditch. And this was an elite unit as well which the Japanese could ill afford to loose!

However, then enter Admiral Mikawa into the arena. He picks up his heavy cruiser squadron from Rabaul and immediately sets sail SE to meet the invasion menace - I think his command was 4 or 5 heavy and 1/2 light cruisers, all primed and ready for night action. Mikawa has detailed reports of the disposition and number of the transports + up to date maps of the area around Savo Island etc, also where the two Allied cruiser squadrons are protecting them + their picket destroyers. Thanks to poor Allied intelligence/reconissance, even though his squadron is spotted sailing SE, nobody thinks that much of it at US high command. He's got extremely detailed and accurate information of the combat area (check out his diaries/memoirs, they are available), even if he's not sharing them with anyone else. In the Battle of Savo Island (8th-9th August 1942) he inflicts one of the worst naval defeats on the Allies ever and leaves four heavy cruisers disabled or sinking, yet doesn't follow it up by then attacking the transports - he was extremely censured by the Japanese Navy over his 'lack of fighting spirit', yet it is worth noting that it was his boldness and his attacking strategy in the first place to clinically take out both cruiser squadrons that put him in such an advantage. Mikawa's excuse was always that his force had gotten so spread out and disbersed that it would have taken him 1-2 hours simply to regroup prior to any attack,and he was seriously worried about US carrier strength in the area (as it turned out, the US carriers had already legged it for reasons that have never adequately been explained, although there was no way he could have known this

ORIGINAL: xj900uk

Actually, that's not entirely true. The Japanese Navy already had fairly good estimates of the numbers of US troops & engineers on both Tulagi and Guadacanal failry quickly

I'd be interested in seeing something confirming this, as just about everything I've read indicates the exact opposite.

I'm pretty sure both were in the dark at the beginning on the size of the force ashore. I'll have a look at Richard Frank's Guadalcanal to see if I can locate anything either way on the matter. I do remember later on during the campaign there was a difference as far as the size of the defending troops between the two services. Hard to understand why the IJA didn't have better intel because their view from Mount Austen was outstanding. They could see the beach and the whole field.

ORIGINAL: xj900uk
The invasions of Guadacanal and Tulagi caught the Japanese by surprise, to be true. On the 'canal they only had technicians and civilian engineers, who fled into the jungle at the first sight of the US navy, whilst on Tulagi there was a small army regiment or unit of about 1,500 men who were slaughtered to a man in a short but bitter defence of the smaller island.

They say the second thing to go is your memory (speaking of myself) I thought there was a token force of about 300 troops on the 'canal maybe I'm wrong. Either way it doesn't matter when you have thousands of Marines coming ashore in a foul mood. [:D]

ORIGINAL: xj900uk
I will try to find out more about the intelligence availalbe to the Japanese when the US turned up in force in August, however the problem is (as highlighted above) that the IJN may have had a fairly good idea of numbers of troops and shipping, but they didn't bother to tell the Army much if anything about them.

As evidenced by Colonel Ichiki's around 900 men assualt during the Battle of the Tenaru they severely underestimated the force. The whole brigade wasn't even ashore yet. The roughly 900 involved in the attack not many more than 100 of the force survived .
on a side note-
I remember reading the Ichiki brigade was involved in the Marco Polo bridge incident which some would say helped kick off WW2.

ORIGINAL: xj900uk
The Guadacanal Campaign was littered with horrendous mistakes by the Japanese (the US were little better, to be said), but they were definitely caught on the hop when the US invaded on 7th August (I think that's the right date).

The IJA problem was complex because of the commitment on New Guinea as well. Hindsight being 20/20, if the Imperial General Staff realized early this was the "decisive battle" they were seeking I believe Henderson would have fallen sometime in September. Purely speculation on my part.

Agree with some of the above, but Mikawa and the IJN had a fairly good idea of the US naval forces deployed and their location at dusk on 08.08.42. Otherwise he would not have won the first battle of Savo Island so decisevely. Whether or not he bothered to share his intel with anyone else, especially the army, is a matter of conjecture.

Re the Japanese having an ideal observation post on top of Mount Austen was also true, although I thought (again) it was mainly for the benefit of the IJN so they could call in their battlecruisers to shell the airfield quite efficiently. But no matter who was responsible right at the top of the mountain, it is clear that reports/intel were never getting to the upper echelons of the Japanese Army, or even if they were sent at all.
Both Japanese services are littered with some wierd illogicalities. For example, the low servicability of their machines on land airfields was due to nobody bothering to take an inventory of what each plane needed (eg a new carburettor) and 'borrow' it from another 'plane that was grounded for a completely different fault or shortage

ORIGINAL: SuluSea
The IJA problem was complex because of the commitment on New Guinea as well. Hindsight being 20/20, if the Imperial General Staff realized early this was the "decisive battle" they were seeking I believe Henderson would have fallen sometime in September. Purely speculation on my part.

Didn't the IJA have troops just east of PM within sight of its AF, but they were recalled back thru the Owen-Stanley Mts. and sent to the 'Canal?

ORIGINAL: Joe D.


Didn't the IJA have troops just east of PM within sight of its AF, but they were recalled back thru the Owen-Stanley Mts. and sent to the 'Canal?

I'm not sure, I do know that the Nankai Detachment retreated from the trail to protect Buna after Kawaguchi's force was shredded at Edson's Ridge, Imperial General Headquarters decided to commit "decisive forces" to Guadalcanal in mid September

Agree with some of the above, but Mikawa and the IJN had a fairly good idea of the US naval forces deployed and their location at dusk on 08.08.42. Otherwise he would not have won the first battle of Savo Island so decisevely. Whether or not he bothered to share his intel with anyone else, especially the army, is a matter of conjecture.

Mikawa was brilliant no less at Savo and in general, but his victory at Savo had more to do with failures on the Allies behalf on almost every level. On July 23, 1942 Mikawa warned the Combined Fleet of an attack on Guadalcanal before the airbase was complete. I read somewhere of the 13 Cruisers that had operated in the constricted waters around Guadalcanal during the campaign all were either sunk or damaged.

Re the Japanese having an ideal observation post on top of Mount Austen was also true, although I thought (again) it was mainly for the benefit of the IJN so they could call in their battlecruisers to shell the airfield quite efficiently. But no matter who was responsible right at the top of the mountain, it is clear that reports/intel were never getting to the upper echelons of the Japanese Army, or even if they were sent at all.

Yea, the IJN had an observer up there but the Army also had the "gifu" not on the summit but close. I think that area provided James Jones inspiration for the book The Thin Red Line.

I think that area provided James Jones inspiration for the book The Thin Red Line.

I´ve seen people on these forums saying they did not like this movie but I thought it was a great movie.

I read somewhere of the 13 Cruisers that had operated in the constricted waters around Guadalcanal during the campaign all were either sunk or damaged.

Well they didn't call the waters around Savo Island 'Ironbottom Sound' for nothing... [8|]

And yeah, i saw the movie recently, starring Sean Penn if my memory is correct, and thought it actually very good even if it only dealt with a small amount of the campaign

ORIGINAL: Ike99

I think that area provided James Jones inspiration for the book The Thin Red Line.

I´ve seen people on these forums saying they did not like this movie but I thought it was a great movie.

I found the movie somewhat depressing, and a number of the surviving veterans of that campaign didn't care for it either; I think they were hoping for a SOPAC version of "Saving Pvt Ryan".

I thought both of the Japanese branches were in the dark as far as the composition of the force ashore, of course as the campaign continued and the Army and Special Naval Landing Forces hit the beach the picture became more clear with the help of some humbling defeats, some excerpts from Richard Franks Guadalcanal-

To work out a joint plan to deal with the new situation, members of the Army and Navy sections of the Imperial General Headquarters convened a series of liaison study meetings. The first of these assemblies , on August 7, reached a tentative consensus that the landing repesented no more than a "reconnaissance in force."

The Combined Fleet did in fact hide its own carrier loses at Midway from the Army not to mention inflated its claims of sinking American flattops so the Army was in the dark from that perspective but I don't see anything written that the Navy knew how many men were ashore in early August and kept the information to themselves.
More from Frank-

When reconvened on August 8, the Imperial Headquarters liaison study group revised the estimate to reflect these reports pointing to a major Allied move. By August 10, the Navy indentified the unit at Guadalcanal as a well equipped Marine Division. Clearly, any attempt to recapture Guadalcanal would meet heavy opposition and marshaling units for a counterattack would have to be the first step in a Japanese riposite.

On the 11th the pilots of six Zeros returned from  low strafing swoops over Guadalcanal to affirm American strength, thus buttressing the estimate that Guadalcanal held a division of Marines.

and later on August 12th-

8th base Force Lieutenant Commander Matsunaga, rode one of three bombers dispatched to Guadalcanal. Not surprisingly, from a perch over 10,000 feet above Lunga Point he failed to see many marines frollicking around the airfield and only a few boats in the water. From these observations he concluded that the main body of troops had been withdrawn.Unfortunately for Japan, Matsunaga's superiors weighed his report in accordance with his rank and position rather than keeping with its intristic value.

ORIGINAL: xj900uk



Actually, that's not entirely true. The Japanese Navy already had fairly good estimates of the numbers of US troops & engineers on both Tulagi and Guadacanal failry quickly


I will try to find out more about the intelligence availalbe to the Japanese when the US turned up in force in August, however the problem is (as highlighted above) that the IJN may have had a fairly good idea of numbers of troops and shipping, but they didn't bother to tell the Army much if anything about them.

It doesn't make any sense that the Combined Fleet would suppress enemy troop information from the Army. The two branches may have been at odds but they both wanted to recapture the airfield.

ORIGINAL: Ike99



I´ve seen people on these forums saying they did not like this movie but I thought it was a great movie.

I haven't read the book because it doesn't come with enough pictures [:D] but from what I understand Hollywood deviated from Jones writing to make it more attractive to a wider audience.

I liked the movie, it also was able to provide me with a mental picture of the area as I read. When I was reading about the Battle of "the GIFU" I said darn if this doesn't remind me of The Thin Red Line.

Whilst I agree that there were examples of the IJN deliberatly withholding info from the Army (eg over carrier losses at Midway), I doubt they woudl have surpressed info about the enemy forces at Guadacanal.
Having said that, it has been established that many individuals within the IJN from individual commanders and pilots right up to Admiral Mikawa seemed remarkably well informed of enemy troop and ship numbers, movements and dispositions, whilst hte general army strategic planning staff seemed to remain in blissful ignorance until far too late in the campaign

I found the movie somewhat depressing, and a number of the surviving veterans of that campaign didn't care for it either; I think they were hoping for a SOPAC version of "Saving Pvt Ryan".

Real war is depressing. I thought it created the mood and enviroment of the campaign very well from the simple soldier point of view.