Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

And I think there are some good Barbarossa scenarios out there. There's one I'm particularly fond of that seems to work quite well. [:)]

They might be good -- or at any rate, as good as they can be given the current limitations of the system.

However, I seriously doubt that you can actually portray the actual number of units the Russians had, their actual equipment, or their actual combat ability.

If you did, the Germans wouldn't be able to get past Smolensk. This leads us to the observation that whatever you've created, the extent to which it is a 'simulation' is debatable.

I'm reminded of SPI's old 'War in the East.' Sure the Germans can pull off something like the historical 1941 advance. That would be because SPI's brilliant research team stumbled upon the little-known fact that the Russian army of 1941 actually consisted of sixty rifle divisions and little else. They simply retreat eastwards fast enough so that the Germans can never muster enough surplus movement points to pay the zone of control costs and engage them.

It works, but it's not simulation. I'm certainly not accusing you or any other designer of a Barbarossa scenario of doing anything as remotely silly as this -- but to some extent, you must go down that road. Given the actual strength of the Red Army in 1941, and given the limited array of tools TOAW offers to simulate command and control problems and simple confusion, there's no alternative.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
That would be the 'crudest way' I acknowledged exists. It's hardly satisfactory -- witness the absence of any really successful France 1940 or Operation Barbarossa scenarios.

It's not any cruder than the combat or logistic systems. We don't account for the windage on sniper rounds, or whether the Italians have enough water for their pasta. All the minutia are more or less combined into an amalgamated whole. Same for disorientation & confusion.

The France 1940 problem is primarily a hindsight problem. Handling disorientation & confusion minutia discretely instead of as a whole wouldn't fix it. The French player would still know the Germans are coming via the Ardennes and not Holland. He'll still know that he needs greater depth of defense to handle Blitzkrieg.

The Russian problem in 1941 can be largely analyzed as a 'hindsight' problem as well.

The Russians engaged the German army as if the Red Army was a combat-ready force capable of meeting the Germans on the field in the Western USSR and throwing it back.

As a result, their original army was virtually wiped out, and they had to do what at least partially amounted to building an army from scratch while in the middle of a war. Virtually untrained conscripts were sent into action with what could be found for them. Those who survived went on to form the core of the combat-ready Red Army that actually did emerge in 1943 or so.

Had the Russians had a correct appreciation of the situation in 1941 -- had they realized just what their force actually was capable of and what the Germans were actually capable of -- they would have willingly withdrawn eastwards, husbanding their trained troops and reorganizing as they went.

They then would have had a vastly stronger army, probably would have shattered Army Group Center in the winter of 1941, and been in Berlin by Christmas 1943. The first Panthers would have caused some nasty hiccups in the Russian advance across Western Poland, but they wouldn't have been able to turn the tide.

But that's not what happened, and the reason it didn't happen is that the Russians operated on several grossly fallacious assumptions in the Summer of 1941.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Sigh. You're going into 'TOAW is perfect. None of the devices it offers are in any way lacking or need to be improved' mode.

Not at all. I'm just saying that amalgamating the combat and logistical minutia works better at TOAW's scale than actually dealing with that minutia in detail would. And I think the same of shock for disorder & confusion.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

However, I seriously doubt that you can actually portray the actual number of units the Russians had, their actual equipment, or their actual combat ability.

If you did, the Germans wouldn't be able to get past Smolensk. This leads us to the observation that whatever you've created, the extent to which it is a 'simulation' is debatable.

But I did and they can. Of course, there's a generous amount of shock involved. Perhaps that disqualifies it for you in some misguided way. But I consider shock to be a legitimate method of modeling disorder & etc.

You might want to at least look at the AAR before you judge. Total ignorance is not a very lofty vantage point.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
The Russian problem in 1941 can be largely analyzed as a 'hindsight' problem as well.

Not as severe as France 1940. No more than your average historical topic. Regardless, dealing with the disorder minutia wouldn't address hindsight.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Sigh. You're going into 'TOAW is perfect. None of the devices it offers are in any way lacking or need to be improved' mode.

Not at all. I'm just saying that amalgamating the combat and logistical minutia works better at TOAW's scale than actually dealing with that minutia in detail would. And I think the same of shock for disorder & confusion.

Well...no.

I would say that command and control and actual combat proficiency are two very different issues. For example, in designing Seelowe I was confronted by the fact that the troops of Britain's array of second-line divisions probably would have fought reasonably well -- but the British would have encountered substantial difficulties in coordinating their actions, in supplying the divisions as they moved about, and in waging a battle -- and particularly a mobile battle -- in general.

Simply using negative shock doesn't work, since it affects combat power as well as the ability to avoid going into reorg. You can't make all the divisions 20% proficiency. Dug in, and waiting for the enemy, or going over the top as ordered after careful preparation they would have no doubt performed quite creditably.

I wound up with the following suite of devices, which go some way to achieving the effect I wanted but are not completely satisfactory.

1. Unit proficiencies for the British raised across the board about 10% above what I would choose otherwise. This offsets the effect of negative shock as far as combat ability goes.

2. British force shock set at 90%. This does something to produce the effect I want in terms of early turn ending, etc -- but is hardly sufficient in and of itself.

3. British force proficiency set at 50%. I would have dialed it down even further, but the effect on reconstituted units becomes too dramatic.

4. Single command squads for the poorer British formations. Two command squads for the average ones. None for the ones that were actually more or less ready for prime time.

5. 'Static' support squads for the poorer British divisions. They can hold a section of the front okay. If they redeploy, their logistical arrangements go all to hell. A good deal of the divisional artillery is usually incorporated into the HQ's so as to make simply leaving the HQ in the rear not an attractive option.

6. An elaborate cooperation and unit color scheme to make cooperation -- particularly artillery cooperation -- between units of different 2nd-line divisions difficult.

Put all this together and the British player finds it hard to get everyone on the same page at the same time -- as they no doubt would have. However, it's at best only a rough approximation of the difficulties that beset early-war opponents of Blitzkrieg, and I certainly couldn't get the right effect with negative shock alone.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
The Russian problem in 1941 can be largely analyzed as a 'hindsight' problem as well.

Not as severe as France 1940...Regardless, dealing with the disorder minutia wouldn't address hindsight.

I dunno about that. Russia's entire 1941 army was virtually destroyed: look up the casualties and the numbers mobilized. They obviously were doing something very wrong -- at least as wrong as the French were the year before.

Now, I will grant that one cannot address the hindsight problem completely. However, one could certainly do more to permit Russian units that in fact have something approaching their historical combat power but simply can't be moved about in a coordinated fashion.

My own take on it all is that one would really want a scenario that begins more or less when the scales have fallen from everyone's eyes. Like say, about end of September. Naturally, this imposes various problems of its own, but at least in theory that is about the point when one could start letting two human players move their respective armies about with some hope of something resembling a historically plausible outcome.

No more than your average historical topic.

I don't think that's accurate. In a lot of battles -- particularly mid- to late-war battles -- both sides have a fairly accurate idea of the respective abilities and limitations of their respective forces. This would apply to North Africa after Rommel's first onslaught, to Russia from sometime in 1942-43 on, to the ETO from Salerno on, to the Japanese (finally!) strategies in defending Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

On the other hand, I do think that in general, one has a problem with war-opening campaigns -- France, the Italian debacles in Greece and North Africa, the Summer of 1941. To that extent I would agree that Barbarossa is not unique. However, this is not a reason to deny the existence of the problem.

One can define the problem as being one of the historical commanders moving their units in a fashion that simply made no sense in light of their abilities or that of their opponents. There are seven panzer divisions lined op on the other side of the Meuse? Ignore them. That German infantry division is a 12-20 and I have two 2-7 infantry divisions that cannot cooperate with each other? Let's attack!

Now how to model this I'm not sure. However I'm confident that insisting the problem isn't there isn't the answer -- nor is negative shock.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Now how to model this I'm not sure. However I'm confident that insisting the problem isn't there isn't the answer -- nor is negative shock.

Independently acting AI subordinates. Maybe an option for TOAW IV...

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
I would say that command and control and actual combat proficiency are two very different issues.

Not necessarily. Confusing commands from on high can result in peicemeal operation of subordinate units. So only a fraction of the unit gets involved in the combat. The other part misunderstood the plan, or was ordered to do the opposite of the other, etc.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

No more than your average historical topic.

I don't think that's accurate.

I have an AAR that seems to say otherwise.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

No more than your average historical topic.

I don't think that's accurate.

I have an AAR that seems to say otherwise.

Your AAR says that the problems involved in simulating Barbarossa are no greater than those involved in your average historical topic?

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
I would say that command and control and actual combat proficiency are two very different issues.

Not necessarily. Confusing commands from on high can result in peicemeal operation of subordinate units. So only a fraction of the unit gets involved in the combat. The other part misunderstood the plan, or was ordered to do the opposite of the other, etc.

There are a couple of problems here.

First, this rationalization only works if we're assuming that the scenario is at such a scale that part of the unit is not getting the word, gets lost, or whatever. Plausible if the units are corps. Not so plausible if they are battalions.

Second, the type of action has a great deal to do with how much command and control deficiencies, etc, interfere with unit performance. See the Russians' entirely creditable defense of Brest-Litovsk in a static siege at the same time as the rest of the Russian army was falling apart in mobile warfare.

I remember an interesting discussion of Jackson's victory at New Orleans in 1815. On the one hand, he was criticized for not following up his rebuff of the British assault by attacking and destroying the remnants of the British army.

On the other hand, Jackson was very much aware that his 'army' consisted of quite untrained militia -- and that if he'd killed half the Englishmen, he hadn't killed the other half. He could count on his troops to pour fire from behind breastworks into advancing British columns. He couldn't count on them performing as impressively if it came to maneuvering in an open field.

'Proficiency' is not some constant. Troops that can perform perfectly well in one type of action may or may not be able to perform equally well in another. An untrained Kentucky frontiersman firing from behind cover may be fully the equal of a British grenadier. He's probably not worth one tenth as much if it comes to marching and counter marching, forming line and square, etc in the open field.

ORIGINAL: Telumar

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

Now how to model this I'm not sure. However I'm confident that insisting the problem isn't there isn't the answer -- nor is negative shock.

Independently acting AI subordinates. Maybe an option for TOAW IV...

Yeah -- that would allow for a better simulation of several campaigns.

I was arguing with someone at 'France 40' about Dunkirk. Certainly there it would work well if the 'Allied' player had control of the BEF -- but not the French and Belgians.

Then there's Yugoslavia. One would certainly want it there.

A variation also strikes me as singularly appropriate for Barbarossa. The Russian player starts with actual control over very few of his units. As the campaign progresses, more and more fall under his control. Aside from everything else, since the German doesn't know exactly which units his opponent has control of, he can't count on them behaving stupidly.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright



I don't think that's accurate.

I have an AAR that seems to say otherwise.

Your AAR says that the problems involved in simulating Barbarossa are no greater than those involved in your average historical topic?

Seems to. Compare the Soviet Union 1941 AAR to the one for Germany 1945 or France 1944 D-Day. It worked at least as well as those (and they had worked very well).

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
I would say that command and control and actual combat proficiency are two very different issues.

Not necessarily. Confusing commands from on high can result in peicemeal operation of subordinate units. So only a fraction of the unit gets involved in the combat. The other part misunderstood the plan, or was ordered to do the opposite of the other, etc.

There are a couple of problems here.

First, this rationalization only works if we're assuming that the scenario is at such a scale that part of the unit is not getting the word, gets lost, or whatever. Plausible if the units are corps. Not so plausible if they are battalions.

Soviet Union 1941 has Army-sized Soviet units. And why would the disorder be limited to the high command? Why shouldn't it extend much lower - to within much smaller sub-units?

Thinking about this, all armies tend to have problems when they are suddenly hit by an enemy breakthrough.

One thinks of the Germans in the winter of 1941. It's been argued that Hitler saved Army Group Center from incipient disintegration when he issued his 'stand fast' order -- and I suspect that's true.

In TOAW, you will of course just calmly continue to see exactly where your units are and what their condition is, and of course your supplies will start flowing without a hiccup along the new routes. There won't be any disruption at all. Naturally you can organize things with perfect efficiency.

That's rarely what happened in real life. Chaos, panic, and logistical collapse is more the rule. To what extent, of course, varied. Still, it is something that would be good to analyze and if possible simulate.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay




Not necessarily. Confusing commands from on high can result in peicemeal operation of subordinate units. So only a fraction of the unit gets involved in the combat. The other part misunderstood the plan, or was ordered to do the opposite of the other, etc.

There are a couple of problems here.

First, this rationalization only works if we're assuming that the scenario is at such a scale that part of the unit is not getting the word, gets lost, or whatever. Plausible if the units are corps. Not so plausible if they are battalions.

Soviet Union 1941 has Army-sized Soviet units. And why would the disorder be limited to the high command? Why shouldn't it extend much lower - to within much smaller sub-units?

Okay -- just for the sake of argument, we can grant that it works for 'Soviet Union 1941.' However, many, many scenarios do not have 'army-sized' units. And even here, I would argue that those armies would do far better defending a fixed locality than they would if constantly forced to redeploy, etc. In other words, whilst one 1941-2 German might be worth ten 1941-2 Russians in mobile combat, that ratio would fall to something far less impressive if it was a matter of a struggle over a fixed point (see 'what went wrong at Stalingrad'). Does your scenario reflect that, or does it simply manage to work in spite of not reflecting that?

As to disorder being less of a problem with small units, one can form a properly trained battalion far more quickly than one can form a properly formed division. Indeed, the most common flaw of poorly trained armies is their inability to maneuver and fight in large formations. A battalion occupies perhaps a square kilometer or two, and you can always send a runner to find out what is going on or where B Coy got to. This doesn't work when it's a division spread out over twenty kilometers. Then one has to have subordinate commanders who clearly understand the plan and know what to do when things go askew, communications that don't break down, etc.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay




I have an AAR that seems to say otherwise.

Your AAR says that the problems involved in simulating Barbarossa are no greater than those involved in your average historical topic?

Seems to. Compare the Soviet Union 1941 AAR to the one for Germany 1945 or France 1944 D-Day. It worked at least as well as those (and they had worked very well).

Now all you are saying is that all your scenarios are great scenarios. Even if we grant that 'Soviet Union 1941' is a great scenario, that does nothing to demonstrate that the design challenges it posed weren't greater than those posed by Germany 1945 or France 1944 D-Day.

Merely that you were able to overcome these as well.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright
Okay -- just for the sake of argument, we can grant that it works for 'Soviet Union 1941.' However, many, many scenarios do not have 'army-sized' units.

Think of Pearl Harbor. Was it just Kimmel and Short that were disordered? Or was it the whole thing - the planes parked wingtip-to-wingtip, the BBs lined up side-by-side without torpedo nets, the lack of CAP, and the men expecting nothing more than a peaceful Sunday morning? Their poor performance that day wasn't due to their proficiency. It was due to shock. It actually affects combat strength. Barbarossa was similar. It took time for the shock of the invasion to wear off - at all levels.

And even here, I would argue that those armies would do far better defending a fixed locality than they would if constantly forced to redeploy, etc. In other words, whilst one 1941-2 German might be worth ten 1941-2 Russians in mobile combat, that ratio would fall to something far less impressive if it was a matter of a struggle over a fixed point (see 'what went wrong at Stalingrad'). Does your scenario reflect that, or does it simply manage to work in spite of not reflecting that?

The Soviets are better equipped and organized for defense than offense. That doesn't change the reality that any early defense would be affected by the mass disorder the campaign started out with.

As to disorder being less of a problem with small units, one can form a properly trained battalion far more quickly than one can form a properly formed division. Indeed, the most common flaw of poorly trained armies is their inability to maneuver and fight in large formations. A battalion occupies perhaps a square kilometer or two, and you can always send a runner to find out what is going on or where B Coy got to. This doesn't work when it's a division spread out over twenty kilometers. Then one has to have subordinate commanders who clearly understand the plan and know what to do when things go askew, communications that don't break down, etc.

Even at that level you have the issue of meddling. The division commander doesn't just issue orders to his regimental commanders and leave it to them. He micromanages the companies and even lower, sometimes overruling the orders of his subordinates. So his disorder can infect even the lowest organizations.

Now, for sure, there are some C&C situations that aren't truely the product of shock, and may need something else. You mentioned the British C&C. That was more of a cronic problem than due to a disruption of any sort. There is a wishlist item for an event effect that causes the C&C penalties of shock without the combat strength effects. But that wasn't the case for Barbarossa - they were shocked.

Curtis,

Your scenario looks interesting. It's a shame that I don't like the 50km scale, because other than that I might be interested in giving it a try. I just don't like corps-level operations. Oh well. Thanks for pointing me to that thread, though.