Re: Re: Re: S3 and ...
Posted: Sun May 12, 2002 11:57 am
Yes - 1st Bull Run is right as well.Originally posted by Wolver
5 Southern troops retreating at (Bull Run?) General Bee saw Jackson and his troops holding their ground.
What's your Strategy?
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Yes - 1st Bull Run is right as well.Originally posted by Wolver
5 Southern troops retreating at (Bull Run?) General Bee saw Jackson and his troops holding their ground.
Yes, yes, and I don't know, but sounds about right.Originally posted by Johnny Canuck
7. Voltaire, on the execution of British Admiral John Byng for failure to relieve Minorca during the Seven Years' War.
9. I believe the quote is by Churchill, from his "World Crisis" (about Jellicoe obviously).
18. I believe that this was Lincoln to McClellan after the failure of the Seven Days' battles.
Correct, except she didn't founder, but was broken up in situ. If ever there was a 20th century British ship that should have been preserved.... Bankrupt countries can't afford such luxuries though!Originally posted by Ron Saueracker
HMS Warspite broke her towline on the way to the breakers, I beleive near you on the Cornish coastline. Ran aground and foundered I think.
Warspite...you are obviously a naval buff as well?
I don't believe the Victoria and Camperdown was due to rigid tactics, so much as the fearsome reputation of Adm Tryon, and an well engrained reluctance to question command. The theory that I subscibe to (and the most accepted) is that he mixed up turning radius and diameter (having done it once before when younger (but got away with it), thus turning inwards with only half the room he should have had. There seems to have been only minimal attempt to question him by his bridge crew, and the other column were expecting orders to correct the situation, until too late. I don't see that this relates to fighting instructions or tactical rigidity.Originally posted by Johnny Canuck
Sorry about that. Good point about the "Fighting Instructions." It's a bit funny to think that by the late-1800s the evolution of command tactics & signalling in the RN led to just as rigid a system as before & led to the Camperdown/Victoria disaster & nearly resulted in the loss of the Queen Elizabeths at Jutland. Prime example of history always repeating itself!
OK, you win! I thought that (guven the forum) we ought to get that one correct!Originally posted by gmenfan
13 The Shóhó at 10:40 on the morning of May 4th 1942, is that specific enough?
4 - yesOriginally posted by Rowlf
S4. Winston Churchill on Bernard Montgomery (nice list of quotes here: http://www.insults.net/html/political/w ... chill.html)
S6. David Lloyd George about General Douglas Haig, I believe following the 3rd Battle of Ypres (Passchendaele) (September, 1917)
S12. Robert Oppenheimer, on seeing the first atomic explosion at Alamogordo, New Mexico, on July 16, 1945
S14. MacArthur, the last part of a statement made to reporters after his escape from Corregidor in 1942
S16. Marquis of Anglesey to Wellington (Wellington's reply "By God sir, so you have")
S17. Charles Napier in a report to Britain after he had just conquered Scinde (India) (bad pun, baaaad pun)![]()
I completely agree with your overview of the disaster; it certainly seems that Tryon made an simple but devastating mistake. However, I would say that the extreme reluctance to question Tryon by the bridge crew & the captain of HMS Camperdown was not an isolated incident, but was endemic in the pre-war RN & was a symptom of the general tactical rigidity. The ethos of "obey the admiral" that led to the loss of the Victoria was the same problem that led Evan-Thomas to not execute a turn together at the crucial moment at Jutland, and instead wait for Beatty's signaller to drop the signal for the turn. The tactical rigidity of the RN led Evan-Thomas to wait to execute the turn, despite the fact that in the wait for the signal to drop, the High Seas Fleet was able to close another 4000 yards & bring Evan-Thomas' Queen Elizabeths under fire as they executed their turn. It was a minor miracle that none of these ships were lost, as they were unsupported during the turn. The loss of HMS Victoria & this incident at Jutland are related, in that subordinates obeyed patently faulty orders & risked disaster. Both cases are related to the general tactical rigidty in the RN that emphasized the chain of command and penalized individual initiative.Originally posted by HMSWarspite
I don't believe the Victoria and Camperdown was due to rigid tactics, so much as the fearsome reputation of Adm Tryon, and an well engrained reluctance to question command. The theory that I subscibe to (and the most accepted) is that he mixed up turning radius and diameter (having done it once before when younger (but got away with it), thus turning inwards with only half the room he should have had. There seems to have been only minimal attempt to question him by his bridge crew, and the other column were expecting orders to correct the situation, until too late. I don't see that this relates to fighting instructions or tactical rigidity.
[edit to correct a small cock-up]