Matrix Games Forums

Agreed. I can think of several things right off the top of my head I'd rather see before this and they are all on the list. [:D]

...but don't attribute the idea of it to me, by the way ...

Not at all, but the technical explanation you provided is certainly appreciated.

I just don't see it as comparable in importance to many other things on the list.

Agreed, also. I only chimed in as there was a discussion on the subject, and I had an opinion. Anytime this topic comes up I look for more info to help me/us better understand. Thanks!

ORIGINAL: Panama

And if someone is unhappy because another player doesn't move any ground units for them to bomb they should realize their air units on interdiction are still suppressing supply, not sitting around doing nothing. What ordinance would be used for that? Something is being used.

It occured to me that this could be an alternate/additional rationale for the strikes. Think about it. Suppose there is no enemy movement. Then, without the strikes, the suppression of his supply occurs cost-free. Here are all these planes flying around in enemy territory, bombing logistical targets. Yet they never encounter any enemy fighters or get fired at by enemy AAA. The strikes may have been intended to partially model that cost.

If so, it becomes debatable whether there should be an option to opt out of them. Can you even tell your pilots not to interdict supplies? Can they tell the difference between a combat column and a supply column from 5,000 feet? And even if they can, then there should be a consequence for opting out in that your interdiction level will not reduce the enemy supply level.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: Panama

And if someone is unhappy because another player doesn't move any ground units for them to bomb they should realize their air units on interdiction are still suppressing supply, not sitting around doing nothing. What ordinance would be used for that? Something is being used.

It occured to me that this could be an alternate/additional rationale for the strikes. Think about it. Suppose there is no enemy movement. Then, without the strikes, the suppression of his supply occurs cost-free. Here are all these planes flying around in enemy territory, bombing logistical targets. Yet they never encounter any enemy fighters or get fired at by enemy AAA. The strikes may have been intended to partially model that cost.

If so, it becomes debatable whether there should be an option to opt out of them. Can you even tell your pilots not to interdict supplies? Can they tell the difference between a combat column and a supply column from 5,000 feet? And even if they can, then there should be a consequence for opting out in that your interdiction level will not reduce the enemy supply level.

Yup, you're right there.

Another thing comes to mind after reading this. Unless a strike is called against enemy units in front lines what pilot will take a chance dropping his ordinance on enemy units at the front? As you say, a pilot has trouble distinguishing things at altitude. And if he isn't at altitude, say a fighter bomber or ground support aircraft, he is traveling at hundreds of miles per hour. It's difficult to distinguish bad guy from good guy. But IMO that would be trivial detail. Wrong scale for that.

This is one of those subjects that could go on forever because there are many logical arguments all with merit. Since this is an operational game some fudging may be necessary.

Try this on. For instance, if air units are on interdiction, and indeed, they would be over enemy territory, they should at the very least be subject to enemy air superiority. They are in enemy air space, are they not? Then they should get shot at by cap. I don't recall seeing anything implying interdicting units suffering air combat. Maybe an oversight.

In my experience...

1. The number of interdiction strikes does not noticeably tail off as the number of rounds increases. If it did, the thing to do with rail movement would often be to wait until a late round, then run the gauntlet -- so we'd have a problem anyway.

2. While some interception of interdiction strikes occurs, in general it's a good way of resting aircraft. My TOAW these years usually consists of playtesting Seelowe. As the Germans, I try to restrict the aircraft assigned to combat support missions to those which are yellow or Green. Orange and red go to interdiction, and recover fairly quickly.

It's a rest camp -- even though there's a significant Fighter Command, and even though they are making interdiction strikes.


Anyway, things I would like to see changed about interdiction.

1. The strikes on static units really are a misfortune. Generally speaking units that don't move should be relatively immune to air power. It's those that move that get creamed. If you really want your Desert Storm, launch a bombardment mission.

2. The likelihood of being interdicted should increase as a unit expends more of its movement allowance. Move half of it, and you're traveling at night, on secondary roads, in dispersed formation -- you're relatively safe. Move all of it, and you're barreling down the main highway bumper to bumper in broad daylight. You should get creamed. In connection with this, the Germans noted late in the war that units transferred from West to East moved slowly and were reluctant to concentrate -- they were behaving in a fashion that would minimize the likelihood of interdiction strikes. Generally, what historically common levels of air superiority do is make concentrated daylight movement difficult. You usually can get by if you stay put -- and if you take your time about moving, you usually can do that as well. So make the likelihood of attracting an interdiction effect escalate as a unit uses more of its movement allowance. Then we'd be getting a historically accurate effect.

3. Somehow, it should be possible to restrict the range of interdiction. As it is, a major 'strategy' in at least two scenarios is to run some junk unit back and forth on a rail line in an area covered by your fighters but out of reach of enemy fighters. Then of course the enemy bombers come right up and fly unescorted missions into the teeth of your fighters. 'But ve must bomb der traffik from Glasgow to Edinburgh. Es ist ein 'Kogerbefehl.' The only thing that saves the Luftwaffe is that as noted, fighters don't really pick on interdiction strikes much. Now try actually bombing something up Scotland way, and you'll get shot out of the skies. The Royal Navy, for example, can usually hang out around the latitude of Newcastle without undue risk.

As a note, restricting the range of interdiction could have some happy effects.

I'm assuming we have some designer-set global limit. Like, he sets the German interdiction range to fifty hexes or whatever. Generally, a designer set limit would be preferable to a play-set one, as such a limit would then only come into play when it was going to improve matters as opposed to simply creating new happy hunting grounds for gamey tactics.

Aside from making it possible to prevent bombers from experimenting with long-range unescorted daylight bombing, setting the limit to zero would also make it possible to simulate forces such as the Japanese, who both in Malaya and in the Philippines, failed to exploit their air supremacy at all in this regard. Plenty of Japanese combat support and airfield strikes, but Allied columns could move down roads in daylight with remarkable impunity.

Then too, assuming I understand how interdiction works correctly, it should make it possible to increase the effectiveness of interdiction by picking a modest range. Since the area now exposed to interdiction would be decreased, the likelihood of any given movement within that area attracting an interdiction strike would be increased. As matters stand, it's notoriously difficult to get the right interdiction effect. Sometimes, interdiction is useless. Other times -- as with the Japanese example -- it's entirely too potent.

ORIGINAL: Panama

Another thing comes to mind after reading this. Unless a strike is called against enemy units in front lines what pilot will take a chance dropping his ordinance on enemy units at the front?

Possibly, but on the other hand, they have to fly over the front just to get to their interdiction targets. They would then be subject to the flak from those frontline elements in crossing. So the strikes on the front lines somewhat model that factor.

Try this on. For instance, if air units are on interdiction, and indeed, they would be over enemy territory, they should at the very least be subject to enemy air superiority. They are in enemy air space, are they not? Then they should get shot at by cap. I don't recall seeing anything implying interdicting units suffering air combat. Maybe an oversight.

They definitely already suffer interception by the enemy AS. In fact, that's a common newbie error, is to have his indictors outrange their escorts. Then you can trigger interdiction beyond the range of the escorts but within the range of the interdictors and slaughter those interdicting units with your own AS.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

In my experience...

1. The number of interdiction strikes does not noticeably tail off as the number of rounds increases. If it did, the thing to do with rail movement would often be to wait until a late round, then run the gauntlet -- so we'd have a problem anyway.

My experience is otherwise. Regardless, the issue concerned the specific case where both sides had equal air power.

1. The strikes on static units really are a misfortune. Generally speaking units that don't move should be relatively immune to air power. It's those that move that get creamed. If you really want your Desert Storm, launch a bombardment mission.

Why should they be immune if they are already observed? They could be bombed normally, during friendly combat operations. And, as I noted, this might model the costs of interdicting logistics.

2. The likelihood of being interdicted should increase as a unit expends more of its movement allowance. Move half of it, and you're traveling at night, on secondary roads, in dispersed formation -- you're relatively safe. Move all of it, and you're barreling down the main highway bumper to bumper in broad daylight. You should get creamed. In connection with this, the Germans noted late in the war that units transferred from West to East moved slowly and were reluctant to concentrate -- they were behaving in a fashion that would minimize the likelihood of interdiction strikes. Generally, what historically common levels of air superiority do is make concentrated daylight movement difficult. You usually can get by if you stay put -- and if you take your time about moving, you usually can do that as well. So make the likelihood of attracting an interdiction effect escalate as a unit uses more of its movement allowance. Then we'd be getting a historically accurate effect.

Your chances are proportional to how many hexes you move as it is now. There is no modeling of night movement yet, though. But that's already on the list.

3. Somehow, it should be possible to restrict the range of interdiction. As it is, a major 'strategy' in at least two scenarios is to run some junk unit back and forth on a rail line in an area covered by your fighters but out of reach of enemy fighters. Then of course the enemy bombers come right up and fly unescorted missions into the teeth of your fighters. 'But ve must bomb der traffik from Glasgow to Edinburgh. Es ist ein 'Kogerbefehl.' The only thing that saves the Luftwaffe is that as noted, fighters don't really pick on interdiction strikes much. Now try actually bombing something up Scotland way, and you'll get shot out of the skies. The Royal Navy, for example, can usually hang out around the latitude of Newcastle without undue risk.

Already on the list. But note that players do have some means of restricting the range of interdiction now, via exactly where they base the interceptors. You can match the area covered by escorts with the area to be covered by interceptors - in theory.

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

In my experience...

1. The number of interdiction strikes does not noticeably tail off as the number of rounds increases. If it did, the thing to do with rail movement would often be to wait until a late round, then run the gauntlet -- so we'd have a problem anyway.

My experience is otherwise. Regardless, the issue concerned the specific case where both sides had equal air power.

1. The strikes on static units really are a misfortune. Generally speaking units that don't move should be relatively immune to air power. It's those that move that get creamed. If you really want your Desert Storm, launch a bombardment mission.

Why should they be immune if they are already observed? They could be bombed normally, during friendly combat operations. And, as I noted, this might model the costs of interdicting logistics.

They should be immune because units that stay under cover are vastly less vulnerable to air strikes than units that are moving -- see Normandy. It was when the Germans tried to move about that they got clobbered.

I'll turn your question on its head. If you want to attack a unit that hasn't moved, why not mount a bombardment mission?

2. The likelihood of being interdicted should increase as a unit expends more of its movement allowance. Move half of it, and you're traveling at night, on secondary roads, in dispersed formation -- you're relatively safe. Move all of it, and you're barreling down the main highway bumper to bumper in broad daylight. You should get creamed. In connection with this, the Germans noted late in the war that units transferred from West to East moved slowly and were reluctant to concentrate -- they were behaving in a fashion that would minimize the likelihood of interdiction strikes. Generally, what historically common levels of air superiority do is make concentrated daylight movement difficult. You usually can get by if you stay put -- and if you take your time about moving, you usually can do that as well. So make the likelihood of attracting an interdiction effect escalate as a unit uses more of its movement allowance. Then we'd be getting a historically accurate effect.

Your chances are proportional to how many hexes you move as it is now. There is no modeling of night movement yet, though. But that's already on the list.

It's proportional -- but directly proportional. It should be geometrically proportional.

Put it this way. If a unit only uses 14 of its 28 MP's, that implies it can afford to use side roads, move in widely dispersed formations, take advantage of twilight and night -- etc. If it uses all 28, the odds that it will be hit increase geometrically. Now it's trying to roll down I-95 with one hundred feet between each vehicle in broad daylight. Using all 28 MP's shouldn't double the chance of being hit as opposed to using only 14 -- it should multiply the chance by about eight.

Aside from everything else, it shouldn't be that hard to insert the appropriate mathematical expression into whatever algorithm is used to determine the probability of being hit by an interdiction strike. The program just needs to look at how many MP's the unit has left when deciding how likely it is that it will be hit.

3. Somehow, it should be possible to restrict the range of interdiction. As it is, a major 'strategy' in at least two scenarios is to run some junk unit back and forth on a rail line in an area covered by your fighters but out of reach of enemy fighters. Then of course the enemy bombers come right up and fly unescorted missions into the teeth of your fighters. 'But ve must bomb der traffik from Glasgow to Edinburgh. Es ist ein 'Kogerbefehl.' The only thing that saves the Luftwaffe is that as noted, fighters don't really pick on interdiction strikes much. Now try actually bombing something up Scotland way, and you'll get shot out of the skies. The Royal Navy, for example, can usually hang out around the latitude of Newcastle without undue risk.

Already on the list. But note that players do have some means of restricting the range of interdiction now, via exactly where they base the interceptors. You can match the area covered by escorts with the area to be covered by interceptors - in theory.

In theory...

However, since bomber ranges often exceed map dimensions whilst fighter ranges do not, it can be hard. What's more, while I will concede that bases, etc can be created to permit discriminatory interdiction, that creates an undesirable level of artificiality in the game. So...KG 55 is based in what would appear to be Poland. That way it can only bomb Southern England. To cite a real-life if somewhat off-topic example I see quite a bit in Seelowe, the British player winds up placing his Blenheim fighter units in Wick (northern Scotland) so that they won't try to fight air battles over Kent.

It works -- but it's not very convincing simulation. There's no way those fighters would wind up being based in Wick.

If it uses all 28, the odds that it will be hit increase geometrically.

Now it's trying to roll down I-95 with one hundred feet between each vehicle in broad daylight. Using all 28 MP's shouldn't double the chance of being hit as opposed to using only 14 -- it should multiply the chance by about eight.

Can you explain how you came up with a multiplier of 8 in a geometric progression?

The program just needs to look at how many MP's the unit has left when deciding how likely it is that it will be hit.

For 1940s scenarios (which seem to be the predominate interest of this forum) think the remaining movement points are not the most relevant factor when calculating the probability that a unit will incur an interdiction attack. I would expect that calculations for an interdiction attack would primarily be based on the physical size (weight) of the unit, terrain, unit agility, the motorized component of the unit, air dominance and whether the turn phase is in the day or night portion of the turn.

Note that any scenario with turns longer than ½ day turns must be composed of both day and night movement points, i.e. day and night turns. The 28 movement points used in the referenced post contains approximately 14 night movement points. Does TOAW model night movement for turns longer than ½ day . . . think not. The 28 movements points all seem to be boiled down to some type of neutered twilight move where day and night factors have equal weight in the game engine calculations. This needs to be corrected.

The night/day factors really become important if we are dealing with modern scenarios where night vision equipment and precision guided weapons are employed. None of these factors have a “remaining movement point” or night/day component.


Seelowe


I still wonder why you continue to reference a scenario that is not in the public domain. I realize that this is your life long endeavor . . . but it’s time to stop quoting invisible sources and publish the scenario for the community to judge. From what I’ve seen you’ll probably get good reviews . . . otherwise please use public domain scenarios for the points you wish to post so that everyone can see your brilliance.

Merry Christmas

Regards, RhinoBones

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

They should be immune because units that stay under cover are vastly less vulnerable to air strikes than units that are moving -- see Normandy. It was when the Germans tried to move about that they got clobbered.

We're talking about units that are already in observed hexes. How can they be immune from bombardment?!? And note that they will benefit from their deployment advantages - unlike moving units.

I'll turn your question on its head. If you want to attack a unit that hasn't moved, why not mount a bombardment mission?

Because it is the enemy player turn, and the air units are assigned to Interdiction, not Combat Support. Furthermore, this isn't necessarily a "want to" issue (see the above discussion). The strikes are detremental to the air units in that they cause losses from interception and flak. As I suggested, those losses could be modeling the costs of the logistical intediction effects.

Put it this way. If a unit only uses 14 of its 28 MP's, that implies it can afford to use side roads, move in widely dispersed formations, take advantage of twilight and night -- etc. If it uses all 28, the odds that it will be hit increase geometrically. Now it's trying to roll down I-95 with one hundred feet between each vehicle in broad daylight. Using all 28 MP's shouldn't double the chance of being hit as opposed to using only 14 -- it should multiply the chance by about eight.

Aside from everything else, it shouldn't be that hard to insert the appropriate mathematical expression into whatever algorithm is used to determine the probability of being hit by an interdiction strike. The program just needs to look at how many MP's the unit has left when deciding how likely it is that it will be hit.

Other than the effects of night movement I don't think the above is very sound. Using one's entire movement allowance can be done in a swamp, not just on I-95. And the chances of triggering interdiction are already affected by staying in the boondocks. We just need an option to specify that the unit is only moving at night. Then it could only be interdicted by all weather equipment or such.

In theory...

I said that. Some scenarios are better at it than others. See CFNA.

But, also note that I said this was on the wishlist. It nearly made it into 3.4.

I still don't like it, my airforce is bombing multiple hexes at the end of each of the enemies movement rounds, and as the opening round of combats. I'm not so sure that it is only observed locations, because some are distant from the front line area. An off map area with a +199 distance has been bombed a few times. Hexes without any observed units are being bombed.

It seems like some thing that the air staff assistant would do. As has been said before, I'd rather be in control of what bombardment missions are assigned. I need to put my air units on interdiction so that they will interdict, but I don't want them flying willy-nilly over the map and hitting silly targets. [:@]

Eplain this to me. How can 42 Ju88 make 22 sorties in 84 hours from Riga to Brest? 20 interdiction and 2 airstrikes (dropping their unused ordinance?). That's one sortie every 3.81 hours. An exceptional and super human feat not only by the sleepless air crews but also by the ground crews.

Okay, maybe they made more than one interdiction attack per sortie. If so, why do they have ordinance left?

What I don't like about this 'feature' is that it smacks of placation with a quick and easy fix. There is a lack of logic underlying this that needs to be addressed. Why, if an air crew is flying interdiction from point A to point B, would they drop their ordinance at point B and not have anything left to drop on any interdiction targets on the way back? That's the only way airstrikes 600 km to the enemy's rear can make sense. Wouldn't they hang on to their ammo for the patrol on the way back?

Furthermore, aren't you getting strategic bombing confused with tactical air ops? Ordinance dumping was something strategic bombers did when all of their targets, primary, secondary, etc., were obscured. They made a practice of dropping them in the ocean too, not on land if it could be helped. Interdiction is operational in nature and tactical in implementation. You also didn't perform ground attacks against units near your own front lines because you run a very good risk of bombing your own troops since you have no spotters on the ground.

Also, shouldn't enemy units be spotted for your air units to be able to perform airstrikes against them? I've run tests and airstrikes are being made on unspotted units (recon set to zero).

This is something that should be left to the scenario designer and it shouldn't be foisted on players as something that is realistic in nature when it is not.

Cheers [;)]

ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay




Other than the effects of night movement I don't think the above is very sound. Using one's entire movement allowance can be done in a swamp, not just on I-95. And the chances of triggering interdiction are already affected by staying in the boondocks. We just need an option to specify that the unit is only moving at night. Then it could only be interdicted by all weather equipment or such.

We're getting into one of those things we're you're refusing to concede something that to me is patently obvious.

When operating in an environment where enemy airstrikes are likely, one can take precautions: move in dispersed order, use secondary routes, avoid crossing open areas at high noon, etc.

Fine -- but it will take time. One is 'not using all of ones movement allowance.'

Alternatively, one can simply disregard all considerations of risk -- use all of ones' movement allowance. Fine -- but the chances that you'll get hit increase geometrically.

So the chances of getting hit by interdiction should increase exponentially as one uses a greater proportion of one's movement allowance. If I'm prepared to confine myself to using 25% or so, I should be able to carry out a move in relative safety in almost any environment this side of 'Desert Storm.' If I want to use 100%, I should figure I'm pretty likely to get hit pretty hard.

...and in fact, heavy interdiction had exactly this effect. Rommel wanted to put the panzers close to the beaches because he knew they would face a Hobson's choice if they had to move a long way under conditions of Allied air supremacy. When SS Panzer units were transferred to the East in 1945, others noted that they were viscerally reluctant to move fast in close order in broad daylight. They were, in fact, infernally slow.

The interdiction 'hit' mechanism has a number of flaws. One of these flaws -- and one of the more fixable -- is that the risk should climb disproportionately as one uses more of one's movement allowance. That, largely, is precisely what has happened historically.

ORIGINAL: Panama

Eplain this to me. How can 42 Ju88 make 22 sorties in 84 hours from Riga to Brest? 20 interdiction and 2 airstrikes (dropping their unused ordinance?). That's one sortie every 3.81 hours. An exceptional and super human feat not only by the sleepless air crews but also by the ground crews.

Okay, maybe they made more than one interdiction attack per sortie. If so, why do they have ordinance left?

What I don't like about this 'feature' is that it smacks of placation with a quick and easy fix. There is a lack of logic underlying this that needs to be addressed. Why, if an air crew is flying interdiction from point A to point B, would they drop their ordinance at point B and not have anything left to drop on any interdiction targets on the way back? That's the only way airstrikes 600 km to the enemy's rear can make sense. Wouldn't they hang on to their ammo for the patrol on the way back?

Furthermore, aren't you getting strategic bombing confused with tactical air ops? Ordinance dumping was something strategic bombers did when all of their targets, primary, secondary, etc., were obscured. They made a practice of dropping them in the ocean too, not on land if it could be helped. Interdiction is operational in nature and tactical in implementation. You also didn't perform ground attacks against units near your own front lines because you run a very good risk of bombing your own troops since you have no spotters on the ground.

Also, shouldn't enemy units be spotted for your air units to be able to perform airstrikes against them? I've run tests and airstrikes are being made on unspotted units (recon set to zero).

This is something that should be left to the scenario designer and it shouldn't be foisted on players as something that is realistic in nature when it is not.

Cheers [;)]

To be fair, TOAW's focus is ground combat. What we want for aerial warfare is something that reflects its impact on the ground combat: reduced supplies, units delayed in transit, etc. I don't want to wind up literally flying air missions.

Not that your objections aren't valid -- I think they are. It's just that we want to correct the abstraction rather than starting to have to plot specific missions.

ORIGINAL: rhinobones

If it uses all 28, the odds that it will be hit increase geometrically.

Now it's trying to roll down I-95 with one hundred feet between each vehicle in broad daylight. Using all 28 MP's shouldn't double the chance of being hit as opposed to using only 14 -- it should multiply the chance by about eight.

Can you explain how you came up with a multiplier of 8 in a geometric progression?

The program just needs to look at how many MP's the unit has left when deciding how likely it is that it will be hit.

For 1940s scenarios (which seem to be the predominate interest of this forum) think the remaining movement points are not the most relevant factor when calculating the probability that a unit will incur an interdiction attack. I would expect that calculations for an interdiction attack would primarily be based on the physical size (weight) of the unit, terrain, unit agility, the motorized component of the unit, air dominance and whether the turn phase is in the day or night portion of the turn.

Note that any scenario with turns longer than ½ day turns must be composed of both day and night movement points, i.e. day and night turns. The 28 movement points used in the referenced post contains approximately 14 night movement points. Does TOAW model night movement for turns longer than ½ day . . . think not. The 28 movements points all seem to be boiled down to some type of neutered twilight move where day and night factors have equal weight in the game engine calculations. This needs to be corrected.

The night/day factors really become important if we are dealing with modern scenarios where night vision equipment and precision guided weapons are employed. None of these factors have a “remaining movement point” or night/day component.


Seelowe


I still wonder why you continue to reference a scenario that is not in the public domain. I realize that this is your life long endeavor . . . but it’s time to stop quoting invisible sources and publish the scenario for the community to judge. From what I’ve seen you’ll probably get good reviews . . . otherwise please use public domain scenarios for the points you wish to post so that everyone can see your brilliance.

Merry Christmas

Regards, RhinoBones

You're amazing. You always manage to bring so much malice and so little of anything else to every conversation you enter. You manage to make even 'Merry Christmas' sound spiteful.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

When operating in an environment where enemy airstrikes are likely, one can take precautions: move in dispersed order, use secondary routes, avoid crossing open areas at high noon, etc.

Fine -- but it will take time. One is 'not using all of ones movement allowance.'

Alternatively, one can simply disregard all considerations of risk -- use all of ones' movement allowance. Fine -- but the chances that you'll get hit increase geometrically.

So the chances of getting hit by interdiction should increase exponentially as one uses a greater proportion of one's movement allowance. If I'm prepared to confine myself to using 25% or so, I should be able to carry out a move in relative safety in almost any environment this side of 'Desert Storm.' If I want to use 100%, I should figure I'm pretty likely to get hit pretty hard.

...and in fact, heavy interdiction had exactly this effect. Rommel wanted to put the panzers close to the beaches because he knew they would face a Hobson's choice if they had to move a long way under conditions of Allied air supremacy. When SS Panzer units were transferred to the East in 1945, others noted that they were viscerally reluctant to move fast in close order in broad daylight. They were, in fact, infernally slow.

The interdiction 'hit' mechanism has a number of flaws. One of these flaws -- and one of the more fixable -- is that the risk should climb disproportionately as one uses more of one's movement allowance. That, largely, is precisely what has happened historically.

Sorry, but I don't see any basis for this other than the impact of night movement. All else being equal, a unit that moves 25% as far as another should face 25% the risk of detection, and therefore 25% the risk of interdiction. And that's exactly how it works now. For sure it's hexes moved not MPs expended that counts. We just need to model night movement effects for day-length turns or longer.

ORIGINAL: ColinWright

To be fair, TOAW's focus is ground combat. What we want for aerial warfare is something that reflects its impact on the ground combat: reduced supplies, units delayed in transit, etc. I don't want to wind up literally flying air missions.

Not that your objections aren't valid -- I think they are. It's just that we want to correct the abstraction rather than starting to have to plot specific missions.

I get to agree with you, Colin.

ORIGINAL: sPzAbt653

I still don't like it, my airforce is bombing multiple hexes at the end of each of the enemies movement rounds, and as the opening round of combats. I'm not so sure that it is only observed locations, because some are distant from the front line area. An off map area with a +199 distance has been bombed a few times. Hexes without any observed units are being bombed.

It's possible the exact mechanism may need to be investigated. But, what about the idea that it reflects the costs of interdicting the enemy logistics? Suppose it was an option - but opting it meant that there was no interdiction of supply: the enemy supply level is not reduced?

But, what about the idea that it reflects the costs of interdicting the enemy logistics?

That's a good one, yes. But I think this occurs during bookkeeping, as when the turn starts there are some air casualties, some units in reorg, and the interdiction effect on supply level is already calculated. Just guessing though.