Johnson, Ellis A., and David A. Katcher. Mines Against Japan. Silver Spring, Md.: Naval Ordnance Laboratory, 1973. 313 pp. -
A record of mine warfare activities in the Pacific Theater during World War II.
" The structure of the Navy's Mine Force has changed dramatically throughout history, in stride with the structure of the Navy in general. During World War II, the Navy's mine warfare assets were in the charge of Commander, Service Squadron FIVE in the Atlantic. Commander, Service Squadron SIX commanded assets in the Pacific Fleet early in the war, followed by the first true MCM type command, Minecraft, U.S. Pacific Fleet. In the postwar reorganization of the fleets, seven type commands were created, each responsible for the condition and readiness of different types of ships, including the Mine Force. In 1946, Mine Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (MINELANT) was created. The Pacific Fleet followed suit in 1947, establishing MINEPAC."
Lott, Arnold S. Most Dangerous Sea: A History of Mine Warfare and an Account of U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Operations in World War II and Korea. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1959. 322 pp.
From another site :
"The History Locker
Voices From the Past
"We agree that the mine warfare conducted by American planes.....produced a very great strategical effect; it quickly reduced our war potential and hastened the end of the war."
"The mine warfare coupled with the bombing raids prevented our utilizing our war strength and completely nullified our plans to the extent of forcing us to abandon them."
"The results of .... mining was so effective against the shipping that it eventually starved the country. I think you probably could have shortened the war by beginning (mining) earlier.
"Mine warfare, in short, was merely another phase of air warfare."
"Many ship casualties thought to be from submarine attack were actually due to mines."
"I think the planes used in mining were more effective than an equal number used in bombing."
"In my opinion the main reason for the war's ending unsuccessfully.... was the lack of cooperation between the scientists and the military. They (the scientists) got no cooperations."
Taken from the consensus of opinion of all Japanese mine experts as presented by Captain Kyuzo Tamura (later Admiral) at the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Conference (1945). The Vice Chairman of the conference was Mr. Paul Nitze, later Secretary of the Navy and Defense, and the interrogator was Commander Tom Moorer, later Chief of Naval Operations and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The mine effectiveness referred to was the 12,500 mines planted by B-29s in the Japanese home waters in the final five months of the war. "
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"In April, 1950, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, approved a report from his planners which described mine countermeasures as "...the only countermeasures which seems to offer the possibility of being cheap enough to make peacetime readiness practical." The report went on to warn that "...the great danger is that if mine countermeasures continues to be neglected, large wartime appropriations for countermeasures will be almost useless because the fundamental development will still have to be done first."
In October of that year, after suffering seven ship casualties and having a 250 ship invasion fleet with 50,000 Marines held up for seven days past D-Day off Wonsan, Korea, all due to mines, Admiral Sherman accepted another report. This report, from Rear Admiral Alan E. (Hoke) Smith, Commander of the Amphibious Force, contained the often quoted statement, "We have lost control of the seas to a nation without a Navy, using pre-World War I weapons, laid by vessels that were utilized at the time of the Birth of Christ."
The above was taken from a briefing to senior Navy officials by Dr. Tamara Moser Melia on May 6, 1991 - three months after the Marines had been denied the invasion beaches of Kuwait by mines. "
Guess what? You never read about the hold up of invasion fleets due to mines. I realize this was in Korea, not WW2. But I'm throwing what I have here. This is what I've been referring to as "course correction" or "avoidance". Sucks up massive resources.
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From the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Website :
"Mines in World War II, 1939-1945
As had been the case in World War I, mine warfare played a key role during World War II. Between 1939 and 1945, these weapons sank more than 1,100 Allied ships. The United States alone lost 108 ships sunk and 85 ships damaged.
Axis losses from mines were even more severe. Between them, Germany, Japan, and Italy lost more than 1,300 vessels, with an additional 540 ships damaged. More than 1,000 Japanese ships were damaged or sunk by mines - more than from any other single source.
With numbers such as these, mine countermeasures could not be ignored. As usual, Great Britain led the way with experimentation and research. And again, the U.S. Navy benefited from the Royal Navy's experience. But by war's end, the United States had the world's largest minesweeping fleet and had built up its own experience levels.
Even so, the new generations of sea mines that appeared during the war - and even older types of mines developed earlier in the century - continued to have a significant influence on naval operations throughout this global conflict. World War II featured significant improvements in mine countermeasures, particularly against the moored contact mines that essentially were carry-over weapons from the previous war. However, while the Allies could contain or work around the threat posed by new influence mines that emerged during the war, they never decisively neutralized them.
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More from the Chief of Naval Operations Website :
"MCM Operational Lessons: The Pacific
U.S. and other Allied forces in the Pacific also faced a daunting mine warfare task. Fortunately, the Japanese rarely used mines offensively, mainly confining their activities to laying defensive fields - many of them off their own coast. Japanese forces used some German-type magnetic mines, but most of the weapons they laid were copies of old British contact mines.
For many operations in the Pacific, U.S. minesweeping task groups consisted of small yard motor minesweepers, fleet minesweepers, and destroyer-minesweepers conducting exploratory sweeps in front of the assembling assault forces. From 1942 until 1944, these mine countermeasures craft were assigned to Service Squadron 6. But in October 1944 they came under the administrative and operational command of Minecraft, Pacific Fleet - commanded by Rear Admiral Alexander Sharp, who had voluntarily gave up one star to take command of this centralized mine command.
RADM Alexander Sharp
Service Squadron 6 continued to grow throughout the war so that by the invasion of Okinawa in April 1945, Sharp controlled the largest minesweeping force in the history of the U.S. Navy. Moreover, as noted by Chief of Naval Operation Ernest J. King, minesweeping operations at Okinawa occurred "on a scale greater than in any previous operation." Admiral King's report to the Secretary of the Navy, described the mine clearance operation off Okinawa:
The mine sweepers were in the van, and on L-minus-8 day [eight days before invasion], 24 March, commenced sweeping under cover of gunfire from battleships of the Fast Carrier Force, and continued this work up to L-day, 1 April. There were 75 sweepers; and the entire coastal perimeter of southern Okinawa was cleared of mines during this pre-assault phase, in addition to the sweeping necessary for the capture of Kerama Retto and Ie Shima. Including re-sweeping, over 3,000 square miles were swept and declared safe prior to L-day. Some 177 mines were swept and about 80 floaters destroyed. The thoroughness of this task is evidenced by the safety with which bombardment and assault ships in great numbers closed the assault beaches without significant loss from mines.
Okinawa may have been the largest minesweeping operation in the Pacific, but the severest test came in June 1945 before the Australian amphibious assault against Balikpapan in Dutch Borneo. Here, Allied mine forces faced a deadly mix of Japanese contact mines and various types of influence mines laid earlier in the war by U.S. and Allied forces defending the area. Several of these fields were also covered by Japanese coastal defenses. All told, the Allies spent sixteen days prior to the 1 July invasion clearing mines, with the bulk of the work being carried out by the U.S. Navy's versatile, wooden-hulled YMSs . Nevertheless, the high-quality target detectors on previously laid U.S. mines sank seven of these vessels, while several more were destroyed or damaged by Japanese coastal guns. The waters off the assault beaches ultimately were cleared, but at high price.
As was the case in the Atlantic, conditions in the Pacific theater also led to innovations in minesweeping gear and techniques. The MCM craft doing pre-invasion sweeping required the ability to do so quickly and in shallow water. To this end, they were fitted with lighter minesweeping equipment adapted from German gear by Mine Station Solomons Island. Minesweepers in the Pacific also used an NOL-produced towed electromagnetic detector capable of finding mines buried in shallow water off invasion beaches. Meanwhile, the Navy Electronic Laboratory in San Diego developed QLA, the first mine-hunting sonar, in 1944. Nine U.S. submarines were fitted with this system, allowing them to navigate more safely through Japanese mine fields.
U.S. mine countermeasure developments were not all technology-related - some of the most effective were decidedly low-technology. An example of this can be found in the wartime work of U.S. divers in both the Pacific and the Atlantic. Closely integrated into all pre-invasion mine clearance operations, Explosive Ordnance Demolition (EOD) divers usually disposed of mines discovered by other minesweeping units. EOD and Underwater Demolition Teams (UDT) also examined the approaches to selected assault beaches in the days before a landing took place to scout for enemy mines and to mark swept channels. These activities sometimes took place under fire - UDT swimmers reconnoitering the waters off Iwo Jima in February 1945 came under intense fire when the Japanese responded to the presence of the landing craft supporting their operations. "
Dgaad notes : This is another example of the ENORMOUS resources that must be expended to "clear" areas of suspected minefields. Its not insignificant, and has a MAJOR tactical impact on operations.
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Rather than post bits and pieces of the Chief of Naval Operations site which has good information on Mine Warfare Operations in the Pacific in WW2, I encourage everyone to go to this link :
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (USN) Website
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More coming as I find it.