Matrix Games Forums

Originally posted by dgaad
Mdiehl : an excellent response to a complaint about game mechanics that reflected history accurately.

I really don't think it was a complaint, dgaad. More of a simple question.

Some fine responses here, thank you gents. However, I doubt Kingfish (the original poster) will benefit.... already all of his historic commanders have jumped ship when he took command. Serg, pretty sad when 50 yr old men would rather brave sharks than your Command!


Jonathan

Originally posted by mdiehl
"I don't understand your point about Japanese CAP effectiveness. Maybe you should take a closer look at the 45+ TBD attack during Midway."

I have. The TBD waves arrived separately and piecemeal. See my comment about Midway being as botched up an attack, with respect to coordination, that the US ever made. At no time were more than 14 TBDs engaged at once. Without escort, they were easy pickings for the 15 or 20 A6Ms flying CAP. When the second wave arrived it drew all remaining Japanese CAP to sea level, thus giving a free hand to the attacking (and also unescorted) SBDs. It was, thus, both a botched American coordination attempt and a bothced Japanese coordination attempt at CAP. The problem for the Japanese is that bad CAP was typical, hence near loss of two other CVs at Coral sea, to what were, for the time, *very* small US airstrikes.

There were 2 TBD waves :
* 09h20 - 15 TBD (Hornet) - all lost
* 10h20 - 26 TBD (Enterprise + Yorktown) - 20 TBD lost

http://www.history.navy.mil/docs/wwii/mid1.htm

So a 30 aircrafts wave CAN be annihilated by Japanese CAP. What the Japanese did not take in account was the 50 SBD arriving 2 mn later

Spooky

It begs the defintion of "wave" to call two flights of TBDs that arrived quite asynchronously (IIRC, about 15 minutes apart) a "30 plane wave."

And you're missing the most important point. Midway shows just how crappy IJN CAP coordination could be, since there was nothing on hand to deal with the threat from the SBDs. If a fellow is routinely having his 30+ plane USN strike chewed up by IJN cap, the model is wrong. *Doubly* so if the inbound strike includes escorting fighters.

15mn apart - it is not what is indicated in the official US Navy AAR ... but you must have some more accurate informations

Originally posted by FM_Freyland


I really don't think it was a complaint, dgaad. More of a simple question.

Some fine responses here, thank you gents. However, I doubt Kingfish (the original poster) will benefit.... already all of his historic commanders have jumped ship when he took command. Serg, pretty sad when 50 yr old men would rather brave sharks than your Command!


Jonathan

Ooooh, this coming from a guy who spends ten minutes trying to launch a sub on patrol. Maybe I should adopt your strategy, that of scuttling the fleet in port. That should save my guys from the sharks!

Kingfish.........sharpening the knives to a razor's edge

Originally posted by Kingfish

Kingfish.........sharpening the knives to a razor's edge

And what is your wife going to say about all those plastic butterknife shavings on the living room floor?

"Have you been clipping your toenails in here again?!?!?!

Originally posted by mdiehl
It begs the defintion of "wave" to call two flights of TBDs that arrived quite asynchronously (IIRC, about 15 minutes apart) a "30 plane wave."

And you're missing the most important point. Midway shows just how crappy IJN CAP coordination could be, since there was nothing on hand to deal with the threat from the SBDs. If a fellow is routinely having his 30+ plane USN strike chewed up by IJN cap, the model is wrong. *Doubly* so if the inbound strike includes escorting fighters.

CAP coordination was an endemic problem for both sides. The Americans took two years to develop effective CAP coordination, and were helped by : 2 years of experience, a functioning radio in every plane with separate channels for plane to plane and plane to ship traffic, long range radar, and a number of new officer positions dedicated to the coordination of carrier air operations.