Matrix Games Forums

Agree with the earlier posters Hitler got painted very unfavourably in post war memoirs. One problem Hitler did have was because his intuition was continually right and inteligence assesments wrong a catastrophe such as Stalingrad was inevitable. My conviction is, Hitler after the initial mistake of bringing about war played his hand pretty well if not ruthlessly.

The German memoirs from the Generals are in cloud cookoo land with regards to the overall strategy of the war. Arguements like stopping Barbarossa for winter when it was a one shot operation show their naievety. The diversion to Kiev is another rediculous of critisism when the whole opeartion was based on the principle of destroying Russian armies. Not attempting an offensive in 43 is another one that amuses me as a viable option.

All I gotta say is that if Germans should be shackled by an insane unseen force, the Soviets need to have something to make them foolishly leave half a million men in a forward pocket. Soviets already get a lot of chances to better organize their forces and avoid repeating historical mistakes, how bout giving the Germans the same ability?

ORIGINAL: Arkady
Well, Hitler is guilty the same way as OKH
Their struggle for controll did more harm than their decisions alone, several times during summer 1941 Hitler's decisions was far better than OKH but due Halder's effort, orders for army groups commanders was changed or indifferent. "Unfortunately" when struggle was over and Hitler won the control, he stop listen to any advice at all.
On the other way, Stalin was after 1941 smart enough to do not meddle with staff decisions once they issued orders

Often quoted as Hitler's big success, the 'hold fast order' is questionable, the Germans lost tactical flexibility, when Model took over 9th Armee, he insisted that the order be relaxed and, with flexibility restored, was able to cut off and destroy 2 Russian armies, despite the winter weather. The Germans ended the winter still having had to retreat anyway, still lost heavy equipment, despite the 'hold' order, but may have saved many men by not holding out everywhere, regardless of the tactical situation.

The 1941 campaign was governed initially by Hitler's Directive 21, it didn't result in capturing Leningrad, or Moscow, and left the Germans with no clear descision. In this and in following decisions, Directive 32 11th June 1941, on reducing to 60 divs in Russia, moving into Turkey and Iran (wishful thinking. Later he commissioned junk AFVs from Dr. Porsche, hindered the development of the Me262 and the MP44, where in this process do you see Hitler making good decisions, apart from specifying the long 50mm gun for the Pkw III, I'm finding it hard to find any sucesses.

The biggest failure of the lot is by his treatment of the people of the conquered territories, such that they would never accept German rule and thereby ensuring that Germany would never win the war, how ever long it took, we should be thankful for that [:)]

ORIGINAL: Aurelian

ORIGINAL: Senno

Only if the Soviet player has to wear a silly mustache at the same time.[:D]

Well, the German player would have to wear one too

True. And balanced. [;)] Unlike this suggestion.....

Which is why I really didn't take it seriously.[:)] The old me would have had more to say. But in the week since I passed from my reckless and feckless youth I have mellowed and matured. Thus a tossed-off little joke sufficed.[:D]

ORIGINAL: Lord_Martin

Actually I believe that Hitlers decisions throughout the war on the eastern front are well balanced by Stalins refusal to believe in a German attack (in this game reflected by the starting positions and German ability to destroy huge Soviet armies).

I find myself in general agreement with LM, as a game design issue.

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa

The 'stop order' before Dunkirk may have been driven by the same motive, the need to control his generals, even at the risk of letting his enemy escape. [:)]

According to Macksey, "Military Errors of Word War Two", von Rundstedt, who was the Commander-in-Chief of that German Army Group, gave the "stop order", and then Hitler approved it. Weinberg ("A world at arms") says that Hitler and von Rundstedt "...agreed that the armoured forces moving north be halted..."

ORIGINAL: alfonso

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa

The 'stop order' before Dunkirk may have been driven by the same motive, the need to control his generals, even at the risk of letting his enemy escape. [:)]

According to Macksey, "Military Errors of Word War Two", von Rundstedt, who was the Commander-in-Chief of that German Army Group, gave the "stop order", and then Hitler approved it. Weinberg ("A world at arms") says that Hitler and von Rundstedt "...agreed that the armoured forces moving north be halted..."

The Blitzkrieg Legend, Karl Heinz Frieser, quotes Hitler as saying that he 'fully and entirely' agreed with Rundstedt and it was 'entirely identical to his (Hitler's) thoughts'. Guderian and the other panzer leaders had exceeded their orders and turned a much more conservative plan into a full scale blitzkrieg. Guderian instead of consolidating the bridgehead at Sedan, had immediately launched his attack toward the coast, this is not what Hitler had envisaged.

I believe that the situation in August 1941, at Smolensk, had it roots in this conflict. Guderian, as in France, was trying to bounce the campaign into an advance on Moscow. He was more concerned with seizing the Elyna bridgehead as a jumping off point for the next stage of the advance, than he was in closing the pocket. He was not concerned about Russian forces escaping, because he expected to catch them in the next encirclement.

However, Hitler was having no more insubordination and proceeded with his own directive in which Moscow was not the main objective. My point is that with a less interference from Hitler in the planning stage, the Kiev grouping would have been dealt with on the way to Moscow and no diversion of forces would have been necessary.

I have no idea if the earlier Marcks, Otto, or OKH planning would have won the war, Hitler and German treatment of conquered populations made that very unlikely, however well the campaign had gone, surrender did not seem to be an option. [:)]

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa
I have no idea if the earlier Macks, Otto, or OKH planning would have won the war, Hitler and German treatment of conquered populations made that very unlikely, however well the campaign had gone, surrender did not seem to be an option. [:)]

This is key. It became apparant early on, and it seems hammered home by late Autumn, that the Germans were in a "culture war" and would be as ruthless as they could imagine. Any dreams of a peace or of the Germans supporting a Ukrainian uprising is as likely as the Germans holding a straight line in winter of 41 in a 1.03 game...Hitler would not have made peace anyway since he was "one battle away" from victory up until the end of Typhoon.

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa

Often quoted as Hitler's big success, the 'hold fast order' is questionable, the Germans lost tactical flexibility, when Model took over 9th Armee, he insisted that the order be relaxed and, with flexibility restored, was able to cut off and destroy 2 Russian armies, despite the winter weather. The Germans ended the winter still having had to retreat anyway, still lost heavy equipment, despite the 'hold' order, but may have saved many men by not holding out everywhere, regardless of the tactical situation.

The 1941 campaign was governed initially by Hitler's Directive 21, it didn't result in capturing Leningrad, or Moscow, and left the Germans with no clear descision. In this and in following decisions, Directive 32 11th June 1941, on reducing to 60 divs in Russia, moving into Turkey and Iran (wishful thinking. Later he commissioned junk AFVs from Dr. Porsche, hindered the development of the Me262 and the MP44, where in this process do you see Hitler making good decisions, apart from specifying the long 50mm gun for the Pkw III, I'm finding it hard to find any sucesses.

The biggest failure of the lot is by his treatment of the people of the conquered territories, such that they would never accept German rule and thereby ensuring that Germany would never win the war, how ever long it took, we should be thankful for that [:)]

The Me 262 is a bit of a myth. Hitler stuck in a major war had hundreds of development projects going on from duraluminum barracks (termite proof for tropical climates) to Jets he put the authority to halt projects in the hands of Keital in his capacity of head of OKW and Riechs minister for Armament. Georing who did not like interference made sure it did not apply to the Luftwaffe putting Milch and the inspector general in control of evalulating development projects. It has to be noted that in winter of 41 priority was given to replacing losses.

Galland and Milch give conflicting insights into Hitlers mind on the 262 Milch states that Hitler was worried about putting it in full scale production in case it flopped whilst Galland maintains Hitler wanted full scale production. Both agree that Messerschimmitts works were "too poorly orginized to carry out the work" In the mean time the Techical office sat on the project.

On 2nd November 43 Goering visited Messerschmitt on Hitlers orders to inquire about equipping it with bombs. Messerschmitt lied and informed Goering that the bomb racks were ready to go into production when this lie was found out he assured Goering that a couple of weeks would suffice to make the modifications. At this stage there was one flying Me 262 in existence. On the same day Milch was assured that the Me 262 could go into full scale production whilst the procurement department reported the Messerschmitt plant was in a "catastrophic situation.... where everything had run into a bottleneck"

By the 5th December Hitler's Luftwaffe aid sends a telegram to Goering including the line "The Fuehrer feels that any delay in our jet fighter program would be tantemout to irresponsible negligence"

Sure Hitler expected a bomber in April 44 but the Me 262's delay had very little to do with him personally but rather the incomptence of others and the general war situation.

Stalin was certainly a factor after 1941 in a negative way for the Russians. He was notoriously impatient and this shows in the series of offensive attacks as the winter of 41 went along. Stavka wanted to concentrate everything in the center and wipe out AGC, but Stalin insisted on a broad front attack.

Stalin sacked a lot of army commanders who were otherwise ok with his impatience and also demanded offensives go in before they were ready, sometimes with bad results. This happen throughout the war, but had less of an impact than a lot of what Hitler did.

In a sense, the Germans are hamstrung with some of Hitler's bad decisions in the war. The biggest is the formation of the Luftwaffe field divisions. These units were not very combat effective and wasted first class manpower that should have been transferred to the army for proper training and used as first class replacements. This could have started as early as the fall of 41, but Goering was able to put it off until the disasters of the winter and then he got his way with keeping them away from the army. The Germans could have been far stronger in the spring of 42 had it not been for this idiotic decision. The SS field forces are another example. While they were "elite" in many cases, it was with elite moral, not skill for a long time (I have read too many accounts where the SS units may have taken something, but took very heavy casualties doing it simply because they did not have trained and experienced NCO's and junior officers. Some units were also built around themes rather than good military sense with examples like the Wiking division). In addition to all of this, the local army commander that had SS and Luftwaffe units in his area often had to ask for permission to move them or order them to do something and often if they did not like the orders, they appealed up their own chains of command, making German command and control unnecessarily complicated and unwieldy. I am sort of getting off the subject here as these things are not really represented in the game beyond the crappy Luftwaffe field forces.

The other thing the Germans are stuck with are Hitler's decisions when it comes to production and he had a far more negative impact on German production than Stalin did with Russian production.

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa

ORIGINAL: alfonso

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa

The 'stop order' before Dunkirk may have been driven by the same motive, the need to control his generals, even at the risk of letting his enemy escape. [:)]

According to Macksey, "Military Errors of Word War Two", von Rundstedt, who was the Commander-in-Chief of that German Army Group, gave the "stop order", and then Hitler approved it. Weinberg ("A world at arms") says that Hitler and von Rundstedt "...agreed that the armoured forces moving north be halted..."

The Blitzkrieg Legend, Karl Heinz Frieser, quotes Hitler as saying that he 'fully and entirely' agreed with Rundstedt and it was 'entirely identical to his (Hitler's) thoughts'. Guderian and the other panzer leaders had exceeded their orders and turned a much more conservative plan into a full scale blitzkrieg. Guderian instead of consolidating the bridgehead at Sedan, had immediately launched his attack toward the coast, this is not what Hitler had envisaged.

I do not understand you know. Are you referring to the dash to the coast (10-20 May) or the stop order before Dunkirk (24 May)?

But I agree with your consideration about German planning before Barbarrosa, which was "confusing" to say the least. But it happened before the game starts, so it should not be necessarily included in the game as anything distinct from the OOB present at turn 1 (i.e. as some kind of additional "Hitler rule")

And, above all, I agree with you in considering the III Reich itself (including the treatment inflicted to conquered peoples) as one enormous, huge ethical and moral blunder.

Notwithstanding the prospect of delays, my point is that it was not a good decision to use a potentially good fighter aircraft to carry a limited bomb load (vengeance being the motive, not sound military judgement). Either way, with only 10 hrs flying time in the engines, the Me 262 was always going to be of marginal use.

The main thing for me is, that I find it very difficult to think of any good decisions that Hitler made. [:)]

When talking about the breakout from Sedan it was Halder who called the idea "senseless". Hitler asked Guderian what he intended to do once breaking out from Sedan. Guderian replied that the leadership had to decide on Ameins or Paris and pointed out that Ameins was the correct course Hitler said nothing and nodded. Busch who commanded the 16th army of Guderians flank stated in the same meeting that he did not believe Guderian could cross the Meuse. You can't blame Hitler for that one when the proffessionals were dead against it.

I don't say Hitler was the only one who had reservations, but he had the final word and ultimate power of decision, his motives tended to be based on other than purely military factors.

The point, however, is on the timing of the plan, it was intended that the bridgehead should be consolidated, which might take several days. Guderian didn't wait, causing much concern among many, including Hitler, it is against this background that the Halt order should be seen.

I also find it interesting that the same motives and conflict seemed to arise again in August 1941, with the internal conflict and delay that it caused. However, my view is that failed decisions were taken earlier during the planning stage. Only complete Soviet collapse would have permitted the Barbarossa plan to succeed, there was too much diversion of effort and that is down to Hitler.[:)]

ORIGINAL: Smirfy


When talking about the breakout from Sedan it was Halder who called the idea "senseless". Hitler asked Guderian what he intended to do once breaking out from Sedan. Guderian replied that the leadership had to decide on Ameins or Paris and pointed out that Ameins was the correct course Hitler said nothing and nodded. Busch who commanded the 16th army of Guderians flank stated in the same meeting that he did not believe Guderian could cross the Meuse. You can't blame Hitler for that one when the proffessionals were dead against it.

Exactly. In reality, the whole conception of the plan, from Manstein, was not well received initially by his superior commanders, but Hitler liked it. And finally, it was a succesful gamble...

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa

Notwithstanding the prospect of delays, my point is that it was not a good decision to use a potentially good fighter aircraft to carry a limited bomb load (vengeance being the motive, not sound military judgement). Either way, with only 10 hrs flying time in the engines, the Me 262 was always going to be of marginal use.

The main thing for me is, that I find it very difficult to think of any good decisions that Hitler made. [:)]

Whilst I abhor the disaster Hitler brought on the world, dispasionatly I have to conclude his choices were pretty rational given his political and strategic position. One went hand in hand with the other hence we have the waste of resources like the SS and Luftwaffe field formations on the other the divide and rule strategy was nessecary to keep him in power (we see the same in Libya in the news). Likewise understanding like Hitler Barbarossa was a one shot operation and knowing Stalin was putting out peace feelers he had to go for it in winter 41 any other action was pointless. Decisions have to be qualified by the situation. To quote Clausewitz "The dangers of the moment are those by which men are chiefly influenced, and often that appears a desperate course, which in fact, in the last instance the only road to safety and the greatest evidence of foresight"

ORIGINAL: Smirfy

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa

Notwithstanding the prospect of delays, my point is that it was not a good decision to use a potentially good fighter aircraft to carry a limited bomb load (vengeance being the motive, not sound military judgement). Either way, with only 10 hrs flying time in the engines, the Me 262 was always going to be of marginal use.

The main thing for me is, that I find it very difficult to think of any good decisions that Hitler made. [:)]

Whilst I abhor the disaster Hitler brought on the world, dispasionatly I have to conclude his choices were pretty rational given his political and strategic position. One went hand in hand with the other hence we have the waste of resources like the SS and Luftwaffe field formations on the other the divide and rule strategy was nessecary to keep him in power (we see the same in Libya in the news). Likewise understanding like Hitler Barbarossa was a one shot operation and knowing Stalin was putting out peace feelers he had to go for it in winter 41 any other action was pointless. Decisions have to be qualified by the situation. To quote Clausewitz "The dangers of the moment are those by which men are chiefly influenced, and often that appears a desperate course, which in fact, in the last instance the only road to safety and the greatest evidence of foresight"

If you only have one shot, you need to make it a good one, my point is that if Hitler had not interfered with the planning process, it might have gone better. He may have made the right decision over the Kiev encirclement, but better decisions earlier on would have made that choice unnecessary. You could say that when you have your hand caught in a meat grinder, it's a good decision to cut off your arm, but it's a better decision not to put your hand in a meat grinder.

I am still finding it difficult to see what good decisions Hitler made. [:)]

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa

I am still finding it difficult to see what good decisions Hitler made. [:)]

Your point is: as the final consequence of everything Hitler did was a complete defeat, he did nothing correctly? For instance, we could argue that the victory over France was nice, but, if that encouraged the help from USA to UK, in reality it was a mistake. And the same with everything else.

Well Kiev was the greatest victory in history and served Germany no better than Hannibals victory at Cannae did to Carthage yet history is kind to Hannibal as a general and Cannae the yardstick. We could also mention Austerlitz and Napoleon, Charles XII and Narva.

Hitler understood unlike his generals logistics, he understood Germany had little in that department Barbarossa was an operation to win the war in western Russia. Nobody gave Russia a chance when it kicked off no one. The one shot was very good beyond expectations it was just Russia and Stalin were more resiliant to collapse than anticipated.

The World was impressed by German achievements, also with Japan, but there was a lack of economic muscle to back it up. Hitler would and should have known this, all the more reason to give your opponent, or at least his people, a way out in an acceptable surrender.

I believe with the OKH Barbarossa variant and a concentration on limited objectives that will force the Russians to fight, the result could have been better (because of the treatment of population I doubt a conclusive win). The victory at Kiev could have been won on the way to a convergence beyond Moscow, a battle won is useless if the war is lost. [:)]

ORIGINAL: alfonso

ORIGINAL: Rasputitsa

I am still finding it difficult to see what good decisions Hitler made. [:)]

Your point is: as the final consequence of everything Hitler did was a complete defeat, he did nothing correctly? For instance, we could argue that the victory over France was nice, but, if that encouraged the help from USA to UK, in reality it was a mistake. And the same with everything else.

No, my point is that I am giving examples of Hitler's bad decisions and I am asking you to give examples of good ones. Big bad decision, declare war on the US when they might have gone off and concentrated on Japan. Hitler made it easy for Roosevelt to make Europe the priority, it is not a good policy to make things easy for your enemy.

Likewise, bad decision to make a population prefer a brutal dictator over your 'liberation' of their countries.

Bad decision to defeat the allies, let the BEF escape, and have no plan on how to defeat Britain. His policy seemed to be to expect that his enemies would all give up, with no plan if they didn't. [:)]