ORIGINAL: FatR
Such are the perils of losing the war badly. One thing people often forget is that Allied sub successes in 1944 happened after Japanese were already on the rout and lacking strength in every area. USN subs helped to mop things up faster, sure, but they did not won the war by themselves... and you should not expect them to do so in the game.
Really? So the greatest naval battle in world history, in October 1944, was after the IJN had routed?
The Mid-Pac campaign didn't begin until November 1943. The Japanese were not "routed" when the Marines hit Tarawa.
As to the sub war, sinking 4 of every 5 merchant tons doesn't constitue for me "mopping up."
From Admiral King's final report to the Secretary of the Navy
http://www.valoratsea.com/King.htm:
"Sinking of enemy merchant ships rose from 134 ships totaling 580,390 tons in 1942 to 284 ships totaling 1,341,968 tons in 1943. Then in 1944, when submarine coordinated attack groups reached the peak of their effectiveness, the merchant fleet of Japan suffered its worst and most crippling blow-492 ships of 2,387,780 tons were sunk or destroyed in submarine torpedo and gun attacks. The figures given above, which are based on evaluated estimates, include only ships of 1000 tons and larger. It should be borne in mind that our submarines sank or destroyed, chiefly by gunfire, large numbers of smaller vessels, particularly during the latter part of the war, when few large enemy ships still remained afloat. In 1945, because of the tremendous attrition on Japanese shipping by our earlier submarine operations and the destructive sweeps by our fleets and carrier air forces, enemy merchantmen sunk by submarines dropped to 132 ships totaling 469,872 tons. The advance of our forces had further driven Japanese ships back to the coast lines and shallow waters of Japan and the Asiatic mainland. Our submarines followed the Page 202 enemy shipping into these dangerous waters and made many skillful and daring attacks, such as the one in April when TIRANTE entered a patrolled anchorage in Quelpart Island to blow up a 10,000 ton tanker and two 1,500 ton escort vessels, which were peacefully lying at anchor. Further south, persistent submarine patrolling plus air sweeps had, by the end of March, stopped almost all enemy traffic along the sea lanes of the East Indies and the coast of Indo-China. For a time, Japanese shipping continued to ply in the East China and Yellow Seas, but the invasion of Okinawa in April soon made the East China Sea untenable to the Japanese. Causing heavy damage, our submarines were very active during April and May in the Yellow Sea and along the east and south coasts of the main Japanese islands. In June the landlocked Sea of Japan was penetrated in force. The submarines had excellent hunting, and in a series of coordinated attacks did tremendous damage to the remnants of the Japanese merchant fleet. One of the intruders, BARB even landed a party on the coast of Honshu, and successfully blew up a bridge and the speeding train that was crossing it. By the end of the war, the Japanese merchant fleet was virtually nonexistent.
ATTACKS ON NAVAL VESSELS
While United States submarines were effectively eliminating the Japanese merchant fleet, they were also carrying out damaging attacks on Japanese naval units. During the course of the war, the following principal Japanese combatant types were sent to the bottom as a result of these attacks: Battleship 1 Carriers 4 Escort Carriers 4 Heavy Cruisers 3 Light Cruisers 9 Destroyers 43 Submarines 23 Minor combatant vessels and naval auxiliaries (including 60 escort vessels) 189 Details of these sinkings will be found in Appendix A. While the loss of the heavier naval units was critical to the Japanese, especially as the strength of our surface fleet increased, the surprisingly high losses of enemy destroyers and escort vessels to submarine attack are particularly noteworthy. Our submarines, refusing to accept the role of the hunted, even after their presence was known, frequently attacked their archenemies under circumstances of such great risk that the failure of their attack on the enemy antisubmarine vessel placed the submarine in extreme danger of loss. So successful, however, were these attacks that the Japanese developed a dangerous deficiency of destroyer screening units in their naval task forces, and their merchant shipping was often inadequately escorted. "
How many AE players see 8 carriers sunk by submarines? Oh, the JFB howling!!!
Despite torpedo trouble and a shortage of modern fleet boats, the totals for 1942-43 are extremely significant when measured against a pre-war Japanese merchant inventory of about 5 million tons. Reading this forum, especially some of the non-US posters' missives, one would think that the USN submarine war was an afterthought. The figures do not bear that out.