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It is quite good and always remember to NEVER get bonded to any character in his books...

Have some research to do with Kaigun, my old Thesis notes, as well as dusting off the Thesis itself.

Been doing some reading and here are a couple of initial thoughts. Please forgive the history lesson within the proposals.

1. If the Japanese had fought for and won the argument at the Washington Conference for a 5:5:3.5 instead of the 5:5:3, the Japanese would gain three new capital ships (some combination of Nagato BB and Amagi BC) and a net gain of 13,500T in CV building. The British and Americans were allotted 135,000T (two major conversions impacted the Americans with Lexington/Saratoga while the Japanese gain Amagi/Akagi) and the Japanese historically ended up with 81,000 in CV building. If we got along the 70% then that number jumps to 94,500T. Short answer would be another CV similar to the Ryujo or Soryu.

2. Following the same rationale, after the failed Geneva Naval Conference of 1928, finds us at the London Conference in 1930. Here the argument broke against Japan by a united front of Great Britain and the USA. The definitions of CA (8" and 10,000T) and CL (6" and 6,000T) were settled upon by the US and GB in the late-20s. Japan comes up short at the Conference and, due to this, the Treaty faction of the Fleet gets canned. The Fleet faction then proceeds with the full intention of leaving the Washington Conference System in 1935 when they purposefully scuttle the 2nd London Conference. If they had gotten what they wanted, the Japanese would have gained roughly 2 CA and 4 CL in allowed building.

Summary:
If we buy into this thinking then there is no change to the US and GB Fleets PRIOR to 1936 planning while the Japanese would gain 3 Capital Ships, a CV, 2 CA, and 4 CL. There would also be more DDs but I do not yet have specific numbers there yet.

The logical starting point for major changes would then be the 3rd Circle Plan (Yamato/Musashi and Shokaku/Zuikaku) leading into the 4th Circle we've done so much with in RA.

I hope the above makes sense...

A few possibilities for the Brits, I'm not too aware of the IJN possibilities, some more likely than others but none require a huge stretch of the imagination:

The Short Stirling does not go into production, instead Short's build more Sunderlands for coastal command allowing more to go overseas as well.

The Admiralty recognises that they will need more convoy escorts, as a result:
The early Black Swans are built in two batches of four in 1937 and five 1939. Realising that the Black Swans are too expensive for mass production and the Admiralty orders several Flower Class corvettes. It's realised that these are too slow and uncomfortable at sea after the first few are built. The Admiralty orders the first River Class frigates in 1940.
Would mean the RAN get their Rivers slightly earlier. The RN has more escorts available in the Indian Ocean.

The cancelled two County Class cruisers are still cancelled, instead their place is taken by two more York/Exeter cruisers (HMS Ely/Lincoln/Canterbury/Durham/Salisbury). HMS London does not have her big refit/rebuild as the money isn't there now.

The Royal Navy regains control of the Fleet Air Arm several years earlier, potentially making slightly less crappy planes available earlier [:D]

The breakdown/non-occurance of the naval treaties means that the KGV class are redesigned to mount 16" guns.

The RN learns the lessons that Norway and Dunkirk taught them about airpower far quicker, and production of the 40mm bofors gun is increased making more available to ships. Most will be fitted to escort ships operating along the East Coast convoys of the UK and any ships based in the Med.

Drop the KGV and build Lions instead.

The wavelength I am on--not sure about Stanislav--is that the Treaties don't breakdown but Japan gets a slightly better deal within the Treaties. Have started pouring over Kaigun again for the plans, debates, and options during this period of time.

I've been crunching the numbers when it comes to Capital Ships and the more realistic addition of two BB or BC seems to fit the number better. The Japanese delegation wangled the completion of Mutsu in exchange for two American Colorados and what would later become the Nelson's for Britain.

Does anyone know the building state of the Japanese BB and BC at the time of Washington? My impression is, beyond Mutsu, the 8-8 Ships still had a ways to go. Akagi and Amagi appear to be next up for completion. Kaga's hull was complete but I'm not sure past that.

The New 'Treaty' Fleet Ideas:
1. New Capital Ships: add Kaga and Tosa as BB or BCs Akagi/Amagi
2. Bring in CarDiv1 with the BC hulls Takao and Atago
3. Add a pair of Heavy Cruisers
4. Build a set of 4 CL that are either a further improvement of the Sendai/Naka-Class or something new.

From the research I have done, you also have the Kii Class and No 13 class that were planned but cancelled due to the Washington Treaty.

Also there would possibly have been a 2nd Improved Hosho (Ryujo) and possibly a second. These were simply listed as 10,000 aviation ships.

Part of the 8-8 plan was to retire the Kongo class with the newer BC types. Also, Fuso, Yamashiro, Ise and Hyuga might have been retired as well.

Oookay, this thread is groving fast. I'll try to give my thoughts as I have the time.

ORIGINAL: House Stark
FatR, you mentioned that Japan probably should not receive much of an increase in industry. Is this due to personal/gameplay reasons or because it seems logically impossible? If Japan is preparing for a possible war in the early 1930s that would give plenty of time for a more organized and competent Japan to develop more industry in the Home Islands, Manchuria, or Korea.

Logically improbable. The perspective of entering a world war can't be predicted more than 1-1,5 years in advance, and that's in the best case (IRL Japanese began immediate preparations for the Pacific War in secod half of 1940). Constant overmilitarization will ruin the economy in the long term. And jumping over one's head economically in mere 10 years, while not strictly impossible, requires way too many assumptions in areas about which none of us are knowledgeable. I'd prefer not to assume increases in production capabilities, unless they directly result from relatively plausible changes in military production planning or events, like the invasion of China happening later than IRL.

ORIGINAL: House Stark
Maybe Japanese leaders realize during the invasion of China that alienating the Chinese people would be counterproductive, and Japanese holdings in China are more developed.

More consistent and less brutal occupation policies are a viable proposal, as IRL they were more dependent on good or ill will of local Japanese commanders and political abilities of local collaborationists, than on any overarching vision. But this won't change the situation in China radically. Japanese didn't have resources to invest in the rest of China as they did in Manchukuo, and the combination of anti-Japanese sentiments in China with Japanese greed provided too much fuel for the conflict. Scen 2 has pro-Japanese local militias appearing in Malaya and DEI, plus, IIRC, more puppet Chinese troops, I don't think that anything more could have been achieved reasonably.

ORIGINAL: John 3rd C. Adding industry in Manchuria is another RA idea we've done. Could that be expanded even more?

Most of the default industry in Manchuria already was built or reconstructed during the Japanese occupation... No, I don't think there is much potential. Maybe some small improvements (incuding local armament production for Manchukuo and later puppet Chinese troops, giving them slightly better armament) due to the all-out war in China starting, say, one year later and the region getting more developed.

About the political circustances of the war's beginning, the immediate cause of the escalation that led to war was Japanese encroachment on French and Dutch colonial territories, that were left seemingly defenseless after their homelands were overran by Germany. I don't think this should or would change. I do think that we can posit more vigorous response by Britain and US once it becomes clear that Japan is not likely to back down. In reality, IIRC, the Allies achieved theoretical superiority in the number of warships by as early as March of 1942 (but of course their fleets were divided between two oceans and two commands). The possiblity of greater buildup before the war clearly was there. Lack of united planning and command before the war still should impair the Allied disposition.

John, I'll post thoughts about your naval ideas a bit later, if you don't mind.

Thanks Stanislav.

I've thought about better reflected preparation for the DEI and got to thinking about wouldn't it be interesting to move an American BatDiv over there to cooperate with the British? What moving the R-Class Brit BBs to Singapore? Certainly could add some spice to the mix.

So, on fleet, only a few thougts, at the moment...

Just in case: vision of carriers as the fleet's main strike force cannot arise before 1937. Even then it requires a huge leap of faith, assuming that the new generation of carrier planes existing only in specifications and on drawing boards at that moment, will be able to achieve the characteristics desired from it AND that these characteristics will overcome improvements in AA defence.

I think we need an overarching and different vision to guide changes to the fleet, and to achieve that the concept of the Decisive Battle (tm) as it existed in Japanese admirals' mind need to be exorcised somehow. I propose somewhat different evaluation of the Russo-Japanese war's lessons. The task faced by Japanese then was not dissimilar from the strategic conundrum of the Pacific War, but their post-war thinking concentrated overtly concentrated on the flashy success at Tsushima, while not paying enough attention to the fact that Tsushima was only the endspiel of the long and narowly won game, by which Japan had an advantage of such magnitude, that not only victory was almost predetermined, a tactical draw was a strategic victory for the Japanese as well, as the only remaining Russian port in the theatre had insufficient repair facilities to handle seriously damaged battleships.

So, how about postulating that after WW I and the first naval limitations, when it became obvious that any possible naval war will be a war against an opponent with both numerically superior (but not entirely concentrated in the Pacfic) fleet at the beginning AND greater ability to reinforce it, lessons of the Russo-Japanese war were reevaluated more carefully? For example (that's just an couple of ideas):

1)The war is explicitly not expected to be over after the first major defeat of the enemy fleet (while the fleet's leadership didn't honestly believed in a brief war by 1941, this idea negatively impacted Japanese operational thinking). It is assumed that the enemy will try a rematch using a combination of parts of its fleet that initially weren't assigned to the Pacific, old ships, and newly built ships, and will not seek peace until IJN's superiority is proven repeatedly. Therefore the war is expected to last no less than 1.5-2 years. This should impact approach to many areas, from sealanes protection to personnel preservation.
2)Expanding on (1), it is expected than in the opening phase of the war Japan will seize the territories that must be held or used as bargaining chips for peace, and after that an extended phase of active defense, including defense against enemy attempts to interdict Japanese communications, will follow. Attrition of the enemy fleet is expected to take place over months, not days immediately before the main engagement (so sub operations aren't tied to the operations of the surface forces as closely, for example).
3)The idea of delivering a crippling opening blow to the enemy fleet in the base is mulled over even more than it was. So when carrier aircraft, potentially capable of this, appear (see above, not before 1937), the idea of a dedicated carrier striking force is formulated faster than IRL.

That is some solid thinking. Let me mull it over some before responding.

Anybody else got thoughts or reactions to what we've been chatting about?

And on the fleet plans: Ryujo was too small to serve as an effective carrier and extra carrier tonnage allocation by the more accomodating treaty will only allow for another ship of her size. Just build a bigger carrier, closer in dimensions to Soryu, instead. Treaties or not, funds are not endless anyway - this option will actually end up saving money on the rebuild, giving a much beter ship for approximately the same price.

Those new CLs you're talking about will be built past the London Treaty in early 30s, right? They most likely will be a development of Yubari. Will try to find some Japanese design alternatives. Well, if you mean CLs, not "CLs" they were building IRL at that time[:)].

It is interesting who's going to cough up the money for all the extra construction, of course. The carrier side is covered if you accept my proposal above... the surface combatant side is more problematic. Maybe no modernization of Fuso/Yamashiro in 1930 (justified by the presence of newer battleships), with money going into new cruisers and so on? Unfortunately, this means lack of the uniform 25-knot battleline that was created by the 30s rebuilds of Japanese battleships in reality... But I don't think that so many extra ships can just come from nowhere.

To all those who made proposals about the Allied changes - I'm not missing them, hopefully we'll discuss them later.

Gave the idea some thinking and like the thought. Pretty fascinating to turn the strategy of the 'Decisive Battle' on its head. If we were to look at this from what you proposed here would be some interesting angles potentially:

1. The need for a viable ASW Command to protect shipping during a long war.
2. A redefinition of the Sub Arm with then a redesign of the actual SS themselves.
3. A longer war would necessitate a Fleet Train (AR, AKE, AS, etc...) and more AOs

What else might be needed along these lines? I am sure Kaigun has some pages on what might have been regarding the ASW issue. Will check that out.

Could we combine the two ideas of new views on the Decisive Battle and differing Treaty outcomes?

Concur regarding aircraft and CVs could not really be impacted until Circle Three in 1936.

ORIGINAL: John 3rd
Could we combine the two ideas of new views on the Decisive Battle and differing Treaty outcomes?

Of course, why not.

ORIGINAL: FatR

And on the fleet plans: Ryujo was too small to serve as an effective carrier and extra carrier tonnage allocation by the more accomodating treaty will only allow for another ship of her size. Just build a bigger carrier, closer in dimensions to Soryu, instead. Treaties or not, funds are not endless anyway - this option will actually end up saving money on the rebuild, giving a much beter ship for approximately the same price.

Those new CLs you're talking about will be built past the London Treaty in early 30s, right? They most likely will be a development of Yubari. Will try to find some Japanese design alternatives. Well, if you mean CLs, not "CLs" they were building IRL at that time[:)].

It is interesting who's going to cough up the money for all the extra construction, of course. The carrier side is covered if you accept my proposal above... the surface combatant side is more problematic. Maybe no modernization of Fuso/Yamashiro in 1930 (justified by the presence of newer battleships), with money going into new cruisers and so on? Unfortunately, this means lack of the uniform 25-knot battleline that was created by the 30s rebuilds of Japanese battleships in reality... But I don't think that so many extra ships can just come from nowhere.

To all those who made proposals about the Allied changes - I'm not missing them, hopefully we'll discuss them later.

1. I think you have to have Ryujo in the mix because both the US and Japanese screwed up by building the small Ranger and Ryujo; however, one could get away with adding a proto-Soryu (not Hiryu) to the Fleet as the final 'experimental' Flattop. The Japanese would be, in effect cheating the tonnage by about 20% as they did with the CAs.

2. The Yubari-type Design certainly would be the preferential design direction away from the Naka's and Sendai's.

3. As to the modernization question wouldn't that be dependent on whether you add a pair of BC or a par of BB with the Washington changes? If new BC then perhaps Kongo's don't get their extensive modernization. If a new pair of Kaga BBs then don't rework a pair of older BBs. Certainly a trade-off. Remember though that these ships were well over 60-75% paid for when the Treaty kicks in so the monetary drain wouldn't be horrific. The real cost would come in the fitting out of the warships.

ORIGINAL: John 3rd
1. I think you have to have Ryujo in the mix because both the US and Japanese screwed up by building the small Ranger and Ryujo; however, one could get away with adding a proto-Soryu (not Hiryu) to the Fleet as the final 'experimental' Flattop. The Japanese would be, in effect cheating the tonnage by about 20% as they did with the CAs.

A carrier as big as Ranger in place of Ryujo (14.5k of standard displacement - a proto-Soryu, as you said, instead of shooting for 8k and ending with 10.6 after the expensive rebuild) will be much more useful and probably won't require the rebuild. With the looser treaty limitations there's no reason for Ryujo to end up as she did. The available tonnage theoretically allows to build a pair of not-super-cramped up 11k (or a bit more, including cheating) light carriers instead, but, again, the problem here is (a)money (b)we shouldn't breed carriers that will be hard to provide with pilots, particularly when these carriers can't be very good. A proto-Soryu won't be great too, of course, once forced to carry modern planes (small airgroup, fragile), but at least it will be able to maintai a decent tempo of flight operations.

ORIGINAL: John 3rd
3. As to the modernization question wouldn't that be dependent on whether you add a pair of BC or a par of BB with the Washington changes? If new BC then perhaps Kongo's don't get their extensive modernization. If a new pair of Kaga BBs then don't rework a pair of older BBs. Certainly a trade-off. Remember though that these ships were well over 60-75% paid for when the Treaty kicks in so the monetary drain wouldn't be horrific. The real cost would come in the fitting out of the warships.

I remember that. That's why I'm more concerned with extra ships in 30s. I think a pair of BBs will be considered far more useful in early 20s, considering that they were the main force of the fleet, and that IJN already had 4 good BCs. 2 Kaga BBs, if I remember correctly what they should have been like, will allow to form 3 squadrons of 4 ships with similar characteristics each, which will undoubtely look appealing from administrative and tactical viewpoint.

Two Kaga's it is then. One could have the BatDivs along these lines:

BatDiv1: Nagato, Mutsu, Kii, and Owari
BatDiv2: Fuso, Yamashiro, Ise, and Hyuga
BatDiv3: Kongo, Hiei, Haruna, and Kirishima

CVs
Akagi and Kaga (figuring there is nothing to avoid the Earthquake!)

Two CVLs with an air group of...say...36 planes?

Hello everybody.

I would like to suggest a different approach For japan strategy. The base of this strategy would be Japan realizing that they will fight a war of attrition not a war of decisive Battle. When This decision is made The conservation of forces are more important then aggrasive big ships. I think the question should be that What could Japan hold in hand after 5 years of fight to survive the war.In the end allied have to make a calculation after they finish the war in Europe. It would be very difficult to fight with japan 2 years after the war is over in Europe. So mainly we should discuss what could make Japan fight till 1947. I thing in descending order. 1) An able air force 2) A CV force never smaller then the allies.3) ability to interdict allies merchant lines all the time. ( blowing the canal doors is a must) 4)Layers of defence perimeter.

Force conservation means no China invasion. Which means 7 years of stockpiling. Also great emhasis in 4 Engine planes and escorts. Which could penetrate deep in to china mainland.

Force conservation would look for force multipliers. Like more advanced fighters, bombers, Conversion CVEs and CVLs.

Better landing craft and escort. Mines, Above all more advanced torps. Could Japan have homing torps in 1943-44 in their 61cm.

Again very long range planes. To secure zone defence.

What is not needed is Big BBs, Infantry divisions. Small subs etc. If japan predicts all those these She can fight a war not for winning but but not for loosing. In the end id no Aboms used. It might succeed.

A fighting force that could identify coming treat from far away and react accordinglly.

Regards

ORIGINAL: John 3rd

Two Kaga's it is then. One could have the BatDivs along these lines:

BatDiv1: Nagato, Mutsu, Kii, and Owari
BatDiv2: Fuso, Yamashiro, Ise, and Hyuga
BatDiv3: Kongo, Hiei, Haruna, and Kirishima

CVs
Akagi and Kaga (figuring there is nothing to avoid the Earthquake!)

Two CVLs with an air group of...say...36 planes?

I still urge you to reconsider building two mini-CVLs. Sure, in the game I'll take two such ships instead of a decent-sized Ryujo that honestly can carry 48 planes (it can already in the game, but I don't think she ever actually operated more than 38, at least during WW II) any day of the week, but that's because for the game code a carrier is a carrier, and the only thing that really impacts air operations is airplane capacity. But IRL Ryujo suffered from, IIRC, being only able to move modern aircraft by its fore lift and too small deck area. I think she wouldn't have been able to carry late-war planes too. They tried to save money by building a small carrier, but thanks to the reconctruction it ended up expensive. And there was little reason to squeeze everything possible of the avialable carrier tonnage right now, with USN not rushing to fill its carrier quota, and combat role of a carrier still remaining vague.

From the game viewpoint, I think post-treaty carrier construction has enough potential for improvement, no need to frontload the mod too much.

On battleships: unfortunately, the two extra battleships of BatDiv 1 will need a reconstruction as well. Considering extra cruiser construction, I don't think there will be money to rebuild any of the older battleships of BatDiv 2 in pre-treaty period. Which might be a hidden blessing, as their early-to-mid-30s rebuilds prepared them for a different war than the one which outline started to form by late 30s (25 knots of speed was enough to maintain a favorable distance of engagement in a daylight artillery duel with the old American battleline, but not enough to run with the carriers and never BBs/BCs).

ORIGINAL: guctony
Force conservation means no China invasion.

Japan capable of not invading China won't be drawn into the world war at all. That said, as you can see, I'm already proposing a delayed beginning of the big war in China, and expectations of a longer war

ORIGINAL: guctony
Like more advanced fighters, bombers, Conversion CVEs and CVLs.

You can bet on better aircraft. I'm not a big fan of conversions, though. Converted passenger liners arguably were worth the effort (but most of them were escort carriers, not intended for use against the enemy battlefleet to begin with) but building and reconstruction of special-project shadow carriers saved little money (20-25%, saying optimistically) compared with just buidling a Hiryu-class carrier, occupied shipyards for longer and produced ships that were vastly inferior.

And besides, one of the biggest problems with alt_naval is expanding the Japanese carrier fleet far beyond Japan's ability to provide with planes and, most of all, pilots. True, in AE there is no such thing as too many carriers, as long as they come with airgroups, even if their pilots are untrained initially. IRL, not really. To avoid this trap and excessive front-loading of the scenario, I think it is preferable to give Japan at the start better carriers, than more carriers, compared to the stock. I think this will be discussed in detail once we go to the post-treaties period.

ORIGINAL: guctony
Better landing craft and escort. Mines, Above all more advanced torps. Could Japan have homing torps in 1943-44 in their 61cm.

No.

ORIGINAL: guctony
Again very long range planes. To secure zone defence.

Japan was ahead of everyone else in plane range already.

For the Circle 3 CV production cycle, would the Hiryu Class be produced only as the heavy CV (how many will be determined by those more into the 'nuts and bolts' than me)??

For the Circle 4 CV production cycle, would the Unryo Class CV be the only one produced??

This discussion on how many new CVs Japan should build, and the potential pilot and game balance problems of that, got me thinking a little. I think that for sure, if the Japanese decide to plan for a longer war with no Decisive Battle, their real-life doctrine of skilled pilots flying effective but fragile planes off of effective but not particularly sturdy carriers would simply no longer fly. In the mid 1930s Japan would look at the situation-a war against at least one of, if not both of the US and Great Britain, which are both more populous with stronger industrial potential-and decide to go down the route of quantity to try and better match their enemies, or quality to overmatch them with skill and technology.

Quantity Approach:
-Japan starts with more CVs than historical, maybe 8 or so.
-Japan adopts a pilot training program that can churn out more pilots due to being less focused on creating such purely elite pilots. After all, in a long war even the best of pilots might eventually die.
-Possibly the naval land based air arm is weakened at the expense of increased carrier-based air.
-To avoid “frontloading” the scenario, the Americans adopt one of the following responses:
1) As they see more Japanese carriers being laid down, they order more Yorktowns or accelerate the Essexes in response.
2) As a two-front war against Germany and Japan seems more likely, US admirals note the lack of large carriers and carrier actions in the European front, and either order rapid construction of several small carriers or rapid conversions of other ships into small carriers for possible use in Europe. This allows all the major US fleet carriers (including Ranger!) to be available in the Pacific, and faster.

Quality Approach:
-Japan puts the emphasis not on numbers, but on survivability.
-Taiho-type carriers become the core of the fleet; in fact, all carriers might have decent armor, even at the expense of some air capacity. These carriers should be able to shrug off most bombs and maybe even some torpedoes, to ensure that even if they are damaged they can sail home to repair and fight again. Perhaps Japan would build at least one massive repair yard to ensure rapid repair of these ships is possible.
-With fewer carriers, and those having smaller capacities, the Japanese pilots must be elite to excel against greater odds. To this end, not just the carriers, but also the aircraft must be geared towards survivability. No paper-thin Zeroes, Vals, and Kates, but instead have armored aircraft, and bombers with effective defense.
-Is it possible to make “Allied Damage Control” apply to the Japanese?

Personally, I almost like the quality approach better as it would make for a greater difference between the two sides, with the Allies having numbers and the Japanese having quality.