Page 2 of 6

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 9:38 am
by Erkki
OK... In my p8 Da Babes they definitely dont...

EDIT: Heres Medan with undamaged oil wells and refineries. No land units so nothing happens with supply until I decided to use the supply pull to move some supply towards the northern end of Sumatra where its needed. Meanwhile, fuel is still generated and 2 TFs picked up full loads:



Image

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 9:46 am
by Sardaukar
I think in DaBigBabes, refineries ability to create supply has been turned off.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 10:33 am
by obvert
If you have Palembang and a few of the ports nearby it's not that hard to bring in masses of supplies. The troops got there somehow afterall. Java is usually the last area captured by the Japanese, so that leaves lots of sealanes open unless teh KB camps outside of Oosthaven for a month. Yes Palembang makes some supply, but probably not enough for the kind of fortress that could withstand an attack with massed air attacks.

Refineries should make supplies in game terms if planes are flown based on supply. Where alse would aviation fuel come from?

It seems that if the Allies in the war had thought it important enought to bring in a few divisions to secure Palembang, they might have also been able to bring in a few ship loads of canned goods and bullets.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 11:17 am
by Sardaukar
ORIGINAL: obvert

If you have Palembang and a few of the ports nearby it's not that hard to bring in masses of supplies. The troops got there somehow afterall. Java is usually the last area captured by the Japanese, so that leaves lots of sealanes open unless teh KB camps outside of Oosthaven for a month. Yes Palembang makes some supply, but probably not enough for the kind of fortress that could withstand an attack with massed air attacks.

Refineries should make supplies in game terms if planes are flown based on supply. Where alse would aviation fuel come from?

It seems that if the Allies in the war had thought it important enought to bring in a few divisions to secure Palembang, they might have also been able to bring in a few ship loads of canned goods and bullets.

That's why Japanese player might consider using part of his CV forces in DEI to prevent both massive reinforcement and redeployment/evacuation. Could for example split of 2 CVs from Kido Butai and put them together with CVLs. That sort of "mini-KB" is usually enough to interdict sea lanes without actually even being there all the time. Mere threat of having divisions worth of troops sunk by it is usually enough to prevent Fortress strategies. And it'd still leave 4 CVs available to counter US carriers in Pacific.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 11:47 am
by KenchiSulla
If I remember correctly (has been 18 months ago since I captured Sumatra) I developed betty bases as quickly as possible as far forward as possible to block the DEI. You can also use BB and CA TFs to enforce a blockade. Allied are not capable of effective ship attack by LBA air througout the most of 1942...

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 12:00 pm
by Chickenboy
ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
My question is this: What impact on his economy and movement of units will he be subjected to given his failure to secure this vital piece of real estate?

I am in this situation in my game against Canoerebel. He still holds southern Sumatra including Palembang, Padang, Benkolen and Oosthaven. The denial of the oil will hurt but at the moment Tarakan and Balikpapn coupled with numerous smaller oilfileds are meeting my needs. The part I am worried about is the severe restriction these forces have placed on my movements. I am that I am unable to disband any major surface units for repair in any port within 4e range of Oosthaven. I am severely restricted in what units I can operate near Sumatra. Anything larger than a DD generates unwanted attention. Muchof the SRA is denied to the Japanese player becasue of this.

Unfortunately I will never be able to take it because I simply do not have the land forces to overcome the 40+ land units at Palembang and Oosthave without stripping China, the SRA and Burma to the bone. I estimate that I would need upwards of 6000 AV and probably much more than that to dent the defense. Add to that the 400+ allied fighters and 200+ allied bombers that months of recon indicate are parked at Oosthaven and you end up with a fortress Sumatra that could never have existed in real life.

I have never encountered this tactic before and my hat is off to Canoerebel. It was a totally unexpected move. But it is one that I will develop a house rule for in future games. The house rule may either prohibit its use or simply remove any impediment to the Japanese player blitzing Sumatra before the fall of Singapore. This is not a gamey tactic as I do not consider it an exploit of the game mechanics. I do believe that it is so far removed from any historical possibility as to make it's real life WWII use a fantasy.

Chez
Chez,

I wanted to follow your AAR vs. Canoerebel. Indeed, I restricted myself from reading his AAR in an effort to provide your Imperial command with any needed advice. Still haven't read it past the first page or so. I won't allow myself to do so now, either.

How did this happen-fortress Palembang?

My initial response would be that this would be an ideal opportunity to sink a multitude of laden Allied transports, destroy whole armies and cut off this attempt. Through your submarines, forward positioned netties and surface forces, were you not able to detect this build up? What was KB doing if not liquidating enemy surface forces around Sumatra? Doesn't scenario 2 allow you greater access to infantry, support vessels and earlier airframe development?

If he's got 400 fighters and 200 bombers there, the cupboard must surely be bare elsewhere, no? Has his (over)commitment here impacted your capture and development of bases further afield?

Why do you think that there needs to be a HR restricting Sumatra's invasion until the end of the Singapore campaign? If / when Singapore is cut off and unable to project a threat to the region, then the sky is the limit for Japanese activity in the area. IMO, this is regardless if the paperwork has been signed for the surrender or not.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 12:05 pm
by Chickenboy
ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: Puhis

I think this shows one of the drawback of the supply system. Palembang can self-support huge number of troops just because there's big refinery.

I guess men there have well oiled digestion...

Indeed. And an oversight on my part. With hindsight, I would not have had refineries output any supply points - just fuel, and this is my recommendation for any modders out there.

Andrew
Would there be a recommended change to the fuel/supply numbers produced by oil refining in that case? In other words, do you also suggest that the fuel number goes up by one (10:0 fuel:supply produced) or that it stays at current value of 9 (thereby making a 9:0 ratio)?

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 12:19 pm
by Erkki
I simply used Kuching invasion force strengthened by some additional LCUs and AAA and aviation support units from Saigon and Hainan, supported by MKB. MKB missed all USN warships escaping PI but Palembang was Japanese and protected by fighters and a good number of heavy AAA guns by December 18th(IIRC). I could have invaded it 2 or 3 days earlier but I did some mistakes with the TF orders so I had to load one of the troop TFs twice, plus one TF started to retire from the staging base back towards Hainan.

edit: looks like it was December 22nd, close enough. [8D]

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 12:21 pm
by KenchiSulla
Singkawang is what I used (Size 6 airfield), and it is great for that purpose. You don't even need to capture Singapore before you can snatch it. Just count the hexes. (escorted) Torpedo range for Betties is 14.. No way allies are going to be able to reinforce Palembang very heavily...

And this is in scenario 1, would be even easier in scenario 2..

Image

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 12:35 pm
by KenchiSulla
Back on topic.. Without Palembang it will be very hard to fuel your industry and your fleet. There will be absolutely 0 room to build a reserve ( I try to maintain about 6 months worth of reserve, guestimated by having enough fuel to run my slowed down industry for a year)..

This is my reserve in july 1943

Image

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 3:55 pm
by Rusty1961
Thank you everyone for your input.

Have a good Sunday.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 6:10 pm
by Mac Linehan
ORIGINAL: Sardaukar

I think in DaBigBabes, refineries ability to create supply has been turned off.

Sardaukar -

This is correct. I am currently playing DBB v08, Scn 28C as the Allies, verses the Japanese AI, and am using Tracker to determine who needs what, when and where. Sumatra has lots of fuel and resources; but no supply. So - supply from Batavia to Palembang (and where ever else I can dredge it up), most rikki tik.

Original Alfred: No need for a HR...

No, Sir, not at all.


quote:

ORIGINAL: Puhis

I think this shows one of the drawback of the supply system. Palembang can self-support huge number of troops just because there's big refinery.

I guess men there have well oiled digestion...

Original: Andrew Brown

Indeed. And an oversight on my part. With hindsight, I would not have had refineries output any supply points - just fuel, and this is my recommendation for any modders out there.

Andrew


Andrew, no oversight - just options for differing play styles - which is remarkable foresight, even if you were not thinking that perspective at the time.
You, Sir, are The Man.

Gents, I wanted to take the training wheels off - and got what I asked for.

Mac

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 6:49 pm
by Mynok
I believe Chickenboy and I stopped this by taking Kuching and Singkawang and setup a Betty base early, just as others did. While our opponents got a decent chunk of stuff into Palembang, it was mostly just units that start on Sumatra. Very little got out of Singers.

This is extremely easy to do as Japanese and quite critical. You must control the Java sea early or everything in Malaysia and Sumatra will escape and cause you grief later.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 7:15 pm
by JeffroK
Does your timetable beat the Allied ability to ship the 3-4 Indian Bdes into Bekeloken and rail them across to Palembang & Oosthaven??
 
Do these relativly weak units provide enough delay to the IJA which then allows 18th British Div to get there as well?
 
Given the need for japan to capture this area, and the Allied realisation that it may be defensible, might result in some ding dong battles for Sumatra in the future.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 7:23 pm
by inqistor
Yeah, reinforcements can land on western island side, no need to actually unload directly in Palembang. Probably most important thing is to keep base damaged, to not allow fort building.

The sole fact of "fortress" is no problem, as long as oil/fuel is stockpiled there, because Japan can get it, when base finally fall. It can be problem, when base reaches maximum stockpile, and no longer produces, or when Allied player transport fuel away (maybe by pumping it to western coast, and quickly loading it onto small transports).

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 10:04 pm
by vettim89
In my defunct 2x2 with the still missing Nomad as my partner, he set up a Festung Palembang defense. Meanwhile our opponents took literally almost all of the SoPac (PM, New Caledonia, Fiji, Samoa, and the Tonga Islands) yet, we reached May 1942 and we still held all of Southern Sumatra. I think a lot of Japan players got quite used to "Brave Sir Robin" and predicated their plans upon it. Counterpunch AFB with the Palembang defense. Counterpunch the JFB by taking Kuching and/or Singkawang early to interdict shipping.

Just a matter of swings of the pendulum. In RL the Japanese took what they needed because they new their economy would crash without the SRA oil. Any bold adventures outside of the SRA were not even considered. In WitP/AE, Japan players sometimes get adventuresome before taking care of bidness to turn a phrase. If the Allied player does a Brave Sir Robin, no harm no foul. If the Allied player decides to fight in situ, JFB can't complain when things go horribly wrong

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2011 10:59 pm
by Canoerebel
I have a vested and ongoing interest in Festung Sumatra, so I don't want to comment in too much detail.  "Loose lips sink ships, and all that."
 
I will say a few things:
 
1)  Some very bright folks have looked at IJ oil needs in Scenario Two and determined that Japan has enough to do without Palembang for a very long time - perhaps deep into 1943.
 
2)  That gives Japan some options in dealing with a Festung Palembang or Festung Sumatra.  Nemo's AAR vs. 1 Eyed Jacks has a lengthy and helpful discussion.
 
3)  Either Festung gambit can be handled by Japan as long as the Japanese player attends to it reasonbly quickly.  One important item is to take and build some bases that give Japanese strike aircraft a decent shot at controlling entry into available Allied ports.
 
4)  The Allies are pretty much limited to "local/regional" units for the first four to eight weeks - Dutch units and some Commonwealth units from Singapore and perhaps a few from India.  That isn't enough to create a fortress that can withstand a well-organized and thought out IJ assault.
 
Bottom Line:  IJ players must pay attention to this region early in the game and make sure they have control of the ports by the end of December or early January.  Do that and the Allied player isn't going to accomplish anything meaningful.  A very, very clever and experienced IJ player can string things out much further, though, in hopes that the Allied player will stick his neck in the noose.  The IJ player will then make moves that will result in the Allied player hanging himself.

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Mon Nov 07, 2011 1:02 am
by DivePac88
Yes Dan... you have a lot to answer for, as this Festung Sumatra that you perfected, has given a lot of JFBs sleepless nights. [:-]

RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Mon Nov 07, 2011 2:19 am
by ChezDaJez
No need for a HR, the situation you face is largely self inflicted.

You were adament that you would not read the relevant AARs. There are AARs which discuss in great detail how to take advantage of an Allied festung Palembang commitment. Even in your own dormant AAR, where you placed strict conditions on the kind of advice you wanted, you were advised in general terms how to avoid the problem from getting out of hand.

Now the situation might be too late too retrieve. Based on your post there remains a basic question which you have not yet addressed. You say to dent the festung Palembang defences you would have to stripping other theatres to the bone. Yet you also lament about the difficulties caused by the festung Palembang. Well the question is really quite simple.


Are these other theatres more important than Sumatra?


If the answer is in the affirmative, then carry on as you currently are. If the answer is in the negative, ie the overall health of the Japanese war effort is more adversely affected by the Allies retaining their current position in Sumatra, then you would be stripping to the bone the other theatres.

Bottom line, none of this requires a HR. As I said, the situation is largely self inflicted. Not a problem if you think there are more important objectives than eliminating the Allied position in Sumatra; not so benign if you believe Palembang is more important than the other objectives but refuse to allocate the resources to deal with Palembang.

Alfred

Alfred,

Thank you for your kind advice once again.

The reason I do not read other AARs for advice is because I don't play the same style game as others. I consider myself a historical player with certain self-imposed strategic and tactical restrictions. Most of these self-impositions are because certain strategies and tactics that are possible in the game were not politically or militarily acceptable during this time period. You see, my approach to the game is more from a historical dilemma viewpoint than it is from a game to be won viewpoint. I also tend to play with an eye towards limiting casualties.

That may sound like a contradiction considering that I agreed to a scenario 2 game. But looking over the OOB I found that scenario 2 is not really a major upgrade over scenario 1. There are a few more air units, most of which don't appear until mid 1944 and there are a few more land units, mostly garrison types and support units. Most of the few usable combat land units are restricted.

As I said, I look at myself as a historical player. I am not the kind of player that adds up every single assault point or combs through available leaders looking for that guy that has 1 more morale point. For that reason, I don't max out the Japanese economy trying to squeeze out that last engine or get that ship one day sooner.

As to the topic at hand, Palembang is crucial to Japan's long term survival. Without it, Japan will not survive very far into 1943. But a direct assault on a fortified Palembang would also cause it's destruction so the Japanese player must capture it before the Allied player can bring in additional troops from far flung lands. Given that the Philippines, Malaya and the southern SRA must be under Japanese player control before he can embark on any assault against Java or Sumatra, the Japanese player would be hard pressed to do so especially against an aggressive defender like Dan. Dan's strong counter attacks in China, Burma and Tarawa plus his invasion of the Kurile Islands (with a full division!) ensured that any available Japanese troops had to be sent to counter these thrusts. Once fortified, all the available combat forces in the 15th, 16th and 25th armies will not be enough to take the place.

Then there is the question of stopping the flow of troops and getting your own into the place. To date I have lost 2 CVs, 3 CVLs, 2 BBs, 8 CAs, 5 CLs and 19 DDs attempting to interdict his shipping in and out of Oosthaven. Dan has lost 5 BBs at Oosthaven along with 7 CA/CLs and 10 DDs (all losses include those reported under FOW). Most of these losses were in or around Oosthaven.

Now factor in the air power Dan has there. How do you propose to get your troops ashore (and where) without incurring excessive shipping and troop losses? Those transports would make nice, juicy targets approaching Oosthaven. Palembang is not a suitable landing point given the river restrictions (no BBs, CAs, large APs). And attempting a landing from the western side of Sumatra is pure suicide. I did attempt a few air raids early on also but found the air losses were prohibitive for little gain. Whole air units were wiped out. I tried night raids but was informed that I could expect major 4e raids if I were to continue.

The bottom line is that against an aggressive defender like Dan, the Japanese player is not going to be able to mount an offensive soon enough or large enough to capture Palembang without seeing its destruction.

I do want to be clear about something just in case people think I am calling out Dan because his style of play is different than mine. Nothing could be further from the truth. I am enjoying this game despite getting schooled hard and I have no intention of leaving it. While I do not believe his tactics would have been militarily or politically acceptable in a historical context, they are certainly well within the possibilities of the game and I do NOT consider them gamey in any way, shape or form. His style and my style are just different, nothing more.

Chez


RE: JFB question: Failure to capture Palembang in '42

Posted: Mon Nov 07, 2011 2:47 am
by Rusty1961
The bottom line is that against an aggressive defender like Dan, the Japanese player is not going to be able to mount an offensive soon enough or large enough to capture Palembang without seeing its destruction.

I've seen Palembang taken in the first two weeks of the game. It can, and is done.