RE: Bombing Japan
Posted: Fri Dec 02, 2011 5:40 pm
My information for the raids against Northern Japan only lasting for a few weeks at a time came from this book, , this book all of which talk about how the Fleet Air Wing 4 operating out of the Aletuian Islands and 11th AF were decimated during the first few massive raids as the Japanese shifted forces north to deal with the threat. After Fletcher canceled the raids, FAW4 shifted to having smaller raids of aircraft that became more successful in ability to get in and get out. However, on a whole during this shift these raids were more along the lines of similar raids flown in backwater portions of the Pacific. Nothing more then harrassment raids to remind the Japanese that they were there but not really doing any major damage.
Well that was the webpage I had seen. I never said the bombers should be able to carry 3000 lbs of bombs from Attu to Paramushiro and maintain a 33% reserve. I'll also admit to not being entirely sure of what all the stats depicted in the charts and tables mean in so far as the operation of the aircraft.
It would seem flawed logic to say first; that the aircraft can not conduct the raids because all they can carry that far is some leaflets and then go on to say that the raids (that couldn't happen anyways) were called off/changed because the Japanese moved a bunch of defenses to the region. That movement of defensive assets would also seem to suggest that the threat as perceived by the Japanese was a good deal more important to them than you are giving FAW 4/11th USAAF credit for. But calling off or making raids depending upon the nature of the enemies defenses is a tactical/operational/strategic decision. As the game stands now the Japanese Player will never have to worry about any Allied medium bomber (B-25s of some model made these raids too) coming at him from Attu and thus will be handed the ability to meet other threats with greater forces. He should have to make a choice as to where those forces are to be employed; not just be allowed to ignore a "theater of war" for so called technical reasons.