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I spent more than 2 years sitting beside a Battalion Commander. I can assure you they know the ammunition conditions of the companies in their battalions.

You think they will have a unit run out of ammunition before they know it? I can tell you from personal experience that they won't. They don't know when every bullet if fired. Nor do they care the distribution process. But the three things they know about every company are the physical state of the unit (how tired they are), how much food (fuel) they've got - the last time they ate or were fueled up, and how much ammunition they have. If any one of the three of those drops below an acceptable level, measures are taken to correct it, immediately.

Grenades are an infantry's most potent weapon. If you are going to count bullets, bursts, then it only makes sense to track their most potent weapons system as well. Again, if you don't care ignore the prompts that you are getting low.

Very simple.

Good Hunting.

MR

There are several misconceptions going on here but I think I will just address the basic one.

In the scale and time limits of this game, the armored units are operating without resupply. That is, 'what they got on them is what they can use'. It is extremely rare that ammunition would be passed out or shared between AFV on the FEBA.

Infantry units are different in that they are not discrete 'vehicles'. Infantry companies are more like large organisms. They can share and even carry ammunition for weapons they do not use. In defensive positions, weapons like grenades can be stored at points along a line so that they can be 'fall-backed-on'. In other words, infantry are not individual weapons carriers.

I would like to see infantry capabilities modeled better but I don't need to know every piece of minutia in that message window.

ORIGINAL: Yoozername

There are several misconceptions going on here but I think I will just address the basic one.

In the scale and time limits of this game, the armored units are operating without resupply. That is, 'what they got on them is what they can use'. It is extremely rare that ammunition would be passed out or shared between AFV on the FEBA.

Infantry units are different in that they are not discrete 'vehicles'. Infantry companies are more like large organisms. They can share and even carry ammunition for weapons they do not use. In defensive positions, weapons like grenades can be stored at points along a line so that they can be 'fall-backed-on'. In other words, infantry are not individual weapons carriers.

I would like to see infantry capabilities modeled better but I don't need to know every piece of minutia in that message window.

On your first point. Right. But on a battlefield 2 km deep, munitions vehicles --for the AFVs-- (along with recovery) would be only about 500m behind firing lines; same for communications et al --and medical would be even closer(coming in and out of harm's way).

500m? I doubt that highly.

2. AMMUNITION SUPPLY FOR TANKS

It is reported that trucks no longer go well forward to supply tanks with ammunition. Trucks now unload out of range of enemy artillery and establish small dumps, which can be cleared in a day. Drivers unload their own vehicles, no extra personnel being allotted for this purpose. Wherever possible, these dumps are located under cover of rising ground, and the tanks come back to the dumps for fresh supplies of ammunition.

http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/notesna/index.html

"Out of range" of [indirect] artillery seems um quite far.

That report is from N Africa; In a desert enviro where there are flat plains. But in hill and dale areas?

I don't mean that support assets are purposefully within visual tracking of enemy or even 500m of enemy. (Note in real life 5 football fields is far--especially considering WWII ranges and speeds.)

Also note that report said recovery occurs on battlefield "very closely behind fighting units". They don't say when or how close though.

Also all AFV are not tanks. Eg over watch weapons and AssGn --with some carrying miniscule ammo good enough for one support mission but not an entire combat mission where it could be redeployed to several support missions (through withdrawing and laterally traversing the area behind the firing line out of sight / range along an "MSR" or "ASR" (main and alt supply routes)).

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For "tactical RPGs/shooters" --ie "tactical" games with 1:1 LOS management*-- thinking about MSRs and ASRs (supply routes) is not necessary. But for *battlegroup* scale games, it should start to be considered.

[*Those games can call themselves company scale all they want. But at company scale --no less combined arms battlegroups-- user management of all that LOS manifests in fatality being way to high, given the player burden; ...'click fest' 'realtime' etc.]

When a *battlegroup* is engaged in combat it is very much aware of and utilizing its MSRs and ASRs behind the firing line. Those routes trace back to divisional (and ultimately further): the forward platoons are not separated from supply columns --though the lowly soldiers in them might think they are. We have been taught by entertainment that combat happens on the scale of the "lost platoon." But platoons are part of mutually supporting prongs of battle, where the forward platoons are the business ends of MSRs and ASRs stretching back many many kms. korp HQ 10+km deep; armee 23-46km deep.

A div is on paper 4 km square; in truth probably 5k wide by 3k deep. On paper 10-20K men; in reality about 10k, most are not forward firing line but many of those who are not on the firing line are still hyper important and part of "combat pay".

Usually 2 battle groups per division compiled from the div's assets per a combat mission's needs.

PzC is often 2 km maps _often with multiple actions at once on the map (enemy equaling a battalion at least)_; meaning pincers and wings of battle, where one deploys fire superiority rather than each man's LOS. Other games are like a platoon over watching another platoon attacking one target on a narrow strip map. In reality, that one close combat battle would be part of a larger engagement resolved and understood at *battlegroup* level, where that one target would be part of a larger string of mutually dependent/related target-goals understood by higher ups (but all within the div's command).

Platoon types don't think in these terms. But they are not officers; they are harmonica players and smut mag readers. They come and go without ever knowing what the battle really was or what its objectives really were.

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This supply and recovery is the least developed area of this gaming culture, yet MSRs and ASR are what it's all about.

Does anyone have any sources other than lone sentry speaking about how battlefield supply works? Reliable ones? It can't be that tanks in order to redeploy drive back a good several km (out of 'arty' range) and then several km back to combat. Divs are only 4 k deep or so.

For a good insight into why armored operations do not keep supply trucks so close to front line operations, read Tigers in the Mud, pgs. 166-173 'The Ambush'.

Ammunition and Fuel resupply was mostly by wheeled trucks. The use of wheeled vehicles is actually EASIER in the desert than in the East Front. While tracked AFV have mobility in mud and other off-road conditions, trucks are mostly road bound. In my readings, it seems that assembly points and ammunition resupply was greater than 500 meters by an order of magnitude or more. Trucks packed with ammunition are extremely vulnerable. Hence the creation of forward dumps that can be retrieved as previously mentioned. So for the most part, resupply in a game such as this means AFV moving to the rear and doing so off-map.

As far as grenades...the evidence here does not support the claims above.

http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topic ... /p_ch3.htm

Fine read.

The chapter before tells that the tiger company had an ammo dump (in a cemetery) 5km from the suspected engagement area. The reading also divulged distances between HQs and combat of 15+ Km! So yes you are right ...except for...

(_ie "BUT"_...)

These are late war firebrigades. Unusually independent and far roving. (Firebrigades are used as damage control or augers. They rely on friendly div(s) in the area for recon-intel, prisoner process, arty, engineers etc (strong point creation; ie capitalizing on gains). These Tiger abteilungen are battalions farmed out by korps and higher as Firebrigades near war's end, imitating an Allied Armour technique. The hero of the book's unit was the 502 Scwhere[heavy] Abteilunge.)

I was thinking more about AssGuns in early war divisional roles and overwatch ATG. I know that StuG ammo HTs stayed "close" as did their spotters(in HTs) who were out in front, reconnoitering off and on. Some assault guns _carried 3 rounds_.

I was thinking of color for the game. Also note that AntiAircraft attachments and Communications attachment (crucial in WWII) are realistic and add color to games.

These latewar Firebrigade abteilunge Tiger tank companies had support APC (armoured personal carriers) as HTs, armored cars AND VW-kubels and motor cycles that followed right behind them to be used out in front as recon vehicles by the COs et al (along with communication attachment, btn staff contingent and occas AA). That should be kept in mind by scenarios makers of firebrigade engagements. Also the tiger company from the book is 12 tanks but "there are always 5 or 6 in repair"; he talks about 2 tanks --him and 'trackmate' (wing)-- and six others at most in combat (usually less).

Note the Russian column that was ambushed was also a firebrigade. Specifically the first big mission of the "Joseph Stalin" brigade and the new Stalin tanks. They penetrated alone --with their supply column in tow-- very deep (50+km? --that's how far Otto Carius[German Tiger company CO] drove to engage them) in a sweeping/flanking coup d main to get to Dunaburg (Daugavpils Lativa). The Russ supply column and its tank support were about 10+km from the forward Stalin Brigade contingent which contained the Russ Brigade CO, 17 Stalins and 5 T34s (destroyed earlier by Carius' Tiger company in Malvina village north of Dunaburg).)

Obviously late war firebrigade pirates (that's the way these "dash-ful" men operated) have different tactics than a Div's ideal techniques.

An earlier chapter speaking about the Tiger company's resupply --Pg154:

"We were resupplying behind high ground far away from the line of sight of the Russians when a richocet [hit Oberfeldwebel Zwetti in the arschlings]." [Would that be his Zwetti arschling?]

So resupply was relatively more close to combat sometimes.

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Note to interested readers: every time I go back to the google preview of the book, more and more of what I'm reading is removed from preview. Curious.

Wishful reading on your part. It actually says they were out of line of sight from the enemy. A ricochet means the projectile had to clear the line of sight obstruction and land on target. Projectiles can travel thousands of yards in a case like this. You are hardly describing the physics of a 500 meter event. But, that's OK. I see you are grasping at anything.

Tank ammunition is extremely vulnerable to the smallest fragmentation and even denting etc. Damaged ammunition will jam a gun and that means death during a battle.

ORIGINAL: Yoozername

Wishful reading on your part. It actually says they were out of line of sight from the enemy. A ricochet means the projectile had to clear the line of sight obstruction and land on target. Projectiles can travel thousands of yards in a case like this. You are hardly describing the physics of a 500 meter event. But, that's OK. I see you are grasping at anything.

Tank ammunition is extremely vulnerable to the smallest fragmentation and even denting etc. Damaged ammunition will jam a gun and that means death during a battle.

I was showing a quote (_which was quoted accurately_)-- from your source-- that showed along with resupply dumps being 5km behind the battlefield (and supply columns 10km behind salient penetrations) there were [possibly] closer resupplies EVEN FOR THESE LATE WAR HEAVIES. For these late war heavies the battlefield ranges themselves are 2Km and distances traveled to engage are 10-20km sometimes. Late war is apparently at least sometimes porous fronts and deep No Mans Lands _behind_ enemy positions. Obviously in situations like that my supposition falls.

I did not bring up the late war heavy brigades originally; Terms should have been clarified as to what I was, in part, envisioning. I have seen the _armored_ ammo carrier HTs for the StuG and armored 'schleppers' for the SP ATG. The issue is, how close to firinglines were these armored carriers coming.

Also note the fact that "The Ambush" did destroy a supply column does demonstrate that games could have such supply scenarios in them accurately.

(Regarding the quote: it doesn't matter either way, since both the accurate quote [mine, heh heh] and the re-quoting are correct variations of the same thing... Behind high ground [out of LOS] and far away from Russ LOS. Further, I was not trying to demonstrate "physics" of ricochets nor am I ignorant of how far a ricochet might travel.)

So now you will supply some information to back up your new suppositions?

In any case, the 'Ambush' destroyed a follow-on force of tanks that erroneously had supply trucks interlaced among the tanks themselves. It would hardly have made much of a scenario as the one-sided ambush received no return fire. So I doubt you would get much 'color' from that.

Also, Carius makes it clear he thought little of the light armored halftracks and favored the VW. I don't think VW's really add much t6o a game but to each his own.

You seem to be arguing out of pure ego-ism at this point. But its amusing. Try backing up your brain-storms with facts.

You have no means whatsoever to mention the ricochet since you have no idea where it took place or even what caused it. It could have been a long range sniper shot from the rear. So, whether you quoted accurately or not, you are making leaps of logic that just don't hold water.

You seem to be arguing out of pure ego-ism at this point. But its amusing. Try backing up your brain-storms with facts.

Please try to keep personal comments out of this discusion.

Thanks
rick

Hesitation in carrying out orders could be added for more realism. Hesitation in movement and hesitation in firing. The better quality troops have less, those closer to or with a NCO unit has less. Pinned and suppressed have much more.
Troops with lots of ammo and grenades have less assaulting an enemy position or tank. Those low on ammo and grenades are less willing to get close to a tank or enemy position. Grenade supply of each squad could just be rated high, medium, low, without an exact count.

ORIGINAL: Yoozername

As far as grenades...the evidence here does not support the claims above.

http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topic ... /p_ch3.htm

Interesting article. The problem with those types of studies is that they are so generic.

Those figures are for all types of combat. What we are looking for is when infantry assault a position. There are other factors to a weapons effectiveness other than pure physical results as well. It doesn't take into account the number of participants stunned by grenades that were then shot, and I didn't see a result of multiple wounds unless that would be the "all other" category. That leaves open to interpretation which wounds were counted as the cause of death if the man was wounded by a grenade and shot.

The report does show what's been known for some time about the lethality of mortars.

Small arms is also not broken down between rifles and machineguns.

The study is too generic for any substantial conclusions to be drawn either way.

As an example, bombs and rockets are shown to cause an almost identical percentage of casualties as mortars. That seems unreasonably high. The disparity in numbers of bomb/rocket attacks vs mortar attacks alone would create a much larger difference I would think. Either that, or bomb and rockets were tremendously effective, while mortars would be seemly extremely ineffective. I think, in real life the exact opposite was true.

Good Hunting.

MR

OTOH, if a studyalways confirmed what one would expect, why have a study?

Those kinds of studies are usually done with the end result well in hand before starting them. The US military is a past master of doing that.

Good Hunting.

MR

I basically posted it in regards to the statement 'Grenades are the deadliest weapons infantry have', or words to that effect.

Grenades are only effective under infrequent circumstances. Otherwise, these cheap weapons that can be produced with a minimum of machining and resources would win the war.

In many infantry firefights, mortars and MG's and rifles keep infantry with grenades from even getting close enough to use them. The limited range one can hurl these (I threw a live grenade about 25m), naturally limits them to close-in fighting. Battlefields like the jungle and hedgerows and fighting in urban areas are naturally going to show the grenade to be important. But I hope to never see a Panzer Command jungle or even a Normandy battlefield. So that mostly leaves street fighting.

I like Mobius' idea in regards to a generic level of supply on grenades. I see no point, besides anal retentiveness, as far as tracking grenades individually or by type for that matter.

I just went through the manual and was wondering exactly HOW grenades figure into firepower or assaulting etc. I am not exactly sure.

But another issue is the 'We can see the number of APCR rounds so we need to see the number of grenades' argument. I am actually leaning on NOT seeing the exact number of tank and other units ammunition specifics once the battle starts.

As far as battlefield resupply for armor, I could see a platoon command to 'resupply' and have the platoon withdraw to a board edge and have the individual AFV leave the board and return. Mind you, bombing up a tank takes time. Time to reach the actual source of ammunition, and the slow process of carefully transfer the ammunition, as well as the return trip.

ORIGINAL: Mobius

I forgot to add.
Question:
When is an actual event merely anecdotal?
A: When it doesn’t support a game design.
Question:
When is an actual event historical evidence?
A: When it does.

So true.

ORIGINAL: Yoozername
I just went through the manual and was wondering exactly HOW grenades figure into firepower or assaulting etc. I am not exactly sure.

It is seen in the increase in infantry firepower at 30m range from the next longer range band. You notice that the FP of teams, even MG teams does not go up at 30m from the next longer range band.

If the squad were to run out of grenades then the firepower number would have to drop. Drop to what I don't know, maybe that of the next higher range band.

I like the Low, Medium, High ranking for grenades. As stated above, you could use the same for every unit if you wanted. A high rating would allow X nu mber of shots before a ammo check would be made, if the level were to drop then another X number of shots could be fired before susequent checks are made. Infantry squads would never truly run out but would have both their firepower and number of shots limited once it failed an ammo check when it is in Low. Again, you want to keep the immersion going for as long as possible. Ammo counts and assault weapon counts could be worked into the graphic for the unit. It would go far to limit the times that a player has to go to a cut screen or read numbers of ammo ect.