Across the entire front, German pressure on the Red Army mounted. In the north, almost inevitably, the defences at Leningrad cracked.
Only the 43rd and 115th Rifle Divisions held out as organised formations having retreated into the northern sector of the city blowing the Neva bridges behind them.

(The Admiralty Clock after the initial German assaults).
Fearing that the Finns would outflank the Volkhov line from the north, Stavka authorised a major redeployment of the Northern Front. Tolbukhin's 24 Army fell back to prepared positions along the Msta defending the flank of NW Front. The rest of the front held a line in the marshes and low hills stretching from Nebolochi to Voznesanya on Lake Onega [1].
In the Ukraine, the Germans tried to eliminate the Poltava pocket using their infantry as they pulled some of their armour out of the line. Here Soviet resistance was sufficient to prevent any immediate advance towards Kharkov or Kursk.
In the south, they took N Caucasus Front by surprise as they pushed over the Mius towards Rostov.
50 Army tried to take advantage of their over-extension but the strung out 25 Motorised Division managed to hold a critical portion of the line [2]. Nonetheless Soviet mobile units struck deep into the communications of 48 Panzer and re-established supply lines to Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye.
Given the weak state of most Soviet formations in the south, the main hope was that the Germans were now badly over-extended and fully committed. Panzers had been spotted in reserve west of Poltava and it was presumed they would attack Kharkov in the coming week.
However, the battles at Vyazma drew most attention. 57 and 39 Panzer Corps managed to encircle the bulk of 20 Army and 33 Army in a pocket as they clawed their way through the Soviet defense lines. Facing a crisis that could have swept away Reserve Front's southern wing, Stavka reacted.
Almost every available bomber was used on the German 28 and 161 Infantry Divisions that sealed the northern edge of the pocket. Koniev then committed 21 Army to break in and ordered 33 Army to break out.

[3]
In consequence the planned breakout failed but a vital supply line was opened to the Vyazma units meaning that 3 German panzer corps were pinned between the Vyazma group and the main defense lines.

(21 Army attack)
Despite this respite, the situation at Moscow remained desparate. VVS recon flights could find no trace of the Panzers previously in action at Leningrad. It was assumed these were heading to the vital Moscow battles along with some of the German assault divisions that had done so much damage.
To improve the protection on Moscow's southern flank 34 Army was released from Stavka reserve and allocated to the Western Front. Koniev drew heavily on the reserves of the Moscow region to rebuild his southern flank. In turn 30 Army, previously involved in the Leningrad battle, took up blocking positions at Moscow having been allocated all the reserve formations from the Northern Front [4]
There seemed little doubt that September was going to see critical battles in the Moscow sector [5]
Losses for both sides matched the intensity of the fighting. The disaster at Leningrad saw another 160,000 prisoners taken and overall the Soviets lost almost 200,000 men, 700 tanks and 320 aircraft. German losses were 34,000 men, 190 tanks and 90 aircraft.
Overall the Soviet armed forces still had 4.5 million men in arms but reserves were increasingly short. Manpower was down to 175,000 and AP to little over 300,000.
[1] – Cherepovets is the only important target in that sector as a valuable source of manpower. My assumption is there will be no serious attempt to take it given the fragility of the Finnish army.
[2] – 3-2 in terms of shown CV, plus massed airstrikes failed dismally
[3] The breakout I think shows that there is a definite gain in the combat engine for attacking en masse. In effect, rather nicely, it does simulate that 'quantity has its own quality'.
[4] – my plan is multiple defense lines, strongly held for Reserve Front, weak but deep for Western Front. I hope to do enough damage to AGC in the current battles that the units from AGN replace rather than reinforce them. There is some grounds for this optimism given that the displayed CV for most infantry divisions is 6-7 and some as low as 4.
[5] – I also don't expect the infantry from AGN to be in action for 3 weeks. They will have to march most of the way as the German railheads are at Luga and Smolensk (both linear tracks with no side connections). An alternative is they may be used to dislodge NW Front from its well built up defences in the Valdai where so far pressure has been limited.
[6] – should stress with the reduced blizzard, I am not going to regain a great deal of ground at Moscow if the Germans fight here. So its not just about holding them away from Moscow till the autumn rains, I am worried about 1942 (if I survive that long)