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RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Opennings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 12:36 pm
by Macclan5
ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

ORIGINAL: Wirraway_Ace

I am interested in opinions from those who generally, usually, almost always play the Allied side on various Japanese first turn strikes.

The four major variations with which I am familiar:

The Classic - Full Pearl Harbor Strike by the Kido Butai (KB); Land Based Air (LBA) attacks on airfields in the Philippines and Malaya
The Split - 4 CVs (usually CARDIVs 2 & 5) hit Pearl Harbor, whilst 2 CVs (often CARDIV 1) and LBA strike the Asiatic Fleet
The Asiatic Special - Full KB strikes Manila
The Singapore Noodle - Full or partial KB strike on Singapore

I am interested in the Allied perspective on these, and others you have experienced, in two domains:
Efficacy - How likely are these to inhibit Allied early and mid-term operations
Reasonableness - Could the have been reasonably conducted while achieving surprise

Thanks,
Mike

I don't know enough about what Allied Intel there was on major IJN units in the northern part of the South China Sea to comment on likelihood of surprise in the Manila/Singapore scenarios. I know the Allies were aware of troop buildups and transport convoys along the Vietnam coast but they never thought the Japanese would dare to attack so they surprised themselves.

In stock, KB starts out in the Kuriles and the magic first turn move is limited to 75 hexes, IIRC, so I don't think KB could strike Singapore first turn in game.
The only reasons to go after Singapore on turn one are to support a Mersing gambit and to try catch Repulse/Prince of Wales before they can move away.

The Manila strikes would be aimed at stopping interference by subs, but with US torpedoes at 80% or 90% dud rate (except the S-boats) they need not bother. The Asiatic fleet is too weak to seriously intercede in Japanese plans if the IJN escorts the troop convoys properly. That should be the main use of the Mini-KB and their cruisers and BBs early on.

The Allies can lose everything in the far east and it will only have effect for about 9 months.

The BBs at PH are completely un-needed for the first six months or more. They are highly desirable for bombardment in support of Allied invasions from late 1942 on, but they are not completely essential there either. Ergo, the attack on PH does not give Japan a knockout blow either, beyond the first 6-9 months.

Unless you are playing one of the scenarios souped up for Japan, they simply do not have enough goodies to defend all the places they must in order to protect the resources they grab early on and the shipping to move the oil/fuel/resources.


This is an excellent synopsis.

Just to add:

The Allies had "some tidbits" and "credible intelligence" of a major attack planned by Japan.

Despite conspiracy theorists notions that the Roosevelt administration "knew definitively in advance and permitted it to draw America into the war" ~ it was not so clear cut. Intelligence rarely is.

Historian Craig Shirly in the book : Dec 1941 - 31 one days that changed America was able to put a lot together out of a series of memos from the declassified archives in the Presidential Library of FDR. The important one is an open assessment date Dec 4; but it speaks as much to Japanese propaganda in Hawaii; not an immediate and sudden attack.

Intelligence assessments generally suggested / inferred an attack was likely. None of them were specific as to where. Few were specific to when and complicated by the interpretation of the International Date Line. They were all case scenario analysis

Still that "not fully complete information" was never agreed upon and never shared across all commands in the US services let alone shared with all Allied powers (they were not Allied partners before Dec 7 ! )




RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 12:40 pm
by szmike
ORIGINAL: HansBolter

From my perspective it is patently unfair to an Allied player for a Japanese player to request a non-historical first turn with surprise.

It you want the benefits of surprise you take the historical path that provided an opportunity for it.

If you want to be free to hurt the Allied player on turn one in new and creative ways the cost of doing so should be the sacrifice of surprise.

Japanese players always seem to want to have their cake and it too.


Imho Japanese players just explore possibilities. In the end of the day surprise doesn't make much of a difference for Allies, but it helps Japanese to keep those pilots a day longer at the least.

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 12:49 pm
by chemkid
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RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 1:14 pm
by LargeSlowTarget
ORIGINAL: szmike

Imho Japanese players just explore possibilities. In the end of the day surprise doesn't make much of a difference for Allies, but it helps Japanese to keep those pilots a day longer at the least.

Yes, in the end, no real or perceived advantage given to the JFBs in a "historic" scenario (not talking what-if mods here) will alter the ultimate outcome of the US industrial might steamrollering Japan.
But it appears that some AFBs are unwilling to accept even the smallest additional challenge (OTOH they have no problem accepting the unhistorical advantages given to the Allied players). Let's face it, it is a game, it has necessarily some limitations and both sides get their share of "unhistorical" advantages and disadvantages.

The war might as well have started with a surprise carrier raid against Manila instead of PH - enough empty ocean to the East and not enough US patrol planes to cover it to allow for a sudden appearance of KB.
However, a surprise strike against Singers would be less likely, much smaller water surface with too much civilian traffic to gibe KB much chance to remain unnoticed.
So while not entirely impossible, the details and limits of an unhistorical first turn with surprise should be discussed between opponents. Those who play the AI do not need to bother, obviously.

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 1:30 pm
by witpqs
ORIGINAL: Encircled

Not hitting Pearl gives the Allies a lot of search aircraft.

That can be crucial if the Japanese are planning a major non-historical expansion.
In my experience this was a huge benefit to the Allies.

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 1:31 pm
by witpqs
ORIGINAL: HansBolter

From my perspective it is patently unfair to an Allied player for a Japanese player to request a non-historical first turn with surprise.

It you want the benefits of surprise you take the historical path that provided an opportunity for it.

If you want to be free to hurt the Allied player on turn one in new and creative ways the cost of doing so should be the sacrifice of surprise.

Japanese players always seem to want to have their cake and it too.

I was OK with it in a few games (one with multiple starts).

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 1:44 pm
by pontiouspilot
I have played 1 PBEM where my opponent opted to use Kaga, or maybe it was Akagi...a big gal anyway.... in support of 1st turn theatrics in PI. The lack of 1 CV at Pearl was hardly noticeable but the 1 extra CV in Philippines caused a lot of trouble. Many subs were damaged badly although surprisingly few sunk. Air supremacy was much enhanced. All the refugee vessels fleeing the area took much worse casualties. The temptation for me to dick around interdicting any invasions in area was gone....it was just run like hell. As I recall he dispatched Houston and Boise which is always a drag.

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 2:16 pm
by MakeeLearn
As a new player who started with the Allies, I fear the ultimate surprise - The Germans bombing Pearl Harbor.

Image

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 2:21 pm
by US87891
There are a couple of Rules that we use for Babes that obviate some of the extreme code things and allows for open ended opening days.

A CV TF may have a maximum of 2 CVs and 1 CVL, depending on the year. This removes the hard coded effect of the 900lb Gorilla KB. A group of 3 CV TFs will function just like the KB was intended to. On Dec. 7,given the code advantages, they will act just like the KB. Otherwise they will act historically. They will win or lose at Midway, or wherever, depending on luck, or a players acumen. It is also much more flexible. The Rule applies to both sides.

An amphib invasion TF MUST be comprised of either AK or xAK-t types. This removes the general cargo/small ship nonsense allowed by the Japanese early month’s bonus. The rule extends throughout the game period.

The manual is not a rule book. There are no rules whatever, anywhere in the manual. The manual is simply a ‘how to’. It was never intended as a rule book. One may do as one wishes. But sometimes, rules are nice.

Matt

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 2:28 pm
by MakeeLearn
The Classic - Full Pearl Harbor Strike by the Kido Butai (KB);


Japan having struck at Pearl should have taken the Hawaiian Islands.

Bombing Pearl and then leaving is like punching someone and then turning your back to them. Taking the Islands would have been a great benefit and may have forced the American carriers into battle at a disadvantage.


RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 3:10 pm
by Lokasenna
ORIGINAL: pontiouspilot

I have played 1 PBEM where my opponent opted to use Kaga, or maybe it was Akagi...a big gal anyway.... in support of 1st turn theatrics in PI. The lack of 1 CV at Pearl was hardly noticeable but the 1 extra CV in Philippines caused a lot of trouble. Many subs were damaged badly although surprisingly few sunk. Air supremacy was much enhanced. All the refugee vessels fleeing the area took much worse casualties. The temptation for me to dick around interdicting any invasions in area was gone....it was just run like hell. As I recall he dispatched Houston and Boise which is always a drag.

This is a fairly common alternate opening, I think, precisely because it can be so effective.

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 5:29 pm
by crsutton
I would opt for taking our as much at Pearl as I could. The Allied BBs are useful late in the war but as said. just as important is the destruction of Allied search and recon aircraft. From my experience, this hurts the Allies very much in the first six months. The idea of taking out the Allied sub force in Manila does not make sense in my eyes. With an 80% dud rate in the first year of the war Allies subs are not much of a threat and they will have plenty of subs when they do get decent torpedoes.

Neither is going to win the war for Japan but I lean towards wrecking things as much as I can at Pearl.


RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 5:47 pm
by Gandalf
ORIGINAL: HansBolter

ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget

Must...not...reply.


Opinions shouldn't be solicited if one isn't prepared to hear and accept them. [8D]

I do have to admire your restraint LST. [;)]

No restraint here... LOL

Not a matter of cake and eat it too. What's so difficult about that expectation? I guess the Japanese understood that Pearl Harbor was the only legitimate surprise piece of cake in the whole pacific theatre. NOT!

According to the Infamy Speech.
Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, members of the Senate and the House of Representatives:

Yesterday, December 7th, 1941 - a date which will live in infamy - the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan.

The United States was at peace with that nation, and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.

Indeed, one hour after Japanese air squadrons had commenced bombing in the American island of Oahu, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States and his colleague delivered to our Secretary of State a formal reply to a recent American message. And, while this reply stated that it seemed useless to continue the existing diplomatic negotiations, it contained no threat or hint of war or of armed attack.

It will be recorded that the distance of Hawaii from Japan makes it obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During the intervening time the Japanese Government has deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements and expressions of hope for continued peace.

The attack yesterday on the Hawaiian Islands has caused severe damage to American naval and military forces. I regret to tell you that very many American lives have been lost. In addition, American ships have been reported torpedoed on the high seas between San Francisco and Honolulu.

Yesterday the Japanese Government also launched an attack against Malaya.
Last night Japanese forces attacked Hong Kong.
Last night Japanese forces attacked Guam.
Last night Japanese forces attacked the Philippine Islands.
Last night the Japanese attacked Wake Island.
And this morning the Japanese attacked Midway Island.


Japan has therefore undertaken a surprise offensive extending throughout the Pacific area. The facts of yesterday and today speak for themselves. The people of the United States have already formed their opinions and well understand the implications to the very life and safety of our nation.

As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy I have directed that all measures be taken for our defense, that always will our whole nation remember the character of the onslaught against us.

No matter how long it may take us to overcome this premeditated invasion, the American people, in their righteous might, will win through to absolute victory.

I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost but will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us.

Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory and our interests are in grave danger.

With confidence in our armed forces, with the unbounding determination of our people, we will gain the inevitable triumph. So help us God.

I ask that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, December 7th, 1941, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt - December 8, 1941

It appears that there was a whole lot of historical cake eating going on by the Japanese! [:D]

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 6:03 pm
by Anthropoid
So let me get this straight . . . if a TF has that "1st Turn Move" tick box selected, it gets to move up to 75 hexes on turn one!?

Oh my goodness, this has "interesting What-If Scenarios" written all over it. [:'(]

ADDIT: having read through the whole thread . . . re: real history, I increasingly have the sense that Japan had its back to the wall. Moreover, the decision-making in the top echelons of Japanese national and military policy seem to have been fraught with factionalism even to the point of assassinations(?).

Japan's decisions were not rational, they were shaped by arrogance and cultural bias as far as I can tell. The rational course of action would have been a compromise which kept them (the decision makers and their way of life) in power while minimizing shame, resources lost and the like. Instead, their aspirations were to achieved dominance over a group of nations whose combined might far outstripped both their level at the time they decided to embark on that path and reasonable projections for the following decade.

The Japanese Empire might well have survived to this day had they agreed to withdraw from China, and become a member of the allies rather than aspiring to repeat their smashing successes against Russia in the preceding decades and become the regions greatest power.

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 8:11 pm
by AW1Steve
For me I fear the Pearl Harbor strike more than the PI gambit. The BB's represent a lot of Victory points , and along with the PBY's, there are a lot of air frames that you can't afford to lose. I even begrudge losing P-26's , which make excellent training fighters (and allow me to switch to P-38's for combat that would normally be tied up). I've always agreed with Richardson and Hart that the smartest thing the Americans could have done was to evacuate the PI before the war. Consequently I regard anything there as lost. I do regret giving up the 4-piper DD's and the "Bird class AM's" as these can be converted to APD's and AVD's and AVP's. But I'd rather he hit the PI or Singapore than PH. And God forbid that he do an extended strike on PH and screw up the repair facility.

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Fri Sep 30, 2016 8:17 pm
by AW1Steve
ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget
ORIGINAL: szmike

Imho Japanese players just explore possibilities. In the end of the day surprise doesn't make much of a difference for Allies, but it helps Japanese to keep those pilots a day longer at the least.

Yes, in the end, no real or perceived advantage given to the JFBs in a "historic" scenario (not talking what-if mods here) will alter the ultimate outcome of the US industrial might steamrollering Japan.
But it appears that some AFBs are unwilling to accept even the smallest additional challenge (OTOH they have no problem accepting the unhistorical advantages given to the Allied players). Let's face it, it is a game, it has necessarily some limitations and both sides get their share of "unhistorical" advantages and disadvantages.

The war might as well have started with a surprise carrier raid against Manila instead of PH - enough empty ocean to the East and not enough US patrol planes to cover it to allow for a sudden appearance of KB.
However, a surprise strike against Singers would be less likely, much smaller water surface with too much civilian traffic to gibe KB much chance to remain unnoticed.
So while not entirely impossible, the details and limits of an unhistorical first turn with surprise should be discussed between opponents. Those who play the AI do not need to bother, obviously.


I might be willing to accept the changes you site , with one stipulation. You give me a "plausible premise why". Any minor personnel change or condition could have completely changed the set up . For instance , had Roosevelt NOT fired Richardson , there would have been Navy PBY's on patrol (as there were before he was fired) as well as some wildcats on CAP). Set me a possible scenario to explain the set up change and I might agree. Don't just say "because I feel like it".

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Sat Oct 01, 2016 4:14 am
by LargeSlowTarget
Well, a Manila strike instead of Pearl Harbor could be explained by Yamamoto not being successful in forcing his PH idea and - being a good solider - following orders from IJN HQ to hit the PI.

I agree with others here that the best opening remains a PH strike, trying to kill some BBs, with Akagi split off and sent to beef-up the Mini-KB in the DEI. The Manila subs are toothless tigers up into 1943 and in range of LBA (if HRs allow more than one port strike on day 1). Singers only makes sense with a Mersing gambit.

I myself actually prefer the "afternoon of Dec 7" with no surprise start - a Dec 8 scenario set to start on Dec 7. The historical damage is done but the Japanese player can make changes, for example to the destination of invasion forces. This requires the HR that KB and the Japanese LBA remain grounded for the first day.

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Sat Oct 01, 2016 8:24 am
by Grfin Zeppelin
ORIGINAL: LargeSlowTarget

Well, a Manila strike instead of Pearl Harbor could be explained by Yamamoto not being successful in forcing his PH idea and - being a good solider - following orders from IJN HQ to hit the PI.

I agree with others here that the best opening remains a PH strike, trying to kill some BBs, with Akagi split off and sent to beef-up the Mini-KB in the DEI. The Manila subs are toothless tigers up into 1943 and in range of LBA (if HRs allow more than one port strike on day 1). Singers only makes sense with a Mersing gambit.

I myself actually prefer the "afternoon of Dec 7" with no surprise start - a Dec 8 scenario set to start on Dec 7. The historical damage is done but the Japanese player can make changes, for example to the destination of invasion forces. This requires the HR that KB and the Japanese LBA remain grounded for the first day.
Kaga, she is the slowest.

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Sat Oct 01, 2016 9:29 am
by zuluhour
"The manual is not a rule book. There are no rules whatever, anywhere in the manual. The manual is simply a ‘how to’. It was never intended as a rule book. One may do as one wishes. But sometimes, rules are nice. "

Matt
 
Never thought of it that way,................

RE: AFB Opinions on Japanese Openings

Posted: Sat Oct 01, 2016 11:28 am
by LargeSlowTarget
ORIGINAL: Gräfin Zeppelin
Kaga, she is the slowest.

Excellent, at least one is paying attention to my rantings. Kaga it is. [:o] Danke, werte Gräfin, ich verwechsele die beiden leider ab und zu...