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Well I will admit that someof what Iwrote can be seen as anecdotal (sp?)...lol[:)] For certain I did not study the subject for years.

For the torp bomber quote I do not know from where I got it - AHH I just remembered apparently the quote is from a Stuka pilot at Youtube I recently found some pilots comments there from all sides - he said they were impressed how the Italian torp bomber crews handled their task in bad odds for themselves.

I also remember another story from this pilot, he said Rudel was assigned to his unit in the Greece area for a while and that he was "strange" and not a good flyer,quite unremarkable. And he was surprised to hear later from the "herioc" deeds of Rudel. He said, perhaps this was another dude or a doppelgänger [:D]


For the subs, I believe I got that impression from a navy site which listed causes of Allied ship losses, it seemed for me IT subs were named quite often [:)]

ORIGINAL: Alpha77

For the torp bomber quote I do not know from where I got it - I just remembered apparently the quote is from a Stuka pilot at Youtube I recently found some pilots comments there from all sides - he said they were impressed how the Italian torp bomber crews handled their task in bad odds for themselves.

warspite1

Yes, that comment - and that of Admiral Cunningham, who spoke highly of the Italian bombers - seems out of step with the facts. Maybe they were referring to bravery as opposed to effectiveness.

"Maybe they were referring to bravery as opposed to effectiveness."

Yup this is the main problem, if your torp bomber unit flies with 30 planes a daring attack on a Brit convoi which is protected by swarms of Hurricans and your own escort "chickens out" or does not arrive at all (like perfectly modelled in this game) you still fly the attack, lose 20 planes for no ship sunk. Brave yes, or stupid?`But not effective for sure.

I don't think it changed much if anything in terms of terms of engagement. Supermarina imposed restrictive conditions on Campioni from day 1 (June 1940) and Taranto was not until November 1940. The Italians feared the British carriers - or carrier to be more precise - Eagle in east or Ark Royal in the west) and this led them to refuse combat even with the numerical - and firepower and speed - advantage.

I think you are making a confusion. There wasn't a time that Italians while "having advantage" retreated from combat because of a carrier. What Italians feared was night combat.
Btw the only time that carrier aircraft had success in fleet actions on Med was in Matapan, all others instances they failed to hit.


Try this in WITP-AE:

Level bombing successes of Regia Aeronautica against naval units at sea only - note the effect of near misses:


HMS Juno(sunk) Under high level bombing attack by five CANT Z1007 aircraft and hit by three bombs which split ship in two abaft the bridge structure sinking her in less than two minute. 116 of ship’s company lost their lives including one RAN rating, five locally Entered Maltese and a NAAFI Canteen employee.. 96 survivors were rescued, by HMS KINGSTON, HMS KANDAHAR and HMS
NUBIAN. Five of those rescued later died.

HMS Imperial(scuttled) near missed by level bombing of S.84
One of the bombs near-missed Imperial's stern, detonating in the vicinity of her propellers, with no immediately apparent consequences. Keeping station, Imperial arrived at Iraklion around 2030 hrs, embarked 300 troops and sailed for Alexandria at 0320 hrs, 29 May.
Shortly after 0345 hrs, while working up speed and already making 29 kn, the rudder, evidently damaged by the earlier near-miss, jammed, and the out-of-control destroyer cut across the bow of Orion, barely missing a catastrophic collision(from uboat.net). Was scuttled shortly after.


HMAS Nestor(scuttled)
Uboat.net: In the meantime, the 8 Cant.Z. 1007 bis attacked the convoy, at the time located some 100 nautical miles north of Tobruk, in position 33°36'N, 24°30'E. At 1806 hrs two bombs, dropped from 17000 feet (5000 metres) fell very close to Nestor's hull, causing a large hull breach in way of the engineering spaces abaft the stack, causing her to go dead in the water with severe engine damage and immediate flooding of #1 boiler room. All personnel in this section was killed, power failed and a fire broke out. It is only RAN ship that never saw Australia.

HMS Havok(damaged)- this was probably by S.81 based on Rodi(Rhodes)
During the Battle of Cape Spada on 19 July, the ship escorted the Australian light cruiser HMAS Sydney and rescued some of the 525 survivors from the Italian cruiser Bartolomeo Colleoni together with the other escorting destroyers. Her boiler room was flooded after an attack by Italian aircraft after this battle and she was repaired at Suez from 29 July to 15 September.

HMS Liverpool(damage):
From wiki seems to have been 2 hits:
Italian aircraft attacked Liverpool with bombs on 12 July(1940) while she was returning to Alexandria, Egypt, causing fatalities and wounding three, including the cruiser's commander.[34]

Later in July, Liverpool escorted convoy AN.2 from Egypt on its way to Greek ports in the Aegean and the southward-convoy AS.2 from the Aegean. The latter convoy came under substantial attack by Italian aircraft on the 29th; Liverpool was the only vessel hit when an unexploded bomb penetrated two decks,[35] killing a rating.

CVL HMS Eagle(damaged)Under heavy and sustained attacks whilst deployed with Fleet units in Aegean to provide aerial protection and anti-submarine patrols.Returned to Alexandria with Fleet units. Examination of hull revealed significant damage and accounted for contamination of aviation fuel system by damage caused during air attacks in recent weeks.Withdrawn from operational service and nominated for extensive refit.

HMS Gloucester(damaged)Wiki: The next day, a bomb dropped by Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 bombers struck the ship's bridge, killing 18 crew members instantly, including the captain.[11] As a result of the attack, the ship could not be steered from the bridge and was uncontrolled for a time before the aft steering position could take over. Despite an inoperable bridge, the ship remained with the fleet and participated in the Battle of Calabria on the 9th, although she was ordered away from the battleline to escort the aircraft carrier Eagle. It seems there were other hits afterwards with duds in other battles.

HMS Fortune:
(From wiki)During the return voyage on 10 May(1941), the ship was badly damaged by a 250-kilogram (550 lb) bomb that detonated nearby. The shockwave ruptured the hull, knocked out her engines, slightly bent her propeller shafts, and caused a lot of flooding. Her crew jettisoned nearly 18,000 pounds (8,200 kg) of topweight and she was able to reach a speed of 12 knots (22 km/h; 14 mph) en route to Gibraltar for temporary repairs. Fortune then sailed to Chatham Royal Dockyard for permanent repairs that lasted until November.[21]


HMS Firedrake:
(From wiki)During Operation Substance, Firedrake and Foxhound were each leading a column of the convoy, streaming their TSDS minesweeps, through the Sicilian Narrows on 23 July when an Italian 100-kilogram (220 lb) bomb near missed Firedrake and detonated off her port side. The shockwave blew in the plating over No. 1 boiler room and disabled her so that she had to be towed back to Gibraltar by the destroyer Eridge. Temporary repairs were made in Gibraltar and she was transferred to the Boston Navy Yard for repair on 23 September.

Warspite I have to admit to being taken aback by your seemingly irascible response to my #7 post. Thus I thought I would wait a while before responding. In no way did I intend to demean you or your input to the thread. If that’s how you took it, then allow me to apologize. Additionally allow me to clarify my input. I try very hard not to assume that a reader has prior knowledge of a subject until proven otherwise. In the case of Mr. Churchill I DO assume that folks on this site know of him in terms of his political career in both wars. However I do not assume that folks know of him as an author. Some folks might think that reading the works of an author who was part of the history he or she is writing about will give one the “truth” from that author’s perspective or the accuracy of that perspective. In some cases they would be right, an example would be U.S. Grant’s autobiography which is renown among historians for being brutally honest in terms of Grants success and more importantly his failings. However the same can not be said of Mr. Churchill. So my point in saying “BY” was not to lower the conversation, but was merely my attempt not to assume prior knowledge and point out that Mr.. Churchill’s writings are somewhat self serving when it comes to mistakes or errors that have been historically laid at his feet by others. Certainly some observations about Mr. Churchill are not deserved, however some are. It would appear from what you post that you see my words as an “insult” where none was intended. If you read my post again you will see that I accuse you of nothing. Yes I’ve asked for views, but my own was not what I was asking. I thought you were asking me to tell you what I thought the book tells the reader and I was mealy trying to respond that it would be better if you read the book and come to your own conclusions about the subject and O’Hara’s interpretation of history rather than read my filtered view on the subject. Sorry for the miscommunication, I will certainly be more careful with you in the future. Hal

My response was not mean't to convey irrascibility - it was meant to convey anger and moreover disappointment.

To be clear I don't care if you demean or disagree with my analysis and conclusions - as said there is no right or wrong answer here and I don't expect people to necessarily agree with my views. But I do care if my views are dismissed as being an unthinking product of biased reading. I had already stated that I am a reader of O'Hara's works - something I could not be if I was only interested in a one-sided view. So hopefully you can appreciate why being asked to read about Churchill and not by Churchill as an immediate response to my view, was most unwelcome.

But you've apologised, which of course I accept, and I've made clear my interest in the truth and historical accuracy and not simply confirmation of pre-conceived notions.

I trust we can move on with a clean slate? The Mediterranean theatre of war - which by the way had more surface engagements than the Pacific - is fascinating.

ORIGINAL: Dili


Try this in WITP-AE:

Level bombing successes of Regia Aerounautica against naval units at sea only - note the effect of near misses:

Interesting list, is it possible the speed of convois in the med was less than eg. pacific and atlantic ? And less space for manouvres. As for training, one would think the Japanese (or Germans) were better trained than the Italians. But had much less success with level bombing (with dive and torp bombing yes). Perhaps also better weather in the med contributed ?

With Allied skip-bombing and mast-bombing it was desirable to have the bomb detonate under the ship.

" At that time, I would fly directly over the ship, retaining my same airspeed and altitude [200-220 mph, 200-250 ft.]. With the 4- to 5-second delay fuze in the bomb, I had time to get away while the bombs sank by the side of the ship. The explosion underwater often broke the ship in half, and it created almost immediate fire and explosions. "

Not sure how you come to think I "dismissed" anything, in fact I accepted some of your analysis which is about as far from a dismissal as one can get short of full acceptance. And clearly you are "thinking" about your product, how could I think otherwise given what you wrote? But one thing is crystal clear, as you pointed out yourself, you've not read the book. O'Hara does present some very interesting views, certainly ones that I've not considered prior to reading it. I was trying to excite folks to do just that, read the work. That's all this thread was designed to convey. It appears to have been successful (for the most part). Moving on is exactly what I've done.

BTW, if anyone is interested I can try to find the pilots interviews, one with the Stuka guy who operated quite alot in the med and another one with a south african with the desert airforce, both provide quite a lot of info, even if the German might be too "uncritical" (as was pointed out in the comments there).

Or I better do not post any more historical stuff ? Might be too "political" (at least perhap for a certain poster in another thread), as the German seems uncritical and the south african too (for Churchill ? [;)]). Guys better not overthink and/or get hurt about this stuff, it is past and can not be changed anymore.

And I always appreciate hints for good books or movies, but there is so little time for playing AND reading. [:(] Thanks Hal for the hint.[:)]


EDit, here is one of the cool stories from the desert airforce guy (flew Hurris and Spits, and tells in other parts quite a lot of tactics etc. from both sides):

WW2 desert fighter pilot interview 16: Dummy airfield disaster
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ityHwfSaTYQ

ORIGINAL: Alpha77

ORIGINAL: Dili


Try this in WITP-AE:

Level bombing successes of Regia Aerounautica against naval units at sea only - note the effect of near misses:

Interesting list, is it possible the speed of convois in the med was less than eg. pacific and atlantic ? And less space for manouvres. As for training, one would think the Japanese (or Germans) were better trained than the Italians. But had much less success with level bombing (with dive and torp bombing yes). Perhaps also better weather in the med contributed ?

If anything the convoy speed should be faster in Med, at least for allied side. More modern merchants, sea state usually better.
Note that these results were still poor for the number of level bombing made. Poor in the sense of comparing with other bombing/attack methods.

ORIGINAL: Dili

I don't think it changed much if anything in terms of terms of engagement. Supermarina imposed restrictive conditions on Campioni from day 1 (June 1940) and Taranto was not until November 1940. The Italians feared the British carriers - or carrier to be more precise - Eagle in east or Ark Royal in the west) and this led them to refuse combat even with the numerical - and firepower and speed - advantage.

I think you are making a confusion. There wasn't a time that Italians while "having advantage" retreated from combat because of a carrier. What Italians feared was night combat.

warspite1

I think what this misses is the restrictive nature of the orders laid down by Supermarina. The combined effect of these, which meant that engaging the British ranged from unlikely to impossible, together with the insistence on putting the two squadrons to sea, meant a double whammy for the Regia Marina. No engagement (even where the Italians had the numerical advantage) but a profligate use of oil.

In the case of Mr. Churchill I DO assume that folks on this site know of him in terms of his political career in both wars. However I do not assume that folks know of him as an author. Some folks might think that reading the works of an author who was part of the history he or she is writing about will give one the “truth” from that author’s perspective or the accuracy of that perspective. In some cases they would be right, an example would be U.S. Grant’s autobiography which is renown among historians for being brutally honest in terms of Grants success and more importantly his failings. However the same can not be said of Mr. Churchill. So my point in saying “BY” was not to lower the conversation, but was merely my attempt not to assume prior knowledge and point out that Mr.. Churchill’s writings are somewhat self serving when it comes to mistakes or errors that have been historically laid at his feet by others. Certainly some observations about Mr. Churchill are not deserved, however some are.

Let me start by saying I like Churchill. Not adore, not take what he says as gospel, but admire as a true and important person to the history we all know to some extent. I can't say I've read him as the only thing I've read by him is his multi-volume WWII history, and that was decades ago. So correct me if I'm wrong (and I'm paraphrasing here) didn't he say at one time that "history shall be kind to me, for I shall write it". Now I love that quote however it was said, and it let's me know upfront that I should not rely on him as my only source.[:D]

That said, it only shows that you should seek multiple sources where possible. I usually do when I can find reliable multiple sources and time allows. Never seem to find enough time to read everything. Another reason I like this forum, lots of info to glean, and not all just about the game. Admittedly info here is just a start on the subject, but I've found a library worth of new sources to check out.

As to O'Hara, I've not read anything by him, at least not that I can recall. So I'll keep out.[8D]

ORIGINAL: Dili

I think you are making a confusion. There wasn't a time that Italians while "having advantage" retreated from combat because of a carrier. What Italians feared was night combat.

warspite1

What about Spartivento?

Had nothing to do with the carrier presence. The battle was just after Taranto attack and the orders from Supermarina was to be even more conservative than usual.

ORIGINAL: Dili

Had nothing to do with the carrier presence. The battle was just after Taranto attack and the orders from Supermarina was to be even more conservative than usual.

warspite1

So two things:

a) that supports my view that Supermarina were too cautious
b) Campioni was, as far as he was aware, facing one capital ship (the battlecruiser Renown) with his two battleships - one of which was the modern Vittorio Veneto. The Italians also had 8-inch gunned cruisers - the British had just one.

His cruisers were being attacked by Renown but he continued to run. His force was attacked by Ark Royal's aircraft to no effect, but you say that had nothing to do with his decision.

Mussolini disagreed and removed Campioni after the battle.

Two other "nuggets" about the battles for the Med.

Italian pilots, even in WWII, were very well trained. Italy had been the first nation to really show the use of air-support during the Italo-Turkish war. In the interwar period, aviation was "fashionable", with many civilians either becoming flyers, enrolling in the Air Force, or (after Italy entered the war) enrolling in the Air Force with their civilian experience. Mussolini own son, Bruno, had been an excellent war pilot, fighting (for real) in the Ethiopian War, the Spanish Civil War and in North Africa. He was also a test pilot and died in 1941 while testing a bomber prototipe.

The problem (the same which plagued the Italian Army in general) was that the technology was, mostly, obsolete. No matter how good they were, the Italian pilots flew on outdated planes; this made their experience if not futile at least not fully useful. The result is something that you can even check in WitP.

The second thing to consider is the "carrier problem" . one of the most enduring myths of WWII. Actually, Italy didn't need carriers, and Mussolini was correct in saying that Italy was "a natural aircraft carrier".

The real problem was the co-ordination between the Navy and the Air Force - which could be rated as "none". The commanders at sea had to request air support from Superaereo (the high command of the Air Force). Here, after deciding what to do, they had to arm and fuel the planes, and brief the pilots. The result was that the Air Force arrived when the battle was over and, in a few occasions, mistakenly attacked Italian ships. The same happened when, for example, a British convoy was sighted.

Just imagine Spruance at the Battle of Midway: instead of launching his attacks, he had to contact Pearl Harbor, detail the situation, wait for an answer, and only then launch the attack. Guess who would have won...

The Matapan disaster wasn't caused by the presence of a British carrier vs. none on the Italian side: it was caused by the total lack of air support for the Italian fleet during the day action (in a rare reversal of roles, the Italians had decripted the British codes and were aware of the presence of a carrier).

Of course the disaster during the night action was caused by a real technological inferiority: the lack of radar on Italian ships. They steamed into the night with no clue that the British fleet was there.

ORIGINAL: dr.hal

Folks,

I've often wondered about the portrayal of the Italian forces in the Med. Were they as poor as some authors would have us believe, or as amazing as the frogmen seemed to illustrate? I recently read an interesting book that I wanted to bring to your attention. It is short and "sweet", full of stuff I was not aware of. It also might change your view of the Regia Marina and the Regia Aeronautica during the latter stages of Italy's participation in the war as a part of the Axis powers. In short, the book illustrates the growth of both forces over the previous years and the deadly consequences of ignoring that growth and allowing preconceived negative stereotypes about the fighting abilities of these forces to persist by the British. The book is by Vincent P. O'Hara and it is titled "In Passage Perilous". Hal

I read it last year. Since I was mainly interested in the convoy action, I skipped over a lot of the background stuff. For the June and August '42
convoy narrative alone, I found it a very worthwhile read even if it was about the boring Med and not the sexy Pacific.

As for the comparisons of the two sides during the mid '42 period, O'Hara did seem to stress the British were getting complacent, expecting the
Italians to keep repeating their behaviour from past attempts and with similar results. I also suspected when reading it that the laws of probability
may also have played a part when Italian operational planning and intel finally clicked.

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

Of course the disaster during the night action was caused by a real technological inferiority: the lack of radar on Italian ships. They steamed into the night with no clue that the British fleet was there.

warspite1

Sorry but again this is too simplistic. Yes, radar played a part but the demise of the entire 1st Division was also down to rank bad decision making by Admiral Iachino. Pola was dead in the water. She was capable of rescue but why did Iachino need to send the rest of the division on a salvage mission? Iachino believed there were no Allied units close - if that was the case then sending the destroyers to tow Pola was sufficient. Admiral Cattaneo (commander of 1st Division) even delayed giving the order thinking that Iachino would realise his error.

Even if Iachino had thought the enemy was close by, why send two heavy cruisers as fodder, knowing as he did the disparity in night fighting capability? Just putting it all down to radar also discounts the fact that Admiral Cunningham could easily have chosen the 'safe' option and not ventured further into waters that would be full of Axis air during daylight when they were on their way home.

ORIGINAL: RFalvo69

The problem (the same which plagued the Italian Army in general) was that the technology was, mostly, obsolete. No matter how good they were, the Italian pilots flew on outdated planes; this made their experience if not futile at least not fully useful.

warspite1

This is what I meant by seeing performance in context. Bravery and skill can overcome only so much - look at the CR42's in the Battle of Britain, look at the Fairy Battles in France 1940, look at the Devastator at Midway, look at the Swordfish in Cerberus.

It is easy to poke fun at Italian tanks with 5 reverse gears and 1 forward or French cheese eating surrender monkeys [8|] - but those who do do not trouble their limited intelligence with trying to understand why what happened happened.