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The Soviet experience clearly shows the dangers of German air power and the importance of artillery support. The preoccupation of Soviet defenders with German tanks and the enormous difference even a few Soviet tanks made to Chuikov's troops when they were available shows the value of tanks (and technology more broadly) even in non-tank terrain.

The image of the Soviet soldier in World War II, and of the Russian soldier over time, is stolid, steadfast, capable of great feats of endurance but not initiative or flexibility. Much of this image comes from the testimony of Germans who fought the Soviets; one example will serve to represent the whole. Russian Combat Methods in World War II, a US army publication prepared by German generals shortly after World War II, gives a good sense of how the Germans regarded their enemy. The Russian soldier, they found, displayed “stubbornness and tenacity in the defence; inflexibility and little adaptability in the attack.” Russians were quick to counterattack, but “the Russian did not often conduct counterattacks that were based on a preconceived plan since, from the standpoint of leadership, they were too difficult for him.” The Russian roads to victory were not “great achievements by small units with clever leadership, but by sacrifices of masses.” The Russians entrenched and fortified their positions rapidly and thoroughly, particularly through “unscrupulous use of the civilian population.”

The irony of Wehrmacht officers complaining of “unscrupulous use of the civilian population” is, of course, quite rich.

This image provided by German generals has proven remarkably persistent, but it is utterly at odds with everything we know about urban warfare in general and the Soviet experience in Stalingrad in particular. The specific conditions of urban combat demand initiative, audacity and improvisation by small-unit commanders and individual soldiers, just the areas where the Soviet military and, more broadly, Russians, are held to be lacking. A Soviet retrospective look at Stalingrad held instead that “the fundamental particularity” of urban combat was that “daring and the independent initiative of each officer and soldier … had the greatest significance.”

The vaunted storm groups were broken down into teams; the “storming subgroup” (shturmuiushchaia podgruppa) that made the initial entry into a enemy-held building consisted of a mere 6–8 men, requiring a level of individual initiative supposedly beyond Soviet capabilities.

Chuikov, in discussing his men, he recalled that:

… in the forefront of my reflections was the individual soldier. He is the main hero of war. More than anyone else it is he who has to meet the enemy face to face… . I underline this point that he studies the enemy, because the soldier has a mind, a heart, an ability to think and not merely to understand the orders of his commander; he can weigh up the situation and the enemy's intentions.

As a result, “In street fighting, a soldier is on occasion his own general. He needed to be given correct guidance and, so to speak, the trust of the generals.”

The small storm groups were no different, for “the tactics of the storm group are based on rapid action, a sudden charge, a wide sense of initiative and boldness on the part of every soldier. These groups need to be flexible in tactics, because, after entering a fortified building and the labyrinth of rooms occupied by the enemy, they are faced with a welter of unexpected situations.”

Accordingly, the soldier in a storm group must have initiative and boldness, must rely on himself alone and believe in his own powers. No one else can carry out his job for him; his comrades have got enough of their own to do… . in an assault, he is very often left to his own devices, acts alone, on his own responsibility. Clearly, to wait and look round for one's comrades is letting them down, not helping them. Once you are inside the house it is too late to ask the commander to repeat his explanations of what you have to do.

Chuikov conceded that “to inculcate qualities of this kind in the men of the Red Army was not easy,” but the results of that battle showed that it happened nonetheless.

Military historians in the former Soviet Union and abroad have begun to use newly opened archives to find the reality of the Second World War behind the smokescreen of 50 years of mythology. A proper understanding of Stalingrad from the Soviet point of view is an important step. The picture revealed shows us a great deal about urban warfare, and about the Soviet Army that fought and won that battle on the Volga.

The German army could have won the Battle at Stalingrad but, finally, It not knew how to win it. Tactical mistakes, refusal to retreat, and not being able to do urban warfare made it nearly impossible for the Germans to win. The Russians fought hard and well, but it was the Germans who lost the battle, not the Soviets who won it. Poor German leadership and Russian determination combined to cost the Germans the battle, and ultimately, the war. Stalingrad was the turning point of World War II. The German Wehrmacht lost too many men in Stalingrad to continue their campaign against the Allies, and with Stalingrad, the momentum of the war shifted into the Allies’ favor. Stalingrad was a battle that was marked by German mistakes. These mistakes would ultimately cost them not only the Battle of Stalingrad, but also the war itself.

16 regiments, belonging to 6 divisions of the sixth German army, and eleven battalions of engineers, fought in the area of the Barrikady factory in the industrial sector of Stalingrad, between October 9 and November 25, 1942.

36 regiments, belonging to 10 divisions of the 62nd Soviet Army, and two independent infantry battalions, fought in the area of the Barrikady factory in the industrial sector of Stalingrad, between October 9 and November 25, 1942.

The Barrikady Gun Factory was a large factory complex located in northern Stalingrad. It was nestled between the Dzerhezinski Tractor Works, the Brickworks to the north, and the Krasny Oktyabr Steel works to the south. These facilities collectively made up the industrial north of Stalingrad. The German operations to conquer the northern industrial areas began on the 14th of October, and would progress into the Barrikady on the 16th of October following the capture of the Dzerhezinski Tractor Factory. The conquest of the Dzerhezinski was accomplished by the 14. Panzer-Division and the 305. Infanterie Division on the 14th and 15th of October.

On the morning of the 16th of October, the 305. Infanterie-Division made its first penetrations into the Barrikady Gun Factory in its north-western sector after pushing south from the Dzerhezinski Tractor Factory . This was done despite the desperate resistance of the 308th Rifle-Division, which was supported by the 84th Tank-Brigade with dug in T-34's. The Barrikady's northern work halls were captured by Grenadier-Regiment 577 and Grenadier-Regiment 576 by the evening of the 16th. However, The fighting would intensify the next day and throughout the following weeks following the arrival of the 138th Rifle-Division from across the Volga on the 16th. The 138th Rifle-Division would offer obstinate resistance from the morning of the 17th onwards. However, Grenadier-Regiments 576, 577, and 578 would continue to make significant gains in the factory with most regiments pushing all the way to the southern end of the factory, and eventually securing large areas of the Volga bank along the divisions sector.

However, over the coming days the fighting would become more confusing as Soviet counter-attacks achieved successes in recapturing areas in the German rear, infiltrating through the sewers and underground passages that ran beneath much of the factory complex. The fighting would continue to swirl back and forth within the rubble strewn work halls, and along the factories railway until both sides settled down for a costly stalemate in the Barrikady lower settlement, the Russians with their backs to the Volga.

Welcome to Stalingrad.

Welcome to Barrikady.

The historical module "Barrikady" is already available in the release 2.0 of “Heroes and Leaders mod.”

The release 2.0 of Heroes and Leaders mod is already available in the threah “Core of Heroes and Leaders mod,” in the post # 1:

tm.asp?m=4354865#

The main news are:
1.- All units of the Soviet army
2.- New units of the German army
3.- New terrain for the historical module "Barrikady"
4.- New Nations file
5.- New Sprites file
6.- New Events file
7.- New rules
8.- First scenario for the historic Barrikady module: "Barrikady West"

Thank you for continuing to support and develop this game. [8D]

Thank you very much Richard. I hope you like the scenarios I have designed for the Barrikady gun Factory.