Matrix Games Forums

The issue with that is that China was very fractured with local warlords retaining area control. If Japan was winning against China, then in their pragmatic fashion they would have 'supported' Japan so they could retain their control. Which would have meant less partisan activities in their areas. So it does make sense the way the game is now.

Also given the huge scale of the game, there was not a lot of guerrilla activity that impacted huge areas of the country anywhere, including China. Reducing supply in locations not garrisoned is the best way to handle partisan activity in a game of this scale. As that better reflects the impact and localized area these activities took place.

While I agree that Russia and China are pretty weak, the overall balance is pretty good after the last patch, so I would oppose changing that. The western allies are forced to do something to help those two. Otherwise you will get a historical game where the Axis always loses, and that is pointless from a game perspective.

ORIGINAL: Numdydar

The issue with China is that most Axis players want to overrun China. The Japanese in RL had no desire to do so.

This is just 100% false. The entire reason for the war in the Pacific is because Japan wanted to subjugate and puppet China. The US embargoed them because of this. Japan attacked the US because of the embargo.

Something needs to be done to make the war in China more historical and fun to play.

I wrote a post here detailing a number of Soviet events related to People's Militia Units that could be added to the game. I think additional and entirely historical PMU events that provided free units are a better fit to what the Soviets need than extra income. Also I also don't want to insult, but have you tried boosting convoy percentage to increase income to the Soviets from UK and from US to UK? From what I've seen, the two combined provide a fairly chunky boost to Soviet income especially in the critical (in this game but not in reality) 42 to 43 period.

The historical route to solving this issue would be to weaken supply throughput on muddy tiles further, especially in occupied territory. This would more accurately capture the situation for the Nazis on the Eastern Front. David Stahel, David Glantz and Robert Forczyk all indicate in their operational histories of the eastern front that mud (and in the case of Stahel, Nazi refusal to acknowledge logistical limitations and emphasis on the supremacy of will) was a substantial limiter. This is not currently represented in game. Winter also has too large of an impact on offensive operation and continues to parrot postwar Nazi propaganda about being defeated by the climate rather than the Soviet military (best understood as a variation on the stab in the back myth from WWI). While it should definitely reduce mobility if not prepared for it, it should not substantially impact offensive capability otherwise.

The Nazis should definitely outnumber the Soviets at the start. On the border on June 22 in 1941 they had a substantial advantage in manpower and material (especially when including the surprisingly large if ill equipped forces of the Axis minors). Around 4 POINT 5mio Axis soldiers attacked around 2 POINT 5mio Soviet defenders. Only after substantial time and the immense crash mobilization that the Soviets underwent did they manage to amass a comparable force in manpower. They then lost this parity at the catastrophes (as Lev Lopukhovsky calls it) at Viaz'ma and Bryansk. And only later in the war did they rectify the real disadvantage in material (chiefly trucks and planes, a substantial disadvantage in both that jointly led to substantial impairment to operational mobility and performance). At no point prior to late 44 did they substantially outnumber the Nazis on the front as a whole. Only by bleeding secondary fronts of all forces and concentrating them into shock armies assigned to specific attacking fronts did the Soviets manage to achieve overwhelming superiority on key frontages. For instance, during the critical counteroffensive against Army Group Center in 41 (during which snow fell on both the Soviet and the German side of the front....) the Soviets barely achieved parity in manpower and were still short of material.

This game also continues the myth of the elite Manchurian units, but I'm not getting into that. Most of the forces transferred were simply equipped to to the prewar standard, largely with obsolete equipment. It is only in comparison to strung out Nazi units and the much reduced TOE of 41 to 42 for Soviet units that they could at all be described as well equipped.

Cities are also far too easy to attack with tank units. I'm not sure why this is at all effective. It has not ever been the case that an armored force was successful in direct assault against a determined and reasonably well equipped/supplied opponent in urban warfare without exceedingly high expenditure in lives and material. Meanwhile in this game I tend to start urban assaults off by smashing the enemy with heavy tanks, an utterly asinine decision from a historical perspective but wildly effective in game terms because it ruins enemy readiness/morale and guts entrenchment. In reality, a concealed 53-K or soldier with an inflammable projectile would have no trouble dispatching a Tiger in the close combat situations enforced by urban fighting. In game, the Tiger would gleefully prance around annihilating everything. The entire scenario feels absurd, as if it were straight from the fevered mind of Hitler himself. Forczyk and Dougherty both detailed the critical nature of small infantry units and combat engineers using infiltration and a hearty helping of explosives to defeating the French fortifications at Sedan, and Glantz says the same regarding Soviet annihilation of Japanese fortifications in Manchuria. I have never read similar comments about SS actions at Kursk (frontal assault with heavily equipped units against Soviet units equipped largely with 45mm and 57mm guns) or Nazi actions at Stalingrad, yet here we are.

edit: And once again this awful forum ate my post because it happened to have a link to my prior post on this forum. Whoever wrote that rule for this site should be sat in a dark room full of garbage to think about what they've done.

edit: Apparently this forum thinks that June 22 OF 1941 (minus the OF) is a phone number and eats my post. Whoever wrote the regex for that is an incompetent gibbering baboon and should be ashamed.

Good feedback, prestidigitation. Hopefully the developers are reading.

Perhaps units in cities/forts should be immune to demoralization from tanks?

(I also think air-power is too good vs. cities.)

ORIGINAL: sveint

ORIGINAL: Numdydar

The issue with China is that most Axis players want to overrun China. The Japanese in RL had no desire to do so.

This is just 100% false. The entire reason for the war in the Pacific is because Japan wanted to subjugate and puppet China. The US embargoed them because of this. Japan attacked the US because of the embargo.

Something needs to be done to make the war in China more historical and fun to play.

Wow. This is just so wrong in so many ways it hard to know where to begin.

But here is one item. The oil embargo was mainly due to Japan occupying the airfields in Indochina, And it did not occur until August 1941. The earlier embargo for scrap metal and closing the Panama canal occurred when Japan occupied Indochina from Vichy France. So between 1937 and Peral Harbor, nothing Japan did in China mattered to the US. Did it raise tensions? Sure. But the US did nothing until Indochina was occupied.

Also Japan was willing to actually leave most of China as late as early '41 in order to get back on good terms with the US. But was ultimately rejected by the War Minister.

While I'm sure Japan would have loved to puppet China, their main goal was to occupy the coast an the major urban centers as they knew they could not really control much more than that with the manpower allocated to China.

Japan attacked the US in order to get the oil in the DEI and the PI was in the way. If Japan could have gotten the oil without having the PI across their trade routes, they would have done so without involving the US in a war.

ORIGINAL: prestidigitation

Winter also has too large of an impact on offensive operation and continues to parrot postwar Nazi propaganda about being defeated by the climate rather than the Soviet military (best understood as a variation on the stab in the back myth from WWI). While it should definitely reduce mobility if not prepared for it, it should not substantially impact offensive capability otherwise.


The Nazis should definitely outnumber the Soviets at the start. On the border on June 22 in 1941 they had a substantial advantage in manpower and material (especially when including the surprisingly large if ill equipped forces of the Axis minors). Around 4 POINT 5mio Axis soldiers attacked around 2 POINT 5mio Soviet defenders. Only after substantial time and the immense crash mobilization that the Soviets underwent did they manage to amass a comparable force in manpower. They then lost this parity at the catastrophes (as Lev Lopukhovsky calls it) at Viaz'ma and Bryansk. And only later in the war did they rectify the real disadvantage in material (chiefly trucks and planes, a substantial disadvantage in both that jointly led to substantial impairment to operational mobility and performance). At no point prior to late 44 did they substantially outnumber the Nazis on the front as a whole. Only by bleeding secondary fronts of all forces and concentrating them into shock armies assigned to specific attacking fronts did the Soviets manage to achieve overwhelming superiority on key frontages. For instance, during the critical counteroffensive against Army Group Center in 41 (during which snow fell on both the Soviet and the German side of the front....) the Soviets barely achieved parity in manpower and were still short of material.

Interesting post of yours. I agree at some points, like the problem with mud period in Russia, what hinders supply. But i also have to disagree with others.

We in the Alps have around 0° to -10°C in winters, with much snow. We think this is cold. But eastern Europe is a totally other level. When temperatures nearly fell down to the -50°C mark at some points at the east front, this was fatal. Motors wont start, weapons freeze, air power is hindered, there is snow everywhere and so on. Just think about the effect this has on a soldier who has to fight for days out in the cold, especially soldiers who never experienced something like this. And how can something hinder mobility and not offensive capability otherwise? Mobility is the cornerstone for every offensive operation.

I also do not see the substantial advantage in manpower and material of axis in the east. If i remember correctly the axis attacked in 1941 with around 3000 tanks, while the soviets managed to field around 24000 tanks in the red army, among them even around 2000 T-30 and KW. How many heavy modern tanks could the Wehrmacht field at this point? While at the initial phase the ratio of combat forces in the east was slightly above 1:1 for the Axis, this began to turn in winter 1941 (1,5:1 for soviets) and never really went under the ratio of 2:1 for soviets after spring/summer 1942. (according to Glantz) I would call a ratio of 2:1 outnumbering, especially with the greater reserves of manpower in mind.

But remember, we are looking at strength factors here, not absolute numbers. The Soviets had more tanks to deploy, but as manned and used they were less effective tank for tank, than the Germans.

You can simply consider that it takes more tanks to make up a 10 step unit for the USSR than it does for Germany.

Yeah, not true Japan wanting China completely subjugated. Japan wanted to chew up and eat bits and pieces of China in a series of wars but the Chinese knew that if they agreed to a peace and gave up a little territory Japan could come back and do it again so they kept the war going in hopes of a reversal rather then ceding territoy. Japan would have been happy to annex what they had and end the war. The Japanese attack on China did not have a "total war" objective like the attacks on Poland and France. Japan was still using the old military playbook.

edit: replied to wrong post.

I am with you on this. Since this is a game i have no problem with some abstaction for playability.