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What was the state of readiness of the BBs (and other ships) at PH?

Did they still have layers of (inflammable) paint on them, canvas tarps erected, and other peacetime paraphernalia on deck?

Is it a myth that they never left harbour on Sundays?

Did they have AAA rounds distributed? Was there a morning stand-to?

Did the AAA regiments have a stand-to on Sunday (and all) mornings?

Someone already mentioned CAP.

I read that in the run-up to December 7th various intel assessments in Washington that war could be imminent resulted in several alerts including on successive weekends. I think the fleet actually sortied at least once - a huge decision given the fuel that would be used. The Navy would not have had a blank cheque to spend money yet, so using the fuel budget would have been a serious issue.

The men were grumbling about the lack of shore leave (all that temptation - soooooo close!) and both Kimmel and Stark decided it would be better not to react to every missive from Washington telling them to be alert. It just happened that the Japanese arrived one week later than the intel-estimated alert the weekend before.

More to point, in peacetime the BB"s would not have put to sea at all without a requirement (exercise) as it was quite expensive to put to sea. Weapon stores also would have been a peacetime stocks, not wartime. etc etc etc. These are all things I refer to above as "options" that Kimmel may have been specifically told NOT to do from Stark. Remember, still peace time and that means budgets have rather more control than might be thought.

PH was a big lesson, commanders now have (and use) more discretion. But prior to then, it isn't clear that it was used to the same level ...

ORIGINAL: warspite1

- I would be keen to know why the Inquiry was keen to reinstate and why the presidents refused.

warspite1

Well I've only been able to find a few bits and pieces, but I do think it curious that there is open criticism of Marshall and Stark - but only Kimmel and Short were left to hang.

....Excerpts From the Pearl Harbor Investigations


the dorn report (1995)

``Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not
fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General
Short; it should be broadly shared.''
``It is clear today, as it should have been since 1946 to
any serious reader of the JCC (Joint Congressional Committee)
hearing record, that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were
not solely responsible for the defeat at Pearl Harbor.''
``. . . the evidence of the handling of these
(intelligence) messages in Washington reveals some
ineptitude, some unwarranted assumptions and misestimates,
limited coordination, ambiguous language, and lack of
clarification and follow-up at higher levels.''
``The `pilot', `fourteen-point' and `one o'clock' messages
point, by the evening of December 6th, to war at dawn
(Hawaiian time) on the 7th--not to an attack on Hawaii--but
officials in Washington were neither energetic nor effective
in getting that warning to the Hawaiian commanders.''


The Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (1991)

``The Army Pearl Harbor Board (of 1944), held that General
Marshall and the Chief of War Plans Division of the War
Department shared in the responsibility for the disaster.''
``The applicant in this case . . . must show . . . that the
FSM (in this case Major General Short) was unjustly treated
by the Army . . . the majority found evidence of injustice.''
``In this regard, the majority was of the opinion that the
FSM, singularly or with the Naval commander, was unjustly
held responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster.''
``Considering the passage of time as well as the burden and
stigma carried until his untimely death in 1949, it would be
equitable and just to restore the FSM to his former rank of
lieutenant general on the retired list.''
``Recommendation.--That all of the Department of the Army
records, related to this case be corrected by advancing the
individual concerned to the rank of lieutenant general on the
retired list.''


the army pearl harbor board inquiry (1944)

``The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C.
Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian
Department in the following particulars:
(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the
Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity
for better preparation for war, of which information he had
an abundance and Short had little.
(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when
evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's
reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General
Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of
November 27 and had not adequately alerted his command for
war.
(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th
and the early morning of December 7th, the critical
information indicating an almost imminent break with Japan,
though there was ample time to have accomplished this.''
``Chief of War Plans Division War Department General Staff,
Major General Leonard T. Gerow, failed in his duties in the
following respects:
(a) To send to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department on November 27, 1941, a clear, concise directive;
on the contrary, he approved the message of November 27,
1941, which contained the confusing statements.
(b) To realize that the state of readiness reported in
Short's reply to the November 27th message was not a state of
war readiness, and he failed to take corrective action.''


the naval court of inquiry (1944)

``It is a prime obligation of Command to keep subordinate
commanders, particularly those in distant areas, constantly
supplied with information. To fail to meet this obligation is
to commit a military error.''
``It is a fact that Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval
Operations and responsible for the operation of the Pacific
Fleet, and having important information in his possession
during this critical period, especially on the morning of 7
December, failed to transmit this information to Admiral
Kimmel, this depriving the latter of a clear picture of the
existing Japanese situation as seen in Washington.''
``The Court is of the opinion that the deficiencies in
personnel and materiel which existed in 1941, had a direct
adverse bearing upon the effectiveness of the defense of
Pearl Harbor on and prior to 7 December.''
``The Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's
decision, made after the dispatch of 24 November, to continue
preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in light
of the information then available to him.''
``The Court is of the opinion that Admiral Harold R. Stark,
U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations . . . failed to display the
sound judgement expected of him in that he did not transmit
to Admiral Kimmel . . . during the very critical period 26
November to 7 December, important information which he had
regarding the Japanese situation, and especially on the
morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately
the fact that a message had been received which appeared to
indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent,
and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected
soon.''


the joint congressional committee report (1946)

``The errors made by the Hawaiian commanders were errors of
judgment and not derelictions of duty.''
``The War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy Departments
failed:
``(a) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the
intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24,
November 15, and November 20 (the harbor berth plan and
related dispatches) and to raise a question as to their
significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in
the Pacific Fleet's base, this intelligence should have been
appreciated and supplied to the Hawaiian commanders for their
assistance, along with other information available to them,
in making their estimate of the situation.
``(b) To be properly on the qui vive to receive the `one
o'clock' intercept and to recognize in the message the fact
that some Japanese military action would very possibly occur
somewhere at 1 p.m., December 7. If properly appreciated this
intelligence should have suggested a dispatch to all Pacific
outpost commanders supplying this information, as General
Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it.''

``The errors made by the Hawaiian commanders were errors of
judgment and not derelictions of duty.''

That is a key point - for various reasons you can't keep the troops/ships on alert ALL the time.

But having said that, high level commanders are expected to exercise skill and judg[e]ment in assessing the required readiness level, and organise training exercises so that it can be rapidly attained with a minimum of confusion. They were on a war alert, and, though not directly relevant, the USN had started fighting an undeclared shooting war in the Atlantic by October 41 latest.

PS: It is interesting that King & Kimmel's predecessor, James O. Richardson, was sacked in February 1941 because he refused to toe the line and recommended, strongly, the fleet be withdrawn to the West Coast - because it was too vulnerable to surprise air attack. The fact he was right didn't see him reinstated, either.

ORIGINAL: fcooke

MM - that's a bit of hyperbole with the wire on the beaches and AA batteries blocking streets. That was not an option and not realistic. Nobody expected an invasion until after the attack. Better manning of existing defenses, actual aircraft dispersal, more Cat patrols, maybe some standing CAP MIGHT (not certain would) have helped. Or not. But to treat sabotage as the biggest threat seems to be a mistake. They would have to get onto the base in the first place, and realistically how much could they take out?

And (he ducks), Mac got a free pass for very similar mistakes/oversights.

Just my thoughts.

Yea! Doug out Doug gets free pass for scwreeing up everything but he is good...

On the operations of the fleet:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410813apac.html

Note who signed it.

So, yes, the fleet wasn't tied up alongside the whole time. There are various pieces of evidence here and there that this schedule was generally adhered to.

Back to an earlier point, some years back I snagged an account from a junior officer on the USS Maury (a Gridley class, you'll note). Among other things he mentions an order to "strip ship" sometime in the summer/early fall of 1941 due to lessons the RN had learned in battle:

[quote]“Strip Ship” meant to remove all inflammable material from the ship and it was devastating to the feeling of well being and comfort in the ship. Below the Main Deck all portholes were removed and steel plates welded over the holes. All linoleum and rugs were removed. All of the beautiful sheathing that concealed the bundles of wires and ever-present pipes had to come out. All curtains and slip covers disappeared. Even the accumulated paint in the interior spaces had to be chipped off, leaving the metal bare or covered with the garish yellow of a thin coat of Zinc Chromate, which we soon learned to loathe. The Captain’s Gig and our 30 ft. Motor Launch were removed with their Davits. The mahogany bridge railings and our Teak Accommodation Ladder were sacrificed because of danger from splinters in case of a hit. Even our beautiful Bridge gratings had to go and we were left to slide around on bare metal.[\quote]

Thanks for posting that - they were at least stripping off the excess flammable materials and getting into war-fighting trim.

Very interesting that the August order and TF composition is not what WITP-AE uses for the starting TFs of Enterprise and Lexington on turn 1. Our game was pretty well researched so I take the TF composition to be quite accurate.

I presume events and the need to cover reinforcements to islands to the west resulted in break up of Kimmel's ordered TFs. I didn't like the make up of TF 1 with Saratoga tied to the BB divisions anyway, but then I know from historic hindsight that CVs became the prime striking force and slow BBs were a drag on their speed. Prior to the PH attack US doctrine held that BBs were the queens of the seas.

I find this stuff pretty fascinating as well. Although it is folly trying to put ourselves in the shoes of commanders in 1941, it sure feels like the lack of concern regarding any sneak attacks at the Flag level filtered down through the commands. The vast majority of troops were caught unaware and disbelief seemed rampant. Kimmel and Short were held responsible in the manner the Navy typically utilizes. I have become pretty cynical regarding my Navy (served 1982-86 w/VS-21) after reading accounts of the Mk14 torpedo debacle, the Midway USS Hornet "flight to nowhere" cover up and numerous other facepalm moments.

I agree that Kimmel was going to take the brunt of retribution whether he really deserved it. While onboard the Enterprise in Nov. of 1985 we hit Bishop's Rock during workups. Captain Robert Leuschner was sacked Jan 27th of 1986. Just the way it goes.

Related to this subject, after reading the first half of Beans, Bullets and Black Oil I came away with a slightly better impression of Admiral Robert Ghormley's role in the South Pacific. Politics and social standing had and still have a lot of power in the flag ranks of the US Navy. Why should top Admirals (and Generals for that matter) be held responsible when there are perfectly ripe scapegoats "closer to the situation"?

ANY military trial or hearing investigating ANY officer after an action will generally be predicated on one major question : did the officer in command take every action possible to protect the forces under his or her command. Not how much did they know about the enemy or his intentions, or much of anything else for that matter. DID that officer use every resource to it's fullest extent to protect his forces? In both the cases of Kimmel and Short , the answer is no.

Kimmel had his ships in a exceptionally relaxed state , especially since he had been in a near continuous state of alert. Several of his battleships were completely "opened up" for inspection completely impairing their water tight integrity. One ship would not be all that unreasonable , but nearly half his ships had some degree of water tight integrity impairment .

None of his ships were scattered. It was standard practice under Richardson (Kimmel's predecessor) to have at least half the fleet either at sea or in a different anchorage (such as Lahania or one of the other islands). His PBY's were not flying patrol so they could "train". (Sorry , after 23 years of being a "VP-flyer" one thing I've learned is you learn to patrol by patrolling. Very little skill polishing is done by sitting on the deck).

Short's biggest problem is that at heart he was a 19yh century cavalry man. (So was Patton and Marshal, THEY didn't have any problem adjusting). A good commander would listen to his advisors. While neither Kimmel or Short were flyers , they had available two of the most knowledgeable aviators in the US military on their respective staffs, and the Martin-Bellinger report absolutely nailed what the Japanese were going to do.

Planes were made vulnerable ,ships were made vulnerable , and as result a lot of people died. Neither man knew everything , but they absolutely did NOT act on what they DID know. They were negligent . Not enough to be shot , but surely enough to be fired. And for that punishment , only a lack of competence need be enough.



All command positions in the US Military are held due to the "confidence of their superior officer". Any senior officer may at any time relieve a subordinate due to "a lack of confidence" in that subordinate. It happens every day. Even without the death of people , ships and planes". Simply the showing of "questionable" judgement is all that is required. [:(]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve
... While neither Kimmel or Short were flyers , they had available two of the most knowledgeable aviators in the US military on their respective staffs....

Ben Affleck and Josh Harnett?

(P.S. Always appreciate your insights, Steve. Good to see you on the Forum.)

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ANY military trial or hearing investigating ANY officer after an action will generally be predicated on one major question : did the officer in command take every action possible to protect the forces under his or her command. Not how much did they know about the enemy or his intentions, or much of anything else for that matter. DID that officer use every resource to it's fullest extent to protect his forces? In both the cases of Kimmel and Short , the answer is no.

Kimmel had his ships in a exceptionally relaxed state , especially since he had been in a near continuous state of alert. Several of his battleships were completely "opened up" for inspection completely impairing their water tight integrity. One ship would not be all that unreasonable , but nearly half his ships had some degree of water tight integrity impairment .

None of his ships were scattered. It was standard practice under Richardson (Kimmel's predecessor) to have at least half the fleet either at sea or in a different anchorage (such as Lahania or one of the other islands). His PBY's were not flying patrol so they could "train". (Sorry , after 23 years of being a "VP-flyer" one thing I've learned is you learn to patrol by patrolling. Very little skill polishing is done by sitting on the deck).

Short's biggest problem is that at heart he was a 19yh century cavalry man. (So was Patton and Marshal, THEY didn't have any problem adjusting). A good commander would listen to his advisors. While neither Kimmel or Short were flyers , they had available two of the most knowledgeable aviators in the US military on their respective staffs, and the Martin-Bellinger report absolutely nailed what the Japanese were going to do.

Planes were made vulnerable ,ships were made vulnerable , and as result a lot of people died. Neither man knew everything , but they absolutely did NOT act on what they DID know. They were negligent . Not enough to be shot , but surely enough to be fired. And for that punishment , only a lack of competence need be enough.



All command positions in the US Military are held due to the "confidence of their superior officer". Any senior officer may at any time relieve a subordinate due to "a lack of confidence" in that subordinate. It happens every day. Even without the death of people , ships and planes". Simply the showing of "questionable" judgement is all that is required. [:(]

warspite1

So your position re Short and Kimmel is clear and the reasons for that view. So I am interested in your thoughts on the comments of the Joint Congressional Committee (1946) the Naval court of Inquiry (1944) and the Dorn Report (1995) (post 24). Do you believe that Stark and Marshall should have 'got away with it' and that just Kimmel and Short should have been blamed?

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

Very interesting that the August order and TF composition is not what WITP-AE uses for the starting TFs of Enterprise and Lexington on turn 1. Our game was pretty well researched so I take the TF composition to be quite accurate.

I presume events and the need to cover reinforcements to islands to the west resulted in break up of Kimmel's ordered TFs. I didn't like the make up of TF 1 with Saratoga tied to the BB divisions anyway, but then I know from historic hindsight that CVs became the prime striking force and slow BBs were a drag on their speed. Prior to the PH attack US doctrine held that BBs were the queens of the seas.

Indeed, no ops plan survives contact with reality, then or now. Though note that if she'd held to her original schedule USS Enterprise and her TF would have returned on the 6th, right on schedule. For that matter USS Saratoga and Colorado were actually doing "upkeep"; just in yards on the west coast, not at Pearl.

Realized that while the August plan covers the December 7th time period, the notes on the November plan might be more interesting as part of this discussion:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411110apac.html

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

Context is important.

The impact of air power was also not fully understood by most of the Navy. Despite demonstrations of it in fleet exercises and in other instances (eg Taranto), the notion of a trans-Pacific airstrike was a hard sell.

Had Kimmel/Short been "prepared for war" in a manner that would have been effective...

I both agree and disagree with you - as difficult as that is to explain. Context is the key point.

The attack on Pearl Harbor was a known threat - assessed - practiced - understood by the USNavy and Army brass ... "if they cared to learn the lesson"

Kimmel (among others) are negligent is underestimating the potential of external attack and overestimating the danger of sabotage.


Yarnell maintained that Japan "had always started operations by attacking before a declaration of war." Accordingly, he designed an attack plan that utilized carrier aviation to launch a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Pearl's defenders had anticipated that Yarnell would attack with his battleships. Instead, he left his battleships behind and advanced with the carriers Saratoga and Lexington to a point north-northeast of Hawaii. At dawn, on Sunday February 7, 1932, Yarnell launched his attack with a force of 152 planes from the two carriers. His attack force first attacked the airfields and then proceeded to attack the ships along battleship row.

Yarnell achieved total surprise. The airfields were put out of commission, with not a single plane getting airborne during the attack. The attacking force scored multiple hits, they dropped sacks of white flour to simulate bombs, on the battleships. The umpires declared that Yarnell's attack had been a complete success and declared him the winner. The Army and Navy brass, however, would have none of it. They complained that Yarnell had cheated. He had attacked at dawn on a Sunday morning, a time considered "inappropriate" for an attack. His attack vector from the north-northeast had mimicked planes arriving from the mainland. Most importantly, the Navy argued, low level precision bombing of battleships at anchor was unrealistic since "everyone knew that Asians lacked sufficient hand-eye coordination to engage in that kind of precision bombing."

Source happens to be: (But I have read it many other places)
https://www.military.com/navy/pearl-har ... ttack.html

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ANY military trial or hearing investigating ANY officer after an action will generally be predicated on one major question : did the officer in command take every action possible to protect the forces under his or her command. Not how much did they know about the enemy or his intentions, or much of anything else for that matter. DID that officer use every resource to it's fullest extent to protect his forces? In both the cases of Kimmel and Short , the answer is no.

Kimmel had his ships in a exceptionally relaxed state , especially since he had been in a near continuous state of alert. Several of his battleships were completely "opened up" for inspection completely impairing their water tight integrity. One ship would not be all that unreasonable , but nearly half his ships had some degree of water tight integrity impairment .

None of his ships were scattered. It was standard practice under Richardson (Kimmel's predecessor) to have at least half the fleet either at sea or in a different anchorage (such as Lahania or one of the other islands). His PBY's were not flying patrol so they could "train". (Sorry , after 23 years of being a "VP-flyer" one thing I've learned is you learn to patrol by patrolling. Very little skill polishing is done by sitting on the deck).

Short's biggest problem is that at heart he was a 19yh century cavalry man. (So was Patton and Marshal, THEY didn't have any problem adjusting). A good commander would listen to his advisors. While neither Kimmel or Short were flyers , they had available two of the most knowledgeable aviators in the US military on their respective staffs, and the Martin-Bellinger report absolutely nailed what the Japanese were going to do.

Planes were made vulnerable ,ships were made vulnerable , and as result a lot of people died. Neither man knew everything , but they absolutely did NOT act on what they DID know. They were negligent . Not enough to be shot , but surely enough to be fired. And for that punishment , only a lack of competence need be enough.



All command positions in the US Military are held due to the "confidence of their superior officer". Any senior officer may at any time relieve a subordinate due to "a lack of confidence" in that subordinate. It happens every day. Even without the death of people , ships and planes". Simply the showing of "questionable" judgement is all that is required. [:(]

warspite1

So your position re Short and Kimmel is clear and the reasons for that view. So I am interested in your thoughts on the comments of the Joint Congressional Committee (1946) the Naval court of Inquiry (1944) and the Dorn Report (1995) (post 24). Do you believe that Stark and Marshall should have 'got away with it' and that just Kimmel and Short should have been blamed?

Stark didn't exactly "get away with it". He was fired as CNO , replaced by Ernie King , then went to London to create a position which would eventually become EUCOM. He was titled as CINCUSNAVFOREUR , except that he had no forces. He was sent as he had a particularly good relationship with the British. He would never again be responsible for USN ships . He became , in essence a diplomat, definitely a demotion after CNO.

Marshall was definitely less responsible. His big mistake , was assigning Short to the position. And Roosevelt felt that he was NOT replaceable.


Someone who certainly DID get away with it was Douglas MacArthur! Not only was he caught flat footed , but he had 24 hours warning AFTER Pearl Harbor (due to weather the Japanese could not attack)! And to a lesser degree his air commander Brereton , who at least wanted to attack Taiwan . Probably not the best plan (which was to move the B-17's south to Del Monte field at Cauragyan. But at least he wanted to do SOMETHING! I've often felt MacArthur should have court martialed. (Actually I personally felt he should have been drawn and quartered , but I suppose that's a little over the top). [8|] [:D]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ANY military trial or hearing investigating ANY officer after an action will generally be predicated on one major question : did the officer in command take every action possible to protect the forces under his or her command. Not how much did they know about the enemy or his intentions, or much of anything else for that matter. DID that officer use every resource to it's fullest extent to protect his forces? In both the cases of Kimmel and Short , the answer is no.

Kimmel had his ships in a exceptionally relaxed state , especially since he had been in a near continuous state of alert. Several of his battleships were completely "opened up" for inspection completely impairing their water tight integrity. One ship would not be all that unreasonable , but nearly half his ships had some degree of water tight integrity impairment .

None of his ships were scattered. It was standard practice under Richardson (Kimmel's predecessor) to have at least half the fleet either at sea or in a different anchorage (such as Lahania or one of the other islands). His PBY's were not flying patrol so they could "train". (Sorry , after 23 years of being a "VP-flyer" one thing I've learned is you learn to patrol by patrolling. Very little skill polishing is done by sitting on the deck).

Short's biggest problem is that at heart he was a 19yh century cavalry man. (So was Patton and Marshal, THEY didn't have any problem adjusting). A good commander would listen to his advisors. While neither Kimmel or Short were flyers , they had available two of the most knowledgeable aviators in the US military on their respective staffs, and the Martin-Bellinger report absolutely nailed what the Japanese were going to do.

Planes were made vulnerable ,ships were made vulnerable , and as result a lot of people died. Neither man knew everything , but they absolutely did NOT act on what they DID know. They were negligent . Not enough to be shot , but surely enough to be fired. And for that punishment , only a lack of competence need be enough.



All command positions in the US Military are held due to the "confidence of their superior officer". Any senior officer may at any time relieve a subordinate due to "a lack of confidence" in that subordinate. It happens every day. Even without the death of people , ships and planes". Simply the showing of "questionable" judgement is all that is required. [:(]

warspite1

So your position re Short and Kimmel is clear and the reasons for that view. So I am interested in your thoughts on the comments of the Joint Congressional Committee (1946) the Naval court of Inquiry (1944) and the Dorn Report (1995) (post 24). Do you believe that Stark and Marshall should have 'got away with it' and that just Kimmel and Short should have been blamed?

Stark didn't exactly "get away with it". He was fired as CNO , replaced by Ernie King , then went to London to create a position which would eventually become EUCOM. He was titled as CINCUSNAVFOREUR , except that he had no forces. He was sent as he had a particularly good relationship with the British. He would never again be responsible for USN ships . He became , in essence a diplomat, definitely a demotion after CNO.

Marshall was definitely less responsible. His big mistake , was assigning Short to the position. And Roosevelt felt that he was NOT replaceable.

warspite1

Yes I see what you mean (in the case of Stark), although a demotion to diplomat was probably a better result than what Kimmel got. Always interesting why some people get the book thrown at them and other people appear teflon coated. I guess being irreplaceable to the big cheese (in the case of Marshall) is always worth more than a coat of teflon.

I'll leave comment on MacArthur for another time - no doubt he will be one of the subjects of future threads if the OP decides to continue with this theme.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ORIGINAL: warspite1

warspite1

So your position re Short and Kimmel is clear and the reasons for that view. So I am interested in your thoughts on the comments of the Joint Congressional Committee (1946) the Naval court of Inquiry (1944) and the Dorn Report (1995) (post 24). Do you believe that Stark and Marshall should have 'got away with it' and that just Kimmel and Short should have been blamed?

Stark didn't exactly "get away with it". He was fired as CNO , replaced by Ernie King , then went to London to create a position which would eventually become EUCOM. He was titled as CINCUSNAVFOREUR , except that he had no forces. He was sent as he had a particularly good relationship with the British. He would never again be responsible for USN ships . He became , in essence a diplomat, definitely a demotion after CNO.

Marshall was definitely less responsible. His big mistake , was assigning Short to the position. And Roosevelt felt that he was NOT replaceable.

warspite1

Yes I see what you mean (in the case of Stark), although a demotion to diplomat was probably a better result than what Kimmel got. Always interesting why some people get the book thrown at them and other people appear teflon coated. I guess being irreplaceable to the big cheese (in the case of Marshall) is always worth more than a coat of teflon.

I'll leave comment on MacArthur for another time - no doubt he will be one of the subjects of future threads if the OP decides to continue with this theme.

Actually Stark was probably the LEAST guilty person we've discussed. You see despite being CNO , he didn't appoint Kimmel , or even have much say in his appointment. FDR personally fired Kimmel's predecessor, for violently disagree with Roosevelt's decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor. (He also did so openly). Roosevelt then "deep selected" Kimmel. (That is he passed over many more senior officers to select Kimmel , who he felt would be "more co-operative". Ironically the position was offered to Chester Nimitz who not only said no , but HELL NO and asked to be stationed "as far away from the Pacific as he could be". He had a pretty good idea what was coming , had been in consultation with Richardson , and was delighted to get BUPERS (Bureau of Personnel). This was a perfect position for him to be in as he was able to review all the officer records and pe-select his team if he DID get CINCUS. (Commander in chief , US fleet). King immediately changed the position after Pearl Harbor , as CICNUS , pronounced as "SINK-US" sounded like a very unfunny joke. [X(] [8|][:(]

Does anyone know if the USN really did start stripping paint, etc before the war? I seem to recall issues with USN cruisers lighting up when getting hit around the Canal because they hadn't yet got rid of paint, paneling, etc.

ORIGINAL: fcooke

Does anyone know if the USN really did start stripping paint, etc before the war? I seem to recall issues with USN cruisers lighting up when getting hit around the Canal because they hadn't yet got rid of paint, paneling, etc.

According to Samuel Elliott Morrison not till after Savo Island.