Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: Zorch

My opinion (not that anyone asked) is that Scharnhorst & Gneisenau, and Bismarck & Tirpitz were a waste of resources. Germany's fate was not decided by surface raiders. The steel and manpower used in building them would have bought a lot of tanks, planes, guns, and U-boots. The disguised raiders like Atlantis represented a much smaller investment and were cost effective.

The new Allied capital ships used to contain the German ships would have been built regardless. And a few more fast BBs in the Pacific in 1942 would not have changed that war very much, IMHO.

The actual ship designs were a throwback to late WWI, with single purpose secondary guns and armor decks low in the ship. Their turbine engines had high fuel consumption and were less reliable than comparable Allied ships (need source). The sterns of the German CAs and 'pocket' ships had a tendency to break off when damaged. Did the larger ships have this same design flaw?

Hitler's surface fleet ambition (including Plan Z) was a megalomaniac's pipe dream that soaked up scarce resources and raised tensions with Britain. <end rant>

warspite1

They may have been, but there was no question of the Germans not building them.... because that's what one did if one were to show they had a serious navy. Yes in hindsight they were a waste but then so were lots of ships that were either built or modernised or otherwise kept in service, because no one knew for certain what was needed should another war come.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

warspite1

Add in the German penchant for design excellence (at the expense of practicality and numbers) and too many ships (of which they had too few in any case) started WWII temperamental, attention hungry and unstable

ORIGINAL: mind_messing
Any serious student of history will know that the claim of German design excellence to be a myth.

[/quote]warspite1

The point I was trying to make was that the Germans went for excellence - I didn't say they achieved it and that was often their problem. So in the examples given the Hippers engines were temperamental, the PB's diesels took too much maintenance and their destroyers were top heavy. Trying to do too much - without first perfecting the technology - is often too big a hindrance - the British HACS is a case in point, the He-177 another.

[/quote]

Your original point was around the professionalism of the German war machine under the Nazis. The link I posted provides evidence that it, in the context of naval design, it actually decreased from WW1.

Then you've missed the point entirely.

The professionalism of the soldiers, sailors and airmen in waging war with what they've got - and how they wage it - is a separate issue to what they have to fight with.

The Kriegsmarine won a tactical victory during Cerberus. It was aided by incompetence within the British command structure, but regardless, those three ships achieved their aim (despite Raeder predicting total disaster).

ORIGINAL: warspite1

The professionalism of the soldiers, sailors and airmen in waging war with what they've got - and how they wage it - is a separate issue to what they have to fight with.

I'd disagree.

Even so, the somewhat scatter-brained approach to German naval engineering (and military engineering in general) certainly counters your original claim of German military professionalism in a general sense.

Maybe some people were trying to keep away from the Eastern Front so they tried anything that they could to keep themselves away from there.

I really dislike how the term 'strategic' victory is used. Once historians get a look of a battle that was deemed tactical defeat at the time it was fought, they easily change it to a strategic win.

BTW. Did you guys know that Cannae was a Roman Strategic Victory?

ORIGINAL: Orm

I really dislike how the term 'strategic' victory is used. Once historians get a look of a battle that was deemed tactical defeat at the time it was fought, they easily change it to a strategic win.

BTW. Did you guys know that Cannae was a Roman Strategic Victory?

It encouraged Hannibal into believing he could defeat Rome by remaining in Italy whilst Rome took the strategic approach of first destroying the base of Carthage's power which was provided by its Spanish colonies and then going straight for the jugular itself, Carthage. Fabius and Scipio, a strategic partnership made in heaven.

Alfred

ORIGINAL: mind_messing

ORIGINAL: warspite1

The professionalism of the soldiers, sailors and airmen in waging war with what they've got - and how they wage it - is a separate issue to what they have to fight with.

I'd disagree.

Even so, the somewhat scatter-brained approach to German naval engineering (and military engineering in general) certainly counters your original claim of German military professionalism in a general sense.

warspite1

No, not at all. The performance of a soldier in the field is often linked to the equipment provided. But as with every walk of life, sometimes people out-perform what they have to work with, while other times they squander the advantage. I think you are confusing the two.

The Germans very often punched well above their weight.

ORIGINAL: Orm

I really dislike how the term 'strategic' victory is used. Once historians get a look of a battle that was deemed tactical defeat at the time it was fought, they easily change it to a strategic win.

BTW. Did you guys know that Cannae was a Roman Strategic Victory?

warspite1

Why is it important whether a strategic victory/defeat is called at the time or later? Are you suggesting that the Kriegsmarine - Raeder in particular - was unaware at the time that strategically the withdrawal from France was a withdrawal that adversely affected the German strategy of subduing the United Kingdom by interdiction of the sealanes?

Do you think that the fact that his ships did not end up at the bottom of the English Channel significantly lessened his disquiet about the turn the war was taking by the action?

Put it this way. The British - the RAF and the RN - would have been deeply embarrassed by Cerberus. But, after the shock, embarrassment and anger had subsided in the coming days, what do you think was their reaction to these ships no longer being based on the west coast of France where they could much more easily slip out into the Atlantic? Relief. This was a strategic defeat for Germany.

ORIGINAL: fcooke

I don't know Zorch - I would take a few more fast BBs in the Pacific in 42. [:'(]

Everyone is putting the German fleet as the sole reason for the deployment of USN fast BBs with the home fleet in 1942. There are a few other considerations:
- Operation Torch - the invasion of North Africa was planned for November 1942 and the fast BBs were needed to guard the invasion. Massachusetts is the only one I know of actually engaging during the invasion. I think CV Wasp was deployed for this too? Immediately after the Torch landings were deemed secure the USN BBs returned to the US for upgrades and Pacific deployment.

- the sudden expansion of the USN brought in a huge wave of raw recruits, and the veterans had to be scattered around the new ships coming to the USN. So overall crew experience was quite low and the deployment with the home fleet gave a chance to "work up" the crews in an environment of low air threat before they went to the Pacific.

- Pearl Harbour was still cleaning up the mess from December 7th, and may not have been ready to handle very many large vessels. Patching up the carriers alone must have taxed the shipyard a bit. Then there was all those cruisers that got banged up - Chicago, Honolulu, San Francisco, Portland, Minneapolis, Atlanta, etc.

ORIGINAL: BBfanboy

ORIGINAL: fcooke

I don't know Zorch - I would take a few more fast BBs in the Pacific in 42. [:'(]

Everyone is putting the German fleet as the sole reason for the deployment of USN fast BBs with the home fleet in 1942. There are a few other considerations:
- Operation Torch - the invasion of North Africa was planned for November 1942 and the fast BBs were needed to guard the invasion. Massachusetts is the only one I know of actually engaging during the invasion. I think CV Wasp was deployed for this too? Immediately after the Torch landings were deemed secure the USN BBs returned to the US for upgrades and Pacific deployment.

- the sudden expansion of the USN brought in a huge wave of raw recruits, and the veterans had to be scattered around the new ships coming to the USN. So overall crew experience was quite low and the deployment with the home fleet gave a chance to "work up" the crews in an environment of low air threat before they went to the Pacific.

- Pearl Harbour was still cleaning up the mess from December 7th, and may not have been ready to handle very many large vessels. Patching up the carriers alone must have taxed the shipyard a bit. Then there was all those cruisers that got banged up - Chicago, Honolulu, San Francisco, Portland, Minneapolis, Atlanta, etc.

warspite1

Not everyone. I think you are mixing up the Home Fleet with other operations. I do not believe for example that Massachusetts ever served with the Home Fleet. Home Fleet units were sent to the Med on occasion - and Arctic Convoys had to be suspended. But not all USN units that fought in the ETO were attached to the Home Fleet.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Orm

I really dislike how the term 'strategic' victory is used. Once historians get a look of a battle that was deemed tactical defeat at the time it was fought, they easily change it to a strategic win.

BTW. Did you guys know that Cannae was a Roman Strategic Victory?

warspite1

Why is it important whether a strategic victory/defeat is called at the time or later? Are you suggesting that the Kriegsmarine - Raeder in particular - was unaware at the time that strategically the withdrawal from France was a withdrawal that adversely affected the German strategy of subduing the United Kingdom by interdiction of the sealanes?

Do you think that the fact that his ships did not end up at the bottom of the English Channel significantly lessened his disquiet about the turn the war was taking by the action?

Put it this way. The British - the RAF and the RN - would have been deeply embarrassed by Cerberus. But, after the shock, embarrassment and anger had subsided in the coming days, what do you think was their reaction to these ships no longer being based on the west coast of France where they could much more easily slip out into the Atlantic? Relief. This was a strategic defeat for Germany.

First, I would like to point out that I didn't mention operation Cerberus. But if I am to comment it on the strategic level as you put it, then the British had won as soon as they decided to do the Channel Dash. Great Britain could have done nothing at all during the transfer and it would have been a strategic victory for them. May I suggest a what if here? What if Germany had changed their minds again and sortied out in the Atlantic? Then the Strategic Victory would disappear after the battle had been fought. This is the reason of my dislike of the term.

What if, after the Battle of Gettysburg, the South hade fought another major battle before withdrawing. The South didn't seek it but were forced to fight it anyway. And it was a bloody affair and the South held the field. A minor Southern win if you will. The Southern Army then decided to withdraw with plans to return next year. But were never able to do so. Then the Battle of Gettysburg wouldn't have been a Strategic Victory for the North. It would just have been called a undeceive Major battle. the last offensive battle would be the Strategic win. And this regardless of the battle outcome on the field.

Strategic victory is, in my humble opinion, more or less a meaningless way to describe the outcome of a battle. Or, in other words, one could win a strategic victory without ever firing a shot. Or by having an entire army annihilated.

Sorry for being off the topic.

BTW. Was Crete a Strategic Victory for the Allies?

With

ORIGINAL: Orm

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Orm

I really dislike how the term 'strategic' victory is used. Once historians get a look of a battle that was deemed tactical defeat at the time it was fought, they easily change it to a strategic win.

BTW. Did you guys know that Cannae was a Roman Strategic Victory?

warspite1

Why is it important whether a strategic victory/defeat is called at the time or later? Are you suggesting that the Kriegsmarine - Raeder in particular - was unaware at the time that strategically the withdrawal from France was a withdrawal that adversely affected the German strategy of subduing the United Kingdom by interdiction of the sealanes?

Do you think that the fact that his ships did not end up at the bottom of the English Channel significantly lessened his disquiet about the turn the war was taking by the action?

Put it this way. The British - the RAF and the RN - would have been deeply embarrassed by Cerberus. But, after the shock, embarrassment and anger had subsided in the coming days, what do you think was their reaction to these ships no longer being based on the west coast of France where they could much more easily slip out into the Atlantic? Relief. This was a strategic defeat for Germany.

First, I would like to point out that I didn't mention operation Cerberus. But if I am to comment it on the strategic level as you put it, then the British had won as soon as they decided to do the Channel Dash. Great Britain could have done nothing at all during the transfer and it would have been a strategic victory for them. May I suggest a what if here? What if Germany had changed their minds again and sortied out in the Atlantic? Then the Strategic Victory would disappear after the battle had been fought. This is the reason of my dislike of the term.

What if, after the Battle of Gettysburg, the South hade fought another major battle before withdrawing. The South didn't seek it but were forced to fight it anyway. And it was a bloody affair and the South held the field. A minor Southern win if you will. The Southern Army then decided to withdraw with plans to return next year. But were never able to do so. Then the Battle of Gettysburg wouldn't have been a Strategic Victory for the North. It would just have been called a undeceive Major battle. the last offensive battle would be the Strategic win. And this regardless of the battle outcome on the field.

Strategic victory is, in my humble opinion, more or less a meaningless way to describe the outcome of a battle. Or, in other words, one could win a strategic victory without ever firing a shot. Or by having an entire army annihilated.

Sorry for being off the topic.

BTW. Was Crete a Strategic Victory for the Allies?

With

Don't know where you were going with the Crete situation, but the British had to move back to more defensible positions in Egypt, which was in balance with their military power in the region. So they gave up "strategic position" to save the strategic assets they had and be able to hold what really counted. Not a strat victory but not a defeat either.

Similarly, the German ships at Brest were being bombed constantly with a continuing list of minor damage for them to repair. Staying there was getting too hot for comfort, and Hitler needed the protective fighters in other regions so he decided to pull them out of the hot water and let them cool their heels in Norway. Not a strategic victory, but he saved his assets for a while. Problem was, he was too timid to use them.

ORIGINAL: Orm

ORIGINAL: warspite1

ORIGINAL: Orm

I really dislike how the term 'strategic' victory is used. Once historians get a look of a battle that was deemed tactical defeat at the time it was fought, they easily change it to a strategic win.

BTW. Did you guys know that Cannae was a Roman Strategic Victory?

warspite1

Why is it important whether a strategic victory/defeat is called at the time or later? Are you suggesting that the Kriegsmarine - Raeder in particular - was unaware at the time that strategically the withdrawal from France was a withdrawal that adversely affected the German strategy of subduing the United Kingdom by interdiction of the sealanes?

Do you think that the fact that his ships did not end up at the bottom of the English Channel significantly lessened his disquiet about the turn the war was taking by the action?

Put it this way. The British - the RAF and the RN - would have been deeply embarrassed by Cerberus. But, after the shock, embarrassment and anger had subsided in the coming days, what do you think was their reaction to these ships no longer being based on the west coast of France where they could much more easily slip out into the Atlantic? Relief. This was a strategic defeat for Germany.

First, I would like to point out that I didn't mention operation Cerberus. But if I am to comment it on the strategic level as you put it, then the British had won as soon as they decided to do the Channel Dash. Great Britain could have done nothing at all during the transfer and it would have been a strategic victory for them. May I suggest a what if here? What if Germany had changed their minds again and sortied out in the Atlantic? Then the Strategic Victory would disappear after the battle had been fought. This is the reason of my dislike of the term.

What if, after the Battle of Gettysburg, the South hade fought another major battle before withdrawing. The South didn't seek it but were forced to fight it anyway. And it was a bloody affair and the South held the field. A minor Southern win if you will. The Southern Army then decided to withdraw with plans to return next year. But were never able to do so. Then the Battle of Gettysburg wouldn't have been a Strategic Victory for the North. It would just have been called a undeceive Major battle. the last offensive battle would be the Strategic win. And this regardless of the battle outcome on the field.

Strategic victory is, in my humble opinion, more or less a meaningless way to describe the outcome of a battle. Or, in other words, one could win a strategic victory without ever firing a shot. Or by having an entire army annihilated.

Sorry for being off the topic.

BTW. Was Crete a Strategic Victory for the Allies?

With

warspite1

Sorry we were talking about the Channel Dash so assumed you were picking up on this as an example of why you dislike subsequent pronouncements of strategic victories. If you weren't then my comments remain generally, but not in answer to your post!

If the Germans had subsequently sought to breakout then yes, the strategic victory would remain true. Why? because any such breakout would be naturally:

- more dangerous because:
- longer to travel
- having to pass through more patrol zones
- closer to aircraft at more stages of the journey
- closer to the home fleet for a large part of the journey
- a longer journey, necessitating more fuel expenditure (not a commodity in great supply!) which means more reliance on tankers (not a commodity in great supply!).

The conditions in 1942 were not those of 1939, 1940 or even 1941. The chances of a successful breakout through the North Sea/Norwegian Sea was much less. But even if it was successful, for the reasons given above, this would not negate that the withdrawal was a strategic defeat.

Without St Nazaire Tirpitz would only be considered as a one way trip and Hitler, scared for his Northern flank, would never have countenanced such an operation anyway.

The only possibility I would see for a change of view, would be if the Kriegsmarine were transferred north and decimated convoy after convoy. They didn't, they were a waste of resources, men and material - have you seen what the Germans employed just to try and keep Tirpitz safe? - and its difficult to see what they could have done to change that.

Was Crete a strategic victory for the British?

Well let's put it this way:

a) Defence of the island was a tactical balls up
b) In so far as it affected North Africa, Crete (and Greece before it) was a tactical and strategic balls up
c) As far as the actual withdrawal from Crete is concerned, well it wasn't a choice the British had, they were ejected from the island, and so no it was not a strategic victory.

The only thing I can assume is that you are referring to the supposed delay in Barbarossa and the losses to the Fallschirmjager?? Well even if the Greek/Crete campaign had any bearing on Barbarossa, it in no way can be judged anything other than a

BALLS UP

My thinking in bringing Crete up was that it changed German doctrine in such sense that Germany didn't perform any major paradrop operations after that. And, it seems to me, that if a side changes doctrine after a battle historians seem keen on calling that battle a strategic win.

And who am I to say that it was, or wasn't. Perhaps, if the paras would have been available, then Germany might have used them to help Army Group South out in the Kiev region in 1941 instead of sending panzers from Army Group Centre. Changing the course of Barbarossa one way or the other.

I would say that the Channel Dash was a strategic retreat, or withdrawal, by the German side. Does a strategic withdrawal automatically transfer to a strategic win to the opposing side?

ORIGINAL: Orm

My thinking in bringing Crete up was that it changed German doctrine in such sense that Germany didn't perform any major paradrop operations after that. And, it seems to me, that if a side changes doctrine after a battle historians seem keen on calling that battle a strategic win.

And who am I to say that it was, or wasn't. Perhaps, if the paras would have been available, then Germany might have used them to help Army Group South out in the Kiev region in 1941 instead of sending panzers from Army Group Centre. Changing the course of Barbarossa one way or the other.

warspite1

Well others will know the Eastern Front much better than me but I can't see how that would make a difference and certainly not sufficient difference to call a Strategic Victory.

Germany has what? One division of paratroopers +. I can't see that their employment in 1941 or early 1942 would have really altered anything in the east, and come the end of 1942 - and almost entirely on the defensive - did they even have sufficient control of the skies to mount such operations? What would one division have done during Citadel? What would one division have done at Stalingrad? Who knows but I think history suggests that any Germans landing behind Soviet lines are going to get a very unpleasant welcome and one in which the defenders simply don't surrender.....

Could they have been used in the Western Desert? Maybe, but again when could they have done this with sufficient control of the skies... seems pretty unlikely to me.

ORIGINAL: Orm

I would say that the Channel Dash was a strategic retreat, or withdrawal, by the German side. Does a strategic withdrawal automatically transfer to a strategic win to the opposing side?

warspite1

I guess so - otherwise the balance sheet ain't gonna balance.... [:)]

Considering that fewer heavier elements of the Allied Navies were needed in the Atlantic after the channel dash except for the northern convoy routes, then it was a strategic plus for the Allies. Call that a victory.

Crete wrecked Hitlers enthusiasm for paratroopers falling from the sky, so that was a strategic plus for the Allies including the Soviets. Call that a victory. No airborne invasion of Malta nor any airborne invasions behind the Allied lines in North Afrika. Not to mention no such operations in the East which could have hastened things in 1941 or even 1942.