Look below to see that not all factors are equal in the industry, and that some choices are more equal than others.
Equal in the sense that they all use the same (limited) industrial inputs.
I’m not saying anything else, but there are many more mistakes that can be corrected with a big difference on the J side than on the A side.
Glad we're in agreement.
you’ll have to explain how freeing 20+ unexperienced battalion-sized units, most fielding I.S.F. Militia before you can upgrade to late Indian Inf models and lacking support, can be useful when you already have a swath of Indian divisions...
The requirement of keeping a capable military force in India given the political situation on the subcontinent should be obvious. In game, so long as the AV threshold is met, there's no repercussions.
Did tensions occur ? Yes. Did it affect severely the conduct of the war in the same way the IJA/IJN rivalry ? I’ll check, but who said the US sent Infantry divisions to Oz so that AIF divisions would stay in Africa instead of hurrying home ?
The initial US deployment to Nz and Oz was in response to fears from these nations of Japanese invasion. The Australian divisions were earmarked for home to defend against an anticipated Japanese invasion. For them to be diverted to another theatre of war would have had serious political consequences in reality, but in game the Allied player is free to send them where needed.
Same too for the NZ division serving in the Middle East. Without US commitment to the South Pacific, that formation would have likely been recalled as well.
But, I would agree to a kind of penalty on interactions and cooperation between Allies if the IJA/IJN « cooperation issues » were implemented. The fact that both sides benefit from improved cooperation doesn’t mean it favors both sides equally.
At which point why not go the full mile and have MacArthur's units co-operate poorly with those of Nimitz, and then a random loss of political points on an occasional basis. Or maybe have Mac get elected President, at which point the objective planning for all US LCU's is reset?
[;)]
Over a year of acceleration for 264.000 supplies. Hardly two weeks of your initial supply production, 0.1% of the total supply you’ll produce in the full game.
Don't confuse gross supply production with net supply production
Despite what you would have others think 264k supplies is a massive number. The ballpark figure for IJ supply surplus going into the late-war is around 4-5 million.
That 264k is around 5% of the total surplus supply Japan should have for the late war.
When the wheels come off the Japanese war machine, that's a absolutely massive number.
Oh yeah, that’s right, the 45 or 50 XP the US pilots arrive with later make them combat ready.. They need as much on-map training as the Japanese rookies, the difference in starting XP might account to a few weeks, less than a month, of difference. Without the ability to upsize squadrons to train hundreds of pilots.
They also use no HI, which is a major drain for the IJ industrial complex.
IIRC the Allies also have overall a greater number of squadrons than Japan, so therefore more on map training capability.
The Allies can also use upsized squadrons to even greater effect than Japan can (considering the vastly greater number of squadrons and larger carrier capacity).
Both sides, really. Again, much more in favor of the Japanese, given the historical deficiencies.
Again, disagree.
There's also the consideration of Allied squadrons that arrive with already experienced pilots to consider.
While it is true that most Allied players will divert the 18th UK Div and a couple of brigades, the scope of that part of foresight is extremely limited compared to the amount of changes the IJ player may introduce. As well, please list the considerable assets that MacArthur received until March ‘42. As an Allied player, I’d be all the most happy to still send them to their doom while picking any one piece of hindsight my opponent should « forget »...
The advantages to Allied foresight are profound.
The comparative weakness of US carrier air power relative to Japan, and a full knowledge of the capability of IJ air power means the Allied player will rarely engage in high risk operations (e.g Wake, Doolittle) is just one example. The weakness of Allied attempts to defend forward positions is another.
The fact that the Sir Robin is a common strategy puts your argument that the Allies can't leverage hindsight as far as Japan can to bed.
I just said it was a design decision to get a more equal level playing field. But a level playing field is not historical, and the advantages one side gets in order to approach that level are much more unbalanced.
I would make the argument that it balances out over the course of a whole game.
Worth considering that an IJ player, no matter how successful, will ever be able to stop production of Allied devices that are produced off-map (not to forget supply and fuel). That is not the case for Japan. That's a massive advantage for the Allies, is it not?
Nice straw man attempt, have a cookie. Counter-measures to industry increases is what I clearly mean to anyone with reading skills. Just tell me how the Allied player limits industrial output of Japan before being in reach of the heavy bombers, given the relative lack of effect of submarine warfare given the abundance of conversions to tankers, and relative lack of need of xAK ?
Large scale industry increases costs precious supply, and the supply margins for the IJ are very narrow.
The Allied player can limit or punish an IJ player for excessive supply consumption by:
1. Seeking protracted land campaigns, preferably involving large numbers of units and continual bombardment attacks.
2. Exploiting Allied naval strength to force Japanese naval assets to respond across a wide geographic area, using up fuel that could otherwise be converted to supply.
3. Present threats on multiple vectors, forcing IJ shipping into long haul journeys, forcing expansion of bases (again using precious supply) and feeding of garrisons outwith Japan, taking fuel and supply away from the Home Islands industrial centres.
Consequences, schmonsequences, of ship production tinkering.
Basics : given the way shipbuilding works, durability has an exponential effect. The real cost, in HI, of building a ship is (durability)squared * 10 (for the duration) * 3 (for the HI cost of shipyards).
A Type-C3 submarine, with a Durability of 33 (or something close, but there is a sub class with 33 and numerous boats) costs 33*33*10*3 = 32.670 HI. How many aircrafts can you build with that ? Divide by 36 (single-engine) = 907.5. What’s best, one submarine, or 900 more planes ?
With the number of submarines which can be halted, you could build over 90.000 airplanes. Even only halting the low Durability ones (the mass of RO- named and a few other less useful, commonly advised to new players to halt) would still allow at least 40.000 more airplanes. Can you still talk about consequences ?
Look at an Unryu-class CV now. Durability 61, so total cost is 111.630 HI. Only three times as much as a big submarine, or five times as much as an RO-named small sub, is that logical or historical ? By kissing goodbye to five of them, you can theoretically accelerate the building of an Unryu by 610 days. Actually, you need less halting as you’ll arrive to the 610 days mark before launch before you’ve spent an equal number of HI, but for a ship planned for mid-45, it means you can accelerate it by a year.
You've made the classic mistake of thinking that HI is the bottleneck for Japan, it isn't. It's supply. Always is, always will be.
Yes, you can build 90,000 airplanes for the cost of a CV, but you'd need to spend something like 2.2 million supply to do that.
90,000/4 (lets say the war lasts to 1945, which gives)
22,500 planes a year.
That would require 1875 planes a month.
At 1100 supply (1000 for the repair, plus expansion cost), that gives you a supply cost of around two million.
Then we need to consider engines for these planes, which I will leave as an exercise to the reader.
Look now at the cargoes. You have xAK with Durability 6 and a capacity around 2000, and xAK with Durability 19 and a capacity around 6000. The Std-A class costs thus around 9 times to build as the Std-D class, but you only need three of the smaller ones to carry as much.
With a reduction in qualities important to merchant ships in a war setting - cargo load, survivability, fuel efficiency.