Matrix Games Forums

17. Terrain

With the exception of places with deep sand and rugged valleys, the desert in the combat zone of the German troops was, in general, passable for both wheeled and tracklaying vehicles. The influence of terrain on tactical operations is just as decisive in the desert as in other theaters of war. It is more difficult, however, to take advantage of the peculiarities of the terrain for one's intentions, since due to the lack of forests, cultivated areas, villages, etc., it is seldom possible for troops to approach and assemble under cover. Nonetheless, even in the desert, there are widely different opportunities to take advantage of the terrain. For example, troop assemblies can be concealed in ravines and valleys from ground observation and-to a limited extent-even from air observation.
In both attack and defense, the important thing was always to have reconnoitred the terrain carefully in advance. In attack, importance was attached to choosing ground that could be easily traversed by motor vehicles and, especially, which offered a covered approach, at least in part, through the utilization of terrain contours. The fact that the desert surface was easily traversed by motor vehicles made it easy to advance in light formations with few casualties, as well as to make all kinds of enveloping movements. In actual practice, few limitations existed on freedom of movement. Thus, it was also easily possible to shift the direction of an attack. During an attack, the tank battle always occupied the foreground. Attempts were made to compensate for the lack of good observation posts by sending out forward observers. Difficulties arose for attackers if they were compelled to use the southern portion of the desert proper, which in places was covered with soft soil.

18. Field Fortifications

The fact that for a distance of 3,800 kilometers, there would only be five natural defense positions of any use shows the great superiority of the attacker in desert warfare.
The German troops constructed only field-type fortifications in the desert. In building them, an effort was made to keep the upper slope at ground level to prevent the enemy from recogniz• ing them too soon. Special difficulties arose in constructing positions for antitank guns and heavy antiaircraft guns (high superstructures). These positions had to be emplaced on the reverse slope. In places where this was not possible, the expedient was adopted of keeping these weapons in readiness in some place in the rear and not bringing them up to the position until they were urgently needed. It should be pointed out that the Italians laid out the fortifications of Tobruk so cleverly that they met with Rommel's unqualified appreciation. The Italian emplacements, which were level with the ground, were later introduced into the German Army as "Tobruk positions" and used both in Italy and on the Western Front.
From a purely technical point of view, it is extremely difficult to prepare field fortifications in the North African steppes and desert. Wherever the ground in the steppes is stony, it is very hard, because there is a layer of so-called surface chalk on the surface. This layer is formed when the rain water absorbed during the winter rises to the surface again during the summer and evaporates. During this process, the dissolved matter, such as chalk, silicic acid, etc., is separated again and cements the top layers into a firm crust having a thickness of from fifty centimeters to two meters. Under this surface chalk layer, there is a so-called lixiviation stratum that is especially soft and therefore easier to work. In constructing field fortifications, it is first necessary to laboriously blast away the surface chalk layer. Work of this kind can only be done if sufficient time is available. If a temporary defense system is being established, one has to be content with erecting positions built out of such stones as may be laying around or else use steep slopes or ravines and fissures to get at the lixiviation stratum quickly.

19. Fortresses

The most important fortresses of the North African desert were Tobruk, Bardia, and Mersa Matruh-as well as the Alamein position, which was constructed like a fortress. The three former fortresses served to protect coastal harbors; the latter was a barrier erected at the gateway to Egypt. All desert fortresses were built in such a way that their works cannot be seen from the ground; that is, they were built level with the ground, had low-wire obstacles, communication trenches that were mostly of concrete, and strong antitank ditches. At the fortress of Tobruk, the outer ring consisted of two lines of strong positions that were not built like bunkers with embrasures but were completely sunk in the ground. In some places, the works in the outer line were surrounded by an antitank ditch. This antitank ditch was partly covered with light boards and a thin layer of sand and stones so that its outline could not be perceived even at close distances. The average length of one work was eighty meters. The work itself consisted of several shelters, well protected with concrete, that together could accommodate a crew of thirty to forty men. The different shelters were connected by a communication trench with combat positions for machine guns, antitank guns, and mortars at their points of intersection. Like the antitank ditch, the communication trench, which was about two and a half meters deep, was also covered over with boards and a thin layer of earth, which could be easily opened at any desired point. The works were surrounded with strong wire obstacles, and the individual positions were connected by barbed-wire obstacles. The second line, which was about 200-300 meters behind the first, was of similar design.

20. Mines

The desert terrain had a great influence on the selection and use of the various weapons. It was found that one cannot have too many tanks in the desert, for because of the almost unlimited possibilities for using and deploying tanks, they bear the brunt of desert warfare. An abundant supply of antitank guns is necessary, since in view of the almost endless distances, reconnaissance naturally assumes special importance.All guns should have the longest possible range, since the enemy can be seen even at a great distance, and it is necessary to get him accurately within your sights before he has you covered. Since there is very little cover and only a few reverseslope positions in the desert, it is advisable, for the most part, to use only weapons and vehicles (including tanks) with a low superstructure. With tanks, it is especially important to have one that is fast, maneuverable, and equipped with a long-range gun. Then, the question of whether the armor plate is of greater or lesser thickness is of no vital importance.
In the course of time, mines acquired tremendous importance in the desert. They were generally used for furnishing un-obstructed terrain with artificial obstacles. All fortresses, strongpoints, and fortifications were protected by minefields. In the course of the fighting, the employment of mines in the desert developed into a real art on both sides.

21. Desert warfare

The only track vehicles used in the desert were tanks, guns mounted on tank chassis, and antitank guns. The armored personnel carriers and artillery prime movers were half-track vehicles. Wheeled vehicles, the same types as were also used in Europe, were employed for all other purposes, especially to transport troops, equipment, and supply goods, as well as to tow guns in an emergency. Whereas track and half-track vehicles were able to traverse all kinds of desert terrain, wheeled vehicles frequently had difficulties, especially in getting over sand dunes or steep slopes. It would be desirable to use only track laying or halftrack vehicles in desert operations. There would be no difficulties whatsoever in moving troops, weapons, equipment, and supplies-except in getting over salt marshes.
Since desert warfare is determined by the terrain and has to be carried out on a mobile basis, mobile engagements will be decided almost exclusively by motorized units. Open country permits a rapid concentration of forces at the decisive point and the long-range weapons of all types are of decisive importance. Combat in this open, unobstructed terrain must be carried on after the manner of a naval battle. The commanders must be stationed in the immediate vicinity of, or right among, the combat troops and should not be hampered in their decisions by orders from headquarters that are far from the front. In desert warfare, a unit commanded from a rear headquarters runs the risk of being encircled and annihilated. To a large extent, Rommel's victories were based on the fact that he realized these tactical necessities of desert warfare and consistently acted accordingly, while the British adhered strictly to orders that they had received a long time previously and were no longer applicable to the existing situation.
As the Field Marshal Rommel said "The North African desert was probably the theater where war was waged in its roost modern form. On both sides the brunt of the fighting was borne by completely motorized units, for use of which there were highly favourable opportunities in this level, unobstructed terrain."

22. Tank warfare

In North Africa was possible to really apply the basic principles for the conduct of tank warfare as had been taught in theory before the war. Here, out-and out tank battles were fought between division-size armored units. Although the war slowed down into infantry and position warfare from time to time, its most important phases-the British winter offensive of 1941-42 and the German summer offensive of 1942-demonstrated the principles of full mobility. In desert warfare, against a motorized or armored opponent, no motorized troops can only hold their own in elaborately prepared positions. If such a position is breached or outflanked, a retreat means delivering up such troops to the enemy. During the withdrawal from Cyrenaica in the winter of 1941-42, practically all the Italian infantry and many German infantry units had to be moved out by shuttle traffic of a few truck columns or else march on foot. Only sacrifices by the motorized units made it possible to cover the retreat of the German and Italian infantry units. Moreover, Field Marshal Graziani's failures in the winter of 1941-42 were largely due to the fact that a large part of the no motorized Italian Army was helplessly exposed in the open desert to attacks by inferior numbers of completely motorized British troops.
The armored troops are the backbone of the motorized army. Everything depends on the tank; the other units are there merely to support it. Therefore, the battle of attrition against the enemy armored units must be fought as much as possible by one's own tank-destroyer units. It is the speed of one's own movements and the organizational unity of the troops that decides the battle and deserves special attention, since desert terrain places hardly any obstacles in the way of swift movements.

23. Camouflage

Camouflage is very difficult in the desert and, in many cases, impossible. During the day, it was impossible to camouflage the movements of troops and columns from air observation. In the neighbourhood of the front, the troops could only with difficulty be camouflaged from ground observation. The unavoidable dust clouds they raised betrayed any movement.
Nevertheless, troop concentrations can be camouflaged, if great care is used. Depressions in the terrain will have to be exploited for this purpose. All vehicles will have to be covered with camouflage nets and vegetation (camel's thorn) attached to the nets. Another means of camouflage, although on a small scale, is to seek out shifting shadows. In the open desert, all vehicles will have to be dug in as deep as possible. It goes without saying that the vehicles will have to be placed at as great a distance from each other as possible.
Although in most cases it will not be possible to camouflage the presence of vehicles and weapons, skilful camouflage can conceal the type of these vehicles (the arm of the service). It would be altogether wrong to resign oneself to the viewpoint that camouflage in the desert is useless. What has been said above is also valid for the troops in position.
In the attack, the German Army preferred easily passable, open desert for a battle site, because it made it possible for the armored forces to exploit their mobility and combat tactics, which were superior to those of the British.
In defense, the positions selected depended to a large extent on the terrain. Positions had to be difficult of access and provide flank protection; otherwise, on the whole, they were useless for defense.

24. Night combat

Field Marshal Rommel preferred to start fighting on moonlit nights or at dawn. The fighting often lasted until dark, unless it was broken off sooner for tactical reasons. There were no lulls in combat, even during the great heat prevailing around noon.
In general, the Germans carried out no night attacks. On the other hand, at the end of October 1942, the British carried out their large-scale attacks on the German positions at Alamein exclusively at night. They used parachute flares to illuminate the battlefield and tracer ammunition to show their troops the direction of the attack and sector boundaries. The British commander in chief, Montgomery, preferred night combat. The German and Italian troops used the night for marches into their assembly areas, for large-scale shifts of forces, and for surprise. These night regroupings could almost always be carried out unnoticed by the enemy and, especially during the winter battles of 1941-42, came as a big surprise to the British.
The daily routine in the desert did not substantially differ from that in other theaters of war. When not in combat, the troops were, as far as possible, given a lengthy rest period during the great heat around noon. The maintenance troops (workshop companies) were also given a noon rest period. Supply traffic could not afford to take these rests.
The generation of dust through the recoil of the powder gases in artillery firing was of no special importance for the detection of artillery positions, because the combat zone was always enveloped in dust clouds anyhow. The discharges of guns of especially flat trajectory with a low-barrel elevation-antitank guns-could be observed and recognized with particular ease by the enemy because of their characteristic dust clouds. Naturally, they also prevented the gun crews from observing the effects of their own fire.

25. Troop Welfare

In the African desert, as in no other theater of war, life was hard for officers and men alike. Life in the rear areas, as it is known in Europe, was possible only in the few supply centers in the rear, and then it was only a weak imitation of that elsewhere. Because of the close contact of the troops with each other, all officers had to give an example of soldierly bearing and good moral living. Any extravagance on the part of an officer is noticed by the men and scrutinized with a magnifying glass. On the other hand, life in the desert offers an excellent opportunity to create a high level of community spirit. This brings about a feeling of solidarity in all ranks and prompts them to do their utmost. Especially in the desert, where no diversions exist, superiors must be carefully concerned about the welfare of their personnel. The fact that there are no outside attractions makes it easier for leaders to provide that attention.
An oppressive feeling of immense loneliness overcomes every-one more or less frequently in the desert-a feeling that one is cut off from everything that one holds dear. Commanders must recognize such moods and depressions and offer sincere encouragement so that such pressures will disappear.
Even more important than rations for the well-being of soldiers in the desert is the maintenance of regular communications with the zone of the interior. The word "mail" occupies a place of high priority in desert warfare. All officers and agencies must be concerned, therefore, with assuring a rapid distribution of mail to the front lines.
A good newspaper that carries up-to-the-minute news and gives space to the problems that absorb the soldiers at the front is also indispensable. Movies and theatrical performances at the front can relieve the monotony of the soldiers' lives, even in the desert.
The normal service time in the desert for a German soldier was six months. Regular rotation could, however, often not be provided in Africa between 1941 and 1943, with the result that many soldiers had to serve in the desert for twelve and even eighteen months.

Afrikakorps Schützen

The units that fought in the North African theater usually started out as regular organized units, but were modified to suit the situation. Some of the units had a so-called "Tropisch" tables of organization, meaning for use in the desert. This usually meant more transport for the logistics/service units than normal tables of organization.
The Deutsche Afrikakorps was Germany’s first truly motorised corps, taking up an unprecedented percentage of the motor transport of the German Army. The Schützen companies were smaller in manpower to a standard German infantry platoon, but could match or outweigh their comrades in firepower. They were typically transported in the Horch built Kfz 70, although, as the campaign progressed more and more captured British vehicles, which were better suited to the desert conditions, were used.
The Schützen regiments, the motorized artillery regiments, and the motorized engineer battalions of both Panzer divisions had only a very few armored vehicles, and that the two reconnaissance battalions were unarmored with the exception of one armored reconnaissance company each.
Throughout 1941, Schützen (or riflemen) regiments 104 and 155 supported the panzers of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. Forerunners of the famous panzergrenadier their role was to be mobile light infantry and in North Africa they fought not only the enemy but also the desert’s sun and sand.
The 1st Battalion, Schützen-Regiment 104 was captured during the Battle of Halfaya Pass on 17 Jan 1942. To replace it, the 8th Machine-Gun Battalion was renamed as the new 1st Battalion, Schützen-Regiment 104 on 17 Apr 1942. (The 15th Motorcycle battalion was renamed as 3rd Battalion, Schützen-Regiment 104 on the same day.)
The 21st Panzer Division (the former 5th Light Division) was changed into a normal armored division with a view to giving the Afrika Korps the full striking power of a Panzer corps. For this purpose, certain units were exchanged with the 15th Panzer Division. The 15th Panzer Division transferred Schützen Regiment 104 to the 21st Panzer Division and received instead Regimental headquarters 200 and Machine Gun Battalion 2. Out of those, and by absorbing Motorcycle Battalion 15, the 15th Panzer Division established Regiment z.b.V. 200 as its second Schützen regiment. The 15th Panzer Division had four Schützen battalions and the 21st Panzer Division only three.
The companies in the Schützen-Regiment 155 are very well equipped for firepower, especially by the standards of the typical German infantry company at the time. With heavy mortars, a lot of machine guns, and two light infantry guns, any strongpoint defended by such a company would have been a serious obstacle to an attack.
In terms of gameplay in Heroes and Leaders mod, Afrikakorps Schützen units have the same characteristics as Schützen units of Wehrmacht except that Africakorps' Schützen soldiers have the extra property of Extended Range (1/2 FP).

Afrikakorps First line Fusiliers

The German infantry received basic training in centers such as Göttingen. Later, the soldiers were taken to specialized facilities to complete their training, such as that of Truppenübungslager Munster. The best prepared troops that were destined to form part of the Afrikakorps were sent to cities like Potsdam where they were grouped in a Sonderverband (special unit).
The Sonderverband was not organized like a typical battalion, that used to have 3 or 4 companies, but had 7 companies. The first company was made up of foreigners, who had grown up in the Middle East and, in total, could speak 20 different Arabic dialects. The second company was GebirgsJäger. The third company was First Line Infantry. The fourth company was reconnaissance and the fifth was an assault weapons company, with light and heavy mortars. The sixth company was a FlaK company and the seventh was an anti-tank rifle company. There was also a water supply and treatment unit, as well as a printing troop, and all the companies were fully motorized.
In the Afrikakorps, many casualties were expected in small combat units, especially elite and First Line troops, so that soldiers were trained in all company roles, so that when there were casualties, any man could take the place. The infantrymen, who have basically been trained to handle rifles, machine guns, and other small arms unique to infantry, were also trained to use light and heavy mortars, anti-tank rifles, and FlaK guns. At the end of the training, all members of a First Line company and the Sonderverband were trained in the use of all handguns.
Finally, the Afrikakorps units were embarked on trains bound for Naples or Letche, on the Adriatic, to be sent to North Africa, either by boat or by plane. The troops that were transferred to Africa by air did so in small Italian planes, old and primitive, lined with canvas, with open entrances and equipped with machine guns for air defense. To avoid British fighters, Italian troop-transport planes flew 200 feet above the sea and, thanks to this, could reach airfields like Derna safely. The unloading of the troops had to be done very quickly, as British intelligence and reconnaissance were very good and they knew when Axis planes or ships were arriving, so that British aviation soon made an appearance at the Afrikakorps airfields in the North Africa and, Italian planes still had to carry the wounded for the journey back to the continent.
In terms of gameplay in Heroes and Leaders mode, Afrikakorps First Line Rifle units have the same characteristics as Wehrmacht First Line Rifle units, except that Africakorps First Line Rifle soldiers have the property Extended Range Bonus (1/2 FP).

Afrikakorps Second Line Rifles

Second Line Rifles soldiers represent an important part of the Afrikakorps. These troops were worse or insufficiently trained, their equipment (and therefore their firepower) was somewhat lower than the First Line troops, and their combat morale was generally weaker.
From early 1942 on, all infantry units were also assigned antitank guns, since tank warfare is the deciding factor in desert warfare, where the antitank gun becomes of even greater importance to the infantry than the machine gun. The aim of furnishing each battalion with eighteen 76.2-mm antitank guns was never achieved.
Many of the Second Line Rifles troops used olive-drab caps with wide visors were excellent; the visor, in particular, was indispensable for the infantryman and for the gunner as protection against the intense glare of the sun. The tropical helmets could be used only in the rear areas and were entirely useless in combat. The German troops wore no steel helmets, in contrast to the British troops, whose steel helmets were more appropriate both in shape and weight, being lighter than the German helmets.
The tropical coats, commonly used by most Second Line Rifles troops, which were made from a thick woolen material, were good, but the English ones, which were fur-lined and reached only to the knees, were better.
Owing to the stiff material from which it was made, the Second Line Rifles troops tropical shirts were inferior to the British ones, which were made of so-called "Tropic" material. To protect the abdominal area of the body against the cold, the wearing of belly bands was obligatory.
Second Line Rifles soldiers were also furnished wall tents, which had a special sun apron. With the exception of footwear, no leather was used in any article of apparel; it was replaced everywhere by thick linen.
Although the war slowed down into infantry and position warfare from time to time, its most important phases-the British winter offensive of 1941-42 and the German summer offensive of 1942-demonstrated the principles of full mobility. In desert warfare, against a motorized or armored opponent, nonmotorized troops can only hold their own in elaborately prepared positions. If such a position is breached or outflanked, a retreat means delivering up such troops to the enemy. The most troops can do is to resist in their positions to the last cartridge. During the withdrawal from Cyrenaica in the winter of 1941-42, many Second Line Rifles soldiers had to be moved out by shuttle traffic of a few truck columns or else march on foot. Only sacrifices by the motorized units made it possible to cover the retreat of the German infantry units.
In terms of gameplay in Heroes and Leaders mod, Afrikakorps Second Line Rifles units have the same characteristics as Second Line Rifles units of Wehrmacht except that Africakorps' Second Line Rifles soldiers have the property Extended Range Bonus (1/2 FP).

Afrikakorps Conscripts

The Conscripts soldiers of the Afrikakorps represent the units that were part of the Feldersatz Bataillon (Field Replacement Battalion) of the different divisions that were part of the Afrikakorps. Many of these troops had not yet received specific training for combat in the special conditions of North Africa. Regarding its armament, although it complied with the standard equipment of the German army, most of the soldiers had not yet used it in real combat fire and were not sufficiently familiar with its handling. All these inconveniences had an impact on the morale of the troops, which were the lowest in the Afrikakorps.
As early as 1 May 1941 the Afrikakorps had ordered the creation of a Feldersatz Bataillon, which was aimed at gathering together the replacements coming from Germany and giving them specific further training, as well as getting them acquainted with both the environment and the new units they would be assigned to working for all divisions, and it was made up of three companies. Actual training of replacements in Germany during 1941 seems to have been adequate, but lacking the required emphasis on living and fighting in the desert.
Specific training included ground exercises, weapons and fire exercises, theoretical lessons and training with armoured cars. Finally the new soldiers proceeded with training with the specific training with AFVs (armoured fighting vehicles), which required each crew member to be able to fulfil every duty aboard. Training companies were immediately dispatched to join its parent unit without any kind of acclimatization or further training. As a matter of fact it was only in early 1942 that a widespread training programme was started amongst Afrikakorps units, which consisted of training with heavy weapons, training of infantry units in defensive positions, training of reconnaissance units (now required to work alongside anti-tank guns) to improve their initiative, training for anti-tank gunners to improve their skills and capabilities, training for field artillery in mobility and observation, training of anti-aircraft guns to fight every kind of ground target (not only tanks) and, for all units, specific training in night marches and in the care and maintenance of weapons.
For example, the Field Replacement Battalion 200 was established in Africa in the spring of 1941. Initially, the battalion was established with four companies and was only known as the 5th Light Division Field Replacement Battalion. After formation, the battalion was subordinated to the 5th Light Division. From August 1, 1941, the battalion was subordinate to the 21st Panzer Division. After, the battalion was also known as the 21st Panzer Division Field Replacement Battalion. The battalion then expanded to include a fifth company and a convalescent company. It was not until the end of 1941 that the name of the Field Replacement Battalion 200 was finally determined. The battalion was destroyed in May 1943 in the Tunis area, in Africa. Another example was the Field Replacement Battalion 599 that was created on July 15, 1941 by the XII Military District for the German Africa Corps. The battalion was divided into personnel and four companies, ready for use on July 25, 1941.
In terms of gameplay in Heroes and Leaders mod, Afrikakorps Conscripts units have the same characteristics as Conscripts units of Wehrmacht except that Africakorps' Conscripts soldiers have the property Extended Range Bonus (1/2 FP).