Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

I have to say that what Tyronec said is so TRUE & I will paraphrase here, "Air Superiority flies around engages nothing and loses a bunch of aircraft to Operational losses". I have to confirm that is exactly what I am seeing. Granted my aircraft were not in the area of the Soviets and I lost 18 Rumanian Aircraft & 6 German 109 to just flying around. I took care to schedule the aircraft judicially spaced out with 2 days in between using them again and multiple air-groups. At this point Air Superiority is just worthless for the losses incurred even when not even engaging a damn thing. Granted some of those OPS losses can be tied to the horrendous German airbases getting Soviet stats on their airbases. But boy is this bad for Air Superiority to lose 24 aircraft for basically flying around.

ORIGINAL: Great_Ajax

"Supply is for us the greatest difficulty in this war." - Richthofen.

"The air losses suffered by Fliegerkorps VIII in twelve days (August 10 to 21) while supporting I Army Corps in its effort to cut the main Moscow-Leningrad railroad dramatizes the impact of attrition on Luftwaffe strength. In this period supporting the advance of one army corps, Fliegerkorps VIII lost 10.3% of its aircraft (destroyed or written off as a result of operations), with 54.5% of its aircraft damaged but repairable. During this action, the air corps had 3.9% of its flying personnel killed, 5.7% wounded, and 2.9% listed as missing for a 12.5% total casualty rate.
"Aiding the Luftwaffe in its support of the army's advance was the flexible supply and maintenance system already discussed in relation to the French campaign. Units moved forward rapidly behind advancing spearheads; and as the campaign's emphasis shifted from one front to another, bomber and fighter units moved swiftly to to new bases and areas of operation. Such flexibility allowed the Luftwaffe to give maximum support to the armored drives and helped the army push ever deeper into Russian territory. Nevertheless, the continual movement of units across the Russian landscape was not without cost. These shifts strained the maintenance and supply system to the breaking point so that by late fall 1941, operational aircraft ready rates were way down, thereby having a negative impact on the whole force."

"Milch in a visit to the eastern front discovered that hundreds of inoperable aircraft were lying about on forward airfields. They had either broken down or been damaged in combat, and spare parts were not flowing forward to repair these aircraft."

Table XVII German Losses, All Cases - 1941 (Not including November) - Aircraft Written Off

Close Recce - 263 (total) - 165 (Due to Enemy Action ie combat losses) - 98 (Not Due to Enemy Action ie Operational Losses) - 37% operational loss rate

Long Range Recce - 290 (total) - 195 combat/95 Operational - 32% operational loss rate

Single-Engine Fighters - 1,327 (total) - 622 combat/705 Operational - 53% operational loss rate

Twin-Engine Fighters - 463 (total) - 246 combat/217 operational - 46% operational loss rate

Bombers - 1,798 (total) - 1,154 combat/644 operational - 35% operational loss rate

Stukas - 366 (total) - 225 combat/141 operational - 38% operational loss rate

Strategy for Defeat, The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 by Williamson Murray.

ORIGINAL: MechFO

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

I have to say that what Tyronec said is so TRUE & I will paraphrase here, "Air Superiority flies around engages nothing and loses a bunch of aircraft to Operational losses". I have to confirm that is exactly what I am seeing. Granted my aircraft were not in the area of the Soviets and I lost 18 Rumanian Aircraft & 6 German 109 to just flying around. I took care to schedule the aircraft judicially spaced out with 2 days in between using them again and multiple air-groups. At this point Air Superiority is just worthless for the losses incurred even when not even engaging a damn thing. Granted some of those OPS losses can be tied to the horrendous German airbases getting Soviet stats on their airbases. But boy is this bad for Air Superiority to lose 24 aircraft for basically flying around.

IMO the actual problem is that the intercept routine is way too good. The dense network of radar and early warning stations that allowed fighter direction and control in the West did not exist, and the intercept routine developed for WITW does not transfer well at all.

The reality was if one did not happen to have at least a semi regular presence over an area, or the enemy was targeting something near your airfield, the raid was going to get through most of the time. This is not reflected in the current system at all. If one were forced to operate as one should, one could start dialing in what numbers are reasonable.

That ops losses are too high for the missions flown in the game is IMO true, but many sources of ops losses are not accounted for. Every movement of aircraft incurred a certain % of ops losses. Moving your air force should cost, especially to new small airfields in bad weather. Training flights also do not exist which led to further ops losses.

ORIGINAL: MechFO

ORIGINAL: Great_Ajax

"Supply is for us the greatest difficulty in this war." - Richthofen.

"The air losses suffered by Fliegerkorps VIII in twelve days (August 10 to 21) while supporting I Army Corps in its effort to cut the main Moscow-Leningrad railroad dramatizes the impact of attrition on Luftwaffe strength. In this period supporting the advance of one army corps, Fliegerkorps VIII lost 10.3% of its aircraft (destroyed or written off as a result of operations), with 54.5% of its aircraft damaged but repairable. During this action, the air corps had 3.9% of its flying personnel killed, 5.7% wounded, and 2.9% listed as missing for a 12.5% total casualty rate.
"Aiding the Luftwaffe in its support of the army's advance was the flexible supply and maintenance system already discussed in relation to the French campaign. Units moved forward rapidly behind advancing spearheads; and as the campaign's emphasis shifted from one front to another, bomber and fighter units moved swiftly to to new bases and areas of operation. Such flexibility allowed the Luftwaffe to give maximum support to the armored drives and helped the army push ever deeper into Russian territory. Nevertheless, the continual movement of units across the Russian landscape was not without cost. These shifts strained the maintenance and supply system to the breaking point so that by late fall 1941, operational aircraft ready rates were way down, thereby having a negative impact on the whole force."

"Milch in a visit to the eastern front discovered that hundreds of inoperable aircraft were lying about on forward airfields. They had either broken down or been damaged in combat, and spare parts were not flowing forward to repair these aircraft."

Table XVII German Losses, All Cases - 1941 (Not including November) - Aircraft Written Off

Close Recce - 263 (total) - 165 (Due to Enemy Action ie combat losses) - 98 (Not Due to Enemy Action ie Operational Losses) - 37% operational loss rate

Long Range Recce - 290 (total) - 195 combat/95 Operational - 32% operational loss rate

Single-Engine Fighters - 1,327 (total) - 622 combat/705 Operational - 53% operational loss rate

Twin-Engine Fighters - 463 (total) - 246 combat/217 operational - 46% operational loss rate

Bombers - 1,798 (total) - 1,154 combat/644 operational - 35% operational loss rate

Stukas - 366 (total) - 225 combat/141 operational - 38% operational loss rate

Strategy for Defeat, The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 by Williamson Murray.

To be fair that was a Luftwaffe operating at an exteme Op tempo even in bad weather with bad airfields and bad supply. Non overstacked appropriately sized airfields with good supply/support, operating only in good weather should not see this, especially given the pilot losses.

ORIGINAL: Great_Ajax

Mechanics could definitely be looked at as I wouldn't like a pre-determined operational rate. I don't honestly know how a German player is going to keep up a high optempo to support the ground forces to make this situation much better. The Germans ran their panzers in the ground in the same manner as their Luftwaffe.

Operational Loss rates should be affected by:

Weather
Pilot Experience
Level of Supply (maintenance)
Quality of Airfields
Distance Flown
Fatigue (optempo)
Changing airbase assignments

ORIGINAL: MechFO

ORIGINAL: Great_Ajax

"Supply is for us the greatest difficulty in this war." - Richthofen.

"The air losses suffered by Fliegerkorps VIII in twelve days (August 10 to 21) while supporting I Army Corps in its effort to cut the main Moscow-Leningrad railroad dramatizes the impact of attrition on Luftwaffe strength. In this period supporting the advance of one army corps, Fliegerkorps VIII lost 10.3% of its aircraft (destroyed or written off as a result of operations), with 54.5% of its aircraft damaged but repairable. During this action, the air corps had 3.9% of its flying personnel killed, 5.7% wounded, and 2.9% listed as missing for a 12.5% total casualty rate.
"Aiding the Luftwaffe in its support of the army's advance was the flexible supply and maintenance system already discussed in relation to the French campaign. Units moved forward rapidly behind advancing spearheads; and as the campaign's emphasis shifted from one front to another, bomber and fighter units moved swiftly to to new bases and areas of operation. Such flexibility allowed the Luftwaffe to give maximum support to the armored drives and helped the army push ever deeper into Russian territory. Nevertheless, the continual movement of units across the Russian landscape was not without cost. These shifts strained the maintenance and supply system to the breaking point so that by late fall 1941, operational aircraft ready rates were way down, thereby having a negative impact on the whole force."

"Milch in a visit to the eastern front discovered that hundreds of inoperable aircraft were lying about on forward airfields. They had either broken down or been damaged in combat, and spare parts were not flowing forward to repair these aircraft."

Table XVII German Losses, All Cases - 1941 (Not including November) - Aircraft Written Off

Close Recce - 263 (total) - 165 (Due to Enemy Action ie combat losses) - 98 (Not Due to Enemy Action ie Operational Losses) - 37% operational loss rate

Long Range Recce - 290 (total) - 195 combat/95 Operational - 32% operational loss rate

Single-Engine Fighters - 1,327 (total) - 622 combat/705 Operational - 53% operational loss rate

Twin-Engine Fighters - 463 (total) - 246 combat/217 operational - 46% operational loss rate

Bombers - 1,798 (total) - 1,154 combat/644 operational - 35% operational loss rate

Stukas - 366 (total) - 225 combat/141 operational - 38% operational loss rate

Strategy for Defeat, The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 by Williamson Murray.

To be fair that was a Luftwaffe operating at an exteme Op tempo even in bad weather with bad airfields and bad supply. Non overstacked appropriately sized airfields with good supply/support, operating only in good weather should not see this, especially given the pilot losses.

ORIGINAL: tyronec

if you fly a long range AS with Migs you could lose 100%.
This has been discussed many times. It is working as designed.

ORIGINAL: Great_Ajax

Mechanics could definitely be looked at as I wouldn't like a pre-determined operational rate. I don't honestly know how a German player is going to keep up a high optempo to support the ground forces to make this situation much better. The Germans ran their panzers in the ground in the same manner as their Luftwaffe.

Operational Loss rates should be affected by:

Weather
Pilot Experience
Level of Supply (maintenance)
Quality of Airfields
Distance Flown
Fatigue (optempo)
Changing airbase assignments

ORIGINAL: MechFO

ORIGINAL: Great_Ajax

"Supply is for us the greatest difficulty in this war." - Richthofen.

"The air losses suffered by Fliegerkorps VIII in twelve days (August 10 to 21) while supporting I Army Corps in its effort to cut the main Moscow-Leningrad railroad dramatizes the impact of attrition on Luftwaffe strength. In this period supporting the advance of one army corps, Fliegerkorps VIII lost 10.3% of its aircraft (destroyed or written off as a result of operations), with 54.5% of its aircraft damaged but repairable. During this action, the air corps had 3.9% of its flying personnel killed, 5.7% wounded, and 2.9% listed as missing for a 12.5% total casualty rate.
"Aiding the Luftwaffe in its support of the army's advance was the flexible supply and maintenance system already discussed in relation to the French campaign. Units moved forward rapidly behind advancing spearheads; and as the campaign's emphasis shifted from one front to another, bomber and fighter units moved swiftly to to new bases and areas of operation. Such flexibility allowed the Luftwaffe to give maximum support to the armored drives and helped the army push ever deeper into Russian territory. Nevertheless, the continual movement of units across the Russian landscape was not without cost. These shifts strained the maintenance and supply system to the breaking point so that by late fall 1941, operational aircraft ready rates were way down, thereby having a negative impact on the whole force."

"Milch in a visit to the eastern front discovered that hundreds of inoperable aircraft were lying about on forward airfields. They had either broken down or been damaged in combat, and spare parts were not flowing forward to repair these aircraft."

Table XVII German Losses, All Cases - 1941 (Not including November) - Aircraft Written Off

Close Recce - 263 (total) - 165 (Due to Enemy Action ie combat losses) - 98 (Not Due to Enemy Action ie Operational Losses) - 37% operational loss rate

Long Range Recce - 290 (total) - 195 combat/95 Operational - 32% operational loss rate

Single-Engine Fighters - 1,327 (total) - 622 combat/705 Operational - 53% operational loss rate

Twin-Engine Fighters - 463 (total) - 246 combat/217 operational - 46% operational loss rate

Bombers - 1,798 (total) - 1,154 combat/644 operational - 35% operational loss rate

Stukas - 366 (total) - 225 combat/141 operational - 38% operational loss rate

Strategy for Defeat, The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 by Williamson Murray.

To be fair that was a Luftwaffe operating at an exteme Op tempo even in bad weather with bad airfields and bad supply. Non overstacked appropriately sized airfields with good supply/support, operating only in good weather should not see this, especially given the pilot losses.

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

ORIGINAL: MechFO

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

I have to say that what Tyronec said is so TRUE & I will paraphrase here, "Air Superiority flies around engages nothing and loses a bunch of aircraft to Operational losses". I have to confirm that is exactly what I am seeing. Granted my aircraft were not in the area of the Soviets and I lost 18 Rumanian Aircraft & 6 German 109 to just flying around. I took care to schedule the aircraft judicially spaced out with 2 days in between using them again and multiple air-groups. At this point Air Superiority is just worthless for the losses incurred even when not even engaging a damn thing. Granted some of those OPS losses can be tied to the horrendous German airbases getting Soviet stats on their airbases. But boy is this bad for Air Superiority to lose 24 aircraft for basically flying around.

IMO the actual problem is that the intercept routine is way too good. The dense network of radar and early warning stations that allowed fighter direction and control in the West did not exist, and the intercept routine developed for WITW does not transfer well at all.

The reality was if one did not happen to have at least a semi regular presence over an area, or the enemy was targeting something near your airfield, the raid was going to get through most of the time. This is not reflected in the current system at all. If one were forced to operate as one should, one could start dialing in what numbers are reasonable.

That ops losses are too high for the missions flown in the game is IMO true, but many sources of ops losses are not accounted for. Every movement of aircraft incurred a certain % of ops losses. Moving your air force should cost, especially to new small airfields in bad weather. Training flights also do not exist which led to further ops losses.

Like a blanket OPS loss to get close to historical results overall?

ORIGINAL: MechFO

ORIGINAL: HardLuckYetAgain

ORIGINAL: MechFO



IMO the actual problem is that the intercept routine is way too good. The dense network of radar and early warning stations that allowed fighter direction and control in the West did not exist, and the intercept routine developed for WITW does not transfer well at all.

The reality was if one did not happen to have at least a semi regular presence over an area, or the enemy was targeting something near your airfield, the raid was going to get through most of the time. This is not reflected in the current system at all. If one were forced to operate as one should, one could start dialing in what numbers are reasonable.

That ops losses are too high for the missions flown in the game is IMO true, but many sources of ops losses are not accounted for. Every movement of aircraft incurred a certain % of ops losses. Moving your air force should cost, especially to new small airfields in bad weather. Training flights also do not exist which led to further ops losses.

Like a blanket OPS loss to get close to historical results overall?

IMO no, but we simply don't have the real life stats for what ops losses are in the game (plane crashes during a flight due to some problem).