thewood1 wrote: Tue Oct 31, 2023 11:28 am
The interesting side effect of China forcing the US to heavily invest in ABM capabilities is that it might upset the nuclear deterrence angle. Its why ABM was always in the Soviet-US treaties. It can completely screw up the balance of power.
This is what has already happened. I'd say the Chinese and Russian development of HGVs was actually a response to US ABM development originating with its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty around 2000.
Denixen wrote: Tue Oct 31, 2023 4:47 pm
thewood1 wrote: Tue Oct 31, 2023 4:27 pm
I think the plan for China is to fire dozens at one CVBG. I am pretty sure the plan is overwhelm any defense.
Which would work the first time, but after that the USN would adapt and deny China any info on the location of their fleets. In that way it is a on-hit-wonder, it works well in the grey zone between war and peace, but once the gloves are off I don't think PLA will be able to do it again. USN would adapt similar to how USN did against the soviets in Red Storm Rising. it is so heavily dependent on good targeting info.
US would shoot down any AWACS that sniffs outside the Chinese coast and shoot down all known Chinese Reconnaissance satellites (as would probably China vis-à-vis Western Reconnaissance satellites that is within range).
I guess whether ASBM are effective is a matter of context and perspective. Give how expensive a Gerald R. Ford carrier is and the aircraft on it, losing a single one is a massive loss, which US would have to account for when deciding whether to defend Taiwan.
I disagree, but the Chinese have more sensors than just satellites and AWACS. Destroyers, frigates, and submarines will be in the area and will be able to report the locations of American carriers.
Note that satellite shoot downs may be unlikely in real life. The current US administration is heavily against direct ascent ASAT weapons, so use of the SM-3 as an ASAT weapon may be out of the question.
Currahee150 wrote: Wed Nov 01, 2023 2:43 am
Ok I'll pitch in my 2 cents.
how much confidence can we place in Command's portrayal of the DF-26 and opposing BMD, as of this year?
I will ask this question: if we had used Command to estimate the survival time of the Ukrainian Air Force on February 21st, 2022, we would likely have concluded it could be estimated in days or hours. However, last I checked the UkAF is still very much alive and kicking, S-400s have been destroyed by cruise missiles that according to Command should have been vaporized as soon as they got picked up by radar, and a CG got waxed by circumstances that from what I've read on this forum take some creativity to even get close to replicating.
My point is that Command is very good tool to analyze challenges, logistics, and tactics in the current operating environment, but I'm not sure I would wager real life results on it reliably. We know based on Command that the DF-26 is a threat to the USN, which is a pretty undisputable fact. At the same time, Command probably won't generate you a solution that reliably lines up with real life (at least on the bleeding edge side of things, which the DF-26 question is), because there's a ton of factors that go into combat, even in naval combat (where from what I can tell its a lot more statistics, averages, and technology driven). To steal a few points made earlier in the thread, some of those factors can be: how far out is CAP? Is there a DDG picket? Is it one CSG or have three CSG come together to great the mother of all SAM baskets? Do we have the [insert latest tech refresh for SM-3s]? Has LEO now started to compete with the Kuiper belt for number of objects in orbit after a short violent ASAT war? Did the Admiral get his third cup of black coffee this morning to make timely decisions? Did the DF-26 crew have to stay up all night fixing a maintenance casualty and now they just aren't on top of their game?
And more importantly, has China figured out how to hit an target they very much does NOT want to get hit, at vast distances, where a incorrect datum or miscalculations can translate to CEP of a great deal of miles, all while using a kill chain that will under active and passive assault by various US military assets, both kinetic and non-kinetic?
Some of these Command can model...a lot of them (as absurd as some of them sound), it cannot (and neither can any simulator on the market, probably ever).
I disagree with this, because scenarios are the exact tool used to analyze these various situations. We can put most of these variables into a scenario. We can say whether we want satellites destroyed by interceptors or not, and we can even say whether the missile crews are at the top of their game based on when we decide to fire (for example, Denixen decided to wait one hour before firing to model a hypothetical delay in targeting time. We can also say whether one carrier is at sea or three. None of the things you listed seem like major challenges to me.
I think Ukraine is a poor comparison for China. The situation in Ukraine is being heavily driven by the idea within the Russian military that Ukraine is not a threat. Thus the Moskva wasn't sailing with radars on, and few cruise missiles were used to take out the air force. Russia also assumed the Ukrainian military would collapse and thus didn't feel a need to use lots of weapons.
Another thing to note is that S-400s, nor any SAM, can have its radar operating constantly. And we don't know how deep Ukrainian infiltration of Russian intelligence is or if there are possible traitors within Russia. These cruise missile strikes may have been carried out within intelligence that the radars would not be operational.
Note that Soviet doctrine, which both Russia and Ukraine use, it not built around massive punishing strikes intended to shut down airfields. It is more structured around supporting the grunts on the frontline. So neither Russia or Ukraine have the ability or desire to try and destroy each other's air forces in the same way the US did to Iraq.
In contrast, China's doctrine is centered around actual destruction of the enemy, and most certainly will not be based on the assumption of a passive enemy now that they have learned from Ukraine.
Furthermore, if we limit the scenario to a certain period of the war rather than trying for a generalized "catch all" simulation, we can control all of the variables, and get a good idea of what might be going on.
No satellites were used on either side, the target was always the ship in the back, which was auto - detected. The SAMs are Aegis Ashore and THAAD batteries, which provided the ships with warning, but did not help to defeat the missiles. I believe China now has geostationary detection satellites with both radar and optical sensors; so if the satellites which the US relies upon for missile defence are safe from attack, then China is equally secure in its ability to detect surface targets and track them until impact, and does not need to rely upon aircraft to target its ASBMs.
Hence, the problem is that if the allies can defend their warships, those warships cannot hide; whereas if the warships can hide, then defence is impossible, and therefore destruction is only a matter of time.
I am sceptical of the 'delay before firing' argument. Clearly reducing reaction time is not easy, but it is doable; for instance, aircraft and missiles on alert against a theatre ballistic missile attack in Europe, or US strategic bombers on alert for a submarine attack, had to launch on six minutes' notice, if I recall correctly - this was forty years ago, and involved crews running to their aircraft, starting them up, taxiing and taking off. I do not see why responding to a detection and classification of a naval target should be so much harder than responding to detection and classification of an inbound missile, especially if modern AI is involved.
I have created my own scenario to test ASBMs. I used the actual PLARF order of battle, the actual satellite network, and the actual position of the Ronald Reagan CSG in early October. I also included a large number of civilian ships. The scenario assumes a crisis has erupted over Taiwan, and China is about to preemptively strike.
I found the CSG actually was able to defeat 36x DF-26D and 24x DF-21D which were all launched at the same time. It had support from a single Japanese Aegis DDG which in real life would be nearby. The missiles that did make it through actually failed to lock on to the carriers and destroyers, instead targeting the nearby civilian ships.
I think the presence of civilian ships is crucial in a "initial period of war" type scenario.
Feel free to check it out!
