Matrix Games Forums

Thanks for sharing the link to The Next War Series. I have watched all of the series that pertain to China several times. It was very nicely done. I can't wait for #21 to be released.

I enjoyed the part about the satellite killers. I have never tried that within CMO, figuring that it was more of a strategic aspect than I was accustomed to. Clearly the video stresses communication disruption, which is similar to what we have been discussing.

Thanks again for sharing.

thewood1 wrote: Wed Dec 24, 2025 12:41 am You are missing the most obvious radar approach. I'm surprised it hasn't come up. Its not on or off. There are many different radar/EMCON strategies. The most obvious is air or surface picketing off-axis and away from the main fleet. This is especially useful with land-based air surveillance nearby. But can still be accomplished with carrier and helo-based AEW. You keep your HVT quiet and out of the way while a SAG and AEW go out looking for trouble. I have used this numerous times in SCS scenarios where I want to bait SSM fire to clear the path into the AO.

Even something as simple as intermittent radar from a rotating set of escorts can be enough to draw out enemy SSMs and AShCMs.

If you go back, you'll see I mentioned this in my initial reply, but the specific topic of this discussion is shipboard radars.

DWReese's situation he is inquiring about is specifically when an SAG finds itself without any AWACS cover.

You have an interesting point about using other surface vessels in a similar manner though. Reminds me of radar picket destroyers off Okinawa in 1945.

You have an interesting point about using other surface vessels in a similar manner though. Reminds me of radar picket destroyers off Okinawa in 1945.

The use of picket ships was also frequently used in those Cold War scenarios designed for Harpoon, and other similar games. In that era, it was truly a time where radars were not activated because it would give away the ship's location. There is no question about that. Hence, SAGs would often send out those picket ships which were essentially offered up as sacrificial lambs. "Find the enemy, got shot at, defend yourself, hope and pray, and run away." Meanwhile, the main force can now direct its weapons at the picket's attackers.

My point has been, with an absence of air cover, it a SAG might actually be better served by activating its radar because if the SAG is discovered first (satellites, enemy radar), the chance of survivability is almost non-existent. Surface-skimming missiles limit detection time, and OODA restrictions limit reaction time. The result is a quick death.

Again, I'm just putting this out for discussion.

"My point has been, with an absence of air cover, it a SAG might actually be better served by activating its radar because if the SAG is discovered first (satellites, enemy radar), the chance of survivability is almost non-existent. Surface-skimming missiles limit detection time, and OODA restrictions limit reaction time. The result is a quick death."


I'll post my same point again. A solid radar plan is not to have the entire SAG radiate. 2-3 ships off-axis 100nm or more in multiple semi-random directions can provide early warning and still take part in an area defense. With modern USN DDGs, they have a enough survivability to get through probing attacks and keep enemy air recon units at bay, depending on the situation. The key is positioning of the pickets and the constant moving of those pickets. They can also provide ECM support that degrades detection from earth-bound ISR.

The other key part is an intermittent energy rotation that provides near continuous coverage across the picket platforms. I'll also point out that, in the US perspective, not having any air ISR assets is unlikely and extremely contrived.

In the link to the YouTube video that you sent, Task Force 173 is sailing to Taiwan. According to the screen provided by the CMO game, TF 173 is being trailed by several intelligence ships, and some Chinese Coast Guard units. There is no air cover. It's quite obvious that they can be visually observed. Is there any reason to not activate their radar in this situation?

Later, the surveillance ships and Coast Guard units pull back, and are replaced by Chinese destroyers and frigates. They are positioned a little further back. They obviously know that TF 173 is there, and where they are headed. Is there any reason to not activate their radar in this situation?

Later still, TF 173 is buzzed by three Chinese H-6 aircraft. Again, they are flying 300 feet overhead, so they obviously know where TF 173 is. Is there any reason to not activate their radar in this situation?

Given these circumstances, it would appear that TF 173 should operate with its radar on in each of these situations.

If not, what am I missing?

Whether a ship is being tracked by surveillance ships, or satellites, it would seem to me that if their whereabouts is known, then there is nothing to be gained by not turning their own radars on---or at least some of them.

I created this situation using CMO, and then had the Chinese ships fire at TF 173 with their radars off. because of the distance and OODA, TF 173 never had a chance.

These are just observations.

Thats why the ASBMs are at their peak as a first strike weapon. Its not much different than Soviet Backfire strikes in the Cold War. Opening moves are driven by tattletale spy ships. Once hostilities start, those ships are gone.

Thats why the ASBMs are at their peak as a first strike weapon.

I understand that, but I was basically talking about were smaller TFs, like the ones in the video. Certainly, the Chinese (for example) wouldn't be using ASBMs on a small TF consisting of just two destroyers and two frigates, right?

Carrier groups are different because they are protected by air cover, and do have AEW aircraft which provides some advanced notice of what is coming. Whereas, with no means of detecting something incoming, all of the ships would be dead before OODA ever kicked in. So, this discussion is really about these smaller, unprotected, TFs with no air coverage, especially if the known enemy has satellites available. What do you think about those situations?

DWReese wrote: Thu Dec 25, 2025 6:36 pm Thats why the ASBMs are at their peak as a first strike weapon.

I understand that, but I was basically talking about were smaller TFs, like the ones in the video. Certainly, the Chinese (for example) wouldn't be using ASBMs on a small TF consisting of just two destroyers and two frigates, right?

I wouldn't be so sure that they would save the ASBMs for high-value targets only. Because the DF-26 ASBM is not limited to a unique launcher like the DF-21D was, it is possible that all of the PLARF brigades equipped with it are capable of firing ASBMs (including those located in western China, which could act as a reserve). That's well over 300 ASBMs available for an opening salvo. Realistically, they won't fire all 300 of them at a single carrier, because some of those DF-26 TELs will be firing conventional DF-26s at land targets. So even if a salvo is limited to 30-60 missiles per Task Force (about two brigades worth), that is still leaving a large number of DF-26s available for other vessels.

Doctrinally, it seems like the DF-26 is prioritized for attacking carriers, but doctrine often breaks down when the shooting starts. Who guessed that Russia would end up using S-300s as ballistic missiles to shell Kyiv with?

I've shared my thoughts about what an SAG would do generally, but when it comes to ASBMs I'd like to add this: It isn't really necessary to turn radars on for those kinds of threats at all. They will receive advanced warning by the Space Force when SBIRS detects the missiles lifting off. Those satellites are likely to be unharmed during a conflict as attacking them would be extremely escalatory, on par with bombing a BMEWS radar site in Alaska. So a Task Force will stand a good chance of defeating a pure ASBM attack when running silent.

Separately, I think you will find an experience I recently had in CMO interesting: I had a carrier strike group operating in the Western Pacific, sailing towards Okinawa. The carrier was initially very far back (nearly the same longitude as Tokyo) and the escorts were progressively spaced out further ahead, forming layers ahead of the carrier with each roughly at 50-70+ nautical miles apart.

As the CSG approached Okinawa, the E-2D began detecting PLA fighters on CAP duty over the island. The escorts got increasingly closer and the PLA ran a distant CAP far from the island. The CSG had to get in close to Okinawa because of the limitations of the strike range of its aircraft. This pushed the escorts closer to frontline, so they eventually started firing SAMs at the fighters. In this scenario, China had only one ELINT satellite—no radar. The PLA aircraft may have provided some initial cueing by coincidentally painting the escorts with their AESA radars as they evaded, but this would have only lasted a few seconds. The satellites, probably assisted by ELINT aircraft that were a few hundred nautical miles away, were still able to fix the position of that escort, and then ASBMs were fired at it. The initial salvo was defeated, but two to three more were launched and it was sunk.

It was cloudy in the scenario and the PLA aircraft were at high altitude, patrolling with their radars off. The escorts were out of the surface detection range of the supporting PLA AWACS aircraft, so the only way they could have been detected and later tracked was by turning on their radars. Note that the entire time, the whole CSG was actually within range of the DF-26s, but they were not attacked at any point throughout the scenario. Only the escort that turned its radars on was.

I'm not sharing this to make a statement about the real world because there are obviously a lot of different factors. But when it comes to CMO, maybe it can be some food for thought, as it seems to relate to your question.