Matrix Games Forums

I'll even be fair and send KB to PH like I always do.

No takers huh? bummer.

By sorteing the Dutch it will simulate the Dutch spotting the invasion force and reacting to it. But only the Dutch, because the US or Australia would not react to a penetration of Dutch waters. You can even deploy the entire Dutch air force if you want. Does not matter in the long run. By the end of the week the Dutch will be basically whipped. Allowing me to overrun the rest even faster.

First I,ll reply to Culiacan Mexico. BTW since probably nothing will change in the game I hope this is just a fun argument and no one is getting too exited. That said:

If resistance is completely futile why not take 5 or 6 extra days to do it legitimately. Yes you have far greater air forces, so why do you want to use the special rule to take dozens of bases before my tiny forces can execute the most merger redeployment. Your navy is stronger and your troops are better. I am almost guarenteed to lose fairly quickly. So why are you so afraid to fight me that you must rely on a trick of the rules to make ANY defence impossible.

Where is the skill in teleporting your troops deep within my position on turn one. Then taking my bases and airfields on turn 2. Then on turn 3 your bombers cover my entire defence area. No skill, No strategy, just exploiting the game system.

Reply to 2ndACR:

You're missing the point. I absolutely agree that full explotation of the first turn movement rule renders the allied defence pointless. You know exactely where every unit of mine is and you can tailor the attacks so that at every point where I can potentially interfer you have superiority. In locations where I cannot interfer you can simply send unescorted transports maybe with one or two escorts for show. Plus you can instantly pop into the invasion hexes meaning that the first turn is the only chance I will have to save the base.

On turn two no matter what I do, even given the most favorable luck, most of your ground troops will have unloaded. The bases will fall. On turn 3 your air units arrive and my fleet has to run away. As I said in previous post, No skill, no strategy, just exploting the first turn move rules.

Now if you actually have to conduct the invasion things require some skill and planning. If you start out on day two you already are uncertain where my fleet is. My subs can be almost anywhere now and I may have rearranged my AF a bit. I even have one tiny ausi unit that can go somewhere and cause a tiny surprise. I'll still lose but at least you are required to conduct a competant military operation. Even if you're incompetant you'll still drive me out of the DEI but I'll make you pay.

There's no point in playing you under your conditions. The result is pre-ordained.

What I've been thinking to slow down the pace in general is some rule restricting the size of an invasion based on prep points. The larger the invasion, the more prep is needed. For example, a small operation could go at 0% prep, multi-division ops require 100% prep. Those in between are, well somewhere in between[:)] . Testing would be need to get the right feel. This is for invasions only, transfers between friendly base would of course have no such restrictions.

just my 2 cents...

Reply to mdpeyrot: Yes maybe, of course you'll have to allow a number of free invasions at start or have some scheme to allow at least some invasions on the first move. Otherwise people will really go nuts. Maybe have a certain number a prep points to allocate on the first turn.

It's difficult to find a way to limit things without being to restrictive. Which is why matrix will probably leave things as they are.

I have said it before...bears repeating....If I wanted to "repeat" history I would read the book. The point of this or any other military game is to take the tools you are given and employ them for better or worse.

Game seems fine to me as far as first turn rules. If I were planning my opening attacks as Japan, I'd be bombing Manila and Singapore ports as well as airfields at first attack. The house rule preventing that is a restriction most Allied players want and not too unreasonable for PBEM. If the Japanese forces send out unescorted ships, make them pay for it. I understand there will be a new scenario coming out with the patch that gets rid of the special rules of turn 1/Dec 7th as it starts the day after. Then as the Allies, they know where the Japanese tf's are sailing towards and then you have roles reversed, eh? Play with your house rules and be happy. I say ZERO house rules, all's fair in love and war. [;)]

I don't want to replay history either. I also don't think It would be possible to have the allies sotie every ship and instantly know that the Phillipense are undefencable and that day begin to evacuate everything Or Load every ship on the West Coast and ship them to Australia. I also aggree that The IJN could not have invaaded 50-60 bases on Dec 7th.

I want a scenerio that has some restrictions as my 1st post. I want an offical scenerio. I hate House rules if the game allows it it will/can be done. An offical sceneio will assure that the data base has not been messed with.

OK one thing has to be said. To beleive that JP can launch all these attacks on Dec7/8 without losing surprise and allowing allied reaction is just silly. They did not have this capability to get to all this locations at once undetected. Look at the actual operation.

On Dec 6 Japan had TWO Significant TF's at sea. The PH carrier force moving along carefully selected and reconed routes and the force heading to malaysia which was using normal JP military convoy routes well within JP air and sea control. Where were the other fleets. Bataan Island was only a short distance away so the fleet could leave that night. Guam not hit until 9 Dec. Wake not hit until 10 Dec. North PI 10 Dec. Legaspi 12 Dec. Main PI landings 22 Dec. Why were these landings delayed? Because multiple task forces all bearing down on allied bases simultainiously make detection and allied reaction almost certain. Now some will argue that because we missed the PH attack the JP should be able to march troops into Omaha on day 1. But we missed it in large part due to the careful Japanese plan and that fact that we expected attack elsewhere. Had nearly every elsewhere on the map been under attack you have to assume that surprise is lost.

If I may . . .

My interest is not in repeating history, but I do have an interest in simulating historical events. Othewise, why not simply play some science-fiction space conquest game or the like? In this regard, I do think it is important to have house rules that accurately reflect the real-world limits that people faced at the time.

The United States was not 'expecting' an attack. Rather, it was 'suspecting' an attack. There was no certain information that Japan would move against even Malaysia and the Philippines. Even though Japanese ships were on the move, Japan was careful to keep its fleet operations from showing any overt signs of attacking U.S. or British interests.

Before the war started, allied units were free to track Japanese ships at will on the open waters -- and did so. Through air reconnaisance, the Allies were taking great pains to watch where the ships were going. So Japan had to take great pains not to make it too obvious that the ships were heading off to attack any American, British, or Dutch objectives.

The Malaya attack force could easily have been going to Thailand. Japan had been lining up troops on the Thailand border for months and were ready to move into the country. The forces that attacked the northern Philippines had the luxury of being able to remain in Japanese-controlled ports until shortly before the start of the war. And those forces involved in the attack of Legaspi could easily have been going to Palau. Guam sits just off of Saipan. Wake Island was the only target some distance from Japanese ports, but the oceans there are big enough to hide an invasion fleet.

Many of the fleet movements that are necessary to take 30 or more ports on the first day in the game, if they occured in early December 1941, would have been an unequivocal signal that an invasion was underway. The messages that would have gone out to Allied units on the first week of December would have said, "THE JAPS WILL BE LANDING IN A DAY OR SO, PREPARE TO FIGHT!", rather than the cryptic and uncertain messages that were actually set.

If one wished to reflect these historical facts in the game, the best way to do so is to limit legitimate targets to regions near legitimate destinations for Japanese fleets. I would argue for placing DEI. Bismark Archipelago, Solomon Islands, and Gilbert Islands to be off limits on the first day. Landings can be created for these targets. However, in the first day of the war they must be located in a Japanese port, so as not to tip off the Allies.

In reply to Thayne.

Exactly [:)]

Oh, so now I can pre-load my troops and ships, just not land. I could live with that rule.
So I take 30 bases on 9 Dec instead of the 7th. So it throws me behind by schedule a day.
Just lets me have that many more escorts and surface warfare groups for the next wave.
Also makes my mini KB even deadlier given the extra day or 2.

This thread is doing an excellent job of convincing me that the best place for someone like me to begin "the big campaign" is with the historical December 8 scenario that I believe will be part of the patch.

The game doesn't attempt to model the prewar political situation and Japan's efforts to escape detection, so there's an inevitable disagreement between the gamers, who see nothing wrong with invading everywhere on December 7, and the simulation-ists (like me) who want Japanese movements to be limited to those that wouldn't have tipped off their plans. (And I'm not saying that one side is right and the other is wrong, these are two different ways of looking at things, and your personal preference is as valid as anyone else's.)

What I'd like to see is three settings for the December 7 Surprise option: on, off and vairable. If variable is chosen, the Japanese player would enter his orders, the game would evaluate how agressive they are based on a number of factors, such as number of landings (biggest chance of detection), number of TFs taking advantage of the "fast move" option, number of TFs taking advantage of the "fast load" option (a smaller chance of detection) and perhaps others. The game would then make a roll, modified by the aggressiveness of the Japanese turn, to determine whether or not surprise is lost. If the roll fails, surprise is lost, Allied flak, air search and CAP operate at full efficiency on turn 1 and the Allied player can enter orders normally for all units (possibly with the benefit of some sigint-like information on Japanese plans). I expect that this would be a fairly significant change to the game, and not likely to be implemented, but it would make non-historical first turns more interesting to the likes of me.

Or we can all make sure that we find opponents who share our views on this question.

ORIGINAL: moses
First I,ll reply to Culiacan Mexico. BTW since probably nothing will change in the game I hope this is just a fun argument and no one is getting too exited. That said:

If resistance is completely futile why not take 5 or 6 extra days to do it legitimately. Yes you have far greater air forces, so why do you want to use the special rule to take dozens of bases before my tiny forces can execute the most merger redeployment. Your navy is stronger and your troops are better. I am almost guarenteed to lose fairly quickly. So why are you so afraid to fight me that you must rely on a trick of the rules to make ANY defence impossible.

Where is the skill in teleporting your troops deep within my position on turn one. Then taking my bases and airfields on turn 2. Then on turn 3 your bombers cover my entire defence area. No skill, No strategy, just exploiting the game system.

Afraid?!

Japan faced the combined economic and military might of The United States, Britain, The Soviet Union, Australia, China, Netherlands, and a few others. This is the same Japan that couldn’t resolve the issue with China alone! Even before the American economic might had even shifted out of second gear the Japanese were smashed at Midway and suffered reverses at Guadalcanal. Playing the game as Japan… afraid, of course I am afraid. Rightfully so.

In reality, Japan must fight a group of Allied nations with ten times their economic might. With that in mind, my priorities differ considerable over what the Japanese did historically: Japan was very concerned about Singapore/Malaya and the Philippines, but for me they are secondary to securing the resources in the DEI. My prime targets are Borneo, Cerberus, and Sumatra with other landings to support these attacks, while I do invade the Northern Philippines with a moderate force, the amphibious invasion of Malaya is cancelled.

Before December 7th, the Americans knew that Japan invasion fleets had left harbor and that in Formosa they were concentrating shipping to be used in the invasion of the Philippines, yet no action was take against these ships (some had suggested bombing them to forestall an invasion). In fact, Washington (General Marshall) order that no actions would be taken against Japanese forces as the US wished the Japanese to make the first overt act. Thus the first turn advantage given to the Japanese reflects a historical advantage the Japanese had, and which they use very effectively in invading Malaysia.

Regarding Kendari, this is valuable target both strategically and tactically, and thus a prime candidate for first turn attack. The air base allows domination of the southern part of the DEI, gives support for the invasion of Timor, while the 600 resource centers equate to the production of 20 fighters per day or 400 Tanks per month or 4000 Infantry Squads per year.

The Japanese historically place priority on the Invasion of Malaysia and sent there fleet from harbor well before the start of hostilities; and the British did not attack this fleet either from the air or intercept it by sea. Are you saying the Dutch would have acted differently? Would the Dutch, already having their homeland occupied by Germany, have initiate hostilities against the Japanese? I don’t belief they would have, any more than the much stronger Americans or British did knowing war was coming.

You believe it is “exploiting” “No skill” “No strategy”, while I do not. The Japanese historically were able to threaten both the US and Britain and yet they took no direct action, even when they knew invasion fleets were on the move. The Dutch were not going to initiate hostilities with Japan.

Historically (in game terms), the Japanese used there first turn advantage to move against Pearl Harbor, Malaysia, Guam, Wake, and the Philippines… were they “exploiting” or showing “No skill” or “No strategy”?

Why do I target key locations in the DEI instead of the historical emphases that Japan placed on Malaysia/Philippines? I know things that the Japanese leadership at the time either didn’t or ignored. I see this war, at its heart, as economic in nature; and plan accordingly. My priorities are different and I have adjusted assets to achieve them: historical pre-first turn moves against Wake, Malaysia and the Philippines are used against more valuable targets. You are saying I shouldn’t be able to do that… even though my strategy is different I should be tied to the same historical tactical choices made.

If the Japanese can historically use their first turn advantage against both the British and the Americans… why not the Dutch?

ORIGINAL: ltfightr
I don't want to replay history either. I also don't think It would be possible to have the allies sotie every ship and instantly know that the Phillipense are undefencable and that day begin to evacuate everything Or Load every ship on the West Coast and ship them to Australia.

Yet that is what happens in the game. Hell, even the computer bugs out of the Philippines after day one.

ORIGINAL: ltfightr
I also aggree that The IJN could not have invaaded 50-60 bases on Dec 7th.

I haven’t argued that. I stated that if a player want to but his emphases on targets other than those that were historically give preference he should be allowed to.

ORIGINAL: ltfightr
I want a scenerio that has some restrictions as my 1st post. I want an offical scenerio. I hate House rules if the game allows it it will/can be done. An offical sceneio will assure that the data base has not been messed with.

I have no interest in a scenario, but I would appreciate a system that limited the choices available to the Japanese such as the point system used to reassign leaders or unit to different commands.

Hi, I let the Japanese player go where ever he wants....Except he has to have aircover for any landing (a CV/CVL can provide such cover) No Japanese TF was outside air cover at wars start. No plan submitted prewar that suggested sending a TF outside aircover would have been approved. The only thing that allows a player in a game to even contemplate this is he knows the enemy is not allowed to respond and he knows all the whats and wheres. This is not planning. This is pure exploitation. If the Japanese player wishes such a first turn fine. However the Allied player must be allowed to do like wise. (Complete and unrestricted access to his units prior on his orders phase. This stilfavors the Japanese player but it limits the fruits of such exploits.

Simply put. Had the Japanese been capable of such action they would hve certainly done so. The Japanese player on turn 1 can modify his turn without resorting to cheap tricks and thinking it brillance.

ORIGINAL: moses
OK one thing has to be said. To beleive that JP can launch all these attacks on Dec7/8 without losing surprise and allowing allied reaction is just silly. They did not have this capability to get to all this locations at once undetected. Look at the actual operation.

Ok, let us look at the actual operation.

The invasion force that attacked for Malaysia was detected. There was no surprise involved and the British knew it was coming their way, yet they did not send Force Z to intercept or launch air strikes to disrupt it. Only once the Japanese had initiated hostilities did the British respond with both sea and air.

“On December 2, American reconnaissance planes from the Philippines sighted 12 Japanese submarines on the surface off Indochina moving south at full speed. It was correctly assumed that they were rushing to set up patrol lines around Singapore to interdict a British naval sortie. Once on station, they mined sea passages between Singapore and key points along the coast of Malaya.”

“On December 4, the top British naval commander at Singapore - Admiral Sir Tom Phillips - flew to Manila with two staff members for a series of secret meetings with Admiral Thomas C. Hart USN and General Douglas MacArthur. They discussed how the British Far Eastern Fleet might join the United States Asiatic Fleet at Manila. Because of their northern position, the Philippines were considered ideal for forward operations against the Japanese. But no ships could leave Singapore until there were enough planes to protect Malaya in the air.”

“A USN officer brought Hart and Phillips the initial contact report. It confirmed that the Japanese convoy - first reported as three ships - was moving south. This figure was later revised to 27 transports, escorted by a battleship (actually Chokai), five cruisers and seven destroyers. Its position was well south of Saigon with a course to the west. The only destination could be Siam or Malaya.”

“Phillips made plans to leave immediately. As he boarded his plane, Hart's last words were "I HAVE JUST ORDERED THE DESTROYERS AT BALIKPAPAN TO PROCEED TO BATAVIA ON THE PRETEXT OF REST AND LEAVE. ACTUALLY, THEY WILL JOIN YOUR FORCE." With that, Phillips was airborne and away from Manila within the hour. His plane left so quickly, that a crewman was left behind and had to follow later.”

“He received additional signals in the air reporting three more convoys totaling 29 transports and multiple escorts. Although Phillips was desperate for more information, bad weather over the South China Sea kept additional patrols from Singapore and Malaya from obtaining any more information. Although the convoy held a course for Bangkok, Singapore correctly plotted its real destination as Malaya.”

”But there was still no declaration of war and the British and Dutch were unwilling to initiate hostilities. Britain was fighting for its life with Nazi Germany. With her forces stretched then she could not afford to initiate a war with Japan - no matter how strong the evidence pointed to an imminent attack. At the same time, the Dutch were far too weak to defend themselves without strong British and American support and were also unwilling to initiate a fight they could not win alone.”

“Twenty eight transports left Hainan, Indochina carrying 26,640 troops of the 5th Infantry Division and 56th Infantry Regiment of the 18th Division. All were bound for landing points at Kota Bharoe, Patani and Singora in Malaya and neutral Siam. For close escort they had the heavy cruiser Chokai, one light cruiser and 13 destroyers; trailing behind were four additional light cruisers and three destroyers.”

“On December 6 an RAAF Hudson sighted the convoy; but after the initial report, it was lost again in the storm. A Royal Navy PBY from 205 Squadron at Singapore again picked up the convoy at noon the following day. This time the Japanese CAP was ready and the PBY only managed a quick position report before five Ki-27 "Nates" from the 1st Sentai shot it down. It was the first act of the Pacific War.”

ORIGINAL: Mogami
Hi, I let the Japanese player go where ever he wants....Except he has to have aircover for any landing (a CV/CVL can provide such cover) No Japanese TF was outside air cover at wars start.

What kind of air cover? Specifically, how does the Japanese invasion of Wake fit you definition? How about the Gilbert Islands?

ORIGINAL: Mogami
If the Japanese player wishes such a first turn fine. However the Allied player must be allowed to do like wise.

The British and Americans tried to some extent. Churchill wanted the US to make a large commitment of P-40 Squadrons to Singapore, but that fell through. The US had agreed to support force Z with some destroyers but they were still in waters around Southern Borneo when the war started. In reality the Allies were very limited politically to what they could do, unlike the Japanese. Also, would most allied players us their turn to run away? I doubt any Japanese player would get upset if the British send Force Z out to intercept convoys.

I don’t have a problem with limiting the numbers of invasions that benefit from turn one, but having to invade Malaysia when I really want Borneo and Cerberus doesn’t seem reasonable to me. Both can be supported by CVLs.

ORIGINAL: Thayne
The United States was not 'expecting' an attack. Rather, it was 'suspecting' an attack. There was no certain information that Japan would move against even Malaysia and the Philippines. Even though Japanese ships were on the move, Japan was careful to keep its fleet operations from showing any overt signs of attacking U.S. or British interests.

Actually they were expecting and had a fairly good idea where it would fall, but they just didn’t know when.

On December 4, a series of meeting were taking place between Admiral Thomas C. Hart USN and Admiral Sir Tom Phillips when the were initially informed of a Japanese task force moving south consisting of three ships, but was later revised to 27 transports well south of Saigon heading west. The only destination could be Siam or Malaya.

An agreement was reached between the two men, which allocated 57th Destroyer Division (Whipple, John D. Ford, Edsall, and Alden) to Singapore to help screen Prince of Wales and Repulse.

"I HAVE JUST ORDERED THE DESTROYERS AT BALIKPAPAN TO PROCEED TO BATAVIA ON THE PRETEXT OF REST AND LEAVE. ACTUALLY, THEY WILL JOIN YOUR FORCE." Admiral Thomas C. Hart USN

Admiral Sir Tom Phillips correctly believed that the invasion fleet was head toward Malaya, and ordered the fleet to be ‘ready to put to sea at short notice’.

“If the American destroyers did not arrive in time, he would sortie without them. At this time, virtually all units of the Asiatic Fleet were already moving south into the Dutch East Indies. The light cruiser Marblehead and 58th Destroyer Division (Paul Jones, Stewart, Bulmer, Barker and Parrot) were fueling at Tarakan. They left Balikpapan on the 9th, where all but two destroyers put into port.”

”Taking on fuel at Balikpapan, was the destroyer tender Blackhawk and 57th Destroyer Division with Whipple, John D. Edwards, Alden and Edsall. Blackhawk left for Soerabaja alone on the 7th. The destroyers left a short time later for Singapore, but arrived after Admiral Phillips had sortied without them.”

ORIGINAL: Thayne
Before the war started, allied units were free to track Japanese ships at will on the open waters -- and did so. Through air reconnaisance, the Allies were taking great pains to watch where the ships were going. So Japan had to take great pains not to make it too obvious that the ships were heading off to attack any American, British, or Dutch objectives.

If they took great pains to hide the objective of the Malaya invasion force then they failed, because neither the British nor the Americans were surprised.

ORIGINAL: Thayne
Many of the fleet movements that are necessary to take 30 or more ports on the first day in the game, if they occured in early December 1941, would have been an unequivocal signal that an invasion was underway. The messages that would have gone out to Allied units on the first week of December would have said, "THE JAPS WILL BE LANDING IN A DAY OR SO, PREPARE TO FIGHT!", rather than the cryptic and uncertain messages that were actually set.

I have never argued for 30 invasions, but have pointed out that the belief that surprise was maintained is not backed by history. The senior commanders in Singapore had already determined that the invasion fleet was headed towards Malaya. Senior commanders in the Philippines knew that the Japanese invasion fleet was in Formosa, and want to launch preemptive strikes. Pre-formal war these attacks were not approved.

It was known that war was coming… just not when.

November 3: All Japanese naval encryption codes are changed. U.S. Navy Intelligence considers this an unmistakable portent of war.

November 26: Allied intelligence reports Japanese transports sailing from Formosa (Taiwan), apparently destined for Indochina.

November 27: Magic issues a warning to all American commands: "THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED A WAR WARNING ... AGGRESSIVE ACTION EXPECTED BY JAPAN IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS."

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE
At Sea
November 28, 1941
BATTLE ORDER NUMBER ONE

1. The ENTERPRISE is now operating under war conditions.

2. At any time, day or night, we must be ready for instant
action.

3. Hostile submarines may be encountered.

4. The importance of every officer and man being specially
alert and vigilant while on watch at his battle station
must be fully realized by all hands.

5. The failure of one man to carry out his assigned task
promptly, particularly the lookouts, those manning the
batteries, and all those on watch on the deck, might
result in great loss of life and even loss of the ship.

6. The Captain is confident all hands will prove equal to
any emergency that may develop.

7. It is part of the tradition of our Navy that, when put
to the test, all hands keep cool, keep their heads, and
FIGHT.

8. Steady nerves and stout hearts are needed now.

G. D. MURRAY,
Captain, U.S. Navy
Commanding

Approved: November 28, 1941.
W. F. HALSEY,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force

ORIGINAL: Thayne
If one wished to reflect these historical facts in the game, the best way to do so is to limit legitimate targets to regions near legitimate destinations for Japanese fleets. I would argue for placing DEI. Bismark Archipelago, Solomon Islands, and Gilbert Islands to be off limits on the first day. Landings can be created for these targets. However, in the first day of the war they must be located in a Japanese port, so as not to tip off the Allies.

There are a lot of reasons to limit the number and locations of the Japanese invasions that take advantage of turn one “tip off the Allies” isn’t one of them.

WARNING OF NOVEMBER 27th

"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform district and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Spenavo inform British. Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage"


“It was apparent from the talks that were going on between the State Department and Mr. Kurusu, as well as from information received from Intelligence sources, that the Japanese were killing time preparatory to an attack. We could not estimate the exact time that the attack would be made, but we knew of troop movements and naval movements in the Far East toward the South. It was at about this time that our search planes first picked up some of the Japanese ships moving along the coast of Indo China. I think it may have been after the date of this dispatch that we instituted plane search of the China Sea, but we were conscious of definite amphibious movements being made before the dispatch we are discussing was sent.”

Admiral Turner


“Admiral Ingersoll said that the reason for sending the war warning of November 27 was indicated in the dispatch, referring to the number and equipment and organization of Japanese naval forces. He said that the reason why the dispatch referred to an aggressive move in the Western Pacific was that the character of the landing craft referred to in the dispatch were such that they could not have been used in any area other than in the far eastern area.”


“The intention of the war message was to state that war was imminent—on the other hand, there was the wish not to take any step which could provoke war with Japan”

PROCEEDINGS OF HEWITT INQUIRY