Matrix Games Forums

Ask the crew of the Hood what their opinion would have been.

[X(]

"Given what other ships acomplished with the weapon, i'd say the risk was justified."
This presents us with an interesting matter of perspective. The Long Lance, and the Oi conversion, was not really intended for anything that actually took place during the war. But if we do view things in terms of what was actually acomplished, the Long Lance (in my opinion) doesn't look too good.
At Java Sea, the Long Lance accomplished what no other torpedo could, but even here, we have to acknowledge the hit rate was poor. And I can't recall anything good the Long Lance did for the Japanese subsequent to Java Sea that a Type 90 couldn't have done.
The Long Lance was a pure oxygen torpedo, not a hydrogen peroxide torpedo. The US hydrogen peroxide torpedoes were the Mk 16 and Mk 17.
At Samar, I believe both Chokai and Suzuya were done in by their own torpedo weaponry. Suzuya did not even suffer any direct hit, but a bomb frgament touched off a reaction in the torpedoes.
There are several other CA that were severely damaged by their Long Lances during the war.

The Long Lance was a pure oxygen torpedo, not a hydrogen peroxide torpedo. The US hydrogen peroxide torpedoes were the Mk 16 and Mk 17.

Ahh - thanks! [:)]

I had a feeling that book was dangerous to quote. It didn't really talk much about the IJN torps, so i suspected the author didn't really know what he was talking about.[8|]

The US hydrogen peroxide torpedoes were the Mk 16 and Mk 17.

from US torpedo history site:

"the Mk.16, though not used in combat during WW II, was a standard submarine weapon until 1975."

The Mk 16 and Mk 17 went into service 1944. The Mk 16 was a sub torp, the Mk 17 was for DDs.

Some comparisons of the Mk 14 steam, Mk 16 Navol and Mk 18 electric:
Model size tot wt warhead propulsion performance
Mk.14 Mod.3A 21"x 246" 3282 lb 660 lb TPX Steam 4,500y @ 46.3kts
Mk.16 Mod.1 21"x 246" 3922 lb 920 lb TPX Navol 11,000y @ 46.2kts
Mk.18 21"x245" 3154 lb 575 lb TPX Electric 4,000y @ 29.0kts

EDIT - i put in some nice formatting, but the forum software removes it and crunches everything together!![:@]

ORIGINAL: Tiornu

This presents us with an interesting matter of perspective. The Long Lance, and the Oi conversion, was not really intended for anything that actually took place during the war. But if we do view things in terms of what was actually acomplished, the Long Lance (in my opinion) doesn't look too good.

This is one of the few areas where we have never agreed. [;)] From a statistical standpoint, torpedoes, any torpedo will never look too good as they were an inherrantly inaccurate weapons system (like many unguided munitions) The 'hit rate' may not have been spectacular, but as i've always argued, the weapon gave an added punch and tactical flexibility that was unmatched until the advent of better, more advanced radar fire controls gave rapid fire medium guns the advantage back. The effects of LL hits on the various battles in the Slot bore evidence to that. I dont recall a single cruiser or DD exploding from an oxygen detonation during any of these fights.

At Samar, I believe both Chokai and Suzuya were done in by their own torpedo weaponry. Suzuya did not even suffer any direct hit, but a bomb frgament touched off a reaction in the torpedoes.
There are several other CA that were severely damaged by their Long Lances during the war.

I'd like to see qualificaiton of the former statement. Admitedly even if true, i dont see the threat from air as an adequate means of making summary judgement on whether cruisers armed with it was an advantage or not. From a surface battle point of view, I've always felt it was. On the latter issue....being damaged by their own long lances but not destroyed or crippled makes my point in my opinion...the risk was justified in trade for the tactical flexibility.

"The effects of LL hits on the various battles in the Slot bore evidence to that."
If you sincerely believe that, then list the successes of the Long Lance in the Solomons that were beyond the capability of Type 90's. In fact, several "Long Lance" hits in the Solomons actually WERE from Type 90's.

"I dont recall a single cruiser or DD exploding from an oxygen detonation during any of these fights."
See Lacroix & Wells for a complete listing of CAs victimized by their own Long Lances. I've never seen a survey for CLs and DDs.

I'd rather if you provided a more specific reasoning that clearly shows that the placement of torpedoes on the Japanese CA's was truely more of a hazzard than a benefit and show specific examples of cruisers crippled or sunk.

Again, i dont feel that late war air attacks on cruisers is a fair qualificaiton (if they occured)

ORIGINAL: Tiornu
See Lacroix & Wells for a complete listing of CAs victimized by their own Long Lances. I've never seen a survey for CLs and DDs.

Well, keeping shells and gunpowder in magazines was a very hazardous practice too.[:D]
Many ships suffered magazine explosions, as you know.

"I'd rather if you provided a more specific reasoning that clearly shows that the placement of torpedoes on the Japanese CA's was truely more of a hazzard than a benefit and show specific examples of cruisers crippled or sunk."
I just gave you the complete reference: L&W. I don't know of any hits by Japanese CA torpedoes after Savo except one at Surigao Strait (a dud hit on Hibuson Island).

I know you did, but not having that reference handy, i'd appeciate it if you could show specific examples of LL equpped cruisers exploding and sinking or being crippled. "injuries" i found too vague because as has already been pointed out, all armaments and ammunition pose dangers if set off.

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

ORIGINAL: Tanaka

ORIGINAL: doktorblood

Considering the fact that these are the only 2 ships in IJN that have radar until you can accelerate some radar equipped Yagumo class destroyers out of the shipyards, I think they are too important to risk in surface actions.

Which is exactly what the Japanese did historically.... [:D]

Are we saying here that K&O were in effect the "Aegis" Cruisers of the IJN ???

I've certainly never read that anywhere - but would be interested in a source !

If the Japanese did withhold these 2 ships because they were so effective at air warning - why were they never used with Kido Butai. I think most posters believe that K&O will improve air warning over a CV task force in which they are deployed [ I haven't tested this so I can't say for sure ]. And if so then - they probably would be the "Aegis" cruisers of the IJN "IN THE GAME" ... though again I find it hard to believe this represents there true historical capability.

Im saying the Japanese never used these ships in a surface action...

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

I know you did, but not having that reference handy, i'd appeciate it if you could show specific examples of LL equpped cruisers exploding and sinking or being crippled. "injuries" i found too vague because as has already been pointed out, all armaments and ammunition pose dangers if set off.

from http://www.combinedfleet.com/suzuya_t.htm

25 October 1944: The Battle off Samar:
The SUZUYA engages Task Group 77. 4. 3's "Jeep" carriers, but is attacked by ten Grumman TBM "Avenger" torpedo-bombers. A near-miss by a bomb causes the loss of her port propeller and her speed falls off to 20 knots. At 0830, Vice Admiral Shiraishi transfers his flag to the SUZUYA from the KUMANO that was damaged heavily in earlier attacks.

At 0904, the SUZUYA, YAMATO, NAGATO and the KONGO are attacked by 12 Grumman TBM "Avenger" bombers and eight fighters launched from Rear Admiral Stump's carriers. Around 0950, the SUZUYA is suddenly enveloped in smoke and flames. It is possible that bomb splinters and flames from successive near misses on her port side amidships area ignite the warhead of the torpedo in No. 1 tube and start a fire.

At 0954, all ships return to their prescribed stations around the YAMATO, then on bearing 225, head towards Leyte. At 1100, reserve torpedoes aboard SUZUYA start to explode. The fire and blasts damage the starboard engine room and boiler rooms Nos. 7 and 8 flood. The cruiser becomes unnavigable. At 1130, Vice Admiral Shiraishi again transfers his flag, this time to the TONE while the OKINAMI stands guard.

At noon, the SUZUYA's remaining torpedoes and ammunition explode. At 1300, Abandon Ship is ordered and fifteen minutes later the SUZUYA turns on her starboard side. At 1322, she sinks at 11-48N, 126-26E. About 450 crewmen are lost, but Captain Teraoka and 415 other crewmen are rescued by the destroyer OKINAMI. The Americans also pick up six of the SUZUYA's crewmen as PoWs. Later, Captain Teraoka becomes the CO of the old armored cruiser YAKUMO.

20 December 1944:
Removed from the Navy List.

Appreciate it String.

However, as i said, I dont see examples such as this late air attack as a justification that retaining a torpedo armament was a bad design move. Many an air attack touched off ammo fires and explosions so I hardly see it as fair to judge by this criteria.

Now if Japanese ships were being crippled and sunk frequently by oxygen fires/explosions in a multitude of surface engagements...

"i'd appeciate it if you could show specific examples of LL equpped cruisers exploding and sinking or being crippled."
Just off the top of my head, I believe tha following were all brutalized by their own torpedoes: Furutaka, Aoba (twice, I think), Chokai, Suzuya, Mikuma, and Mogami.

"as has already been pointed out, all armaments and ammunition pose dangers if set off."
This was mentioned facetiously, and it hardly makes a serious point. No one would suggest building a heavy cruiser without guns, but there were plenty of them that did fine without torpedoes. Furthermore, gun ammunition can be protected by heavy armor, while torpedoes are out there on their own.

"However, as i said, I dont see examples such as this late air attack as a justification that retaining a torpedo armament was a bad design move."
Urk..retaining a system that accomplishes nothing but the destruction of your own units--that's a good design move?

Neither Oi nor Kitikami ever accompanied the Kido Butai. In fact I don't think either ever did much through out the war. As for their fearsome torpedo armament I believe all of it was eventually removed during "upgrades" to their true calling of barge carriers or some such.

ORIGINAL: spence

Neither Oi nor Kitikami ever accompanied the Kido Butai. In fact I don't think either ever did much through out the war. As for their fearsome torpedo armament I believe all of it was eventually removed during "upgrades" to their true calling of barge carriers or some such.

Believe they were re-built twice. Once as barge carriers, and then again to carry Kaitens.
What is certain is that they never did anything useful during the war. I have to agree with wilkerson that it seems very odd that they are given such apparently usefull radar capabilities in the game. If they had radar, it was certainly a primitive surface search set for use during the "decisive battle" in long range targeting for their torpedo salvos. If the sets were actually as good as some players want them to be, then the Japanese High Command would certainly be guilty of incompatency (if not stupidity) for not using them in the Solomans area where the lack of Japanese radar allowed the Allies to gain the upper hand in surface actions.

But I would agree with the fellow who suggested that they should have 5x4 TT per side in order to be more useful in game surface actions. But as useful adjuncts to Kido Butai, forget it.

ORIGINAL: Tiornu

Urk..retaining a system that accomplishes nothing but the destruction of your own units--that's a good design move?

Some BBs in the WWI era had fixed torp tubes in their hulls. The defenses leading to Oslo had LAND mounted torp tubes. If the torpedo accomplishes nothing, why are they still carried in US (and other nations) subs? We have missles, why have torps? Beacuse they work maybe?

The Japs prior to the war had a healthy respect for the torpedo (perhaps that was the major cause of their victory over the Russians? I dont know, I am speculating), in any event, the early battles around Guadalcanal more than justified putting them on any ship that could carry them. As to their later war lack of performance, part of the reason was that the US commanders developed an appreciation of Jap torps and took action accordingly (meaning the tactics we used didnt give the Japs a chance to use their torps the way they would have wanted to).

If the torpedo accomplishes nothing, why are they still carried in US (and other nations) subs? We have missles, why have torps? Beacuse they work maybe?

I believe they are talking about exposed weapons systems, not those contained within the hull. And I think the argument is also: Does the benefit outweigh the risk of these exposed weapons?

As far as subs carrying them today, they are still the primary ASW weapon and have a secondary mission of ASUW. ASW aircraft like the P-3C and the Nimrod all carry torps for ASW.

As I understood it, the Japanese liked to launch multiple torps in large salvos just before opening fire (assuming they had surprise) with guns. The primary goal was to create confusion within the enemy's TF, hopefully by getting hits. They would then capitalize on the confusion with gunfire. But once most Allied ships began employing radar, Japanese forces lost the tactical element of surprise. That coupled with the knowledge the Allies had gained about the LL reduced its effectiveness in battle. Japanese search radars were greatly inferior to US radars in detection ranges, power and reliability so even with their radar, they couldn't regain the element of surprise.

As far as the O and K steaming with KB, I don't see the point. Their torpedoes would certainly be superfluous in an Air TF. They would be much better off removing them and turning the ships into CLAAs if they were going to stay with KB. Just my opinion anyways.

Chez

I may be mistaken, but I don't believe Tiornu was advocating deleting torpedoes from the Japanese cruisers' armament. I think he's saying that the LL was more dangerous to the ships which carried it than its effectiveness ( vis the Type 90, I believe ) warranted. In other words, the Type 90 would have been just as effective in the circumstances which prevailed in the Solomons as the LL's were. I've come to hold the opinion that the Japanese superiority in the battles in the Solomons was due at least as much to superiority in training and doctrine ( and luck ) as it was to superior torpedoes. I'd be interested if anyone could tell me which, if any, of the Allied ships sunk by LL's would NOT have been sunk by Type 90's. Certainly ( in my opinion, anyway ), the physical constraints of the Solomons area generally negated the advantage the LL's extreme long range, didn't it?

Regards,
Randy

"If the torpedo accomplishes nothing, why are they still carried in US (and other nations) subs?"
No one has said torpedoes accomplish nothing. We're talking about Long Lances on heavy cruisers "late" in the war.
The submerged torpedoes of old battleships were recognized as useless, which is why they were removed after WWI. The Nelsons were the last battleships completed with submerged tubes. Rodney actually claimed a torpedo hit against Bismarck, the only BBvBB claim; however, though she fired off all twelve of her torpedoes, she was not officially credited with a hit.
The Germans actually design "H" with a full set of submerged tubes. What were they thinking?
If torpedoes on a battleship were pointless, what about the carrier Bearn? Now, that's just weird.