RE: Name This...(414)
Posted: Fri Aug 12, 2005 10:48 pm
Fletcher doesn't get enough credit for the good decisions that he did make at Midway. Unlike Spruance, he did his own scouting, thus also retaining a reserve strike element. Spruance OTOH relied entirely on searches by Midway-based patrol aircraft. While this sufficed for the initial contact, no further sighting reports were made by any of the many aircraft that contacted the 1st Carrier Strike Force. It was scouts from the Yorktown that regained contact after the morning battle, reporting the new location of Hiryu. It was the Yorktown's relatively fresh scout squadron that smoked Hiryu (after the Enterprize's bombers all missed) in the afternoon strike.
Of course, any credit Fletcher accrued to himself as a result of his performance at Midway was entirely offset by his over-eager retreat from Guadalcanal following the loss of a couple-dozen fighters in the first two days spent supporting the landings. Here is his infamous signal of 1800 on 8 August:" Fighter plane strength reduced from 99 to 78. In view of the large number of enemy torpedo planes and bombers in this area, I recommend the immediate withdrawal of my carriers. Request tankers sent forward immediately as fuel running low." Then, instead of waiting for a reply, he set course to the southeast, leaving Turner "bare-arse (Turner's phrase)." Eight hours later, Quincy, Vincennes, Astoria, and Canberra were sinking. Could Fletcher have stopped Mikawa? Probably not. Could he have given warning of his approach? Absolutely. It is puzzling that Fletcher remained in command for several weeks yet following this shameful flight from his responsibilities. It is an interesting contrast that immediately following the battle Mikawa was beached for the duration because of his failure to follow up his success against the allied warships with a strike against the transports.
Of course, any credit Fletcher accrued to himself as a result of his performance at Midway was entirely offset by his over-eager retreat from Guadalcanal following the loss of a couple-dozen fighters in the first two days spent supporting the landings. Here is his infamous signal of 1800 on 8 August:" Fighter plane strength reduced from 99 to 78. In view of the large number of enemy torpedo planes and bombers in this area, I recommend the immediate withdrawal of my carriers. Request tankers sent forward immediately as fuel running low." Then, instead of waiting for a reply, he set course to the southeast, leaving Turner "bare-arse (Turner's phrase)." Eight hours later, Quincy, Vincennes, Astoria, and Canberra were sinking. Could Fletcher have stopped Mikawa? Probably not. Could he have given warning of his approach? Absolutely. It is puzzling that Fletcher remained in command for several weeks yet following this shameful flight from his responsibilities. It is an interesting contrast that immediately following the battle Mikawa was beached for the duration because of his failure to follow up his success against the allied warships with a strike against the transports.