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RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 10:44 am
by el cid again
but the problem with it is we get no informations.
Like the "only 1 out of 5 planes start"-problem... the logic says, we have prepared 2 Weeks, every engine works, no problems... the pilots are rested, fuel and ammo is here... our recons/radars detect the carrier task force, around 120 miles outside... and what do we do ? Nothing. Just sit and wait. That sounds strange.
Nope. It does NOT sound strange. It sounds NORMAL. You are in the jungle. You are using near the state of the art machines not entirely reliable yet. Rats eat the wires. Microscopic living things we have never heard of eat fabrics and other materials. Water condensation changes the electrical resistence of the air or insulation (they use fabric insulation then - no plastic yet). A simple motor vehicle (not nearly as complex as a combat aircraft) is "more trouble than it is worth" to maintain after just 30,000 miles in these conditions (and the design life is 100,000 miles, with many often able to well exceed - even double - that). Then there are the really big factors - human ones. Humans are sick. In a jungle hex you probably catch malaria AND denge fever (both). [EVERY person on Bataan had both. There was only quinine for Malaria - and it only works 70% of the time. If you are exposed - bitten - every day - you are 30% likely to be infected in 1 day, 51% in 2 days, 65% in 3 days, 76% in 4 days, 83% in 5 days, 88% in 6 days, 92% in a week - with only one bite a day - impossible. And there is NO prophalactic for dengue fever, not even today. If you go outside at night, you will get it.] Conditions eat your maps and documents - and even a person with a photographic memory for maps and documents cannot create the effect of these things on the planning table for the whole staff to see. The list is endless.
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 10:48 am
by el cid again
Yes, acmejeff, if you are using CHS, Gilligan's Island is indeed "on the map",
Actually IRL it IS on the map - it is at Pearl Harbor.
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 10:51 am
by el cid again
the Japanese sailor can only be countered with either the "Ginger" or "Mary Anne" cluster devices.......
Oddly, in RHS the identically performing Ki-30 and Ki-32 were combined - so were their code names - resulting in the code name MaryAnn!
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 1:47 pm
by m10bob
ORIGINAL: rockmedic109
Shouldn't the S.S.Minnow be a small AP rather than a small AK? I thought it carried more personel than supplies. Maybe an LCVP would actually be a better designation. But the commanders frustration rating should be in the 90s and the the first officer's hilarity rating should be even higher.
Rockmedic109..I was trying to be practical and keep it in game terms..Could not just call it a "tramp steamer" in that Mrs Howell might take offense, and I would not call it an LCVP as it had no ramp, just a big hole in the front.(Keep it clean.)
While it did carry more people than cargo, it seems that radio(cargo) played more importance, as it had batteries which never went dead, (I guess.)
Not sure about the commanders rating, too many variables.........
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 4:15 pm
by Mike Scholl
ORIGINAL: witpqs
Please re-read Mike's point as this is very valid, in that these gents *intentionally* by-passed Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers, and scads of troopships seeking nothing but....CARRIERS!!!!!
"When Nimitz sent Spruance and Fletcher out to Midway, he sent them looking for Kido Butai, not for the first stray Japanese force that was spotted. That's why they ignored the "main body" spotting on the 3rd."
Mike
does have a good point. In my games, carriers do act that way (hitting the right targets - like carriers) the vast majority of the time. In terms of what you are saying, I think it boils down to 'should those orders (or priorities since the game doesn't allow you to give the orders explicitly) always be perfectly obeyed?' If so, you lose that 'friction' element. If you don't want it, that's good. If you want the flavor of slightly uncontrolled reality in there to simulate WWII, then sometimes things will go askew...
The ORDERS should be obeyed, as in "Take off and TRY to attack "X" target. Now they might not find it (as most of Hornet's A/C failed to do at Midway)---but at least they would be trying to attack the "right" target (Midway's B-17's didn't go hairing off to the WSW to attack Tanaka's Transport Force---they went after Kido Butai). The big problem with "naval strike" is you CAN'T give it any orders, you CAN'T specify any priorities, you CAN'T even suggest a direction. I don't expect "perfect" results..., but we ought to be able to avoid "perfectly rediculous" results. As it stands now, a gamey but usable strategy is to send some TF's of garbage along with anything important because the game mechanics will generally go after the easiest prey.
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 4:23 pm
by jwilkerson
ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
ORIGINAL: witpqs
Please re-read Mike's point as this is very valid, in that these gents *intentionally* by-passed Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers, and scads of troopships seeking nothing but....CARRIERS!!!!!
"When Nimitz sent Spruance and Fletcher out to Midway, he sent them looking for Kido Butai, not for the first stray Japanese force that was spotted. That's why they ignored the "main body" spotting on the 3rd."
Mike
does have a good point. In my games, carriers do act that way (hitting the right targets - like carriers) the vast majority of the time. In terms of what you are saying, I think it boils down to 'should those orders (or priorities since the game doesn't allow you to give the orders explicitly) always be perfectly obeyed?' If so, you lose that 'friction' element. If you don't want it, that's good. If you want the flavor of slightly uncontrolled reality in there to simulate WWII, then sometimes things will go askew...
The ORDERS should be obeyed, as in "Take off and TRY to attack "X" target. Now they might not find it (as most of Hornet's A/C failed to do at Midway)---but at least they would be trying to attack the "right" target (Midway's B-17's didn't go hairing off to the WSW to attack Tanaka's Transport Force---they went after Kido Butai). The big problem with "naval strike" is you CAN'T give it any orders, you CAN'T specify any priorities, you CAN'T even suggest a direction. I don't expect "perfect" results..., but we ought to be able to avoid "perfectly rediculous" results. As it stands now, a gamey but usable strategy is to send some TF's of garbage along with anything important because the game mechanics will generally go after the easiest prey.
Just "confusing the issue with facts" and pointing out that I "don't" think you want to completely remove possibility of strikes hitting the "wrong target" ... as this description of the Battle of Coral Sea shows, on the 7th of May ... everyone hit the "wrong targets" even though the big carrier forces were clearly stalking each other. But they both missed. And so did both sides land based planes, though the American ones tried to bomb the Allies as well an "aggrevated" miss that can't even happen in our WITP !
The first day of the carrier battle of Coral Sea, 7 May 1942, saw the Americans searching for carriers they knew were present and the Japanese looking for ones they feared might be in the area. The opposing commanders, U.S. Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher and Japanese Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi and Rear Admiral Tadaichi Hara, endeavored to "get in the first blow", a presumed prerequisite to victory (and to survival) in a battle between heavily-armed and lightly-protected aircraft carriers. However, both sides suffered from inadequate work by their scouts and launched massive air strikes against greatly inferior secondary targets, which were duly sunk, leaving the most important enemy forces unhit.
Japanese scouting planes spotted the U.S. oiler Neosho (AO-23) and her escort, the destroyer USS Sims (DD-409), before 8AM, in a southerly position well away from Admiral Fletcher's carriers. Reported as a "carrier and a cruiser", these two ships received two high-level bombing attacks during the morning that, as would become typical of such tactics, missed. However, about noon a large force of dive bombers appeared. As was normal for that type of attack, these did not miss. Sims sank with very heavy casualties and Neosho was reduced to a drifting wreck whose survivors were not rescued for days.
Meanwhile, a scout plane from USS Yorktown (CV-5) found the Japanese Covering Group, the light carrier Shoho and four heavy cruisers, which faulty message coding transformed into "two carriers and four heavy cruisers". Yorktown and USS Lexington (CV-2) sent out a huge strike: fifty-three scout-bombers, twenty-two torpedo planes and eighteen fighters. In well-delivered attacks before noon, these simply overwhelmed the Shoho, which received so many bomb and torpedo hits that she sank in minutes. Her passing was marked by some of the War's most dramatic photography.
Adding to the confusion, if not to the score, Japanese land-based torpedo planes and bombers struck an advanced force of Australian and U.S. Navy cruisers, far to the west of Admiral Fletcher's carriers. Skillful ship-handling prevented any damage. Australia-based U.S. Army B-17s also arrived and dropped their bombs, fortunately without hitting anything.
All this had one beneficial effect: the Japanese ordered their Port Moresby invasion force to turn back to await developments. Late in the day, they also sent out nearly thirty carrier planes to search for Fletcher's ships. Most of these were shot down or lost in night landing attempts, significantly reducing Japanese striking power. The opposing carrier forces, quite close together by the standards of air warfare, prepared to resume battle in the morning.
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 4:40 pm
by treespider
Just "confusing the issue with facts" and pointing out that I "don't" think you want to completely remove possibility of strikes hitting the "wrong target" ... as this description of the Battle of Coral Sea shows, on the 7th of May ... everyone hit the "wrong targets" even though the big carrier forces were clearly stalking each other. But they both missed. And so did both sides land based planes, though the American ones tried to bomb the Allies as well an "aggrevated" miss that can't even happen in our WITP !
The question is how often is this occurring in WitP as compared to IRL? I'm not sure anyone knows or could answer that question.
However I would be willing to bet that when it does occur in game, it is always noticed at what is perceived a 'crucial' moment. Whereas the successfully targeted missions are not noticed at all because they were supposed to happen that way.
Maybe someone could setup some tests (alot of work though)
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 7:28 pm
by witpqs
ORIGINAL: m10bob
I'm pretty sure it would have to do with the year the war was inr as to the better chance of making good tactical identification of targets, (better training in identification of types of ships for the airmen with more time in war experience involved.)
Permanent party duty stations always had follow up training, (whether we could fight the hangovers to pay attention was another matter), but honestly, at ANY point in the war, a carrier pilot especially should have a darned better chance of knowing a carrier *like the one he just flew off of*, than to go after PT boats and AG type vessels.
If a targeting bonus were just given to carrier pilots, it would be more accurate than the piss weak chances of going after carriers now !
(BTW, Ron does not have proprietary license to the term "piss weak"....)[:D]
Agreed. I wonder if the engine currently does that?
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 7:46 pm
by witpqs
ORIGINAL: treespider
The question is how often is this occurring in WitP as compared to IRL? I'm not sure anyone knows or could answer that question.
However I would be willing to bet that when it does occur in game, it is always noticed at what is perceived a 'crucial' moment. Whereas the successfully targeted missions are not noticed at all because they were supposed to happen that way.
This is what I also suspect is happening.
Separately, I think carrier planes should be treated differently than land-based planes for purposes of
whether they fly or not when attacking other sea-based targets. LBA might elect not to fly in fear of being slaughtered. CBA knows it would also get slaughtered if it
fails to fly.
I do think that CBA should still have chances of attacking the wrong target (thanks for the write-up Joe!), but maybe get a bonus to be more likely to identify carriers correctly (like m10bob says). As Joe points out, they can still get bad scouting or signals data, ID the wrong target on their own (in spite of being from carriers - sorry Mike, it did happen IRL). Bad scouting/signals data can certainly result in the strike going 180 degrees in the wrong direction. Like treespider says,
how much does that happen?
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 9:36 pm
by el cid again
Just "confusing the issue with facts" and pointing out that I "don't" think you want to completely remove possibility of strikes hitting the "wrong target" ... as this description of the Battle of Coral Sea shows, on the 7th of May ... everyone hit the "wrong targets" even though the big carrier forces were clearly stalking each other. But they both missed. And so did both sides land based planes, though the American ones tried to bomb the Allies as well an "aggrevated" miss that can't even happen in our WITP !
The question is how often is this occurring in WitP as compared to IRL? I'm not sure anyone knows or could answer that question.
A whole lot more often than you might think. On June 19, 1968 I sailed into Subic Bay on USS Waddell - behind a near sister ship - HMAS Hobart. Hobart looked like a refugee from a WWII naval battle, having taken three hits from Sparrows (although we were told two at the time). Seems USAF mistook USS Boston, HMAS Hobart and two destroyers for two enemy Mi-6 helicopters! And I have just learned a US PF was sunk - either in this incident or a different one - about the same time. [Either way it is awful]. It is a whole lot easier to screw up than people realize, and from the air it is easy indeed to get confused.
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 9:40 pm
by el cid again
Separately, I think carrier planes should be treated differently than land-based planes for purposes of whether they fly or not when attacking other sea-based targets. LBA might elect not to fly in fear of being slaughtered. CBA knows it would also get slaughtered if it fails to fly.
I do think that CBA should still have chances of attacking the wrong target (thanks for the write-up Joe!), but maybe get a bonus to be more likely to identify carriers correctly (like m10bob says).
Both your wishes were granted - in advance of being made - by the programmers! [It is like the gospel song says: "sooner than right now, faster than immediately, God answer's prayer"] This is the way the code was written and works. One may quibble with variables and die percentiles, but those are quibbles.
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 9:50 pm
by mdiehl
Like the Swordfish that attacked a US Coast Guard cutter instead of Bismark...
Never happened. Swordfish flew past USCGC
Modoc (WPG 46). No attacks were made on
Modoc.
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 9:57 pm
by Terminus
The attack was made on the Sheffield, wasn't it?
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 10:49 pm
by spence
Not sure whether a couple of drops were actually made on Sheffield. The Swordfish did initiate an attack but I believe at some point during said attack Sheffield was recognized as friendly and the attacks were broken off.
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 10:50 pm
by treespider
Here is another example...
http://home.st.net.au/~dunn/friendlyfire/coral01.htm
On the 7 May 1942 the Allied Task Force led by HMAS Australia was attempting to intercept a reported Japanese invasion group headed towards Port Moresby.
The Allied Task Force included:-
HMAS Australia
HMAS Canberra
HMAS Hobart
USS Chicago
USS Perkins
USS Walke
USS Farragut
The Japanese Invasion Group was reported to comprise a battleship, two aircraft carriers and 17 transports.
On the afternoon of the 7 May 1942, the Allied Task Force was attacked by twelve twin-engined Japanese torpedo bombers. They dropped their torpedoes and strafed the ships causing minimal damage. Five of the Japanese aircraft were shot down in the encounter.
Not long after this attack, the Allied Task Force was again attacked by nineteen heavy bombers flying over at 18,000 feet. But this time they were not Japanese! They were American B-17 Flying Fortresses, of the 435th Bomb Squadron, 19th Bomb Group, based at Townsville. That were returning to Townsville after a bombing raid in New Guinea. Their bombs straddled HMAS Australia, whose upper decks were swamped with water from the explosion. Some minor damage was reported by bomb shrapnel. A further three aircraft then dropped bombs from 25,000 feet near the USS Perkins. Harry Spieth was one of the pilots involved in this accidental bombing incident. HMAS Australia returned fire with its anti-aircraft guns.
These B-17's had formerly been part of a US Navy Task Force in "Southern Bomber Command". Six of the aircraft in this Task Force had been members of the 88th Reconnaissance Squadron of the 7th Bomb Group. The Navy Task Force was then transferred to the 40th Reconnaissance Squadron of the 19th Bombardment Group, which was later redesignated to become the 435th Bomb Squadron.
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 10:52 pm
by Terminus
ORIGINAL: spence
Not sure whether a couple of drops were actually made on Sheffield. The Swordfish did initiate an attack but I believe at some point during said attack Sheffield was recognized as friendly and the attacks were broken off.
Actually, no fewer than 11 torpedoes were dropped against her.
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 11:01 pm
by treespider
ORIGINAL: Terminus
ORIGINAL: spence
Not sure whether a couple of drops were actually made on Sheffield. The Swordfish did initiate an attack but I believe at some point during said attack Sheffield was recognized as friendly and the attacks were broken off.
Actually, no fewer than 11 torpedoes were dropped against her.
This is true....Google Sheffield and Swordfish
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 11:02 pm
by treespider
Found this interesting tidbit looking up Friendly fire stats....
Friendly Fire
Code: Select all
Casualties on US Ships Hit by Allied Gunfire During WW2
1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Ship Type WIA KIA WIA KIA WIA KIA WIA KIA WIA KIA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carrier 0 0 0 0 0 0 115 16 15 16
Destroyer 8 5 0 0 21 3 80 10 109 18
Battleship 0 0 0 0 0 0 99 21 109 21
Submarine 0 0 0 0 0 83 0 0 0 83
PT Boat 0 0 0 0 23 22 0 4 23 26
Landing Ship 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 3 35 3
Salvage Ship 0 0 18 8 0 0 0 6 18 14
Cruiser 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 2 21 2
Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 1 8 1
Patrol Craft 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 6 1
Minesweeper 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 1
Cargo Ship 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Seaplane Tender 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hospital Ship 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 8 5 18 8 44 108 368 65 438 186
Source:
Gauker, Eleanor D. and Christopher G. Blood. "Friendly Fire Incidents During World War II Naval Operations." Naval War College Review 48, no.1 (Winter 1995): 115-22.
Interestingly more incidents occurred later in the war. Maybe misdirected AA fire.
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Mon Mar 13, 2006 11:11 pm
by Terminus
Well that, and the simple fact that there were more ships, and they were used more.
RE: Game design and 'fudge' factors
Posted: Tue Mar 14, 2006 12:44 am
by Ron Saueracker
ORIGINAL: treespider
Found this interesting tidbit looking up Friendly fire stats....
Friendly Fire
Code: Select all
Casualties on US Ships Hit by Allied Gunfire During WW2
1942 1943 1944 1945 Total
Ship Type WIA KIA WIA KIA WIA KIA WIA KIA WIA KIA
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carrier 0 0 0 0 0 0 115 16 15 16
Destroyer 8 5 0 0 21 3 80 10 109 18
Battleship 0 0 0 0 0 0 99 21 109 21
Submarine 0 0 0 0 0 83 0 0 0 83
PT Boat 0 0 0 0 23 22 0 4 23 26
Landing Ship 0 0 0 0 0 0 35 3 35 3
Salvage Ship 0 0 18 8 0 0 0 6 18 14
Cruiser 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 2 21 2
Transport 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 1 8 1
Patrol Craft 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 6 1
Minesweeper 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 3 1
Cargo Ship 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Seaplane Tender 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hospital Ship 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 8 5 18 8 44 108 368 65 438 186
Source:
Gauker, Eleanor D. and Christopher G. Blood. "Friendly Fire Incidents During World War II Naval Operations." Naval War College Review 48, no.1 (Winter 1995): 115-22.
Interestingly more incidents occurred later in the war. Maybe misdirected AA fire.
This entire list is potentially useless as it does not even credit the Atlanta, hit by ships in her own TF at 1st Guadalcanal.