Matrix Games Forums

Hi all,

Does anyone know how close any ship was in coming near to KB during it's voyage? Transports? Steamers? Subs? Neutrals etc?

Steven

But anything speculative is PROBABLY going to produce a result more favorable to the US.

I would agree in regards to losses of Japanese aircrews. However, they planned on taking far heavier losses than what they actually incurred.

However, I don't believe that any force at Pearl Harbor except several carriers had the means to inflict substantial damage on KB.

What Nagumo would have done after sinking a US CV is anyone's guess. But if I were Nagumo, I would rely upon my scout planes and subs to tell me where the fleet had gone. I then might select a course that would put KB in a position to cut them off if possible.

Without any tactical intel, I might take the fleet E/NE of PH in the hopes of finding any ships fleeing towards the West Coast. PH isn't going anywhere and once I've engaged the US fleet or ascertained that it can not be engaged, I can launch any necessary strikes against PH or retire. Assuming that I must strike PH, my first strike would target the airfields, specifically fighter airfields. If I'm able to gain air superiority, the repair and oil facilities would next be on the target list.

I should have been in charge!!!

Chez

Hi, Kimmel got in trouble for being surprised. However if he had advance warning and ran south rather then towards the enemy he would have been shot.
There were plenty of Admirals in the USN on Dec 6th 1941 who didn't think the Japanese could sink a USN BB by air. In fact the only USN BB sank in the war were sunk on Dec 7th at PH.

It might have led to a disaster. (unless it was a night action) But KB only has 2 Kongos against the USN battleline.
However I can't see anyone in the US Military running from the fight. The B-17's would launch as soon as they could be armed. (without escorts)

If KB was more then 2 days from PH and the contact had radio. Nagumo would have no choice but to turn around. If the contact was less then 24 hours from PH then he would have sped up and launched as soon as in range.

However, on the comments that Nagumo was a big chicken

I did not mean to say that Nagumo was a big chicken ( if you were getting that from me ). Not too many Japanese admirals were chickens ! Nagumo was a bit more cautious than many ( which in general is probably more of a complement that not ) ... I used the words "run away" ... perhaps I should have said "reverse course boldly" !

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

But anything speculative is PROBABLY going to produce a result more favorable to the US.

I would agree in regards to losses of Japanese aircrews. However, they planned on taking far heavier losses than what they actually incurred.

However, I don't believe that any force at Pearl Harbor except several carriers had the means to inflict substantial damage on KB.

What Nagumo would have done after sinking a US CV is anyone's guess. But if I were Nagumo, I would rely upon my scout planes and subs to tell me where the fleet had gone. I then might select a course that would put KB in a position to cut them off if possible.

Without any tactical intel, I might take the fleet E/NE of PH in the hopes of finding any ships fleeing towards the West Coast. PH isn't going anywhere and once I've engaged the US fleet or ascertained that it can not be engaged, I can launch any necessary strikes against PH or retire. Assuming that I must strike PH, my first strike would target the airfields, specifically fighter airfields. If I'm able to gain air superiority, the repair and oil facilities would next be on the target list.
Chez

I doubt this. Nagumo wasn't willing to stick around even when he had a terrific result in real life. Hard to imagine him staying in the area when his initial airstrikes came back minus 100+ A/C and a report that the fleet wasn't there and the defenses were ready. And while I agree that the Japanese were expecting and willing to take higher losses to achieve their goals they were also totally unprepared to replace them.
You know exactly what advantages the game will give you, exactly where the US Fleet starts, where the US CV's were. Nagumo knew none of this. He knew he had charge of a number of his nations irreplacable assets..., and that he was several thousand miles from support or safety.

Nagumo tends to get painted as somewhat overcautious and/or indecisive, but the recent literature from Shattered Sword painted a different picture. Nagumo (in the author's opinions) acted aggressively and quickly once he had all the info he felt was necessary (which wasn't enough of course) After the disaster if anything, he actually got overaggressive and sought a surface engagement with the enemy despite the futility of such a move.

Nagumo's primary fault was that he wasn't really carrier Admiral material and tended to go with the flow a bit too much. He didn't become what i'd term "cautious" until after Midway but then again, if you lost 4 precious carriers in one battle, you'd probably be a little hesitant too. [;)]

The lack of CV's present at PH was definately a major disapointment for Nagumo and co. If he and his staff thought there was a chance of catching one with 1st Air Fleet, i don't see why he wouldn't have acted as he did at Midway (once news of enemy flattops was confirmed)

You know exactly what advantages the game will give you, exactly where the US Fleet starts, where the US CV's were. Nagumo knew none of this. He knew he had charge of a number of his nations irreplacable assets..., and that he was several thousand miles from support or safety.

My "what if" has nothing to do with WitP and the locations of US forces.

The premise is: What if Nagumo was presented with a present in the form of a US CV on Dec 6, 41? What would he have done?

I think he would have attacked it and most likely sunk it. Then he has a choice. (1) Continue with the PH attack mission -or- (2) change his plans and attempt to engage any US ships that have sortied -or- (3) retire.

(1) PH is alerted and the US fleet has most likely sortied. Is PH still a worthwhile target? Worthwhile in terms of damage inflicted versus losses to aircrews or damage to ships? In the Japanese mind, probably not the best choice. They want an engagement with the fleet, hopefully sink the remaining carrier. They know Saratoga is on the West Coast. They know that 2 carriers have been operating out of Pearl. Now one is sunk. Where is the other? Do they search for it or go after the BBs that have left port? What about option (2)?

(2) So they think about going after the fleet. The question is: Which way do the US ships head? Will they attempt to engage KB based on limited intel as to exactly where KB is? Do they attempt to link up with the remaining carrier? Or do they make a break for safety. Nagumo has to answer that question to have a reasonable chance of success.

In my mind, the prudent thing for the US BBs is to head S, SE or E for safety or remain in Hawaiin waters where land-based air cover is available. The US really has little clue about what they are up against other than knowing a swarm of aircraft from an unknown number of carriers attacked and sank a US CV somewhere to the NW. By this time, the European war is showing that BBs without air cover are vulnerable. So sending the US BBs on a potential wild goose chase to the NW without air cover is a huge gamble, one that most likely would result in several BBs being added to Davy Jone's Locker. I seriously doubt that they would ever be able to close to gun range even if KB is firmly located. Jap scout planes are going to be airborne and most likely will detect them well before hand. Add to that any time required for them to fuel and arm, organize escorts and sail out of PH probably means a delay of at least 12-24 hours. KB has plenty of time to pursue their own plans.

But that still doesn't answer the question that Nagumo ponders. Where is the US fleet going and what are their intentions? With a bit of luck, the subs will give him enough info that will allow Nagumo to react accordingly. If not, he will have to guess.

Heading due south means passing close to PH, not really a good idea even though PH has only limited offensive air power and most of that is relatively short-ranged and obsolete. Plus if the US fleet remains in home waters it gains the benefit of land-based CAP and is now in a position to possibly intercept. Plus it puts him further from his oilers and he will need to refuel by the evening of 7 Dec as the attack of the US CV would have cancelled any scheduled refueling operations.

Does he head for a position ENE of PH? This covers the US retreat route but also puts PH and an unlocated carrier between him and home. Not the best of tactical positions. One little sub can ruin KB's whole day. Plus there is the issue with fuel again.

Head SW in the hopes of finding the other carrier? Quite a long shot with little prospect of success unless the US CV throws itself on KB's sword. He can at least order his oilers to proceed towards Kawjalein and meet them somwhere south of Midway.

That leaves option (3) which is really not an option. Nagumo will lose face if he returns to Japan without seeking a decisive battle with the US fleet and PH untouched. So what if he sank a carrier. So he will attack. My guess would be PH with a pre-dawn strike, hoping to catch many planes of the ground. Losses are bound to be heavy but the Japanese have never called off a strike simply because losses might be heavy. Plus the IJN fleet is likely to survive relatively unscathed. There is no reason to believe that the US Army air forces are going to be any more effective than they were at Midway. Of course, Nagumo doesn't know that but they pretty much had only contempt for the US air forces anyways.

My guess? He goes for option (1). He attacks Pearl. With any luck the repair and fuel facilities are heavily damaged, maybe even destroyed. US air power is sure to take a beating and Japanese air losses will probably be heavy but it just may force the US fleet to relocate to the West Coast temporarily or to some other, less capable location.

My guess is as good as yours. No one knows what Nagumo would have done. It would have been a difficult decision regardless. The bigger question is given a Japanese attack 24 hours ahed of schedule, how does that effect the events in the Far East? Do we respond any better? Surely the Brits will but who knows about MacArthur.

Chez

I am currenlt re-reading "At Dawn We Slept" by Prange and happen to be in the first week of December. [;)]
I will quote from the author on what Nagumo's intentions were.
"At 0925 on December 3 Nagumo signaled his force, expressing clearly his anxiety and sense of lurking danger:
1. It has already been ordered to go to war on 8 December, but so critical has become the situation in the Far East that one can hardly predict war would not explode by that time. So far no new information on Hawaii area received and also no indication of out task Task Force being detected. But since the enemey intention is naturally beyond prediction, strict attention will be directed to meet any unexpected encounter with an enemy.
2. It is intended that this force will operate as scheduled even if war break out before 8 December...
At 1040 on December 4, local time - henceforth all times pertaining to the task force are local - Nagumo further instructed: " When an enemy or Third Power's warship or merchant ship is sighted, her communication equipment will be destroyed if and when necessary to protect secrecy of our intention, and, in case of emergency, she will be sunk." Nagumo's signal should dispose of any idea that if his task force were spotted, he would have abandoned Operation Hawaii, despite Kusaka's and Genda's remarks at Hitokappu Bay. At X-3 day the moment to recall the First Air Fleet for any reason short of a sudden diplomatic victory in Washington had passed."

From this time forward the amount of planes placed on a alert status on all the CV's increased.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

You know exactly what advantages the game will give you, exactly where the US Fleet starts, where the US CV's were. Nagumo knew none of this. He knew he had charge of a number of his nations irreplacable assets..., and that he was several thousand miles from support or safety.

My "what if" has nothing to do with WitP and the locations of US forces.

The premise is: What if Nagumo was presented with a present in the form of a US CV on Dec 6, 41? What would he have done?

The question is HOW would this happen? The two US CV's were a good deal South and West of Oahu; while Nagumo was coming down from due north of the island. This can only be a "what if" is someone was doing something totally stupid and against orders.

I think he would have attacked it and most likely sunk it. Then he has a choice. (1) Continue with the PH attack mission -or- (2) change his plans and attempt to engage any US ships that have sortied -or- (3) retire.

I'm sure that would have been what he tried to do too. But the chance of it happening was nil. Nagumo's course was determined specifically to avoid this kind of thing. His goal was SUPRISE.

(1) PH is alerted and the US fleet has most likely sortied. Is PH still a worthwhile target? Worthwhile in terms of damage inflicted versus losses to aircrews or damage to ships? In the Japanese mind, probably not the best choice. They want an engagement with the fleet, hopefully sink the remaining carrier. They know Saratoga is on the West Coast. They know that 2 carriers have been operating out of Pearl. Now one is sunk. Where is the other? Do they search for it or go after the BBs that have left port? What about option (2)?

And HOW does Nagumo KNOW that the Pacific Fleet has left PH? It isn't like he has satelite photography available. His first means of knowing would be when Fuchida & company arrived and found 100 fighters on CAP and no targets below. And as far as I can tell, the Japs had no idea where Saratoga was.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

You know exactly what advantages the game will give you, exactly where the US Fleet starts, where the US CV's were. Nagumo knew none of this. He knew he had charge of a number of his nations irreplacable assets..., and that he was several thousand miles from support or safety.

My "what if" has nothing to do with WitP and the locations of US forces.

The premise is: What if Nagumo was presented with a present in the form of a US CV on Dec 6, 41? What would he have done?

The question is HOW would this happen? The two US CV's were a good deal South and West of Oahu; while Nagumo was coming down from due north of the island. This can only be a "what if" is someone was doing something totally stupid and against orders.

I think he would have attacked it and most likely sunk it. Then he has a choice. (1) Continue with the PH attack mission -or- (2) change his plans and attempt to engage any US ships that have sortied -or- (3) retire.

I'm sure that would have been what he tried to do too. But the chance of it happening was nil. Nagumo's course was determined specifically to avoid this kind of thing. His goal was SUPRISE.

(1) PH is alerted and the US fleet has most likely sortied. Is PH still a worthwhile target? Worthwhile in terms of damage inflicted versus losses to aircrews or damage to ships? In the Japanese mind, probably not the best choice. They want an engagement with the fleet, hopefully sink the remaining carrier. They know Saratoga is on the West Coast. They know that 2 carriers have been operating out of Pearl. Now one is sunk. Where is the other? Do they search for it or go after the BBs that have left port? What about option (2)?

And HOW does Nagumo KNOW that the Pacific Fleet has left PH? It isn't like he has satelite photography available. His first means of knowing would be when Fuchida & company arrived and found 100 fighters on CAP and no targets below. And as far as I can tell, the Japs had no idea where Saratoga was.

Obviously there is something you don't understand about "what if" scenarios. The original hypothesis was, "What if a US carrier was positioned in KB's path?" You need to be a little more flexible in your thinking if you are to evaluate potentialities.

And yes, the Japanese knew that Saratoga was on the West Coast. They knew that she had left drydock in Bremerton and was scheduled to arrive in San Diego to pick up her airwing. Not that hard to figure out. Especially when you consider the Japanese consulate in San Diego had a panoramic view of San Diego harbor and North Island. As for the other 2 carriers the Japanese knew only that they were not in port and assumed operating somewhere in the CentPac.

As far as knowing whether the US fleet had sailed or not, what would a prudent US commander do? Leave his ships bottled up in harbor? Come on, think about it! The Japanese would have assumed they had sortied. If they hadn't, all the better for the Japanese. Scout planes would probably reconned the harbor and its highly doubtful that that many ships could leave harbor without being spotted by at least 1 sub.

Chez

I wish I had time to read my own thread. I've been slammed this week. No time to read or post Mystery Ships.

As you were...
-F-

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

My "what if" has nothing to do with WitP and the locations of US forces.

The premise is: What if Nagumo was presented with a present in the form of a US CV on Dec 6, 41? What would he have done?

I think the answer would be where, when and how the CV was encountered. If it were me and I thought there was a chance I had not been detected, since after all a US CV would not have been operating with full naval search capability, I would try to skirt the CV to attack PH still undetected. YOu have to hit the larger force first with the most you can, then come back and try to run down the carrier. Attacking I fully alerted PH would have been tough, possibly suicide for the KB pilots.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Obviously there is something you don't understand about "what if" scenarios. The original hypothesis was, "What if a US carrier was positioned in KB's path?" You need to be a little more flexible in your thinking if you are to evaluate potentialities.

I suppose I see a difference between "what if" (something that might have happened, but didn't), and "let's speculate" (anything goes..., maybe the CVN NIMITZ got time-warped to 1941). What possible reason would a US CV have for being 250-500 miles NORTH of Oahu? There is nothing there except bad weather and rough seas (exactly why the Japanese came that way). It's more likely to say that due to a navagation error Kido Butai ran half a dozen ships ashore on French Frigate Shoals at 25 knots in the dark.

As far as knowing whether the US fleet had sailed or not, what would a prudent US commander do? Leave his ships bottled up in harbor? Come on, think about it! The Japanese would have assumed they had sortied. If they hadn't, all the better for the Japanese. Scout planes would probably reconned the harbor and its highly doubtful that that many ships could leave harbor without being spotted by at least 1 sub.

But the Japanese DIDN'T send scout planes to Oahu (they didn't want to give the American's any warning)
And under radio silence what Jap sub is going to file a "sighting report"---which then would have to work it's way through the Japanese command structure and back to Nagumo (look at the mess they had at Midway 6 months later). "What would a prudent US commander do?" Good question. How much warning are you going to speculate? Does the US Commander have a good read on Kido Butai's course and speed? Or just that they seem to be heading towards Hawaii? Remember, he has NO naval air cover available unless he links up with Lexington and Enterprise. And he KNOWS Kido Butai is faster than his battleline. Seeking "sea room" gives you room to manuever and fight..., but it also offers room to run and hide while you wait for the rest of the fleet to join up.

No matter what kind of "spot" you speculate on, the chance of "shadowing" KB is unlikely (planes go home at night, subs couldn't keep up when the high speed run south began, and a surface ship would likely have been sunk). So Kimmel couldn't strive for a night or dawn intercept (The Ideal solution from the US side). With no air support, and no probability of intercepting the Japanese, there are two possibilities remaining. Either stay in port with all defenses manned and trust to army and marine air cover..., or escape to the open ocean and be unfindable until the rest of the fleet can join up.

Chez

What possible reason would a US CV have for being 250-500 miles NORTH of Oahu? There is nothing there except bad weather and rough seas (exactly why the Japanese came that way).

Who knows why a US carrier would operate there. Maybe for training, maybe taking the northen route to ferry aircraft to Midway. Who knows, who cares. The fact is that it was possible and not unreasonable for a US carrier to be operating north of Hawaii. Maybe not likely but most certainly possible.

As far as the Japanese taking the northern route to PH, they took it because it was clear of the commercial shipping lanes and had a reduced liklihood of detection, not a zero chance of detection.

But the Japanese DIDN'T send scout planes to Oahu (they didn't want to give the American's any warning)
And under radio silence what Jap sub is going to file a "sighting report"---

Why wouldn't they attempt to recon PH if their presence is already known through their attack on a US vessel? What's left to hide? Nagumo surely would have broken radio silence to inform Combined Fleet of the attack and it would be an easy enough task for Combined fleet to order the subs to report any ship movements immediately regardless of the consequences.

No matter what kind of "spot" you speculate on, the chance of "shadowing" KB is unlikely (planes go home at night, subs couldn't keep up when the high speed run south began, and a surface ship would likely have been sunk). So Kimmel couldn't strive for a night or dawn intercept (The Ideal solution from the US side). With no air support, and no probability of intercepting the Japanese, there are two possibilities remaining. Either stay in port with all defenses manned and trust to army and marine air cover..., or escape to the open ocean and be unfindable until the rest of the fleet can join up.

I think that's what I said.

Out of curiosity, just what do you think Nagumo would have done had KB been detected 24 hours prior to the attack? Turn tail and go home?

BTW, you asked how the Japanese knew where the Saratoga was. Try this website: Japanese Intel Reports

Here's a n example of what Tokyo was receiving from her consulates in the States:

[111]

From Tokyo (Toyoda)

To: Seattle

October 16, 1941

J-19

Cir. #2187

Henceforth, I would like to have you refer in your reports to the movement of warships as follows:

1. As long as there are no great changes in the movement and basing of warships, report on them at least once every ten days. In the event of priority intelligence, report such on each occasion.

a. The arrival or departure of American flagships of the fleet or scouting force.

b. Should more than ten vessels of any type arrive or depart from port at one time.

c. The arrival or departure of warships of countries other than the United States (give as detailed a report as possible on the class of ------).

2. Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes, report it at once.

ARMY 24117 Trans. 10/29/41 (S)



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

From: Seattle (Sato)
To: Tokyo
October 22, 1941
J-19 (Priority)
#150
The following warships entered Bremerton Naval Yard on the 21st: The Warspite "repairs are to be made to her bridge), the Maryland and a vessel which seems to be a cruiser.

Relayed to and Los Angeles.

ARMY 24316 Trans. 11/4/41 (7)


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[112]

From: Seattle (Sato)
To: Tokyo
October 28, 1941
J-19 (Priority)
#150

In commemoration of Navy Day, the 27th, fifteen Coast Guard vessels sailed through the harbor here in single file. Their names were as follows: The Kane, Ciruma, [a] the Brooks, the Fox (the above listed

Page 310

vessels have had their four-inch guns replaced by five-inch guns; all of these were brand-new ones), the Frigate Bird, the Crow, the Pintail, the Eagle 57, Batukei, [a] the Butternut, the Amber, the YP 83, 87, 89, and 90.

ARMY 24997 Trans. 11/19/41 (2)

[a] Kana spelling.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


From: Seattle (Sato)
To: Tokyo
November 10, 1941
J-19 (Priority)
#165 (Message to Washington Circular #80.)
Vessels anchored in Brementon on the 9th: Saratoga, Warspite, Colorado, (I have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I have reported on successive occasions as the Maryland) and the Charleston.

Relayed to ----- and Los Angeles.

ARMY 24990 Trans. 11/19/41 (2)

[113]


B. TRANSLATED AFTER 7 DECEMBER 1941
From: Seattle
To: Tokyo
December 6, 1941
PA-K2
#184 (Urgent intelligence.)

1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado.

2 The Saratoga sailed the same day.

ARMY 25876 Trans. 12/8/41 (2-TT)

So the Japanese had plenty of intel on ship movements on the West Coast.


Chez

Even when a surprise attack is accidentally "discovered" ahead of time, human nature is to deny the reality. Second and third recon missions are typically ordered, and the decision making apparatus is frequently paralyzed by the confusion.

No American commander would have initiated a war even if the Japanese CVs were discovered prior to Pearl Harbor in international waters, and in all likelihood very little would have been done at Pearl Harbor other than to put everyone on the highest level of alert (if even that). I seriously doubt that the U.S. fleet would have sortied in any direction.

Even today, if we suddenly found an unusual number of nuclear subs off our coasts and landing craft loading troops in China or elsewhere, I doubt that we would act. Human nature is to deny the intelligence reports and the possibility of a surprise attack. Moreover, signs of the 9/11 attack were missed or misintepreted by professionals.

In the ETO, nations were "surprised" and caught unprepared even though plentiful advance warnings of an attack were present.

It is my understanding that the Japanese fleet traveled a great deal of the distance towards Pearl Harbor in a storm system, making any discovery unlikely, and certainly a condition worthy of a second or third look "to see for sure" even if a freighter would have reported a fleet within the storm. In such a case, complete surprise was still possible IMO, for the simple reason that the decision making apparatus is often inept or paralyzed.

Chez, were those actual intercepts or just a fictional representation? My reason for the question is that these intercepts are placing HMS Warspite in Puget Sound Naval Yard on Dec 6. If this is true, then she should be on our maps on Dec 7.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

What possible reason would a US CV have for being 250-500 miles NORTH of Oahu? There is nothing there except bad weather and rough seas (exactly why the Japanese came that way).

Who knows why a US carrier would operate there. Maybe for training, maybe taking the northen route to ferry aircraft to Midway. Who knows, who cares. The fact is that it was possible and not unreasonable for a US carrier to be operating north of Hawaii. Maybe not likely but most certainly possible.

NO it isn't. Steam north into bad weather and rough seas for "training"? Planes and pilots are expensive (as were torpedoes..., and we know where that led); why add to the risk of losses? In your eagerness to get some US CV's wrecked you are postulating the rediculous. There is one rational "what if" that puts a US CV in Kido Butai's sights..., and that is if the Enterprise Group hadn't been held up a day and had sailed into Pearl on the evening of the 6th. The rest is just "pie-in-the-sky" fanboyism. Like my suggestion of KB wrecking a couple of CV's on French Frigate Shoals through a night navigation error. That's silly..., but so is your "let's say a US CV was screwing around 500 miles north of Oahu for no understandable reason".

Chez wrote somewhere that the Kb was going after the CVs. IMHO you are wrong in this issue. The KB was after the BB's and not until Midway have they realized the importance of the CV see Nagumo's attempt for a surface engagement.

ORIGINAL: Ursa MAior

Chez wrote somewhere that the Kb was going after the CVs. IMHO you are wrong in this issue. The KB was after the BB's and not until Midway have they realized the importance of the CV see Nagumo's attempt for a surface engagement.

Ah, but this is where the orders link posted in post #3 of this thread helps us. I quote a couple of excerpts below.


The targets for the first group will be limited to about four battleships and four aircraft carriers; the order of targets will be battleships and then aircraft carriers.

The targets for the second group will be limited to four or five enemy aircraft carriers. If the number of targets is insufficient, they will select targets in the order of cruisers and battleships.

So the orders called for destruction of both BB, CV and CA/CL, with BB having the priority for the first attack and CV for the second, but with CV also being targeted in the first.

Also the fact that the Japanese formed First Air Fleet in April 1941 containing all the large carriers in one tactical entity is an indication that they realized the "importance" of the CV.

Sure, some of the Japanese admirals did, but they must have had the same fights between "gun-club" and "plane-club" admirals as any other major navy at the time.