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This is a very interesting discussion.

Every time I think I understand something it only lasts until I have to discuss it.

One thing I don't get is at what level of warfare (operational or tactical) you are discussing.
I ask this because in CotA the player and the computer opponents are given objectives which appear to be operational ones (correct me if I'm wrong). I speculate that given the size of CotA maps, there is no room for maneuver (pun intended) at the operational level. I argue that for a typical CotA scenario, a maneuver warfare type of war waging at the operational level would mean the player going out of the map boundaries.
So the objectives come to us from a level of warfare that we are not waging during the scenario length. In other words, commander's intentions for our mission are tied to the scenario objectives (secure that crossing, deny the enemy the use of this crossing, etc).

When Guderian was crossing the Ardennes during May of 1940, he had an objective in mind that was a piece of terrain (a crossing at Sedan).

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy

I would love to hear errr....read the German term, in case it's mentioned anywhere.

Guys,

OK, I will try to reply, but be aware that there are a number of important maneuver warfare concepts that I have not mentioned, such as the importance3 of the "main effort", the "reserve", "surfaces and gaps", "Schwerpunkt" and so on.

I did not have Lind"s book with me when I wrote the above and my German is poor, so now that I have the book, here it is from Lind's book:"In German, the terrain that you designate as objective would be called the 'Angriffsziel' , or the aiming point for the attack. The Angriffsziel or aiming point might change during the course of a battle, especially if the enemy is mobile. It is the enemy, then, that is the objekt of our efforts."

Wylie states that when he says "objective", he means "Angriffsziel". Otherwise the term used should be "mission", "which should not be confused with objective".

As pointed out by Wylie in this lesson, in the river problem the mission is not the river but to prevent the enemy from crossing the river.The river as well as the hills and other terrain used to accomplish the mission are "Angriffsziel".

As for the Battle of the Bulge, I am like most wargamers generally familiar with the battle, but not to the extent of being able to discuss the orders given to the Germans (Perhaps I can find something in Mellinthin's or Von Luck's memoirs, but I don't have time right now, I have to watch the Edward R. Morrow movie I rented....).

But it seems clear to me that the mission of the Germans in the Bulge was to screw up the Allies ability to fight by seizing the port of Antwerp thus cutting off their supplies. The river and the Port itself were "Angriffsziel".

As for Rommel, it is true that he was given orders to cross the river, but clearly he interpreted his orders that the aim was to disrupt the enemy. When Rommel saw the situation, he changed his orders and exploited the opportunity to continue, thus surprising and disorganizing the enemy wuith a speed that the Allies were unabble to match, a classical case of exploiting the Boyd OODA cycle.

As for Lenhard's criticism of Operation Desert Storm, it is a 40-page appendix of his book. I am not prepared at this point to go into its details, but his idea is clearly that the US Army was "not a good army. It was merely a better army than its opponent... Operation Desert Storm was strictly controlled from the top down. There was no room for individual initiative". I would not be surprised that General Schwartzkopf disagrees...[8|]

Since whole books have been written on the subject, it is not surprising that short paragraphs ae not enough to say everything, especially coming from an amateur like me[:'(]

As for the game, it is a good point that the size of the map can sometimes preclude deviating from one's orders. But I see this as less of a problem than the additional delays when changing the "Angriffsziel".This is partly because the player represents only the top-level commander, which is not an unreasonable choice.A necessary consequence of this is that if the lower-level commander does not take the initiative to "interpret" his orders, there is nothing you can do about it. Perhaps a solution would be to give the choice of the player to command ANY one unit in the scenario for the duration of the scenario, the others being controlled by the AI.But I suppose that this would raise problems all its own.[8|]

Henri

ORIGINAL: hen5ri

But it seems clear to me that the mission of the Germans in the Bulge was to screw up the Allies ability to fight by seizing the port of Antwerp thus cutting off their supplies. The river and the Port itself were "Angriffsziel".

No.
First of all, all generals, who were using their brains, knew that the final plan's goal, to reach Antwerpen, couldn't be accomplished with the ressources at hand (troops, fuel, vehicles).
In many officers minds, the "official" goal Antwerpen was rather meant as pointer to mark the direction of the thrust, as the main goal was to get the Brits on the right flank into trouble, if not crush them, and to take the fuel depots in Liège.
The deployment of artificial harbours along the Normandy coast, and the capture of Cherbourg (along with its deep harbour) ensured a halfway constant flow of supplies. The rapid advance, right into Germany, in particular the Aachen and Huertghenwald area, just overstretched the Allied supply lines, but they were never threatened to be cut off, even with Antwerpen under German control it just would have been a disruption forcing the Allies to change routes. Supply lines were only cut off locally, e.g. during the siege of Bastogne.

The corresponding term in English for "Angriffsziel" is "Target", so there's no lack of corresponding terms here, at least. So, just to make sure........is that POA-thingy (which I don't recall at all) a term resulting from your bad German [;)], or a real term/approach used in WW2? (serious question :p)

As for Rommel, it is true that he was given orders to cross the river, but clearly he interpreted his orders that the aim was to disrupt the enemy. When Rommel saw the situation, he changed his orders and exploited the opportunity to continue, thus surprising and disorganizing the enemy wuith a speed that the Allies were unabble to match........

Exactly, that speed, along with him ignoring the imminent loss of secure supply lines, had been scathed by Rommels superiors, even by Guderian, who in turn kinda "invented" fast armoured movements (way before Rommel got the chance to lead any armoured formation), laid down in one of his books he wrote b4 the war (1937) - but even for him the speed appeared to be out of place, and too dangerous for his liking. That's why I was pointing out the initial minimalistic set of objectives that had been defined prior to the campaign in France, where the lack of proceeding orders might have partially encouraged Rommel to go further - if so, an interesting + surprising side-effect. [:D]

....."not a good army. It was merely a better army than its opponent......."

Operation Desert Storm was strictly controlled from the top down. There was no room for individual initiative".

Well......now, the quality of the Army would be another topic. At the time (1990) the US military started to deploy forces for desert storm, and later on for desert shield, it hadn't finished (maybe not even started in some sectors) the process of adjusting doctrines or defining a new orientation (afaik), caused by new types of tasks emerged after the end of the Cold War . So they were still undergoing major changes at that time, imho.

I was just referring to the statement that claimed that attrition warfare was the only type being used at the time.

Even today, the US military incorporates 2 military schools/approaches, the "System of Systems" and the "self-synchronization".

The first is the term for a system (set) of individual systems (relegating soldiers on the ground to the role of sensors, in fact), e.g. special forces marking targets for another system - the Air Force, helicopters/planes clearing a path for tanks, etc., so literally all components of a military organization (ppl, weapons, communications systems) coming together to form this system of systems - tightly coupled - featuring a rather centralized/directive approach.

The second term rather suggests that the military is a network of component parts, where the devolvement of decision-making processes to lower levels, and the greater connectivity via networks (provided that the technical progress of communications would emerge), would create an environment that would enforce lower level units to act autonomously in such a way that "out of a large number of independent actions order would emerge". This would be self-synchronization. "Systems capable of self-synchronization are called "complex adaptive systems".

Now, I don't know which school "won", since I haven't read/heard much about 'em for a long time, but my guess is that these latest changes aren't finished today, nor will it be easy to implement any of these systems to be used for new tasks in the future (e.g. conflicts in the 3rd world) successfully, given the current/historic culture in the US military.

These challenges/changes will weaken the US army for quite some time, that's my guess at least.

Perhaps a solution would be to give the choice of the player to command ANY one unit in the scenario for the duration of the scenario, the others being controlled by the AI.But I suppose that this would raise problems all its own.[8|]

Yeah, a game causing 100% CPU/system load for example, hehe. [;)][:D]

Well, I'd rather love to see a more feasable solution where the order delay would have a different impact, depending on the level of command:

e.g. the order delay should be ZERO if the player decides to issue orders to single (detached) coys/platoons. This would compensate the current absence of an intelligent/universal AI (which would be able to define/change objectives on its own) and simulate a kind of adaption (in real time) on the lowest level. It's an easy guess that coys wouldn't have to face the same time-consuming prep-phase a fully fledged division would need to carry out an attack......a coy would almost adjust plans on the fly, as there's no command-chain overhead, as infos/orders from the CO will have to be forwarded to 1st/2nd lieutenants, to platoon leaders, and to a couple of NCOs, only.

Therefor order delay on higher levels (e.g. Bn, Rgt or Div. level) should remain untouched (if the user turned on any level of order delay).

Goodguy said:

"First of all, all generals, who were using their brains, knew that the final plan's goal, to reach Antwerpen, couldn't be accomplished with the ressources at hand (troops, fuel, vehicles).
In many officers minds, the "official" goal Antwerpen was rather meant as pointer to mark the direction of the thrust, as the main goal was to get the Brits on the right flank into trouble, if not crush them, and to take the fuel depots in Liège.
The deployment of artificial harbours along the Normandy coast, and the capture of Cherbourg (along with its deep harbour) ensured a halfway constant flow of supplies. The rapid advance, right into Germany, in particular the Aachen and Huertghenwald area, just overstretched the Allied supply lines, but they were never threatened to be cut off, even with Antwerpen under German control it just would have been a disruption forcing the Allies to change routes. Supply lines were only cut off locally, e.g. during the siege of Bastogne."

The important point is that both for the Bulge offensive as it was planned and as its modification as was proposed by some generals, the objective was the enemy and not terrain. Here is what Guderian says in "Panzer Leader"

"The entire strength of the German Army that could be collected together during the last few months was to attack from the Eifel towards the Meuse south of Liege, with the object of breaking through the relatively thin Allied front in this sector; this force was then to cross the Meuse towards Brussels and Antwerp, thus achieving a strategic breakthrough; the enemy forces North of the breakthough were finally to be encircled and destroyed."

It is true that some Generals proposed a more modest attack, but the objective was still the same. Guderian continues:

"They wished the attack to be limited to the area East of the Meuse with the purpose of defeating the enemy forces located along the East bank between Aachen and Liege."

It is clear that the objective of the Ardennes offensive was not to gain terrain, but that the objective was the enemy.

In Guderian's book the Appendices give the detailed orders for the 1940 France offensive and various Russian offensives. In the case of the French Blitzkrieg, it is interesting to note that in accordance with Maneuver theory, the orders gave as objectives things like "...to seize bridgeheads across the Meuse...", or "...take the heights then sweep West in pursuit of the enemy...".Although general areas were often indicated (along with lines separating divisions, in no cases were specific points for these bridgeheads mentioned.

It would have been clear to an officer receiving such orders that the importance was not to take hill 301 per se, but to take it IF it allowed him to achieve the aim of destroying the enemy.

Henri

ORIGINAL: hen5ri

The important point is that both for the Bulge offensive as it was planned and as its modification as was proposed by some generals, the objective was the enemy and not terrain.

Dunno, there seem to be missing a few words in the first part of this sentence, I don't get its meaning at least.

"The entire strength of the German Army that could be collected together during the last few months was to attack from the Eifel towards the Meuse south of Liege, with the object of breaking through the relatively thin Allied front in this sector; this force was then to cross the Meuse towards Brussels and Antwerp, thus achieving a strategic breakthrough; the enemy forces North of the breakthough were finally to be encircled and destroyed."

That's exactly what I said, although I haven't read this book: :p
I said there was
a) the directive ("official") objective Antwerpen, which was supposed to be taken later on, an objective that was supposed to mark the direction of the thrust, and
b) the objective to encircle the enemy on the right flank.

1st objective involved gaining/securing vital points, 2nd objective focused on the enemy troops and their encirclement.

It is true that some Generals proposed a more modest attack, but the objective was still the same. Guderian continues:

"They wished the attack to be limited to the area East of the Meuse with the purpose of defeating the enemy forces located along the East bank between Aachen and Liege."

It is clear that the objective of the Ardennes offensive was not to gain terrain, but that the objective was the enemy.

While the quotes seem to be correct, your conclusion regarding a "modest" attack is wrong, also the 2nd conclusion regarding terrain misses the point, since, as mentioned by both of us, terrain wasn't the important thing here, but to reach + secure key-positions used to be the really important objectives.
In some attempts, made by several formations, - with Kamfgruppe Peiper (Malmedy massacre) being the most inglorious example, they started a race to the fuel depots in Liège) - , orders had been ignored or altered and key positions had been left behind - unsecured.

Plan 1+2 (as outlined in my other reply), 1 created by Model + 1 by Rundstedt, not taken into account by Hitler/Jodl, favoured a limited (regarding depth of penetration) but a way STRONGER (2-3 waves) thrust, where Rundstedt opted for "adjusting" operations in the Aachen area, prior to the start of the offensive.
Model in turn opted for a different approach (don't recall it atm, would have to get the book), but his "several waves"-option was similar, and, as I've mentioned before, they put both plans together eventually. Both figured that the offensive should be launched later, to amass troops and "new" Bns/Divs, that were not supposed to be ready before late November or December. It took Hitler ca. 1 month to sign the final plan and the corresponding order.
Historians assume that he discussed his plan with Jodl, argueing about each and every detail or changes, plus, he may have been indecisive, as his version was a very risky one. If he'd have waited 'til December, he would have had several new Divisions at his disposal, and the needed personnel for Plan 1 or 2. My guess is, that the offensive with one of those plans wouldn't have failed all the way, maybe with the result that the war would have been extended, in the West at least.

Again, apart from the "ideal"-objective Antwerpen, the general objective in the final plan was to halt the Allied advance in the West, to forestall an Allied offensive, and, besides encircling the Allies on the right flank, to secure several sub-objectives (towns{e.g. Bastogne}, hubs, crossroads, villages). The targets and even the routes (especially for armoured formations) have been planned as well (pre-planning like that had been rarely done before, afaik).

Furthermore, Guderian became Chief of Staff (Army High Command, "OKH") on 20th of July 1944.
The OKH had to hand over the command over all of its theaters to the "OKW" (Military Supreme Command) which was subordinated to Hitler solely) in 1941, when operation "Barbarossa" began, the OKH just kept the command over the Russian/eastern theater. The OKH was never involved in any planning in the west, and it has been rarely informed at later stages at the war, as Hitler didn't trust many Generals, especially after the assassination attempt on 20th of July '44.
There are interesting books on the US army website, one book reports about the major astonishment in the OKH and among the generals, when "some" Offensive in the west had been announced, 24 hrs b4 the attack was about to begin, and with very few infos (apart from the marching orders) being shared with OKH and other departments. That said, I doubt that he knew that much about intentions, objectives, deployments, unless it involved troops being withdrawn from the East to support the attack (which hasn't been ordered in general, apart from some rare exceptions, afaik).

..........gave as objectives things like "...to seize bridgeheads across the Meuse...", or "...take the heights then sweep West in pursuit of the enemy...".Although general areas were often indicated (along with lines separating divisions, in no cases were specific points for these bridgeheads mentioned.

Again, that's what I said. Few objectives, rather dimly outlined, maybe in fear of an outcome like in 1914/15 -> where the offensive slowed down, and came to a halt eventually, resulting in a trench warfare. The main objective in 1940 (outlined before the campaign started) was to cut off the BEF, by penetrating/bypassing the Maginot line.

Last but not least, I'm still waiting for an answer to this question:

The corresponding term in English for "Angriffsziel" is "Target", so there's no lack of corresponding terms here, at least. So, just to make sure........is that POA-thingy (which I don't recall at all) a term resulting from your bad German , or a real term/approach used in WW2? (serious question :p)

ORIGINAL: GoodGuy


Dunno, there seem to be missing a few words in the first part of this sentence, I don't get its meaning at least.

Antwerp was not given as an objective to be taken, it was given as a 'direction', there was only one objective: to destroy the enemy.

While the quotes seem to be correct, your conclusion regarding a "modest" attack is wrong.

These are Guderian's words: he thought it was more modest than the adopted plan. In any case, according to Guderian, Hitler overruled it.

Again, that's what I said. Few objectives, rather dimly outlined, maybe in fear of an outcome like in 1914/15 -> where the offensive slowed down, and came to a halt eventually, resulting in a trench warfare. The main objective in 1940 (outlined before the campaign started) was to cut off the BEF, by penetrating/bypassing the Maginot line.

Not because of fear of anything, it was to leave some of the intitiative to commanders so they could adapt to changing circumstances.

Guderian shows detailed orders for Corps and divisions in the appendix of Panzer Leader.I can find no mention of Antwerp nor of cutting off the BEF in thse orders. The orders specifically do say "The objective is to create bridgeheads across the Meuse".

Here is what Von Mellinthin, who did not participate in the battle but who says that he had access to Balck's firsthand account, says in "Panzer Battles" about the objectives: "...force the crossing of the Meuse at Sedan. They were then to sweep rapidly West and push far behind the flank and rear of the enemy's forces in Belgium." Note the abscence of any specific terrain objectives.

The slight apparent difference between terrain objectives and maneuver objectives is that in maneuver warfare, terrain is accessory, the objective is the enemy, whereas in 'classical' warfare, the emphasis is on specific terrain objectives.In the latter case, if you take the objective, you have won, whereas in maneuver warfare, taking the terrain is useful only to the extent that it gives you an advantage over the enemy. It is true that sometimes the two are equivalent. But there are plenty of cases in Korea and Vietnam where both sides took heavy casualties fighting for terrain that had no value whatsoever, except for following orders that indicated that it was an objective.

I have to add that although this discussion involves mostly mission orders and objectives, Lind and other Maneuver warfare theorists also insist on the importance of other aspects of maneuver warfare such as firepower, concentration of forces, main line of attack, feedback to superior commanders, and coordination. It would be wrong to interpret Maqneuver warfare as proposing that units running around on their own without coordination, just for the sake of movement.

Henri

ORIGINAL: hen5ri

Antwerp was not given as an objective to be taken, it was given as a 'direction', there was only one objective: to destroy the enemy.

No....... Hitler meant it to be seen as objective, while most officers knew that it could only act as a marker to point the direction for a thrust, with the resources at hand. Hitler was already in a desperate or maybe even mentally deranged state in late '44, full of illusions. He kept shuffling around units on his Eastern Theater maps that didn't exist anymore. I'm pretty sure that he thought Antwerpen could be reached, maybe after an initial success that would allow for another thrust.

These are Guderian's words: he thought it was more modest than the adopted plan. In any case, according to Guderian, Hitler overruled it.

Pls be so kind and use quote-tags where you're quoting sources, in the future, in order to clarify whether it's your opinion or an account of what other ppl emitted about a certain topic.
Also, even worse (from a military POV), Hitler didn't even take a single line (from the "small solution") into account, and HIS own (to some extent Jodl's I guess) plan formed the final plan.

Not because of fear of anything, it was to leave some of the intitiative to commanders so they could adapt to changing circumstances.

I disagree. Fear could be found all over the place. Fears among the generals planning the campaign, even fear among brilliant/courageous leaders, like Guderian and other "new school" commanders. Even Hitler, who influenced vital parts of the plan (he had indeed some good ideas back then, when it came to planning an offensive, unlike his ability or better non-ability to direct defensive tasks) was alarmed when he got to know details about Rommels thrust.
The only commander who didn't fear anything might've been Rommel himself, who led an armoured formation for the very first time. Some german historians say he acted unintelligent, partially.
I agree regarding the devolvement to subordinates, to some extent at least.

Guderian shows detailed orders for Corps and divisions in the appendix of Panzer Leader.I can find no mention of Antwerp nor of cutting off the BEF in thse orders. The orders specifically do say "The objective is to create bridgeheads across the Meuse".

Maybe you should read Rommels book, or other books some time.
The idea was to lure away the BEF from the border France/Germany, which could be achieved by launching a fake attack in Belgium and mainly the Netherlands, which in turn forced the BEF to move towards the dutch border, in an attempt to block any german advance up there.
The French forces were then supposed to be overrun, with the BEF being trapped and fighting a hopeless battle. The french forces were not regarded to be a match for the Wehrmacht, especially the shortcomings in their command structures and communications (lack of radios, telephones had been used along the Maginot Line/Forts, mostly) appeared to be fatal obstacles once they had been cut/shut down. Defensive moves/barrages were badly coordinated, if coordinated at all.

The only arm that had been underestimated by the germans might have been the french tank formations (their hvy tanks), since their guns had good punch, so they caused some severe casualties during the first days - the german tanks could outrun them easily, though.
But like I said, these goals might not be reflected in the initial few objectives, but they have been outlined to high ranked staff.

.......in Korea and Vietnam where both sides took heavy casualties fighting for terrain that had no value whatsoever, except for following orders that indicated that it was an objective.

If I remember correctly, North-Korean troops made a smashing thrust into the south, securing almost all of the Korean peninsula, with loads of american soldiers being cut off and/or captured. The KPA(?) (Korean People's Army) in turn then suffered of the lack of supplies, and got cut off when McArthur(?) launched the daring landing assault near the line of demarcation. Many battles seem to have happened in attempts to win decisive victories ignoring losses of terrain, just like the French disaster in a valley in Vietnam, also, I'd say McArthur rather pursued the bulk of the retreating KPA, when he led his forces right to Pyongyang, the northern capital, and even further, to the Chinese border.

But I wouldn't compare the war in Korea to the campaign in France. [:-][:)]

It would be wrong to interpret Maqneuver warfare as proposing that units running around on their own without coordination, just for the sake of movement.

I didn't plan to do that. [8D]

If I remember correctly, North-Vietnamese troops made a smashing thrust into the south, with loads of american soldiers being cut off and/or captured. The NVA in turn then suffered of the lack of supplies, and got cut off when McArthur(?) launched the daring landing assault near the line of demarcation. Many battles seem to have happened in attempts to win decisive victories ignoring losses of terrain, just like the French disaster in a valley in Vietnam, also, I'd say McArthur rather pursued the bulk of the retreating NVA, when he led his forces right to Pyongyang, the northern capital.

GoodGuy, surely you meant North Korea everytime you uttered North Vietnam in the above, and you surely didn't mean to say that the NVA were fighting MacArthur on the Korean peninsula... [:-]

Henri... I respect what you are saying, but for an Army to operate, at least on some levels it needs very specific instructions... the higher you go up the chain the less specific these instructions need to be.  For a Corps Commander to get instructions to seize crossings over the Meuse is not surprising to me.. if he in turn told his Division Commanders to do the same, again I would not be surprised.  However, what you are failing to appreciate (or maybe you are but it just isn't coming across) is that each of these formations, regardless of echelon will have a very strict sector, often only a couple of roads on which to operate, this significantly reduces the amount of "maneuver" that is possible, as in the example for the Meuse crossings, there were only so many bridges, and among them only so many that could hold the panzers.  So in effect, even though he might have been given non-specific mission type orders, he really was still restricted to certain terrain objectives.  As a Corps or even Division Commander he should have the leeway to maneuver his forces within those restrictions... I would be willing to bet though, that once you got down to Regiment and Battalion Command level (the level at which COTA and HTTR are mostly played), that the instructions got very terrain specific indeed.

Bil

ORIGINAL: Bil H

GoodGuy, surely you meant North Korea everytime you uttered North Vietnam in the above, and you surely didn't mean to say that the NVA were fighting MacArthur on the Korean peninsula... [:-]

Arg dammit, yes, I edited that part early in a.m., so I guess my brain started to cease working correctly, there were 1000 thoughts coming to my mind when I've read his stuff about Korea / Vietnam, eheh.
Although, the german term for North-Korean People's Army, would be N(ord-Koreanische) V(olks)-A(rmee) , so NVA appeared to be pretty logic for a tired brain, hehe....so, my brain put in some german logic at least, hehe....
I know that this was the designation for regular troops in North-Vietn. troops, though.

Edit: Fixed!

ORIGINAL: Bil H

GoodGuy, surely you meant North Korea everytime you uttered North Vietnam in the above, and you surely didn't mean to say that the NVA were fighting MacArthur on the Korean peninsula... [:-]

Henri... I respect what you are saying, but for an Army to operate, at least on some levels it needs very specific instructions... the higher you go up the chain the less specific these instructions need to be. For a Corps Commander to get instructions to seize crossings over the Meuse is not surprising to me.. if he in turn told his Division Commanders to do the same, again I would not be surprised. However, what you are failing to appreciate (or maybe you are but it just isn't coming across) is that each of these formations, regardless of echelon will have a very strict sector, often only a couple of roads on which to operate, this significantly reduces the amount of "maneuver" that is possible, as in the example for the Meuse crossings, there were only so many bridges, and among them only so many that could hold the panzers. So in effect, even though he might have been given non-specific mission type orders, he really was still restricted to certain terrain objectives. As a Corps or even Division Commander he should have the leeway to maneuver his forces within those restrictions... I would be willing to bet though, that once you got down to Regiment and Battalion Command level (the level at which COTA and HTTR are mostly played), that the instructions got very terrain specific indeed.

Bil

Of course Guderian does not list the orders doen to battalion level, so I don't know what the orders said. But according to Lind, the German maneuver theory required that unit orders included the order "intent" two levels up, because it is of the utmost importance for a lower-level commander to know the purpose of his orders if he is to be flexible in following them. And although he is encouraged to change his orders in order to follow the intent of his superiors, he is not encouraged to change their intent.

And I don't disagree that sometimes because of terrain (roads and bridges) contraints, units did not have much flexibility in following orders. The important point is that the flexibility was there for when it was needed.

And Goodguy, when I mentioned useless terrain in Korea, I was not disparaging Macarthur's genius thrust behind the North Koreans (a perfect example of maneuver warfare), but I was thinking of some "Hamburger hill" type battles.

And oh yes Goodguy, I DO have and read other books than Guderian's memoir, but I don't hae the whole public library here...[:D]

Henri

ORIGINAL: hen5ri

The important point is that the flexibility was there for when it was needed.

Not really. Rommel is a good example for a commander ignoring (parts of) a plan. The flexibility arose when he decided to adjust orders, against all obligations, with his superiors (and even his field HQ) knowing shyte about the position or direction of his columns, often!
A famous term spread quickly and was then used by ordinary soldiers (maybe even by HQ staff), during the first days/weeks: His unit was called "the ghost-division".