Matrix Games Forums

(quote)Tristanjohn
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As I recall most of that, if not all of it, was given by me en passant and only in reference to details from history you had raised. Your argument (I'm not going to bother going back and reading it--I suggest you do, though) went more or less: there must be reasons the Betty's attacked the way they did on 8 August 1942 instead of going for an "anvil'; you further delivered yourself to the oipinion that the water off Lunga Point might have been too shallow for torpedoes and that an attack from the south over Guadacanal had to be ruled out because the "air space" involved was too small.

You recall?
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Yup. I recall, I dont really want to rehash old post, but to put the record straight I believe again it was a case of talking past each other. I was speaking of a theoretical attack at Lunga roads at the point of disembarkation. Specifically 9000 yrds off lunga at the 50 fathom line with GD raising over 7000 feet in elavation. Not 10 miles out in the middle of Sealark channel in 100-300 fathoms that the actual attack took place as I believe you were refering to. Turns out we were both wrong on the reason.




(quote)
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Otherwise I doubt I'd have ever raised any of those points. They are relevant (and I got them right) but only insofar as they bear on the limitation of the UV model as we find it today--they would also be relevant as far as they could possibly cast light on why the Japanese attack was conducted the way it was.
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The minutia I was refering to was the attempt to determine the "proper" TF composition for the test based not on the agregate number of ships covering the TF historically, but instead on which individual ships were in position with a clear line of sight of the a/c attacking from the north at an altitude of 50feet. My point being that such minutia are irrevelant to the game mechanics and thus were not relevant to the TF composion.



(quote)
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As I noted to Mike Wood what's called for are weather fronts that move sort of like "screen-saver" semi-tranparent overlays across the map, behind which (or in front of, depending on orientation of either side in the game) reasonable sense might be made of planning, say, a week down the road.
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Tristanjohn, I agree the weather model needs to be improvement, but how can such a proponent of strict historical accuracy be requesting something that is clearly beyond the meterological capability of the the time. A satelite view of moving weatherfronts? Even today in my neck of the country weather forecast are little better than a flip of a coin. More often than not catching the right or wrong weather back then had more to do with luck or bad luck then accurate forecasting. Albeit with all things being equal the allies should in most cases have more accurate weather picture than Japan



(quote)
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What we have is useless.
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Not entirely, it does impart the same sort of exasperation/frustrtation that must have been expirenced when attempting to plan around variable and inconsistent weather forecast.

Mogami wrote:No I am asking if anyone thinks the historic daylight action had any impact on the historic night battle.

Well, My vote is yes. I have read accounts that fatigue played a role in the night battle. Plus the delays in offloading caused by the air attacks meant that the covering force needed to be deployed to protect those transports. If the transports had retired when planned there would not have been a need to split the Surface force to cover the 3 approaches. More likely free of the imcomburing transports they would have been deployed as a single combined reaction force as employed the later surface battles. Just my MHO.

TIMJOT wrote:Tristanjohn,

Just wanted to answer some of your direct questions.

(quote)
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Lots of ships in WWII "narrowly avoided" torpedoes. So what?
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So what? Well I was merely pointing out that not only Vincence contributed to the defence ( you stated you were unsure ) but it was in point of fact was in the thick of it. Second I was attempting to point out that according to accounts much of the attacks were in fact directed at the escorts not the Transports.

As I understand it the attack in general went after the transports. Battles are confusing, though, and anything might happen once they commence.

For sure and certain the planes were ordered to get the transports (without supplies troops aren't much good) first and foremost. In fact, Turner did turn back after Savo Island and the Marines were left with a lot less than they wanted with regard to supplies. They carried on anyway, of course, and cleaned house eventually, but to that extent at least Yamada's attack was successful.

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Not if this artificially pumps up Turner's defending AA fire.
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Not sure why that would be the case. From what I understand the TF AA model takes into account that not all guns can be brought to bare at the same time.

You're not sure, I'm not sure. Is anyone sure? Why must we guess?

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As you state, the primary mission of the japanese pilots in actuality was to attack and damage as far as possible the transport shipping in the channel. That ought to be a no-brainer to anyone. Without the ability to reflect this sort ofasset management in the game there's an even smaller chance of conducting realistic and intelligent games.
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Actually I didnt state that at all. I believe you did.

Yes, I did. You probably should have if you did not in fact. I'm tired of going back.

Regardless the actual primary mission that day was attack the USN CVs.

No one on the Japanese side knew where the CVs were. The planes on the 7th and the 8th flew straight as an arrow down the Slot and attacked around Guadacanal.

It was only when the scouts fail to locate them, that the attack was redirected (inflight) to attack the Lunga TF.

Scouts were always out looking for the CVs but didn't find them. The only target Yamada had in sight were those transports and supporting screen. The transports were the critical issue, for without them the Maines would then be "stranded" without proper supply.

Anyway, had the CVs been discovered then it's possible those bombers would have gone for them. They didn't because the CVs weren't spotted. Ever. Had the planes gone for Noyes it would have been a mistake in theory as the easier and more important target was in the water between Guadacanal and Florida. The Japanese wanted to save Guadacanal. Bombing the CVs would not have affected that one whit.

This BTW this answers our question on why the hammer and anvil tactic was not employed at Lunga on the 8th. Again given accounts and the known Japanese pilots propensity to place priority on culling combat ships as per their training and strategic doctorine. It is not at all clear that the transports were the priority of the Japanses pilots that day. Although certainly they should have been.

I don't follow that at all. When those planes came round Florida they knew then for sure what their target was going to be and anvil tactics were not employed. We're no wiser on that issue than we were a couple of days ago.

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Because it's a an important variable to the defense.
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Why? Sorry if I am slow, but could you be a bit more specific, I truely do not understand your reasonings

Because it directly bears on USN defensive capability inside the game model. We have to guess re how that model figures in AA values. Averaged or not the simulation assigns specific AA values to various ships and my contention is still that not all Allied shipping present in the channel could possibly have brought their weapons to bear the same as if everyone was in a at-sea-circular formation designed for all-round AA defense.

So how does UV model it? Which case? I don't know, you don't know. I doubt if very many people would know and no one relying solely on the manual could possibly know. They could only possibly guess.

No matter what the game model intends AA to mean I "guess" that it means to have AA perform this funtions always in the same manner (e.g., AA points relfect the same values whether the combat in game takes place out in the open sea or in a port, if the ships present are all tranports or all destroyers or whatever).

Ergo, the more AA present in a TF the greater the chance of defending against attack. Except for the "some planes will always probably leak through" caveat that I read in the "manual" (or words to that conveyed the same meaning).

If we pump up the AA too high then the test would be skewed, hence I suggested not to put too much AA but be sure to keep as many transport hulls as possible.

None of this would be an issue if we didn't have the model's limitations to work under. We do so it is necessary.

In real life the Allied ships did what they could and it was enough, as it turned out, to keep casualties below what they might have otherwise been. But no way did all of those ships have line of sight to the attacking bombers. Those things came just over the water and were mostly hidden to most of the Allied ships during their runs.

How do you the gunners on a DD could possibly see through the much higher profile of a transport? Or a cruiser for that matter. Those ships weren't lined up the way a child might place them on a coffee table, but steaming for their very lives in a complicated formation in order to avoid enemy torpedoes. It is not hard (should not be hard) for you to extrapolate from that scenario what I extrapolate: only a portion of those ships at any given moment in time enjoyed anything resembling a clear line of sight to the Japanese bombers.

That Vincennes was narrowly missed and Jarvis hit doesn't mean those ships were targeted. As I say, all those ships were busy maneuvering for their lives and there were plenty of them. I doubt that either of those knew torpedoes were headed there way until the last minute--probably didn't (it's almost for sure) see the planes that dropped those torpedoes drop them. Because they didn't have line of sight.

What is so hard about that to understand?

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Don't you think AA fire bends tortuously around this issue? I can't help it if Gary's model has silly TF-size limits (what's the point to that?) and doesn't accomodate realities such as other TFs in "port" hexes needing the ability to lend their AA fire (or a reasonable portion of it) to the defense of neighboring TFs. No one asked my opinion. They're too busy asking the opinions of others to whom these detals apparently aren't important or never occurred to begin with.
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I believe One, it has something to do with diminishing returns regarding AA effectiveness.

Diminishing returns? In combat that's not an issue. In combat you put out there what you got as fast and heavy and as accurately as you can.

Two I am guessing its a programming issue. Regardless I do think that some TF limits is nessary otherwise you are going to have equally silly uber TFs ( 100 to 200+ ships)

It's a "programming issue" all right.

But never mind that. It only makes the job of testing the model for historical accuracy all the more difficult. Indeed, suggests in its own way that this model was not conceived for "accuracy" but rather for fun.

Not that there's anything wrong with a fun game. But my position, as always, is that an accurate simulation can be just as much fun as one that's not accurate. That doesn't necessarily hold true, but other things being equal accuracy's not a game breaker.

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Look. None of this is getting us anywhere useful. Bottomline: the simulation gives, all too often, ahistoric results, and early in the game at least these results tend to favor the Japanese to a notorious extent.
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Tristanjohn, Take this for what its is. A friendly hint. I believe you wouldnt get nearly as much opposition if your statements like above, were not so definitive in nature.

Well that's just too bad. If it's come to the stage where everything has to be couched "diplomatically" then there's little hope. Besides, why should I write as if I'm not clear about this stuff when in fact I'm ultra clear? Why isn't everyone else clear? Or a better question yet: how is it a model that's not accurate can be touted by so many as being . . . accurate? And then, when you point this out so even my wife could understand how the model isn't accurate you're assaulted with the same old tired refrain . . . "Well, we didn't bill it to be anything other than an operational game" . . . as if that made sense.

You know, I wouldn't mind any of this if 1) the developers would just acknowledge these problems and 2) promised to try to do a better job with WitP. But that's not the feedback I've received, which leads me to believe WitP is bound to be more of the same, just a little bit bigger in nature.

A few caveats like "In my opinion" or "In my expirence" would go a long way. You seem to leave little room for other player's expirences or opinions. Many players are simply not consistently getting the results you are reporting. So when people ask you if you are playing on "historical" or if you are running 2.3 ect.... its because some of us are perplexed on how your stated expirences can be so diametrically opposed to our own.

Other playeers aren't "consistenly getting" the results I report? How often does one need to get ahistoric results for these to be considered "consistent" results? Which isn't even to mention the general lack of historic awareness on the forums generally speaking. And what about the palytesters, or developers for that matter? Is everyone working from the same books here, does everyone want the same simulation I do, or even pulling in the same direction?

Consistent results: my Spanish PBEM friend has no idea that the results this model renders are ahistoric. I suggested a number of general books for him to read but he doesn't want to buy anything that's not in Spanish. So much for Morison right off the bat. So much for a lot of books.

The same, I'm confident, could be said for many users of UV and a lot of those don't have the excuse that English isn't there native tongue.

Will you grant me that much? Or do you maintain everyone's opinion here is "equal" for the reason . . . "all men are created equal and endowed . . . "?

As for your advice: I realize it's well meant, TIMJOT, but I've listened to this same lecture for years, and it didn't make any more sense the first time than it does now.

How about if we call a spade a spade? If we once embrace that philosophical outlook then it's easier to take the next step. Something either works or it does not work.

See how simple it is?

When games are good I'm the first one to give them praise. I could tick off any number of titles over the years that have impressed me. On the other hand, when games come to me flawed I'm the first one to ask for something better.

The problem (if you consider it a problem) is that serious gamers hold historical simulations to a higher standard--the standard of history. We know beforehand how a given model is supposed to behave. The only question is does it? If not, how great is its deviation from our historical expectations?

Sometimes I do pepper my writing with those kinds of qualifiers, by the way, and you could look that up. But only when it's a clearly subjective case. When I find frequently-recurring ahistoric results in my play then that's no longer necessary. Because now, by definition, the model is showing itself to be in error.

That's the way I find UV and for reasons unknown to me (though I might guess) the feedback in these forums is generally one of . . . denial. Or "It's good enough for me."

Well, I still want something better.

Finally, I want to repeat: I am not against Matrix (a very good company in my experience) or Gary Grigsby (a man who has designed a number of games that have given me many hours of enjoyment) or the playtesters or anyone else. I am for a better (read: more accurate) simulation.

I do resent having people come forward and to tell me that black is white and then try to shout me down, ridicule me and everything else that goes on around here when I refuse to swallow it. Sorry, but that's not in my makeup. Consider me "flawed."

Tristanjohn wrote:This is what I'm talking about. The results reflected below come from a PBEM game I've got going with a fellow who lives in Spain. The Scenario is #14 and I've just sent two very powerful bombardment TFs to Buka, met by a couple of equally powerful IJN Tfs as it turned out.

Just watch what the Japanese air elements in Buka, Rabaul (and one strike from Lae) are allowed to accomplish through the air phase of this turn. (And by the way, my ships, weren't all that damaged and in fact except for what looked to be one "separated" TF with apparently a CA, CL and DD in it" all my surface elements were six or seven hexes away from Buka returning to their home port of Lunga after the bombardment attack, so it isn't as if the Japanese were shooting up "crippoles" here. And pay witness to how many different attacks the program sends in, and from such great distances! Over and over and over again.

Fact is, neither side ever during World War II, to include the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor where the target ships were moored and the crews asleep or on leave, ever enjoyed such results.

I tell you you it is ridiculous. You'll tell me it's just "game." But then I already knew that, didn't I? And not a very "accurate" one at that.

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Hi, I've seen the replay and have a few attachments
I don't know how TJ was able to assess damage to ships between night battle and air attacks.

AFTER ACTION REPORTS FOR 09/20/42

Weather: Partly Cloudy

Night Time Surface Combat, near Buka at 26,30

Japanese Ships
BB Kongo, Shell hits 1
CA Chikuma
CA Takao, Shell hits 1
CA Atago, Shell hits 1
CA Ashigara, Shell hits 1
CL Tama, Shell hits 2
CL Tenryu
DD Akitsuki
DD Akigumo
DD Yuzuki
DD Oite
DD Yunagi, Shell hits 1

Allied Ships
CA Salt Lake City
CA Quincy, Shell hits 2, on fire
CA Australia, Shell hits 8, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage
DD Grayson
DD Aaron Ward
DD Laffey
DD Hughes
DD Helm, Shell hits 3
DD Mugford, Shell hits 1, on fire
DD Stack, Shell hits 1, on fire
DD Sterett
DD MacDonough
DMS Hopkins


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Night Time Surface Combat, near Buka at 26,30

Japanese Ships
BB Kongo
CA Chikuma
CA Takao, Shell hits 2
CA Atago, Shell hits 2
CA Ashigara, Shell hits 2
CL Tama, Shell hits 1
CL Tenryu, Shell hits 1
DD Akitsuki
DD Akigumo, Shell hits 3, on fire
DD Yuzuki
DD Oite, Shell hits 1, on fire
DD Yunagi, Shell hits 1

Allied Ships
BB North Carolina, Shell hits 4, on fire
CA Chicago
CA Astoria, Shell hits 3, on fire
CL Leander, Shell hits 3, on fire
CLAA Atlanta, Shell hits 2, on fire
CLAA San Juan, Shell hits 1
DD Farenholt
DD Patterson, Shell hits 1
DD Dewey
DD Worden
DMS Hovey
DMS Zane, Shell hits 1


Note: At this juncture of the AAR I'll try to give the point of origin of these Japanese air attacks, note in bold face, the best I can from memory so you have some idea of the distance invovled. This, of course, does have direct bearing on the question. For what it's worth, thus far in play, when Japanese have bombarded one of my USN ports (this from several different PBEM games) and have limped away with "crippled" ships my air assets at that base and any others within range have delivered attacks on just two IJN hulls. The rest of the IJN hulls have been, for all intents and purposes, invidible to my planes. Now witness how the program interprets this scenario from the Japanese point of view:

Not one USN ship moved full allowance away from Buka. It can only be assumed as a result the ships had reduced speeds (making them easier targets)
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Air attack on Port Moresby from Rabau, at 10,40

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 17

no losses


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Air attack on Lunga from Buka, at 38,40

Japanese aircraft
A6M3 Zero x 15

no losses


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Air attack on TF, near Gili Gili from Rabaul at 17,42

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 3
A6M3 Zero x 18
G3M Nell x 3
G4M1 Betty x 11

Japanese aircraft losses
G4M1 Betty x 1 damaged

Allied Ships
SC 521, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage
SC 517, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage
SC 644

Attacking Level Bombers:
3 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
3 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet

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Air attack on TF, near Russell Islands from Buka at 35,39

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 34
G3M Nell x 15

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 18
P-39D Airacobra x 19

Japanese aircraft losses
A6M2 Zero x 1 destroyed
G3M Nell x 5 destroyed
G3M Nell x 10 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat x 1 destroyed
F4F-4 Wildcat x 1 damaged
P-39D Airacobra x 2 destroyed
P-39D Airacobra x 1 damaged

2LT D. Hartley of VMF-224 is credited with kill number 2

CPT W. Brown of 80th FS bails out and is RESCUED

Allied Ships
DD Gwin
AK Bellatrix
AK Betelgeuse
AP Hunter Liggett

Attacking Level Bombers:
2 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
4 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
4 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
1 x G3M Nell at 200 feet

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Air attack on TF, near Russell Islands from Buka at 35,39

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 4
A6M3 Zero x 4
G4M1 Betty x 4

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 17
P-39D Airacobra x 16

Japanese aircraft losses
G4M1 Betty x 4 destroyed
G4M1 Betty x 1 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
P-39D Airacobra x 1 destroyed
P-39D Airacobra x 1 damaged

CPT S. Nicolay of VMF-224 is credited with kill number 2

Allied Ships
DD Farragut, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage

Attacking Level Bombers:
1 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet

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Air attack on TF from Buka at 32,32 (TF moved 7 of 12 hexes from Buka night battle. Speed reduced to 7/12ths of normal- Mog)

Japanese aircraft
G4M1 Betty x 4

Japanese aircraft losses
G4M1 Betty x 5 damaged

Allied Ships
DD Mugford, on fire, heavy damage

Attacking Level Bombers:
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet

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Air attack on TF from Buka at 31,32 (North Carolina 6 hexes from Buka and burning before airattack begins-Mog)

Japanese aircraft
G4M1 Betty x 12

Japanese aircraft losses
G4M1 Betty x 2 destroyed
G4M1 Betty x 13 damaged

Allied Ships
BB North Carolina, Torpedo hits 7, on fire, heavy damage

Attacking Level Bombers:
3 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
3 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet

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Air attack on TF from Buka at 31,32

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 16
A6M3 Zero x 15
D3A Val x 6
G4M1 Betty x 11

Japanese aircraft losses
D3A Val x 1 destroyed
D3A Val x 4 damaged
G4M1 Betty x 2 damaged

Allied Ships
BB North Carolina, Torpedo hits 2, on fire, heavy damage
CLAA Atlanta, on fire

Attacking Level Bombers:
3 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet

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Air attack on Port Moresby from Rabul, at 10,40

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 15

no losses


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Air attack on TF, near Russell Islands from Buka at 35,39

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 3
G3M Nell x 3
G4M1 Betty x 17

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 16
P-39D Airacobra x 15

Japanese aircraft losses
G3M Nell x 2 damaged
G4M1 Betty x 10 destroyed
G4M1 Betty x 11 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
F4F-4 Wildcat x 1 destroyed
P-39D Airacobra x 1 damaged

2LT C. Bryan of VMF-224 is credited with kill number 3

Allied Ships
AP Heywood, Torpedo hits 1, on fire
DD Gwin
AK Neleus, Torpedo hits 1

Attacking Level Bombers:
3 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
3 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
3 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
3 x G3M Nell at 200 feet

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Air attack on TF, near Russell Islands from Buka at 35,39

Japanese aircraft
G3M Nell x 15
G4M1 Betty x 16

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 15
P-39D Airacobra x 15

Japanese aircraft losses
G3M Nell x 1 destroyed
G3M Nell x 16 damaged
G4M1 Betty x 1 destroyed
G4M1 Betty x 11 damaged

Allied aircraft losses
P-39D Airacobra x 1 damaged

Allied Ships
AK Bellatrix, Torpedo hits 1, on fire
DD Buchanan
AP Hunter Liggett
AK Alchiba, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage
DD Gwin
AK Asphalion

Attacking Level Bombers:
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
2 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
3 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
1 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
3 x G3M Nell at 200 feet
4 x G3M Nell at 200 feet

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Air attack on TF, near Russell Islands from Rabaul at 35,39

Japanese aircraft
G3M Nell x 3

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 15
P-39D Airacobra x 15

Japanese aircraft losses
G3M Nell x 2 destroyed
G3M Nell x 1 damaged


Allied Ships
CA Minneapolis

Attacking Level Bombers:
1 x G3M Nell at 200 feet

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Air attack on TF from Buka at 17,43

Japanese aircraft
G4M1 Betty x 12

Japanese aircraft losses
G4M1 Betty x 12 destroyed
G4M1 Betty x 4 damaged

Allied Ships
CL Honolulu
DD Cushing, Torpedo hits 1, on fire, heavy damage

Attacking Level Bombers:
1 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
1 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
1 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet

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Air attack on TF from Buka at 32,32

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 19
A6M3 Zero x 37
D3A Val x 4

no losses

Allied Ships
DD Mugford, Bomb hits 3, on fire, heavy damage


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Air attack on TF from Rabaul, near Russell Islands at 35,39

Japanese aircraft
G3M Nell x 3

Allied aircraft
F4F-4 Wildcat x 15
P-39D Airacobra x 15

Japanese aircraft losses
G3M Nell x 1 damaged



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Air attack on TF from Buka at 27,30 (TF 1 hex from Buka. Indicating heavy damage from night battle. Crusiers on fire at start-Mog)

Japanese aircraft
A6M2 Zero x 33
A6M3 Zero x 18
D3A Val x 27
G3M Nell x 3
G4M1 Betty x 11

Japanese aircraft losses
D3A Val x 6 damaged
G3M Nell x 1 destroyed
G3M Nell x 2 damaged
G4M1 Betty x 6 damaged

Allied Ships
CA Astoria, Bomb hits 2, Torpedo hits 4, on fire, heavy damage
CLAA San Juan, Bomb hits 4, on fire, heavy damage
DD Farenholt, Torpedo hits 2, on fire, heavy damage

Attacking Level Bombers:
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
3 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
2 x G3M Nell at 200 feet

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Air attack on TF from Buka at 31,32

Japanese aircraft
G4M1 Betty x 9

Japanese aircraft losses
G4M1 Betty x 2 destroyed
G4M1 Betty x 9 damaged

Allied Ships
CLAA Atlanta, Torpedo hits 3, on fire, heavy damage

Attacking Level Bombers:
3 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
4 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet
0 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet

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Air attack on TF from Buka at 30,32

Japanese aircraft
A6M3 Zero x 5
G4M1 Betty x 3

Japanese aircraft losses
G4M1 Betty x 1 destroyed
G4M1 Betty x 1 damaged

Allied Ships
CA Salt Lake City, on fire

Attacking Level Bombers:
2 x G4M1 Betty at 200 feet


My opinion of aircombat on ships from TF's engaged night before at Buka is none of these TF's had full movement. (12 hexes) The farthest any moved was 7 hexes. They were spread from 1 hex out to 7. There was no allied aircover over any of them)
I would expect unopposed Japanese aircraft to score hits on slow moving targets.
The farthest USN TF composed of ships from Buka battle was 210 miles.
strikes also went from 30,60,90,120 and so on as ships were spread from 1 to 7 hexes from Buka.

(quote)
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No one on the Japanese side knew where the CVs were. The planes on the 7th and the 8th flew straight as an arrow down the Slot and attacked around Guadacanal.
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Not on the 8th according to Franks, which I dare say many includeing myself consider the definitive source on the campaign. He states that the flight was sent out in hopes of finding and attacking the CVs. When the scouts failed to spot them Yamada redirected the attack to the ships at lunga. He swung his planes around Florida to avoid the CAP.




(quote)
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Welll that's just too bad. If it's come to the stage where everything has to be couched "diplomatically" then there's little hope. Besides, why should I write as if I'm not clear about this stuff when in fact I'm ultra clear.
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Ultra clear on events like the attack on the 8th going directly down the slot to attack the transports at lunga even when a highly respected account contridicts you?

Tristanjohn. I not trying to pick fights. You are obviously well read, but none of us are infallible. Not me be a long shot. I wasnt clear about the exact circumstances of the 8th attack either and only came accross Franks account while re-reading him over the long weekend.

In the end, all I can say I am not expirenceing the type of results you are getting. Why I have no idea, but I can assure you its not a case of denial. What I have posted is the type results I am getting when playing the game.

I wish you luck in getting results you deem appropriate in the future.

TIMJOT wrote:(quote)Tristanjohn
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As I recall most of that, if not all of it, was given by me en passant and only in reference to details from history you had raised. Your argument (I'm not going to bother going back and reading it--I suggest you do, though) went more or less: there must be reasons the Betty's attacked the way they did on 8 August 1942 instead of going for an "anvil'; you further delivered yourself to the oipinion that the water off Lunga Point might have been too shallow for torpedoes and that an attack from the south over Guadacanal had to be ruled out because the "air space" involved was too small.

You recall?
------------------------------------

Yup. I recall, I dont really want to rehash old post, but to put the record straight I believe again it was a case of talking past each other. I was speaking of a theoretical attack at Lunga roads at the point of disembarkation. Specifically 9000 yrds off lunga at the 50 fathom line with GD raising over 7000 feet in elavation. Not 10 miles out in the middle of Sealark channel in 100-300 fathoms that the actual attack took place as I believe you were refering to. Turns out we were both wrong on the reason.

I doubt if the battle area could be considered part of Sealark Channel but more like Ironbottom Sound. And yes, the chart does show just about 300 fathoms of water out there.

As for my description: I never stated the battle took place in Sealark but rather Ironbottom.

--------------------------------
Otherwise I doubt I'd have ever raised any of those points. They are relevant (and I got them right) but only insofar as they bear on the limitation of the UV model as we find it today--they would also be relevant as far as they could possibly cast light on why the Japanese attack was conducted the way it was.
--------------------------------

The minutia I was refering to was the attempt to determine the "proper" TF composition for the test based not on the agregate number of ships covering the TF historically, but instead on which individual ships were in position with a clear line of sight of the a/c attacking from the north at an altitude of 50feet. My point being that such minutia are irrevelant to the game mechanics and thus were not relevant to the TF composion.

I told you at the time and I've explained further today what my concerns were and are re the TF's composition vis-a-vis AA and targets. As for the other "minutiae" I also told you it was just for fun (though I did have some hope that perhaps a higher-rated Turner could more favorably affect Allied fortune).

---------------------------------
As I noted to Mike Wood what's called for are weather fronts that move sort of like "screen-saver" semi-tranparent overlays across the map, behind which (or in front of, depending on orientation of either side in the game) reasonable sense might be made of planning, say, a week down the road.
----------------------------------

Tristanjohn, I agree the weather model needs to be improvement, but how can such a proponent of strict historical accuracy be requesting something that is clearly beyond the meterological capability of the the time. A satelite view of moving weatherfronts? Even today in my neck of the country weather forecast are little better than a flip of a coin. More often than not catching the right or wrong weather back then had more to do with luck or bad luck then accurate forecasting. Albeit with all things being equal the allies should in most cases have more accurate weather picture than Japan

The military at the time didn't have satellite views but the did know a "front" when they saw one or it was reported or conditions (like the barometer) suggested one might be on the way (just like they knew back in the age of tall sails) and even if that were not true (and it is) military men certainly knew a front when they were inside of one and a sailor would tend to look upon this sort of weather as favorable if he happened to be trying to sneak up on his enemy. The air force, naturally, entertained other views of it.

The point is what we have doesn't work, wasn't conceived very well. Something else would be better, what I propose sounds reasonable. At that, no one said a "front" seen on the screen would have represent "reality" but rather could suggest to the players what the gneral conditions were, or were projected to be in any given greater area of the map for the coming turn or turns. For that matter, the Japanese p[layer could be given one "estimate" while the Allied player worked under some different impression. But when a turn was run then it's reasonable to suppose that an even clearer impression of "waeather reality" would than attain for all concerned. How it shook out the next day would be something else.

Look. Navies used weather a lot during this period. The Japanese knew they could probably rely on at least some protection from detection from air and sea on their way to Pearl because they intentionally steamed along with a bad weather front. CV TFs would actively seek this kind of weather. When CV captains couldn't find it they were at least disappointed and sometimes scared because they knew they were sitting docks in the sunshine.

Anyway, if you have a better idea I'd love to hear it. So far I've heard nothing better, though.

------------------------------
What we have is useless.
------------------------------

Not entirely

You couldn't live on the difference.

it does impart the same sort of exasperation/frustrtation that must have been expirenced when attempting to plan around variable and inconsistent weather forecast.

It doesn't impart anything of the kind to me. It's hit and miss, with a thunderhead here and one over there . . . and spotting still too effective, of course. Sometimes this spotting (and combat) occurs within those thunderheads, worse still. Indeed, I remember one turn in PBEM where (I think it was at Rabaul) my planes were denied access to the a thunderhead hex (I'm using Mario Valee's icons, I think--anyway, these look like "thunderheads") but the Japanese planes were quite able to fly out of this same hex.

Just more nonsense.

TIMJOT wrote:(quote)
------------------------------
No one on the Japanese side knew where the CVs were. The planes on the 7th and the 8th flew straight as an arrow down the Slot and attacked around Guadacanal.
------------------------------



Not on the 8th according to Franks, which I dare say many includeing myself consider the definitive source on the campaign. He states that the flight was sent out in hopes of finding and attacking the CVs. When the scouts failed to spot them Yamada redirected the attack to the ships at lunga. He swung his planes around Florida to avoid the CAP.

I presume you're talking about Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle by Richard B, Frank. If so, I haven't read it but you me interested. Until I do read it there's nothing more I can say and it hardly bears on whether the simulation is accurate or not.

-----------------------------
Welll that's just too bad. If it's come to the stage where everything has to be couched "diplomatically" then there's little hope. Besides, why should I write as if I'm not clear about this stuff when in fact I'm ultra clear.
-----------------------------

Ultra clear on events like the attack on the 8th going directly down the slot to attack the transports at lunga even when a highly respected account contridicts you?

Now you're telling me the attacks on the 7th and 8th were flying all over the place looking for CVs instead of heading to the 'Canal? This is what Frank contends? I guess that would have come as news to Yamada then after the war when Morison (or his staff) interviewed him.

Tristanjohn. I not trying to pick fights. You are obviously well read, but none of us are infallible.

To that I willingly agree, TIMJOT. This is why I rely on Morison so heavily to at least guide me in the right direction. That I happen to have his entire set of works on my bookshelf makes that easy--it would be more difficult to have to truck on down to the public library and spend hours researching each and every point, to say the least.

(I've other stuff here, too, by the way, for purposes of research. I mention Morison because his work on WWII is the most comprehensive of its kind available and regarded everywhere as being more than just a little competent.)

Not me be a long shot. I wasnt clear about the exact circumstances of the 8th attack either and only came accross Franks account while re-reading him over the long weekend.

In the end, all I can say I am not expirenceing the type of results you are getting. Why I have no idea, but I can assure you its not a case of denial. What I have posted is the type results I am getting when playing the game.

What did you think of the results I just posted re my ongoing PBEM game?

I wish you luck in getting results you deem appropriate in the future.

Me, too. But then we all stand to benefit. (Not holding my breath, though. )

"It doesn't impart anything of the kind to me. It's hit and miss, with a thunderhead here and one over there . . . and spotting still too effective, of course. Sometimes this spotting (and combat) occurs within those thunderheads, worse still. Indeed, I remember one turn in PBEM where (I think it was at Rabaul) my planes were denied access to the a thunderhead hex (I'm using Mario Valee's icons, I think--anyway, these look like "thunderheads") but the Japanese planes were quite able to fly out of this same hex.

Just more nonsense"

Hi, Another bug. Aircraft should not fly into or out of a weather hex.
Post report
Send save and details
without save (that reproduces bug) it can not be fixed.

I've looked at a few reports of this occuring but the bug did not reproduce on my machine (no strike aircraft flew into or out of hex)
There are two air phases. I've looked at a few saves where player reported this bug but what actually occured was hex had weather in AM but not in PM (or reverse)

I am wondering about something TMJOT do you not get a forecast during orders phase? It is what I go by. While it does not give forecast for every hex you do have an idea if weather is
remaing the same
getting worse
getting better.

Works for me. (I do get those attacks where my CAP is down because of forcast and enemy attacks hex that is not closed.-but they suffer the weather effects on target accuracy and op loss)

Mogami wrote:"It doesn't impart anything of the kind to me. It's hit and miss, with a thunderhead here and one over there . . . and spotting still too effective, of course. Sometimes this spotting (and combat) occurs within those thunderheads, worse still. Indeed, I remember one turn in PBEM where (I think it was at Rabaul) my planes were denied access to the a thunderhead hex (I'm using Mario Valee's icons, I think--anyway, these look like "thunderheads") but the Japanese planes were quite able to fly out of this same hex.

Just more nonsense"

Hi, Another bug. Aircraft should not fly into or out of a weather hex.
Post report Send save and details without save (that reproduces bug) it can not be fixed.

As if I could possibly be the first person to report this, or see it. If the developers of this game system haven't figured yet that that bug exists then I doubt if ever will be fixed. It happens all the time.

I've looked at a few reports of this occuring but the bug did not reproduce on my machine (no strike aircraft flew into or out of hex)
There are two air phases. I've looked at a few saves where player reported this bug but what actually occured was hex had weather in AM but not in PM (or reverse)

Whatever.

I am wondering about something TMJOT do you not get a forecast during orders phase? It is what I go by. While it does not give forecast for every hex you do have an idea if weather is
remaing the same
getting worse
getting better.

Works for me. (I do get those attacks where my CAP is down because of forcast and enemy attacks hex that is not closed.-but they suffer the weather effects on target accuracy and op loss)

They don't with me, at least not so I could notice it. But then the game I play has a "scratched disc" so I guess my results don't count very much

Hi, TJ you were a tester. If 10,000 people report a bug but submit no save where bug can be reproduced what can be done to fix it?
Trying to induce a bug by testers is not the answer. (We have been trying to reproduce this bug since it was first reported.)

Since this bug was first reported I have finished 2 complete (600 turn) PBEM games without either player seeing this occur. (and several dozen lesser PBEM completed before running full allowance of turns) I have 7 PBEM games on going at present and no occurance.

If it happens all the time just send in a save prior to it occuring. (when you run a turn where this happens send in the turn before)



Edit. He sent me a save file. There is no bug. He never read the 2.30 patch update item 25 that states "offensive missions" he saw recon flying into these hexes and thought it was a bug.

(quote)Tristanjohn
-----------------------------
Now you're telling me the attacks on the 7th and 8th were flying all over the place looking for CVs instead of heading to the 'Canal? This is what Frank contends? I guess that would have come as news to Yamada then after the war when Morison (or his staff) interviewed him.
-----------------------------


Now don't be putting words in my mouth. I clearly said on the 8th only. On the 7th the a/c were sent to attack the invasion forces. On the 8th the Japanese sent out scouts followed by 27 Bettys and zero escort with the intent on finding and attacking the USN CVs. When their location failed to materialize Yamada redirected his group in a attack on known shipping at GD. his approach from the North over Florida was ad hoc attempt to dodge expected CAP.

Morrison also sites allied estimates of 40 odd twin engine bombers attacked that day. Frank sites IJN records that confirm only 27 Bettys taking off from Rabaul that day. Whereas I consider Morrison a very good souce for USN operations in WWII, I find him a somewhat wanting
source (certainly not definitive) when it comes to the details of IJN operations in WWII. Really no fault of his own, but the fact is at the time of his writting his epic tome, many IJN records had yet to recovered and or translated. When it came to IJN ops he relied mainly on US intel, interogations, mixed with some conjecture to fill the blanks.



(quote)
-----------------------------
To that I willingly agree, TIMJOT. This is why I rely on Morison so heavily to at least guide me in the right direction. That I happen to have his entire set of works on my bookshelf makes that easy--it would be more difficult to have to truck on down to the public library and spend hours researching each and every point, to say the least.
------------------------------


Luckily my local library has the complete collection. I do own Morrison's ubridged Two Ocean War however, if I could only find it.



(quote)
---------------------------
"What did you think of the results I just posted re my ongoing PBEM" game?
---------------------------



I find it more than a little baffeling. I personally never accountered so many repeated attacks from what looks like the same airunits. Especially after incurring so many losses. Just how many Betty and Nells does your opponent have? On the face of it I would say something is not right.

I have to admit though I personally can not recall any similar circumstance. As I tend not to send major surface forces down the slot until I am pretty sure I have destoyed or at least nuetralized enemy airpower in the upper solomons and never without CAP. I will usually cover my TFs by sending my LBA to bomb or straff near by airfields to disrupt enemy flight ops as well. Thats just my own personal preferences on strategy and tactics. I cast no dispersions or claim validity over whatever tactics/strategy you or anyone elses might endeavor to follow.

Regards

Hi If it is scen 14 historic arrival then by 9-20-42 Japanese could deploy
3 Betty 3 Nell 1 Val (LB) 2 A6M2 and 2 A6M3 groups for a possible total of 162 Betty/Nell 27 Val 54 A6M2 54 A6M3 no doubt some of these groups would be under size. Still I'm not sticking my neck out to find out.
(recon would give approx numbers at each base. Better with more recon)

TIMJOT wrote: Tristanjohn
-----------------------------
Now you're telling me the attacks on the 7th and 8th were flying all over the place looking for CVs instead of heading to the 'Canal? This is what Frank contends? I guess that would have come as news to Yamada then after the war when Morison (or his staff) interviewed him.
-----------------------------

Now don't be putting words in my mouth. I clearly said on the 8th only. On the 7th the a/c were sent to attack the invasion forces. On the 8th the Japanese sent out scouts followed by 27 Bettys and zero escort with the intent on finding and attacking the USN CVs. When their location failed to materialize Yamada redirected his group in a attack on known shipping at GD. his approach from the North over Florida was ad hoc attempt to dodge expected CAP.

I apologize if I did put words in your mouth, TIMJOT. I try hard never to do that.

Okay, then, just on the 8th.

After the main attack went in another weaker (and as far as I know unescorted) flight of bombers attacked. I've mentioned this small group. It could be these were stragglers or it might just be they were those scouts (or some of them) on their way back from trying to find the USN CVs.

Morison cites (when he cites something you can bet your bottom dollar it's right, or was right when he interviewed someone) that Yamada (in command of the 25th Air Flotilla) had 48 bombers and 12 to 15 flying boats ready (I take this to mean fully operational with pilots) for the attack. So if the battle accounts are correct (40 Bettys in the first wave--remember this comes from lots of different people at the battle) that would leave 8 unaccounted for, and those could well have been scouting earlier.

We're just guessing again but I'd bet that second attack was from the scouting mission, or part of it.

Anyway, sorry again for dinging you, Didn't mean to.

Morrison also sites allied estimates of 40 odd twin engine bombers attacked that day.

That is not what he writes. He writes that precisely 9 of the 40 Bettys that attacked in the first wave passed the formation of ships--the rest were shot down. Yamada, after the war, affirmed this from whatever records he had, plus his memory I suppose.

Frank sites IJN records that confirm only 27 Bettys taking off from Rabaul that day.

Already I distrust this guy Frank.

Here's the deal. Japanese records were notorious for their outright inaccuracies in numbers, whole gaps of data missing, dates screwed up, you name it. I could go into some detail on this but I don't care to spend a lot of time on an issue I've already resolved the first time around.

I suggest you start with Morison and read him closely, his entire work, check his sources, refer to them if necessary, then get back to me. It'll take you a year if you start in the morning . . . but the effort is worth the benefit.

Whereas I consider Morrison a very good souce for USN operations in WWII, I find him a somewhat wanting
source (certainly not definitive) when it comes to the details of IJN operations in WWII.

That's just the problem. And Morison recognizes this. Nobody can claim to know exactly (or not to the same degree of confidence they could with the USN) what happened in World War II with the Japanese. Those people didn't bother to keep records on a lot of stuff we take for granted--like casualties, for instance. A dead Japanese to a Japanese was a bad Japanese, a Japanese who hadn't done much for his Emperor. That's the way it was.

If Frank is using Japanese records to prove anything then he doesn't sound like a researcher to depend on. I don't say Morison has all the answers--he'd be the first one to tell you he does not--if he weren't dead. But when he couldn't find something out for sure he states this and also states why. When he cites something he always give the source, and very often it's several sources, from both sides.

Look. Morison's work isn't just another history, It is considered to be the sine qua non of USN activities in WWII and the finest work of its kind bar none ever achieved. Frank strikes me as fishy from what you've told me about him thus far. And he certainly is nobody to be contradicting the work of someone of Morison's stature unless he is able to definitively cite reliable sources which indisputably prove (show how and why) Morison was in error.

Now I doubt Frank can do this, or even tries. But if he can and does, bring him on by all means. (With the proof, of course. )

Really no fault of his own, but the fact is at the time of his writting his epic tome, many IJN records had yet to recovered and or translated. When it came to IJN ops he relied mainly on US intel, interogations, mixed with some conjecture to fill the blanks.

When Morison resorts to conjecture he states so in no uncertain terms. Again, Japanese records are unreliable for the most part, and have been shown to be so. I hear nothing about Frank to lead me to believe he knows more about his subject, even this many years down the line, than did Morison just after the war.

-----------------------------
To that I willingly agree, TIMJOT. This is why I rely on Morison so heavily to at least guide me in the right direction. That I happen to have his entire set of works on my bookshelf makes that easy--it would be more difficult to have to truck on down to the public library and spend hours researching each and every point, to say the least.
------------------------------

Luckily my local library has the complete collection. I do own Morrison's ubridged Two Ocean War however, if I could only find it.

You need the entire 14 volumes, plus the index is awful handy. There's an awful lot of information in there and it can be hard to find. His two-volume work is just a sketch and useless for our purpose here.

---------------------------
"What did you think of the results I just posted re my ongoing PBEM" game?
---------------------------

I find it more than a little baffeling. I personally never accountered so many repeated attacks from what looks like the same airunits. Especially after incurring so many losses. Just how many Betty and Nells does your opponent have? On the face of it I would say something is not right.

I've encountered this before, though I admit not often. It always comes, however, from the Japanese, never the Allies (those experience and morale ratings at work again--plus as I stated earlier it wouldn't surprise me if there's a little "Japanese switch" in there that's turned on from time to time ) and can be as devastating as it is ahistoric.

Please also consider this: historians are a strange breed even when on good behavior (ever known any? I have) and often we find newer authors with something to "prove," especially it seems when they stand in the shadow of a legend. Morison is a legend. It could be Frank has something to prove. I don't know, but it's worth considering. This stuff has been known.

I have to admit though I personally can not recall any similar circumstance. As I tend not to send major surface forces down the slot until I am pretty sure I have destoyed or at least nuetralized enemy airpower in the upper solomons and never without CAP. I will usually cover my TFs by sending my LBA to bomb or straff near by airfields to disrupt enemy flight ops as well. Thats just my own personal preferences on strategy and tactics. I cast no dispersions or claim validity over whatever tactics/strategy you or anyone elses might endeavor to follow.

I tend to agree with that in principle (Mogami made a similar point to me in an email) but it still doesn't explain the air attacks, which is the only reason I bothered to post the AAR.

The air model's off, and sometimes by a good deal. Especially for the Japanese.

Hi, Excuse me. If the Japanese records stink. How can Morison be more accurate? I tried following the logic in that last post and now I'm standing on my head.
He talks to a guy, who heard it from a guy, who knew a guy, who flew a mission on Aug 8 to Lunga and this is more accurate then the War Diary of the 25th Air Flotilla?

"8 Aug 1942 27 Betties target Lunga" or whatever?

But using that logic (31 of 40 bombers shot down) I can see where you would say the Japanese are getting a lot of help.


As I mentioned above. You were not hit by the same units over and over. You've under estimated the number of bombers your opponent has

(I think you think he has less then 80 bombers when in fact I think he has well over 120 bombers and as a result those extra 40 bombers appear to you as bombers making extra missions)

AM phase by my count 66 Bombers
PM phase after TF's have been located and strikes organized
122 bombers (Assuming only 1/3 of morning bombers launch a 2nd strike
would make 100 new bombers (total available before AM strikes around 160 ready bombers. Groups on hand could contain 189 bombers at full strength.

Mogami wrote:Hi, Excuse me. If the Japanese records stink. How can Morison be more accurate? I tried following the logic in that last post and now I'm standing on my head.
He talks to a guy, who heard it from a guy, who knew a guy, who flew a mission on Aug 8 to Lunga and this is more accurate then the War Diary of the 25th Air Flotilla?

"8 Aug 1942 27 Betties target Lunga" or whatever?

But using that logic (31 of 40 bombers shot down) I can see where you would say the Japanese are getting a lot of help.


As I mentioned above. You were not hit by the same units over and over. You've under estimated the number of bombers your opponent has

(I think you think he has less then 80 bombers when in fact I think he has well over 120 bombers and as a result those extra 40 bombers appear to you as bombers making extra missions)

AM phase by my count 66 Bombers
PM phase after TF's have been located and strikes organized
122 bombers (Assuming only 1/3 of morning bombers launch a 2nd strike
would make 100 new bombers (total available before AM strikes around 140 ready bombers. Groups on hand could contain 189 bombers at full strength.

That's swell. Now we're gonna kick 'ol Sam around awhile.

If what I wrote re Morison and Frank and Japanese WWII records in general makes no sense to you then you need to go get yourself a proper education.

As for what happened in the replay: I give up. The model is dead-on accurate and the result in that AAR is just about what I'd expect, even if nothing of the kind ever did transpire in World War II, and happens a lot in this game. I trust Gary more than I trust history.

You're right, I'm wrong, I was silly to bring it up.

Have a nice day.

Hi, No USN leader ever dared be as brave as you. Thus we have no example. However now thanks to you and UV we know why no USN leader ever dared to be as brave as you.

Tristanjohn

Just curious, seeing you are an unabash fan of both Morison and Turner. Whats your stand on Morison's flip flop evaluation of Turner?

This is the present US Navy view on the events

Guadalcanal Campaign, Aug. 1942 - Feb. 1943 --
Japanese Air Attacks, 7-8 August 1942
Japanese reaction to the Guadalcanal-Tulagi invasion was swift, if not initially very effective. At Rabaul, the principal Japanese base in the area, the local fleet commander, Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, pulled together some ground troops, put them in six transports and ordered them off toward Guadalcanal, about six hundred miles to the southeastward. However, during the night of 8 August one of the transports had the ill-fortune to pass near the old U.S. submarine S-38, which sank her with over three hundred men. This forced the cancellation of this first of what would be many Japanese efforts to reinforce their embattled troops on Guadalcanal.

Meanwhile, Japanese planes from Rabaul were sent off to attack the invaders, or preferably their supporting aircraft carriers. In the early afternoon of 7 August, some 27 twin-engine bombers (of a type soon to be nicknamed "Betty") and 18 deadly "Zero" fighters, not having found the carriers, arrived over the invasion fleet. Making a high-level bombing attack, they achieved no hits and lost five bombers and two fighters in actions with U.S. carrier planes (of which the "Zeros" shot down several F4F-4 "Wildcat" fighters and one SBD scout bomber). A few hours later nine single-engine Japanese dive bombers (type "Val") appeared and scored a non-fatal hit on the destroyer Mugford. All of these attackers were lost, either shot down or ditched on the way home.

The Japanese tried again the next day, this time with 27 "Betty" bombers fitted with aerial torpedos and an escort of 15 "Zeros". Once more, they failed to locate the U.S. aircraft carriers, but made a daring low-level torpedo attack on the Vice Admiral Turner's amphibious force. Turner skillfully maneuvered his ships in the sound between Guadalcanal and Tulagi, throwing off the enemy's aim. Only one torpedo scored, hitting destroyer Jarvis in the bow. The transport George F. Elliot was struck amidships by a crashing bomber and was set afire. Japanese losses were very heavy, about seventeen bombers and two fighters, the great majority to the ship's anti-aircraft guns.

The damage done by these Japanese air attacks only inconvenienced the invasion force, slowing supply off-loading by a few hours and taking three ships out of the fight. George F. Elliot was a total loss, her fires burned out of control and she had to be scuttled. Jarvis and Mugford were both able to steam away to seek repairs, but the former, sailing independently, was found by enemy planes on the 9th of August and sunk with no survivors.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY -- NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER
805 KIDDER BREESE SE -- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
WASHINGTON DC 20374-5060

Hi, In one of my current PBEM scenario 17
Date 2-15-43

Air Loss
Allied Japanese
Air to air 394 375
DOF 89 131
AA 108 248
OP 225 711 (longer range has it's price)
Total 816 1465
Allied loss rate approx 3 ac per day. Japanese approx 5 ac per day.

USAAF Heavy bombers 84xB-17 5xB-24 (over 10 percent of my loss and heavy bombers do not make up 10 percent of my aircraft.)

Navy Fighters
F4Fx132 Zero (2&3) 355

Army Fighters
P-40Ex48 Oscar (I&II) 53
P-38Gx30
P-39x124
P-400x20
Wirrawayx23
F-5Ax30

More IJN ships have been sunk by air then USN ships sunk by air. B-17/B-24 have never flown any naval strikes. All meduim bomber strikes are at 6k.

Ships lost by cause
IJN Mines 4xIJN 4xUSN
USN mines 2xIJN
Air bombs 27xIJN 0xUSN
Air torp 2xIJN 9xUSN
Long Lance 23xUSN
USN Sub 19xIJN
IJN Sub2xUSN
Gunfire 11xIJN 23xUSN
DC 7xIJN 0xUSN

60xUSN ships worth 351 VP
75xIJN ships worth 1246 VP

I consider this PBEM player capable. I doubt he would agree the Japanese are weighted or endowed with extra abilty.

Can we see a few more PBEM totals from games that have went at least 6 months?

Regarding Tristanjohn's posted drubbing at hands of Japanese bombers in PBEM AAR.

I really can't see anything wrong with the results.

Apparently, you sailed a surface taskforce into a hornets nest of land based aircraft and got hammered.
You criticize the result as ahistorical (losing the North Carolina wouldn't have coloured your perception on this, obviously), yet Prince of Wales and Repulse had similar experiences off Singapore.

You also criticize search routines.
Well, apparently your opponent was doing just fine in this area.
Just out of curiosity Tristanjohn, what number of aircraft did you have in the air in the examples you cite where your own land based searches were ineffective.
There was a reason that B17's were used extensively in the search role.
Intelligence on enemy fleet movement is a prerequisite to intelligent asset management.

Oh, and your previous post regarding the inability of CV's to operate in coastal hexes is wrong.
CV's operate at 50% ops in base hexes only (ie where there is at least a size one port of airbase).
Please don't get your knickers in a twist and criticize designers and players about non-issues.
You really need more experience in UV.