Matrix Games Forums

Thanks for the links, skyros.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: Skyros

Here is a site where they discuss a possible operation. I do not know how valid the info is.

http://www.users.bigpond.com/pacificwar ... wayOp.html

"Dr Stephan claims in his book that on 9 December 1941 Admiral Yamamoto ordered his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki, to draw up a plan for an invasion of Hawaii (p.92)." I find it interesting that even in this most "rose-colored" assessment, the notion of actually invading Hawaii doesn't show up until AFTER Pearl Harbor.

...and that's just the Navy's planning. The army was rather tardy, it seems:

"Dr Stephan claims that on 3 June 1942 (Tokyo Time) Major General Tanaka instructed his subordinates in the Operations Section of Army General Staff to prepare a feasibility study for an assault on Oahu (p.119). On 5 June 1942 (Tokyo Time) the four fleet carriers of the Japanese carrier striking force at Midway were destroyed by SBD dive-bombers of the US Pacific Fleet."

"Dr Stephan claims in his book that on 9 December 1941 Admiral Yamamoto ordered his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki, to draw up a plan for an invasion of Hawaii (p.92)." I find it interesting that even in this most "rose-colored" assessment, the notion of actually invading Hawaii doesn't show up until AFTER Pearl Harbor.

I just found that article myself. While Japan had conducted numerous feasibility studies for invading Hawaii prewar, she had made no serious attempt to take them further. We do the same during peacetime. But I find the decision to begin indepth studies after the war began ridiculous. Even more astounding/puzzling/mystifying is the time frame given for implementation. Stephans states that the timetable was:

Jun 42: Part (1) Invade the Aleutians
Jun 42: Part (2) Invade Midway
Aug 42: Part (3) Invade Johnston Island and Palmyra
Nov 42: (Part 4) Invade Hawaii

This seems to go against the grain of everything Adm Yamamato knew about the Americans. Given his statement that Japan would only be victorious for 6 months to a year before American industrial might stepped in, its inconceivable that he would have accepted this plan in whole. The opposition to just the Midway portion of this plan was strong. MGen Tanaka was totally against expanding the defensive perimeter, at least until Doolittle changed his mind and even then he was unwilling to provide a huge committment of land forces in support of a Hawaii operation. Yamamato had to threaten to resign just to get his own naval buddies to agree to invade Midway let alone Hawaii. And Yamamato never did present the 3rd and 4th parts of this "plan" to the General Staff or to the Emporer.

Invading Hawaii in Nov 42, after the US has had nearly a full year to repair and improve its defenses is pure fantasy. Stephans says that they planned to use 3 divisions to seize Hawaii. That's a pretty small force even knowing that there was already one full US division at the outbreak of war. Surely Japan would have realized that the US hadn't been idle during this time and was quite likely to have heavily reinforced Hawaii. Add to that the fact that Hawaii now is fully stockpiled with everything needed to sustain war and can be supplied far easier than can Yamamato's boys.

But let's assume for a moment that Yamamato gets his way and actually begins that the long chain of events that will culminate in the invasion of Hawaii. Troops and shipping needs are identified, naval units assigned, training begun, etc... ect... ect... There is still one inescapable fact. Everything stops with the Battle of Midway. Even if it doesn't, Guadalcanal is sure to cause the army to withdraw its participation.

Japan's only realistic chance to take Hawaii was in the opening moments of the war, to invade whiule the US was still reeling from the attack on Pearl Harbor. Invading in Nov 42, no matter how much planning was done, simply was not going to happen due to the combined effects of the events at Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal.

Chez

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Japan's only realistic chance to take Hawaii was in the opening moments of the war, to invade whiule the US was still reeling from the attack on Pearl Harbor. Invading in Nov 42, no matter how much planning was done, simply was not going to happen due to the combined effects of the events at Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal.

Chez

And as the second article shows, that idea was rubbish as well. Our problem in a nutshell is that the designer's of the game gave the Japanese much more capability than they really had. Had they made it historically accurate, we would all be sitting around puzzling how the Japanese actually accomplished as much as they did. It was a remarkable performance, done on a logistical shoestring.

And as the second article shows, that idea was rubbish as well. Our problem in a nutshell is that the designer's of the game gave the Japanese much more capability than they really had. Had they made it historically accurate, we would all be sitting around puzzling how the Japanese actually accomplished as much as they did. It was a remarkable performance, done on a logistical shoestring.

Yes, its a nice idea... invading Hawaii but totally unsustainable due to the logistical difficulties involved in a multi-front war. Japan needs the SRA far more than any benefit seizing Hawaii brings.

Chez

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

The arguement here is about LOGISTIC CAPABILITY - and IF Japan truly lacked the LOGISTIC ability to attempt the invasion - they would not have tired to do so. Since they did try - the first 100,000 men were actually sent out on more than 200 ships - there is no reasonable basis to say they could not

These 100,000 men... what units were they and when and where did they embark for a Hawaii operation? What ships were earmarked for escorts? And where did these troops end up?

Planning an operation is not the same as conducting it. Sure you write all the planning documents and point papers you want, you can even identify the units and the ships you would need, you can even wargame it but the fact remains everything was purely hypothetical because Japan NEVER attempted to actually invade Hawaii.

Amassing the forces necessary to invade Hawaii would require a far larger committment of men and material than they planned for Midway. Plus the Japanese would have had to delay or cancel either the Malaya or PI operation in order to gather the necessary shipping which in turn delays the taking of the SRA.

Chez

All your questions are answered by the many references to the Battle of Midway. This was the opening phase of the operation intended to entice those pesky enemy carriers out to do battle (boy did that work!!) - the idea being that once sunk they could not do another Doolittle raid - nor anything else that mattered in either the heart of the Empire nor the SRA. I grant that almost nothing you will read (before Let the Sea Make a Noise was published) in English disclosed that it was what the battle was about - it now is known that is what was going on: you may read some translated documents in The Pearl Harbor Papers, the Pacific War Papers, and Hawaii Under the Risinig Sun (all University of Hawaii materials) - and you may read in far more detail in the Official History.

Almost every comment you follow your questions with is dead on correct. Many more forces were required to invade Hawaii than for Midway alone - and we have specific data about them. We know, for example, that three divisions were put on alert orders for the op, so they could plan, equip, and to the pre-embarcation tasks required. They did NOT have to cancel ANY other operations however - but it is true that planned operations in the direction of Fiji, New Caledonia and so on could not be put on "execute" stage planning due to lack of resources in 1942 (it was hoped that would change in 1943). Interestingly, an often alleged planned operation to "invade Australia" did NOT have to be delayed because it never achieved approval, the IJA objecting to trying to find the troops for it - which it put at ten divisions. The closest to reality that concept ever came was when Adm Ukagi asked a staff officer to look at it - in early 1942 - and the product of his thinking ran into a solid brick wall of IJA opposition on the grounds he had not allocated sufficient forces - which could nto in any case be found. So there WERE limits to the troops and shipping available - but these were of a wholly different scale than would be required for the Hawaii operation. Further - Hawaii had been in planning since 1910 - it was not a new idea - and everyone was used to the concept that 'in the right circumstances, we will do this'. Australia never had been on the table (except in paranoid Western thinking) - and Ukagi is the only general officer to actually order any study of the idea be done. He didn't do it as a plan either - but like Patton - he asked for THREE DIFFERENT contingency plans - for possible follow up operations after initial operations were completed in the SE area. This was only one of them. The idea of going to New Caledonia had long been considered, Japan had invested in a major mine there just before the war began, and Fiji was thought to be an outstanding forward base for submarines and recon to support them - to cut the SLOC between Australia and the USA. That operation - requiring as many troops as Hawaii - did NOT run into the same IJA brick wall. Corps sized ops were considered feasible - but 10 division sized ones were not. Given what happened later on Guadalcanal and New Guinea - particularly when you consider the troops SENT (vice arrived) - it is clear that this sort of thinking was fairly sound.

ORIGINAL: herwin

ORIGINAL: bradfordkay

ORIGINAL: Terminus

How the hell would the Japanese gather together enough transports to sail 5 divisions to Hawai'i at once, anyway? "Unlikely" would be a polite understatement...

Well, it's late July 1942 in our game, and Chez just landed 5-6 divisions, 3 infantry brigades, 2 infantry regiments plus supporting troops at Darwin (CHS v2.08, scen 159).

That's the size of the invasion of Sicily in early 1943. "There were 2,760 ships and major landing craft converging on their rendezvous near Malta." from Combined Arms Site. Did the Japanese have those sorts of amphibious assets in mid-1942?

Remember - however - that landing craft - even "major landing craft" - are substantially abstract in our game system. All LCM, LCVP and even some larger LCT which function from APA, AKA and LSDs do NOT show up as separate craft. Further - except for AKWarrior's mod and RHS (using AKWarriors work) - you never get close to the right number of LSTs for the Allies - and as far as I know - only RHS offers up to 60 landing craft per naval unit for independent landing craft operations. In WITP the majority of those vessels are not going to appear as separate ships.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

The arguement here is about LOGISTIC CAPABILITY - and IF Japan truly lacked the LOGISTIC ability to attempt the invasion - they would not have tired to do so. Since they did try - the first 100,000 men were actually sent out on more than 200 ships - there is no reasonable basis to say they could not

These 100,000 men... what units were they and when and where did they embark for a Hawaii operation? What ships were earmarked for escorts? And where did these troops end up?

Planning an operation is not the same as conducting it. Sure you write all the planning documents and point papers you want, you can even identify the units and the ships you would need, you can even wargame it but the fact remains everything was purely hypothetical because Japan NEVER attempted to actually invade Hawaii.

Amassing the forces necessary to invade Hawaii would require a far larger committment of men and material than they planned for Midway. Plus the Japanese would have had to delay or cancel either the Malaya or PI operation in order to gather the necessary shipping which in turn delays the taking of the SRA.

Chez

We know, for example, that three divisions were put on alert orders for the op, so they could plan, equip, and to the pre-embarcation tasks required.

What three divisions? You must give their designations in their entirety and prove it.

You're on the chopping block here, Sid. When you go to extremes like this, it's your responsibility to prove what you're saying is correct. Otherwise, you're a liar.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

Japan's only realistic chance to take Hawaii was in the opening moments of the war, to invade whiule the US was still reeling from the attack on Pearl Harbor. Invading in Nov 42, no matter how much planning was done, simply was not going to happen due to the combined effects of the events at Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal.

Chez

Parsalls and Tully (Shattered le' Sword) agree with you. By the time of Midway the US had had time to repair the damage done to the organic airforce and the level of military personell had greatly balooned. IIRC the numbers approached if not exceeded 100,000. Not all front line troops of course but a good indication of the level of buildup ongoing. Japan would have needed more than 4-5 Divisions at this point I think.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again
The idea the Japanese might come out of their mandate bases was hardly a surprise. The US forces were looking for precisely such a move - and that is a big part of why they didn't find the KB on Dec 7 (US time) IRL. The idea that such an invasion would be a surprise on that particular day is certainly possible. It is difficult to overstate the lack of readiness and the peacetime mind set in place on Dec 7, 1941 - worldwide and in Hawaii. There was no ready ammunition. There was no manning of AAA positions or CD positions. There was no combat air patrol. There was minimal air and inshore patrol. Wether or not that means that the forces would reach all the way to Hawaii undetected is another subject entirely - and not an assertion anyone has made - least of all I.

Cid. I believe the point that BRADFORDKEY was trying to make is that to guarantee Kido Butai's arrival was a suprise at PH, most of the supporting invasion convoys and their escorts really couldn't sail until maybe 12/5 or so. They would be too big to hide, and Japan had no other major targets to the East but the United States. That being the case, every garrison and position in the Hawaiian Chain would be on full War footing before they could possibly arrive to invade, and additional forces on the way from the West Coast.

That doesn't mean the Japs would encounter major opposition in the Western Hawaiian Area when siezing advanced bases (like the Brits grabbed South Georgia during the Falklands Affair)..., but it does mean that resistance would be ready and aimed at all the militarily developed and useful bases (almost all of which were on or near Oahu).

If you are correct, then he, you and I are substantially in agreement. Except for a single brigade based forward on Kwajalein, and smaller forces used for operations like Wake and Guam, the original planning concieved the major INVASION and support forces would stage out of major ports in JAPAN itself. This is the plan I implemented - because the changes made for 1942 do not yet apply in 1941. Some of these forces are still in Japan on Dec 7 1941. Others have sailed already - and perhaps some of them before Dec 5 - but it would not be clear they were not headed to Malaya, the Philippines, toward Rabaul, or China - or even Russia (Japan sent 100,000 ment to Kwangtun Army between July and the start of the war - bringing units up to wartime strength) - or where? I do not have any sense that sailing more ships - or even loading them prior to sailing - might not be detected - and that some hostile interpretation might not be placed on such moves. If players wish to turn off "first turn surprise" I think that is entirely reasonable. And so far I have resisted suggestions that greater portions of Hawaii forces be disabled - because I am not persuaded that is the best estimate. But I don't think the fact it is still peacetime can be overstressed. There is tension - and there might more tension in this scenario - but the mind set "it hasn't happened yet" would still exist. Much planning was based on the assumption hostilities would begin in the spring of 1942 - and had it not - many things in the shipping and production streams would not have been caught were they were when the war began.

I think my point was/is that I did not build the scenario on the assumption of major strategic surprise or complete tactical surprise. For example, I astounded the Allied Tag Team when I said the entire fleet could sortee - IF they thought Kimmel would do that - or any fraction thereof - subject to the ALLIED PLAYER'S belief of what was likely to be considered wise in what the ALLIED PLAYER estimated might be known or suspected. I have never objected to putting any fraction of fighters on CAP - right up to the max of 90% game mechanics allow - or 100% if on sweep. Tests indicate this does help - but not nearly enough to change the outcome - due to force size and performance issues. The scenario ASSUMES detection of the incoming forces at some point - and WHERE that point is may be strongly influenced by the orders the Allies issue their units. Where do they go? How many planes are searching? Stuff like that determines when the incoming forces are detected, and how the Allied forces react to those detections.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again
Sorry Cid..., but that's one big barrel of baloney. The Japanese "planned" to conquer China---and look how well that was turning out! "Wishfull Thinking" was a major ingredient in many Japanese Plans and Estimates.

Lets be perfectly clear here:

You claimed Japan lacked the logistic ability to invade Hawaii -

and you are wholly ignoring that Japan DID invade Hawaii IRL - in 1942

NO ..., they didn't. They made a "raid" on Midway (and the Aleutians) in hopes of drawing the US Navy into "the Decisive Battle". And they got their wish at Midway. The only things that got "invaded" were a couple of almost uninhabited islands at the far end of the Aleutians. And there is a good case to be made that even the "Midway Landing Force" was totally inadequate to the job allotted it, and would have been butchered had it tried to land.

An "invasion" of Hawaii would require the siezure of the area around and including Oahu (1200 miles farther from Japan) with at minimum and "Army-sized force" (in Japanese terms..., 3-5 Divisions). A long and drawn out process requiring the IJN to stay in position to support and protect lots of convoys and oilers and aircraft ferries and such...., and requiring many times the logistical support of the historical Midway Operation.

Wow. The Aleutians were raided, not invaded! The Thousand Mile War, The Forgotten War, Silent Siege and all the other materials on the war in Alaska all got it wrong - and my regiment should not be proud of its alleged heritage I suppose either?

But - yes - the true aim of the operation was indeed to suck the USN into a Decisive Battle - a la doctrine - a la Mahan -
and as happened in the Russo Japanese war. That is the REASON threats to Hawaii and the Aleutians were regarded as wise moves: it was assumed the fleet would sortee. Turns out they were right about that too!

And - yes - taking Hawaii DOES require "taking the area around Oahu" - which is 1200 miles further than Midway - to be sure - but not so much farther than putting troops and a raiding force into the Aleutians and all the way to Kodiak. Japan could do such things - did do such things - and planned to do exactly that to Oahu - but not BEFORE they owned Midway (or - FYI - before they also owned Johnston Island). Also not BEFORE they had got that pesky enemy carrier fleet, which had demonstrated it could be irritating in the Doolittle Raid. What exactly do you think those three divisions were standing up to invade - if not the lower Hawaiian islands? And why, exactly, do you have any problem believing the Japanese know what they planned to do?

Judging the Midway operation in isolation is to miss the strategic point: it was the LEAD operation - and the forces for the follow on operations (plural) were standing to: the logistic and force capabilities existed and the decision to implement them was implemented. It didn't work out - praise the Lord - but that does not change the fact your allegations the logistic capability did not exist - or IJA assignment of troops was impossible - were wholly incorrect.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: Terminus
Furthermore, given the sort of facilities the Japanese provided on their troop ships (quite literally hammocks and a trough to sh*t in), their troops would have been in a sorry state if they'd ever gotten to Hawai'i in the first place.

A valid point when the length of the voyage to the landing site grows from days to weeks... The Japanese soldier was a fairly hardy fellow, but his medical support was a joke, and his care and feeding aboard ship almost a "war crime" in itself (and by his own side to boot).

Well - it isn't exactly a valid point - insofar as the Japanese did not provide hammocks for most of their troops at all.
Our controversial Tsuji came up with a quite different system - he tells about it in his more famous book - during the planning for the war. For reasons unclear Japan did not want to use passenger ships for troops! Instead they wanted to use AKs. [Parillo says these were designed with decks and self loading cranes to facilitate landing craft - so possibly that is why - they wouldn't need ports] So Tsjui came up with a horrible tiny box - four men to a box - it was not very nice.
But they would not have been "swinging in hammocks" if those were used.

And it isn't clear that such a system would be used for Hawaii? For the long cross ocean trip I tend to assign the idle APs in Japan - to forward bases - where I take the time to offload the ships (at inadequate ports at a slow rate) and THEN load them (even more slowly) on smaller ships for the final leg - these on amphib task forces (which, hopefully, are assumed to be combat loading, and take longer to load - anyway code could be written to that end if it isn't). The Aleutians were a special case - because there was no land based opposition to get in the way (although one stupid missionary did shoot at them - and got killed for his trouble). But they didn't use the Tsuji Box/small AK formula there as far as I know. It is SOP in naval ops to apply different solutions to different situations. IJN was modeled on RN - and that sort of thinking was normal.

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: el cid again
As WITP mechanics are cast in stone, no scenario designer can give the Allies control over their production. Nor - probably - should we tinker with different allocations between theaters.

I don't see why not? Modders are allowed to change things. I haven't seen any comments from the game designers that modders should not change the allocation of forces in "what-if" scenarios.

Here I am referring to hard code beyond the reach of a modder: we are not permitted to give the Allied players control over CHANGING production in the sense the game system permits the Japanese to do it. It means - whatever a modder does - THAT becomes set in stone as well - the Allied player cannot change it - even if in his war situation he probably should/would. I would PREFER that both sides have production - and perhaps in WITP II they will. Game designer's comments are not germane to the game design itself: THAT casts Allied production in stone - a modder can change it - but THEN it is locked - and the Allies cannot change it at all - no matter what they need/want/could have done.

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: el cid again

I don't think we can make good estimates of the impacts of that.

If the allocation of greater forces by the USA to the Pacific is considered the likely response to a Japanese invasion of Hawaii, and I certainly believe that to be the case, then adding additional US reinforcements, even if we do not exactly know what form those forces would take, would be more accurate than not adding them.

OK - we agree on the first part - but you ignored the "impacts" part. Adding additional US reinforcements (at one point I even suggested RN might contribute a carrier) does not tell us how that impacts NON PTO in the intermediate term - and the out year impact those impacts will have on PTO might be? Unless our forces were wholly ineffective, NOT sending them somewhere means something does not get done. That probably means - as you said and I already agreed with - "Germany survives longer." So what is a reasonable gestimate of how much longer it survives - the x I asked for above - how many months are 1945 unit transfers to PTO delayed due to this shifting? And any other thing that is likely to be an impact - if you can thing of something.

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

Tinkering with this is a big can of worms -and WITP design was soundly based on the assumption "when things entered PTO is the time they enter in the game" - period.

You have placed that comment in quotes. Who are you quoting? Also, were they talking about "what-if" scenarios? I also don't understand this objection to changing the Allied reinforcements. After all, they arrived when they did partly due to the situation at the time. If the war takes a different course, then the situation is different, and that influence on the arrival of reinforcements changes as well.

Well - in a sense I am quoting the many Forum comments "unit x arrived at location y on date z" - it is the de facto standard implied by stock and most mods. But in another sense, it is structural: any attempt to do anything else is unrealistic and improbable UNLESS a serious effort is made to figure out what that might mean? In general, moving things to PTO means they are not in other theaters. Unless they were of no value whatever, that impacts what happens in those other theaters. Less for the Allies should mean more success for the Axis - long term. That ought to mean the war does not end in May 1945 - that Italy may not surrender/change sides on schedule - that Suez may not become a viable route as soon - stuff like that - at least if the sum of such forces removed is great enough. Essentially, I am agreeing with your last sentende: "if the war takes a different course, then the situation is different, and that influence on the arrival of reinforcements changes as well" - but it is a very complicated thing if you think it through: not only have you sent more stuff to PTO in 1942 - you probably have LESS stuff to send in 1944 and certainly in 1945 IF you do that. I will go that way - send more in 1942 - IF you tell me what that means later in the war? Best guess since we have no calculus. A non-rigid freespiel with you as the judge. But you can't just stop with "double air forces sent to PTO" - that is only the beginning. What does cutting air forces everywhere else by 1/3 mean downstream? [In the end doubling is too much - we won't have the slots - but the principle remains: if we increase they by 150% - what will it mean?]

...morale in many places is likely to have some political impacts. It is on the record that Gen Marshall and FDR worried about the impacts of casualties on US domestic politics. Lacking the ability to calculate when, if, and with what impact these sorts of changes might occur, I think it is much safer to stay with things more or less as they were

Given the outrage in the USA after the PH attack, I would expect that there would be even more outrage if PH was invaded in December 1941. That translates to a greater, rather than lesser, resolve to fight the war on the part of the USA.

Because I am a strategic thinker, I am thinking about more than Dec 10, 1941. What if the casualty list is long? What if the fleet losses are heavy? What if we are thrown out - try to go back - and fail? At some point this is almost certain to have an impact on politics. Even in undemocratic Japan - the Tojo regime fell because of unpopularity with the course of the war - and every administration that followed sought to end it. We could have come to terms with any of those administrations had we been willing to do so on other than a basis that guaranteed starvation in Japan (and, note, the way the war ended IRL DID result in starvation in Japan).

I am not in disagreement about immediate reaction in the USA - I am reminding you that longer term reactions are not necessairly in the same line. We probably do not have the option of fighting a war with heavy losses year after year - and so I said the ending being forced a few months after the real one is realistic - that if the Allies cannot do it in that much time - they probably won't be able to do it period.

Boy, this is an exciting thread!

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

Japan's only realistic chance to take Hawaii was in the opening moments of the war, to invade whiule the US was still reeling from the attack on Pearl Harbor. Invading in Nov 42, no matter how much planning was done, simply was not going to happen due to the combined effects of the events at Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal.

Chez

Parsalls and Tully (Shattered le' Sword) agree with you. By the time of Midway the US had had time to repair the damage done to the organic airforce and the level of military personell had greatly balooned. IIRC the numbers approached if not exceeded 100,000. Not all front line troops of course but a good indication of the level of buildup ongoing. Japan would have needed more than 4-5 Divisions at this point I think.

While I won't confess to be an expert, my gut call is also that there was a (small) chance to take Hawaii right off the bat. Certainly not in late '42.

And, getting briefly back to the subject of WITP, I don't think the game has it all that bad. While Japan's logistical problems in game aren't as difficult as IRL, it still seems like a tough and risky operation to me. I doubt I'll ever try it. I think I'd only consider it if I got intel that the bulk of Hawaii's garrison was being deployed forward.

If an allied player pays any attention to defending Hawaii, it'll be a hard nut to crack by early-mid Jan. By March-April, with forts building up and more troops & supplies coming in, it would be next to impossible. And I'd love to play someone who would try to invade Hawaii in November...

ORIGINAL: el cid again

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again




Wow. The Aleutians were raided, not invaded! The Thousand Mile War, The Forgotten War, Silent Siege and all the other materials on the war in Alaska all got it wrong - and my regiment should not be proud of its alleged heritage I suppose either?

Now who's being facecious? The (Aluetians) were in parenthsis for a reason. And my explanation of what I meant by "invasion" was certainly obvious in the next paragraph. You are grasping at straws to build your "strawmen" now Cid. Why won't you just let it go and admit that while invading Hawaii may be possible due to the imperfections of the game, it was impossible in real life. Really Cid, we won't think less of you for admitting that you can be wrong once in a while.

Quite the contrary. It might help you start building some credibility around here.

I can be wrong - and I often admit it directly and indirectly - incorporating the corrections into various scenarios. There are even aspects of RHS which are the way they are in spite of the fact I don't want them that way - because the Forum has a different consensus view. But offering not a single fact to counter the official history or the official documents on which it is based is not a viable way to convince me (or any rational reader) that I am wrong.

This is not an occasion on which I am wrong in any sense. Failing to admit the merit of factual evidence from multiple incontrovertable sources impairs the credibility of the critics - not me. Ranting "it is utterly impossible" - and refusing to face the reality they really did it in one form (from the NE) - and long planned to do it in another form (from the SE) - is not persuasive. Yet it is eloquent in its own right: to the charge they really planned to do this - and Yamamoto said on Dec 10 "we should have" - and to the charge they really tried to do it in a modified form in 1942 - not a single fact is offered. We are not shown how the official history - or all the documents in the University of Hawaii tranlations - were fabrications of (who???). No one is doing math on the ships - "it would take 3 million tons to lift one division - so the total would have to be 9 million tons - more than available" - because of course doing the math would show no such thing.

This is my thread: I started it, it is about two (or three if we add OIO) of my scenarios, and it was more or less notice about the significant ways these differ at start from the other RHS scenarios. While at the moment this alternate opening is only in the EOS and AIO scenarios I do not regard as "strictly historical" - it is not this opening that makes them such - it is the differences in things Japan has to fight with because of differences in what was ordered into production (or how it was modified). I can - and will if there is interest - offer a "strictly historical" scenario with this start: because if done with exactly historical forces it would be just that - an alternate way to organize initial operations. In the sense that it is more like most contingency plans written before the war began than the plan actually implemented - this is a very historical start indeed - and represents both classical Japanese naval thinking and a great deal of American naval thinking. Read again about why US officers believed the Japanese approach was "probably from their bases in the Mandates" and think about why they believed that? Enough so that is where they focused their search efforts on the day the war began.

I have close to shocked this is regarded as controversial. Japan had four or five times the military and sealift assets required to invade Hawaii - the proposition that it did not is irrational, unfounded, and in the face of the fact they both planned to do it and attempted to do it - virtually a misrepresentation of the truth. If it were required Japan could lift 12 or 15 divisions - although I submit it would dangerously impair security and operations in other theaters if it did so.

THIS thread - and THESE scenarios - are not fantasy mods - about might have beens if something were radically different - or if the impossible somehow became possible. It is about alternate history - based on the MAIN thread of Japanese naval thought before WWII - and based on the view of its greatest commander two days after Pearl Harbor. One may believe the IJN had things wrong - and that its logistic reach was less than it believed it was. One Japanese historian thinks they should never have tried to establish major positions more distant than Rabaul. But in fact it may well be that Hawaii is a very special case - that it might offer decisive advantages if it were not an enemy base - and it might greatly impact the timing and size of counteroffensive operations - perhaps enough to have war winning implications. Beyond that, the THREAT such a possibility poses conspires with the arrogance and ignorance of the Americans of the period to all but guaranteed the Japanese (actually American Mahanian) fixation with Decisive Battle could be implemented. Forcing the US Fleet into battle early - against a concentrated, undamaged and supported Japanese Kiddo Butai - is the best possible way to insure the US won't be launching any counteroffensives before 1943.
That in turn is what Japan needs to establish an effective autarky - and have the time it needs to create a situation in which a favorable war termination might exist. I have never seen any other suggestion of a viable path to this end for WWII for the Japanese. It isn't likely - but it is a real possibility.

Anyone who does not like this start does not need to think about it - or to load up and play EOS or AIO. But THIS thread is for those who DO like it - to make CONSTRUCTIVE comments that might make it better. "It is impossible" - when clearly that is utterly false - is just a waste of time - and I will not waste any more time on such comments. I have addressed them in far more detail than they diserve - and pointed at the strongest possible evidence. A mere belief "they lacked logistic capability" is pale compared to known details of their real logistical assets- only part of which were required or assigned to this operation in either its pre war or 1942 forms. Such beliefs are rooted in a deep seated belief the Japanese must be inferior - and not in facts. Japan didn't need a million tons to lift three divisions - yet it had more than five times that much. I began my military life on the last APA built for the USN, and I am logistically oriented - forcing RHS players to lift supplies that they get free forward in all other forms of WITP - because I "eat" the excess supplies resource centers produce. I see no useful purpose in debating this matter further: it is an alternate start for some scenarios - and comments on how to do it better are what this thread is about. I do not require you agree with Yamamoto or me about what was possible. But since there is no logical or logistical foundation for such a belief - I won't consider it any further.

You'll never learn...[8|]