Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl
Of course. That's what "simulation gaming" is all about. But you can't do "better than historically" unless you limit the game to the historical resources at hand. What's the fun of saying "I'm better than Rommel, I took Alexandria and Cairo", if you gave yourself a division of Abrams Tanks to do it with? Or even just removed all his logistical difficulties? "Different than Historically" does not make "Better than Historically"...., it just makes different. To be worth playing you need to face as many of the original challenges, faced by the original commanders, as can be worked into the game. Your troops are never going to bleed, and you'll never really have to face the difficulties of the Political-Military infighting that actually exists (you're both..., problem solved). But logistical availabilities and the means of supporting your forces across the map can be modeled. Unfortunately WITP doesn't do that very well (one of the big reasons for Sid's attempts in RHS).

Mike, I think you have this mostly right. What you say is totally true, and there is another aspect to it. You talk about exploring the 'what if' of the commanders decisions and the luck of the day (weather, etc.) - I love doing that. It's also valid exploration to look at some differences in setup (like the logistics and other things you mention). The reason I think it's valid is that those things can vary (to some degree) based upon decisions made at a strategic level higher than the game represents. This is the same as looking at whether you can do better than the field commander if you change a certain strategy. They're both just decisions that people made at the time, and you are exploring alternatives.

Now, how much you change in the scenario determines whether it's an interesting 'what if', or just fantasy. You mention Abrams tanks - fantasy. Germany does not declare war on US, and US does not go to war with Germany for at least 2 or 3 years. Uninteresting to me because even if it was a real possibility, the outcome would be crushingly obvious. A 'Japan first' strategy where the mix of early forces is changed - interesting. The EOS type changes where Japan did a better job of preparation and a better job of coordinating betweens services - interesting. If those changes were carried too far - fantasy.

A December '41 invasion of Hawaii in a baseline (RHS CVO) scenario - probably shooting Japans wad early, maybe interesting for the two players gaming it. A December '41 invasion of Hawaii in the 'Japan better prepared and coordinated (RHS EOS) scenario - maybe interesting because Japan in that (what-if) case decided to produce more CVL's pre-war, and this scenario could help to indicate just how dangerous it is to get how far behind a hostile potential (read 'eventual') adversary.

I'm trying to point out that I think it's valid to change the historical resources within a limited context and still have a valid simulation game. Go too far and of course it's just fantasy. Where one leaves of and the other begins is - opinion!

Truth is the designers "fudged" a LOT to try and make the AI a decent opponent for at least a year of play. But in a "head-to-head" game all that "fudging" allows some very ahistoric possibilities, as players are much better at exploiting advantages than any AI will ever be. And so the invasion of Hawaii becomes possible "in the game" when it wasn't in "reality"...., and 9 pages of forum entries are the result.

This is definitely a limitation of the game engine. I particularly dislike the fact that even if Japan produces several times as many airframes as historically, the US - which historically reduced production at a certain point - is limited with numbers assigned at scenario start (whether stock, or more historical in CHS and RHS). The various limitations of the game engine definitely influence which 'what if' scenarios are practical to explore.

BTW, I echo m10bob's praise about you making your points on issues without making personal attacks. It matters.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

"Dr Stephan claims in his book that on 9 December 1941 Admiral Yamamoto ordered his chief of staff, Rear Admiral Matome Ugaki, to draw up a plan for an invasion of Hawaii (p.92)." I find it interesting that even in this most "rose-colored" assessment, the notion of actually invading Hawaii doesn't show up until AFTER Pearl Harbor.

I just found that article myself. While Japan had conducted numerous feasibility studies for invading Hawaii prewar, she had made no serious attempt to take them further. We do the same during peacetime. But I find the decision to begin indepth studies after the war began ridiculous. Even more astounding/puzzling/mystifying is the time frame given for implementation. Stephans states that the timetable was:

Jun 42: Part (1) Invade the Aleutians
Jun 42: Part (2) Invade Midway
Aug 42: Part (3) Invade Johnston Island and Palmyra
Nov 42: (Part 4) Invade Hawaii

This seems to go against the grain of everything Adm Yamamato knew about the Americans. Given his statement that Japan would only be victorious for 6 months to a year before American industrial might stepped in, its inconceivable that he would have accepted this plan in whole. Chez

Part of your confusion is mistranslation - widely done on this famous quote. What Yamamoto actually said literally was "I will run wild for six months to a year and a half". The shorter quote is probably done to make him appear wiser than he was - since Midway is six months after the war begins. His vision was cloudy - and he felt that there was a window of 300% in how long IJN might dominate Pacific operations: anywhere from 6 to 18 months - depending on thinks unknown and/or unknowable - including luck.

Another part is that this was indeed long studied - and it was truly believed to require a proper campaign - just as I outlined previously in the thread. Between each stage ships would be repaired, supplies and fuel brought forward,
units trained for the next operation - a full scale sort of preparation which one should envisage if the enemy is large and competant. It is not entirely a sign of weakness the Japanese planning process was this way. It is also not altogehter different than the ideas involved in War Plan Orange, nor the variation of it used in the island hopping campaign IRL. It certainly also took a long time, involved withdrawing and repairing fleet units, moving up supplies, training units for the next op, the lot.

The final part of your confusion is that no one in Japan - and almost no one in the USA for that matter - could comprehend the pace of changes that were going to happen in PTO before the fact. Both sides long planned on the basis that things were going to be pretty much the same for the duration - but as it turned out there was an almost fantastic evolution of machines, tactics and even operational concepts. The combat process turned out to foster a very savage kind of evolution - and it turned out many times that plans were not well related to events as they happened. This was not just a problem for the Japanese. We had awful casualties in our second major landing of the war - and the enemy was not even present. We had awful casualties near the very end of the war at Palau - and it is still argued to little purpose to such an extent no one is sure why we did it? Halsey got suckered into chasing ghosts at Leyte Gulf - and a serious gun force got into the invasion area. What is expected is not always what happens.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez
Japan's only realistic chance to take Hawaii was in the opening moments of the war, to invade whiule the US was still reeling from the attack on Pearl Harbor. Invading in Nov 42, no matter how much planning was done, simply was not going to happen due to the combined effects of the events at Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal.

Chez

And as the second article shows, that idea was rubbish as well. Our problem in a nutshell is that the designer's of the game gave the Japanese much more capability than they really had. Had they made it historically accurate, we would all be sitting around puzzling how the Japanese actually accomplished as much as they did. It was a remarkable performance, done on a logistical shoestring.

You have misread the second article - which I agree with. It says that POST MIDWAY an invasion is not going to work.
It does NOT say it would not work at the start of the war.

Nor does anything said in the articles relate to the game system. The game system makes invasion far harder than it should - and impossible for AI I believe. But easy or hard - the system is not any worse re this op than any other. In this case - IF you do what I did - and make Hawaii mountains instead of jungle - it almost certainly will not fall - because of the way code works. Two divisions supplied in mountains will hold out unrealistically long.

ORIGINAL: el cid again

Part of your confusion is mistranslation - widely done on this famous quote. What Yamamoto actually said literally was "I will run wild for six months to a year and a half".

Prove it.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: el cid again

I can be wrong - and I often admit it directly and indirectly - incorporating the corrections into various scenarios.

This is not an occasion on which I am wrong in any sense.

This is my thread: I started it, it is about two (or three if we add OIO) of my scenarios,

THIS thread - and THESE scenarios - are not fantasy mods - about might have beens if something were radically different - or if the impossible somehow became possible.

Anyone who does not like this start does not need to think about it - or to load up and play EOS or AIO. But THIS thread is for those who DO like it - to make CONSTRUCTIVE comments that might make it better.

Well..., that's clear enough. The old playground "I get to pitch because it's my ball" arguement. Though if you are now going to say this thread was only about your "fantasy scenario" you really should have made that plain. I've said several times in this discussion that "It's fun to discuss and play around with..., but in the real world it's nonsense." You bounce back and forth between "game world" and "real world" as if they are interchangeable. I like many of your "game" ideas, and respect the whole RHS project (for which you seem to have carried most of the water). But your "real world" claims are sometimes "all wet"...., and this has been one of them. Good luck to you Sid.

Well - I never use the term "fantasy scenario" - because I never play fantasy games. I only do historical ones. But I don't think history is about what inevitably had to happen. I don't think history is about what was likely to happen. I think history is about what DID happen - likely or not - in the context of luck and specific choices by specific players IRL. I think historical gaming permits game players to make different choices - and sort out what probably would be the outcome. I have no interest in fantasy - so I don't ever think about it. I also am a loggie doggie at heart - and against strong opposition I imposed reforms on fuel consumption, fuel requirements, free supplies, name it - so we could have a better engine for figuring out what happens. The idea Japan could not do what it really did do - your position expressed in my words - is the real fantisy in this thread. It had much more than it needed for this op - which is why it never considered doing it as an isolated thing - but always as just one of several things. Since you really can do the math - I find it inexcusable you do not do it and admit - 'yeah - they had enough lift - enough troops - and enough everything else - and - yeah - they really did think about this for a long time - in several variations - and finally implemented one of them - too late for it to work out in the event."

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: m10bob

In that this is a game, anything is a "what if", even when based on an historical event, and when studying a major event like the Malaysian campaign, and what that conquest gained the victor,(albeit temporarily Singapore,etc.) one might see the possibilities of a Hawiian invasion as viable, if this were given priority?

Is not the concept of the game to see if one might do better than occurred historically?

Of course. That's what "simulation gaming" is all about. But you can't do "better than historically" unless you limit the game to the historical resources at hand. What's the fun of saying "I'm better than Rommel, I took Alexandria and Cairo", if you gave yourself a division of Abrams Tanks to do it with? Or even just removed all his logistical difficulties? "Different than Historically" does not make "Better than Historically"...., it just makes different. To be worth playing you need to face as many of the original challanges, faced by the original commanders, as can be worked into the game. Your troops are never going to bleed, and you'll never really have to face the difficulties of the Political-Military infighting that actually exists (you're both..., problem solved). But logistical availabilities and the means of supporting your forces across the map can be modeled. Unfortunately WITP doesn't do that very well (one of the big reasons for Sid's attempts in RHS). Truth is the designers "fudged" a LOT to try and make the AI a decent opponant for at least a year of play. But in a "head-to-head" game all that "fudging" allows some very ahistoric possibilities, as players are much better at exploiting advantages than any AI will ever be. And so the invasion of Hawaii becomes possible "in the game" when it wasn't in "reality"...., and 9 pages of forum entries are the result.

There is no reason whatever that we could not implement the 1941 invasion plan in a strictly historical mod where nothing whatever is different from history - except where things are sent. And in the present case - EOS (and AIO) do not have great changes by the time the war begins. The biggest change is that many (not all) air units can choose to use aircraft from the other service - if enough can be produced (which often is not possible in time for this or that). There are no Abhrams tanks - and no extra forces at all. Aside from lacking slots for them, I believe the amount of steel, manpower, etc would be constant: you might organize differently - but you don't have more to organize. The assertions that this invasion plan could not happen IRL is bogus because - well - the Japanese always thought in these terms - and never discovered any such limitations.

Note that the USA never in any era had a petroleum reserve as large as Japan had in 1941 (measured in months of time).
Saying that they might run out sooner if they use more does not mean they should not use more. We never had, needed, believed in or practiced running a reserve out for many dozens of months. Curtailing operations that have decisive impacts are not the way to win a war. Since - as Parillo points out - there is "more than enough" oil in the SRA - it is vital to capture it and insure it is not molested - for long enough a war terminiation situation might become attractive to the enemy. This is probably the very best way to get there: it almost guarantees the US fleet will take horrible casualties and not be able to intervene during the expansion period; it almost guarantees a US counter campaign will be aimed at Hawaii - and if it is not - that it will have a fraction of its power because the LOC is too long.

Sid, all nice and well, but:

(1) Which Japanese divisions were ready for a PH invasion in Dec 1941?

(2) Which forces were supposed to be employed in an invasion of Hawaii after Midway?

K

ORIGINAL: el cid again
...I am thinking - first of all - of the Battle of the Atlantic. This was difficult to wage due to an absense of bases in the middle (sans Iceland, which we invaded). Things changed when Dr Salazar declared for the Allies. This was a most unlikely "Ally" - Salazar was a Fashista in almost every sense - and a classic dictator who ruled until his death. But the tide had turned in his view, and better to ride a rising tide than to be swept over by it. OK - with me so far? Now comes along this idea above we might "triple the air power sent to PTO" (from 1/4 to 3/4) - which may or may not have the numbers right - but that was the proposal. And you (Andrew) proposed to double it (from 1/4 to 1/2?)
Either way - the implications are drastic reductions in air power sent to all other theaters. If the above ratios are right, that would be a cut to 1/3 in the first case, and to 2/3 in the latter (i.e. 67% and 33% respectively). So - I wonder - what is the impact on that on the Battle of the Atlantic as well as on the "Air War" in Europe? We already said Torch might not go ahead. Drastic reduction in the sinking of submarines, drastic reduction in the destruction from bombing, no invasion of NOrth Africa or follow on into Italy - why would Salazar see "the handwriting on the wall" enough to declare war?

My suggestion was a 50% increase, not a doubling. And that is in general, not per aircraft type. Presumably, if the Allies are sensible, they would not significantly reduce the numbers of patrol aircraft covering the Atlantic. Combine that with the fact that the number of ships deployed in the Atlantic would be the same (I didn't make any suggestion that it wouldn't), means that there is no need to assume that the Battle of the Atlantic would be impacted at all, or at least not to any significant effect. So there would be no real changes there, I think.

Andrew

ORIGINAL: el cid again
I do like one idea of yours: no stuff transfers ETO to PTO later in the war frees up slots - and takes slots that show up late in the war (i.e. never get used in almost all games) and lets us put stuff in them that might show up in many games. So I am inclined to go forward down this path of reasoning a bit more. I asked for X - how many months Germany surrenders later - and you said - in effect - forget those transferred units altogether. Certainly simple. And it helps resolve a major problem: slot limits. Other technical changes in RHS - multiple ship units - have also resulted in a lot of empty ship slots - so this is more feasible than it once would have been.

Given that I suggested that as the flip-side of providing the USA with large increases in air and ground reinforcements, doing this without also adding those additional reinforcements would be nothing more than an arbitrary, and unjustified, penalty to the Allied side.

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

My suggestion was a 50% increase, not a doubling. And that is in general, not per aircraft type. Presumably, if the Allies are sensible, they would not significantly reduce the numbers of patrol aircraft covering the Atlantic. Combine that with the fact that the number of ships deployed in the Atlantic would be the same (I didn't make any suggestion that it wouldn't), means that there is no need to assume that the Battle of the Atlantic would be impacted at all, or at least not to any significant effect. So there would be no real changes there, I think.

Andrew

Given how hard the USN and Coastal Command had to fight for every Army bomber, especially the 4E type, and given all the other multitude of factors that influenced the BoA, I too don't feel that the Battle would be seriously impacted. Besides which, there are only so many planes that PH needs to give an adequate accounting of itself.

Cid. One last point while you are "what iffing" your way to a Hawaiian invasion. What about a simple "what if" for the Allies. Requires nothing but an idea. Somebody working in the "Economics" section of an Allied Planning Division notes that the one thing that might drive Japan into the War is her lack of oil. And makes the logical assumption that if Japan does go to war, it will be to sieze the oil resources of Southeast Asia..., which she will need desperately if she is to fight a war.

Word goes out, and every single oil well, pipeline, loading facility, and refinery in the SRA is wired and set for demolition by 12/07/41...,with orders to blow them all to he11 if the Japanese get within 300 miles. Result? Every single oil source in the SRA the Japanese are spotted within 5 hexes of is automatically 99% damaged...., and Japan goes "down the tubes" in 1943 from lack of oil. Not very exciting, but quite effective, and requiring hardly any "what if" at all (the Allies DID try to blow these facilities in the real campaign, so all we're talking about is a more organized and well though-out effort).

Seems that all the "what iffing" ever done on these forums is a shade of "what if the JAPANESE had this, or had done that, or hadn't done whatever?". But the Japanese players are hardly ever faced with a "what if the Allies aren't where they are supposed to be?"; or doing "what they're supposed to do?". When you look at the planning and discussion on the Japanese side before the war, there is a tremendous amount of doubt and worry over how the opening campaigns will unfold..., but players have almost no doubts that "exactly this will be exactly there and in exactly what condition".

Why not game it out using Command at Sea? Sofian's "No Sailor But A Fool" is supposed to allow the modelling of amphibious operations. Game out the campaign, and see if the Japanese can sustain a high enough tempo to prevent the Americans from reinforcing in time. You cannot assume surprise.

The Seelowe scenario in Sofian is a landing by two German infantry divisions against a beach defended by a heavily entrenched infantry brigade. It's believed to be balanced. The American divisions on Oahu were the best available in the Army at the time, so the force needed for a successful landing on Oahu was probably well in excess of three divisions.

ORIGINAL: herwin

Why not game it out using Command at Sea? Sofian's "No Sailor But A Fool" is supposed to allow the modelling of amphibious operations. Game out the campaign, and see if the Japanese can sustain a high enough tempo to prevent the Americans from reinforcing in time. You cannot assume surprise.

The Seelowe scenario in Sofian is a landing by two German infantry divisions against a beach defended by a heavily entrenched infantry brigade. It's believed to be balanced. The American divisions on Oahu were the best available in the Army at the time, so the force needed for a successful landing on Oahu was probably well in excess of three divisions.

What a fun idea. Might actually try it. The Marines in the group might get a kick out of it. Our group uses WitP as the strategic portion of a campaign, and TacOps as the tactical element. I think we can come up with suitable topos for the Islands. Our map guru can usually translate in a couple hours or so.

2 Big Questions … 1) where do they land? and 2) composition of the landing force?

Hydrography says they come in from the North/Northwest. Winter in the Islands … hmm … can’t be the Big Island, realistically, gotta go to the SW shore, and run the entire gauntlet of Island defenses; hydrography says it’s not likely to be Maui or Molokai, although a strike at Kaunakakai or Maalaea is not out of the question; Oahu sucks as a landing objective, Waialua??, Waianae??, or maybe into the teeth of Ewa?; no, my money’s on Kauai.

South shore (NorthWest shore runs right into the Waimea badlands) maybe at Kekaha or Eleele; could go as far east as Lihue, but hydrography again – not likely; probably couldn’t realistically get past Poipu Point.

Other perspectives are certainly welcome.

And how big is the landing force? Let’s assume they take Lihue and have access to Nawiliwili Bay. How big could it reasonably be?

Thoughts are certainly welcome here, as well.

ORIGINAL: Kereguelen

Sid, all nice and well, but:

(1) Which Japanese divisions were ready for a PH invasion in Dec 1941?

(2) Which forces were supposed to be employed in an invasion of Hawaii after Midway?

K

The latter are named in the Official History. Regretfully - this is neither very available nor as easy to read as Morison
I don't remember. I probably have it in a file - but I have well over 30,000 pages filed and a couple of thousand more awaiting to be filed. It might be in the new Pacific War Papers - which I have but have not yet read. It might be in Hawaii Under the Rising Sun - which I have not read in a couple of years. I do not remember - except I remember it was not divisions that I would have expected to be assigned. If I come across it I will post it.

There were no divisions "ready for a PH invasion in Dec 1941" because (news flash) Japan did not decide to invade Hawaii in Dec 1941. They had long done contingency planning for such an operation. Some staff officers recommended this be done. There was time to work up operational plans for such an effort - but Adm Yamamoto did not order such operational planning until two days after the war began. [Someone has posted Dec 9 - I have posted Dec 10 - and these are identical postings: most Americans use US time and I always use Japanese time. Japanese time applies to everything I read in Japanese - they have no time zones - just what we call Tokyo time and dates. And it is the most logical thing to use in WITP - Matrix even sometimes thinks about making the game occur on Japanese dates - but probably this would be considered too controversial to implement.] We cannot say what divisions were ready in history in the sense of ordered, equipped, trained for the op. We can only say what divisions were ready in the sense they were fully outfitted and not requird by other operations. There the list would be long. If you want my opinion what might be good choices - see EOS. It is beyond question that Japan could find three divisions and sealift for them - even in the sense "including specialist attachments" - resources available always greatly exceed whatever might be required. The more difficult questions always were "exactly how to organize operations, and how to sequence them?"

It is possible the same divisions were intended by both operations. It may be it is also in the official history - or in planning documents from an archive or private collection. As time passes we are learning a great deal more than I used to think was possible. One factor is that the participants are reaching the stage they have nothing to lose: their children - reaching retirement age - cannot lose their jobs; they - nearing death - cannot suffer stigma. Documents are being found, released or written that - taken together - reveal a great deal which it was intended we should not know when the orders were given to destroy them all in 1945. Adm Ukagi himself led a flight of Kamakaze pilots - but he only ordered his diary destroyed - he did not destroy it: it not only survived, but was translated, and is published as Fading Victory. He starts each day as a sailor does - noting the weather. But then he makes notes about both events and thoughts of the day. Few have read it all - and fewer still can remember everything he recorded. [Ukagi was Yamamoto's chief of staff, then took over the command of Combined Fleet himself] I don't know at this moment if the divisions are the same or not? I didn't even think of the idea until now. But I will keep my eyes open - and if I find something clear - I will post it.
I suspect we may know in due course - so much has come out I never dreamed possible. There is enough data to justify another edition of Japan's Secret War (that is, the book which first outlined what we knew of the Japanese atomic research program - or programs plural to be more accurate). Since it was redone (that is, since the Second edition) an entire set of original papers was discovered in an academic holding in the USA - and was returned to Japan - where it was published. Papers we were pretty sure no longer existed - and we would never be able to know the details of. It may be we have more of this material (about the invasion of Hawaii) than we yet understand. And for openers we should read the new University of Hawaii translations (most of which seem to have originally have been collected by Prang and his staff).

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: el cid again
...I am thinking - first of all - of the Battle of the Atlantic. This was difficult to wage due to an absense of bases in the middle (sans Iceland, which we invaded). Things changed when Dr Salazar declared for the Allies. This was a most unlikely "Ally" - Salazar was a Fashista in almost every sense - and a classic dictator who ruled until his death. But the tide had turned in his view, and better to ride a rising tide than to be swept over by it. OK - with me so far? Now comes along this idea above we might "triple the air power sent to PTO" (from 1/4 to 3/4) - which may or may not have the numbers right - but that was the proposal. And you (Andrew) proposed to double it (from 1/4 to 1/2?)
Either way - the implications are drastic reductions in air power sent to all other theaters. If the above ratios are right, that would be a cut to 1/3 in the first case, and to 2/3 in the latter (i.e. 67% and 33% respectively). So - I wonder - what is the impact on that on the Battle of the Atlantic as well as on the "Air War" in Europe? We already said Torch might not go ahead. Drastic reduction in the sinking of submarines, drastic reduction in the destruction from bombing, no invasion of NOrth Africa or follow on into Italy - why would Salazar see "the handwriting on the wall" enough to declare war?

My suggestion was a 50% increase, not a doubling. And that is in general, not per aircraft type. Presumably, if the Allies are sensible, they would not significantly reduce the numbers of patrol aircraft covering the Atlantic. Combine that with the fact that the number of ships deployed in the Atlantic would be the same (I didn't make any suggestion that it wouldn't), means that there is no need to assume that the Battle of the Atlantic would be impacted at all, or at least not to any significant effect. So there would be no real changes there, I think.

Andrew

OK - You are certainly conservative and careful. I thought you said double air and naval - and you did say more warships - so I assumed that implied more merchant ships. But this is pretty close to my own analysis - and I think 50% is reasonable enough to assume AFTER the arguments about why it should not be more are considered. But if there is no decrease in the patrol effort - I think we should have done NO strategic bombing and ALL patrol and operational bombing - it means you are only decreasing the strategic air force. That hurt us more than it helped - although it did contribute to victory we paid three times as much as we hurt the enemy - and other uses were a more efficient way to hurt the enemy.
Keeping the ships and patrol the same helps us have a "rest of the world" not too radically changed - and that is probably practical to work with.

Now for the hard part: what specific change applies per type - or what methodology do we use to figure it out? And also, for out years, where we have the war not ending in other areas, what numbers of replacements that at present go to PTO will be needed to support the air units that do not transfer ETO to PTO?

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

ORIGINAL: el cid again
I do like one idea of yours: no stuff transfers ETO to PTO later in the war frees up slots - and takes slots that show up late in the war (i.e. never get used in almost all games) and lets us put stuff in them that might show up in many games. So I am inclined to go forward down this path of reasoning a bit more. I asked for X - how many months Germany surrenders later - and you said - in effect - forget those transferred units altogether. Certainly simple. And it helps resolve a major problem: slot limits. Other technical changes in RHS - multiple ship units - have also resulted in a lot of empty ship slots - so this is more feasible than it once would have been.

Given that I suggested that as the flip-side of providing the USA with large increases in air and ground reinforcements, doing this without also adding those additional reinforcements would be nothing more than an arbitrary, and unjustified, penalty to the Allied side.

Uh - yes - it does seem to be a package deal. Did I imply otherwise?

ORIGINAL: Nikademus

ORIGINAL: Andrew Brown

My suggestion was a 50% increase, not a doubling. And that is in general, not per aircraft type. Presumably, if the Allies are sensible, they would not significantly reduce the numbers of patrol aircraft covering the Atlantic. Combine that with the fact that the number of ships deployed in the Atlantic would be the same (I didn't make any suggestion that it wouldn't), means that there is no need to assume that the Battle of the Atlantic would be impacted at all, or at least not to any significant effect. So there would be no real changes there, I think.

Andrew

Given how hard the USN and Coastal Command had to fight for every Army bomber, especially the 4E type, and given all the other multitude of factors that influenced the BoA, I too don't feel that the Battle would be seriously impacted. Besides which, there are only so many planes that PH needs to give an adequate accounting of itself.

Two unrelated comments about this:

Second: surely the numbers we are considering are vastly greater than PH could use - but are still logical as a downstram consquence (or possible one). I am not SURE there could me more war hysteria than there really was? But IF there could- invasion of Hawaii surely would do it.

First: If there are many fewer bombers to fight for - surely USN and Coastal Command will lose the argument more often. I tend to side with USN and Coastal Command - and think the dividends for using the planes on patrol greatly exceed those for using them in a strategic bombing campaign. Your loss rate is lower - so each plane/crew serves for many more missions. The impact on logistics is far bigger than it looks like if you get a submarine: it isn't big in tonnage - but each time - it NEVER again hurts you; each ship it does not sink not only completes THIS voyage - but many more voyages it can never complete if sunk. Measured in logistical "tons delivered by the end of the war" terms, significant increases in patrol bombers pays very well indeed. And you have made a lot fewer widows - either at home - or among civilians near the target areas. Over time you might be able to produce fewer planes - or field more of them - because you don't lose as many. Either way - you have more resources to allocate - thinking logistically.

The idea "we send fewer bombers to ETO" must have significant impacts on the Battle of the Atlantic - UNLESS we adopt Andrew's idea somehow the naval services could demand 100% as many. I don't think it is very likely - but I like it - and if we go that way - it does mean no change in the Battle of the Atlantic.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

Cid. One last point while you are "what iffing" your way to a Hawaiian invasion. What about a simple "what if" for the Allies. Requires nothing but an idea. Somebody working in the "Economics" section of an Allied Planning Division notes that the one thing that might drive Japan into the War is her lack of oil. And makes the logical assumption that if Japan does go to war, it will be to sieze the oil resources of Southeast Asia..., which she will need desperately if she is to fight a war.

Word goes out, and every single oil well, pipeline, loading facility, and refinery in the SRA is wired and set for demolition by 12/07/41...,with orders to blow them all to he11 if the Japanese get within 300 miles. Result? Every single oil source in the SRA the Japanese are spotted within 5 hexes of is automatically 99% damaged...., and Japan goes "down the tubes" in 1943 from lack of oil. Not very exciting, but quite effective, and requiring hardly any "what if" at all (the Allies DID try to blow these facilities in the real campaign, so all we're talking about is a more organized and well though-out effort).

Seems that all the "what iffing" ever done on these forums is a shade of "what if the JAPANESE had this, or had done that, or hadn't done whatever?". But the Japanese players are hardly ever faced with a "what if the Allies aren't where they are supposed to be?"; or doing "what they're supposed to do?". When you look at the planning and discussion on the Japanese side before the war, there is a tremendous amount of doubt and worry over how the opening campaigns will unfold..., but players have almost no doubts that "exactly this will be exactly there and in exactly what condition".

There is a difference between adopting a plan that existed and long had been considered and dreaming up a plan no one ever proposed. That would be proper in a fantasy mod - but not a historical one (and I myself only do historical ones).

In this particular case - the plan would run afoul of the real people in places like Royal Dutch Shell. Here I refer to what you might call "Japanese quislings" - and for a tale of one of the bigger ones see The Pacific Clipper - which is pure history - no fiction in it. More generally, the plan would run afoul of the stark inability of White men in colonial locations - and in major capitals - to take the Japanese seriously. They still fly biplanes sort of thing. [Japan even fed this deliberately: they put the wash out pilots in air shows - and so observers saw horrible flying and some crashes - and concluded "if that is their best - imagine their regular guys"] There were rare voices of reason in Malaya, Manila, and probably even the NEI - but they were pretty much ignored. Finally- it turns out that the oilfields were pretty effectively damaged by local technical people. Even the airborn op into Palembang failed to prevent damage to the refineries. Japan got lucky - local native workers fixed things faster than anyone on either side thought possible. But

how can you damage them more than damaged? If it is going to happen - it is going to happen - no special effort required

In any case - in RHS - I FORCE your plan into action - by the use of supply sinks. It puts immobile units on the major sites, units with engineers who will demolish automatically - not to mention general damage done because a battle must be fought even if NO military units are present. In a sense RHS pre adopted your idea - for different reasons. I don't say the Allies had such a plan - I say the locals can and did try to damage things - and the Japanese get nothing - ever - for free - undamaged - unlike forms of WITP without supply sinks. My sinks exist not only to eat supplies - but to be your demolition teams - and IF Matrix fixes the excess supply problem - the demolition function will probably be grounds to keep them. [The Allies need not defend a location: if it has a supply sink it must be fought over - and it will demolish before it dies - and many think it will defend too strongly (we had to work long to make them not be too strong)]

ORIGINAL: herwin

Why not game it out using Command at Sea? Sofian's "No Sailor But A Fool" is supposed to allow the modelling of amphibious operations. Game out the campaign, and see if the Japanese can sustain a high enough tempo to prevent the Americans from reinforcing in time. You cannot assume surprise.

The Seelowe scenario in Sofian is a landing by two German infantry divisions against a beach defended by a heavily entrenched infantry brigade. It's believed to be balanced. The American divisions on Oahu were the best available in the Army at the time, so the force needed for a successful landing on Oahu was probably well in excess of three divisions.

I design variations of mechanical games - and use Command at Sea elements - which then are played by entire staffs - most of which are serving or former members of various US services. I have gamed this for decades - on both sides - and as judge in the middle. Every participant I know - regardless of starting opinion - has come around to believing it was a potential battle of some significance. The defenses of Oahu are strong enough - and so well stocked - that only the isolation of the area would render defeat in the medium term a probability. In the short term, it could not fall to an invasion - nor could surprise be achieved for such an attempt. The main forces must come in large numbers - and they require support from forward ports and airfields - a process that must be noticed.

The problem with Command at Sea is it isn't up to the sheer scale of this. Doing a day real time would require months of game player time.

ORIGINAL: JWE

ORIGINAL: herwin

Why not game it out using Command at Sea? Sofian's "No Sailor But A Fool" is supposed to allow the modelling of amphibious operations. Game out the campaign, and see if the Japanese can sustain a high enough tempo to prevent the Americans from reinforcing in time. You cannot assume surprise.

The Seelowe scenario in Sofian is a landing by two German infantry divisions against a beach defended by a heavily entrenched infantry brigade. It's believed to be balanced. The American divisions on Oahu were the best available in the Army at the time, so the force needed for a successful landing on Oahu was probably well in excess of three divisions.

What a fun idea. Might actually try it. The Marines in the group might get a kick out of it. Our group uses WitP as the strategic portion of a campaign, and TacOps as the tactical element. I think we can come up with suitable topos for the Islands. Our map guru can usually translate in a couple hours or so.

2 Big Questions … 1) where do they land? and 2) composition of the landing force?

Hydrography says they come in from the North/Northwest. Winter in the Islands … hmm … can’t be the Big Island, realistically, gotta go to the SW shore, and run the entire gauntlet of Island defenses; hydrography says it’s not likely to be Maui or Molokai, although a strike at Kaunakakai or Maalaea is not out of the question; Oahu sucks as a landing objective, Waialua??, Waianae??, or maybe into the teeth of Ewa?; no, my money’s on Kauai.

South shore (NorthWest shore runs right into the Waimea badlands) maybe at Kekaha or Eleele; could go as far east as Lihue, but hydrography again – not likely; probably couldn’t realistically get past Poipu Point.

Other perspectives are certainly welcome.

And how big is the landing force? Let’s assume they take Lihue and have access to Nawiliwili Bay. How big could it reasonably be?

Thoughts are certainly welcome here, as well.

I like to put a small force onto Lanai - airborne from carriers (Japan had the world's only COD aircraft in this era) - because it is nice to have an emergency field for planes in trouble - and because there is no military defense on this Dole owned island. There are only two towns - one "on top" not too far from the airfield - one "on the bottom" of the crater rim - where the coffee and pineapple is exported. No one speaks English either - even today your chances of getting waited on are better if you speak Ilocano. This is sort of a "pre move" before anyone has a clue what is happening - you have a baby airstrip up and running - and any sort of force can defend against a landing - there is one proper road and one old track to a historic site - "ladies with broomsticks" can defend those cliffs.

For operational reasons the choices are Maui or Molokai for the main base. You need ports and airfields. Both have some stores of fuel as well. Both are defended - but only by modest coast defense units and support units. Whichever is your first choice, take the other in the second move, so that you end up with both as bases - and no single enemy bombardment (air or sea) can take out all your assets even momentarily.

Hawaii (big Island) has more serious coast defense guns, and more difficult geological/hydrological problems, not particularly inspiring facilities, and is more distant from the point we want to project air power - Oahu. It can be taken as a secondary objective - mainly to deny the enemy use of its airfields and ports - and because you don't want an enemy force from the mainland to be able to get anything for free.