ORIGINAL: IronDuke
Besides, Combined Arms has a "Bypass" general order that allows you to tell your units to go around enemy units they encounter on their path. Also, there never was a way to co-ordinate manouevre when forces decided to step outside their Staff instructions.
Generally, units followed their AXIs of advance because going around generally meant you blundered into the axis of advance of the neighbouring unit which (depending on the level we are discussing) was either a Company, battalion, regiment or Division. This presented juicy arty interdiction targets and created traffic jams.
ORIGINAL: Curtis Lemay
And that "Bypass" choice would have to be made in advance - before you can evaluate just what you're going to encounter or what sort of shape you're in. Really, the options you're giving players aren’t even as sophisticated as the abilities of the PO in TOAW. And we all know what a fine player the PO is.
With respect, have you really studied this? I mean in detail in terms of how WWII actually went? I read through far more of this with bemusement than I was comfortable with given your position here.
"Bypass" is an operational response that you can pretty much pre-program because it is a response not to circumstance at point of contact, but a pre-programmed response based on operational intent.
In other words, what you do in differing scenarios when meeting a dug in LEHR Panzergrenadier Btn is dependent on your mission. So, if they are dug in on your objective, then you know you'll attack if you reach them. If your mission is just to plunge deep because the battlefield is broken, the enemy front line shattered and the way to Paris open, then you might consider "bypass" but it is your Commander's assessment of the battlefield and his intent before you even move that judges this. In other words, if he says drive to Paris and stop for nothing, you set bypass. If he says take Falaise, you set "attack" as the "general order" in circumstances where you meet an enemy unit.
In other words, if the Lehr dominate a key road junction, you won't bypass, and you know you won't bypass before you even set off because your Commander wants that road junction to shift his armour down. Therefore, you will attack. You won't bypass because that means your mission has failed.
Subordinates didn't get the sort of latitude you are suggesting for these sorts of reasons. They weren't paid to know the overall operational situation and the minute they decided what to do based on their appreciation of the tactical situation and the narrow needs of their own command was the point plans started failing.
You want us to believe that military commanders had no authority to do anything.
Pretty much at most levels. You can prove me wrong by citing examples (if you have any) but the ones I can think of were very macro-operational in nature. Clark arguably decided to go for glory after the Anzio breakout, but that was a decision made at Army level and was a decision I suspect he made very early before the troops set off. It certainly wasn't made after an appreciation of the operational situation in the way you would want.
German freedom of action was curtailed in early 1942 and by the end of the war you couldn't shift a battalion without fuhrer approval. The one classic example of WWII "Aufstragstaktik" was arguably Guderian on the Meuse, but so great was his authority to do what he liked that he had to threaten to resign to be allowed to resume the advance as he wanted.
Another might be Hausser at third Kharkov, but Nipe has a different opinion (next on my reading list) and no one would have been surprised if Hausser had been sacked for the insubordination.
British and American troops got orders and actioned them. Nobody bypassed anything in Bradley's drive on St Lo and Epsom, Goodwood et al were too narrowly fronted for anyone to manouver anywhere. You could argue Wood in Lorraine attempted something along these lines but he ran into a number of issues and eventually lost his job. The British Army simply didn't work like this, certainly not after Montgomery took command.
Nobody bypassed the Hurtgen etc. Military Commanders are given orders which often include Staff directions for their AXIS of advance and general posture when you start to look at Divisions and regiments. I can't think of any 8 hour period in the war when anyone doing anything wouldn't have already known before contact whether he was likely to bypass or attack if he encountered resistance. The response was dependant on his orders, which he already had.
Troops don't fight in a vacuum. You drive around a roadblock at the operational level and you generally move onto someone else's roadnet. Do it at the tactical level and who is going to notice in hex sizes of 1km and higher?
This is why you have to get away from talking about infiltration at operational and strategic levels. It simplym isn't a term that describes anything.
Or rather, what would you describe as operational infiltration (a WWII example to illustrate what you mean)?
Your motives are obvious.
To be fair, so are yours. Mine are at least grounded in some historical reality.
Commanders must be brainless, because that's how WEGO will model them.
Or Commanders must be all powerful and at the head of the column and in instantaneous, flawless and operationally complete communication with all higher, peer and subordinate commands who can action fresh orders instantaneously because that's how IGOUGO manages them.
When was this ever the case? This doesn't sound all that realistic to me.
I can cite examples to support me. If you cite some to support you we can start to debate specifics.
WEGO forces are going to function more or less like they were commanded by General John Bell Hood: They’re going to proceed on to Nashville even though they were crushed at Franklin – because that’s what the plan was.
No, they are not, because if they get crushed at Franklin, they're not going to get through to Nashville without another turn to decide what to do, as indeed Hood got.
Infiltration tactics were a (largely German) taqctical method of screening infantry advance behind darkness or broken terrain in order to open the attack from a closer, more advantageous and surprising position. It doesn't really have a place in the operational level unless you simulate it with a combat modifier. It was about getting a better position to attack from, and penetrating the defensive position to its depth, it wasn't an operational concept about having recce companies marauding about in the enemy's rear.
No. Its principles applied at the tactical, operational, and even strategic scales. Blitzkrieg was just infiltration with tanks.
How do you infiltrate strategically or even operationally?
Against a solid front line, you can't spirit divisions through the gaps. Squads and platoons maybe, but then they are not going to press blindly on, they are going to infiltrate for a purpose and that purpose is to attack from the rear so gaps can be opened in the defences. This is abstracted within the combat as it has no real operational context. It's a tactical thing, period. It isn't an operational infilitration but a tactical one.
As the war progressed, defensive zones got progressively deeper. You can't infiltrate through defences 10 kilometres thick as they were at Goodwood etc. Infiltration (if it was ever practised) would have got harder and harder in these circumstances. To prove this, you have to show me infiltration at the operational level. It's difficult to infiltrate when you are advancing behind a creeping barrage or in the wake of 500 heavy bombers.
Soviet firepower levels at point of contact were just as intense and Guard's Tank Armies or Rifle Divisions didn't "infiltrate" anywhere, trust me, they attacked, flattened and pushed on.
That leaves the Germans whose chief operational characteristic was massed employment of armour which again doesn't really "infiltrate". It tears open the front and pours through.
you have to get over this loose language. Infiltration tactics started during the first world war as a largely German way of opening up the front line. It was a tactical response to a tactical question: How do I get across no man's land in the face of automatic weapons fire and penetrate three trench lines over a kilometre or two before the enemy brings up reinforcements and counterattacks.
It isn't operational because it does not have any theory on what to do after the breakthrough. Conventional fighting forces will pour through these gaps and fight a conventional campaign until halted at which point the tactical response re-appears to force a gap again.
Therefore, operationally and strategically, nobody infiltrates. It doesn't mean anything.
Blitzkrieg was just infiltration with tanks.
Blitzkrieg was not "infiltration with Tanks". it was a meaningless phrase which if it meant anything meant a
combined arms fracturing of the enemy front at a point of pre-chosen main effort combined with swift manouver and pursuit once the fracture was complete. The maneuver and pursuit was generally aimed at encirclement and the destruction of the enemy's main field forces.
Blitzkrieg might ask it's infantry to infiltrate as part of the attack to open the defence up, but this is a tactical method of breaking the line. Blitzkrieg as a concept was not a method of breaking the line, it was a method of breaking and encircling the enemy forces by dint of rapid manouver.
I would strongly advise against posting your description of "Blitzkrieg" anywhere where the knowledge of German operational method is higher than "Guderian did the tank thing really good, Man." It is more than innaccurate. You'll be offended by the responses.
All of WWII was the application of infiltration principles.
Incorrect. British troops didn't really infiltrate, they advanced behind a carpet of high explosive. No one was ever in any doubt when British infantry was approaching because the decibel level went through the roof. Much the same for the Americans. The Allied advantages lay in better artillery support procedures and massed air support. When you have that, sneaking a couple of squads through the trees is an unneccessary exercise. Besides, this has no effect upon the operational picture which is really not interested in what Easy Company are doing in front of, to the side or even behind that Farmhouse.
Infiltration uses a short sharp barrage to allow troops to close to tactically useful ranges to use their heavy weapons. The British didn;t do that. They bombarded for a week and then went over the top. It was much the same in WWII with elaborate and massive fire plans backed by overwhelming firepower in the air.
And, again, how do you direct your reserves to exploit success instead of reinforce failure?
The next turn, much like you might in TOAW. Reserves don't just get involved in these situations because you've taken a hill, but because you've punched through the other side and started making progress. You can't move to exploit success in TOAW until combat (and turn burn) has shown you where the weak point is. In CA you program this the next turn using the forces you have earmarked for exploitation.
You can pre-program bypass, ...
That's not the same as taking the path of least resistance. That requires mental faculties.
But path of least resistance is not known for several hours or even days. CA isn't 50Km per hex and 1 month turns. When you find path of least resistance, you gravitate towards it when your next turn starts.
The Americans and British generally fought linear battles where everyone advanced along their axis of attack. the Russians were relatively inflexible once they had torn the hole in your front. The German method simply didn't emphasise this initiative after early 1942, and if there was still some initiative at the small unit level, you simulate that with greater proficiency within the game engine at an operational level.
You're asking for something which simply didn't happen all that often in practice. I can think of Peiper in the Ardennes and Wood at one point in Lorraine but American Infantry divisions didn't bypass resistance because that put you on the roads and terrain being used by the neighbouring division and led to friendly fire, traffic jams and target rich environments.
Linear tactics were basically abandoned by the end of WWI.
With respect, you need to read more. Linear was all Monty really did, and in Lorraine, Patton, US Godhead of maneuver, attacked across the length of his front. The drive on St Lo was linear as was the battle for the Hurtgen. Even Cobra was a wide attack initially as Bradley threw everything in he had.
That's why WWII battles were so fluid relative to WWI.
Fluid? WWII campaigns were generally static after mid 42, marked by sudden occasional breakthrough and pursuit before the next big set piece.
The battle for France 44 is fluid for all of five minutes as the Allies chase the Germans across France. Before that there were 10 weeks of very linear, very static attrition in Normandy. After your dizzy five minutes, things settle down and American Armies then grind their way through Lorraine, the Vosges and the Hurtgen whilst Monty labours up the Scheldt estuary. This isn't fluid (at least not as I understand it).
Sicily and Italy were fighting withdrawals for which the word fluid applies even less, save for five minutes after the Anzio breakout.
In the east, the front lines between Nov 41 and June 44 hardly changed at all in the north and centre. In the south, things got fluid when the Germans ran out of resources and fluid isn't the right word. They basically got pursued.
There was nothing fluid about Kursk, for example. Other large scale efforts either ground forward or were centred on precise geographical features like Balck's fight along the Chir or the SS PanzerKorps along the Mius (clear operational mistakes because rivers dont have much significance I've heard).
Bagration was very fluid, but then the Soviets attacked everywhere in a rolling effort along the front. It was very linear in that sense, and then only fluid once the pursuit began. This sort of fluidity was evident in the east during WWI, on the western front during 1918 and on the Italian front in 1917 if memory serves. Fluidity is a product of operational circumstance, and you can periods in both wards of great fluidity and large scale rigidity.
But there are far more problems beyond infiltration. No coordination is possible against unexpected targets. That includes both ground forces and support. You can't do "hit and run" tactics. It all traces back to the brainless commander problem.
How much co-ordination can there ever be against unexpected threats? Remember, your neighbouring units are in a fight of their own. They may not be able to peel away and co-ordinate to aid you, not least because that involves an active disengagement and an opportunity for the enemy as they pull away. There was generally a pause if Units required help against a threat they couldn't cope with as the CO organised reserves and worked out a fresh plan and Staff instructions to get them there.
Really?
One of the reasons the Germans killed "Aufstragstaktik" (which I presume is what you are hinting at) was because it wasn't practical in the era of mass Armies to have divisional or Corp Commanders setting their own objectives based on how they saw the battlefield and it didn't really occur in the US Army anyway and practically never in the British Army of WWII.
What I was hinting at was that if a squad ran into a machinegun nest across their axis of advance, they weren't forced to launch a frontal assault on it. They had the latitude to maneuver against it, even coordinate with another squad or two. They could call for support, etc. The same was true at all scales.
No it wasn't true at all scales. Maneuvring against it is simple squad tactics vis a vis the MG nest. All combat within TOAW surely simulates and abstracts this during the tactical phases. Besides, on scales of 1 KM and above, how (indeed why) do you simulate a squad shifting 200 yards east to use trees to cover a flanking move on an MG nest? At the greater scales, Divisions don't do sideways, not least because you run right across the roadnet earmarked for another division. Such a move would also require a pause whilst your Staff Officers worked out who was moving first and to where.
the flaw in your reasoning is that Junior Commanders were in any position to make this operational freedom work without screwing things up royally for someone else. I tell my Regiments to advance on separate but generally parallel AXIs of advance because I want to clear my front. A Colonel taking it upon himself to shift sideways 5 kilometres screws that plan up in several ways.
The wargaming is in setting realistic plans that balance objectives with necessity. Yes, I want to get forward, but that uncleared town at the shoulder of my penetration is worrying and I see Tanks massing the other side of it. Therefore, I have to launch a preemptive assault or dig in infantry and AT assets to prevent the counter attack.
You can see attacks hit thin air as the enemy pull back and enemy troops irritatingly withdraw rather than be obligingly static whilst you flank them. However, it's very fluid, realistic and the fun is in the planning. Plan better than your opponent and you win. You also (IMHO) have to plan with very Military considerations in mind.
CA complicates the planning process by giving you numerous deployment states. You don't move and attack in the same state (or rather you can move forward in at attacking deployment but much slower than if you were in a column advancing) and these various states give you a trade off between time and action. I think it works very well.
I've seen sizeable penetrations made. Narrow penetrations made and units cut off as flanking troops advancing hit stiffer resistance. I've seen the bypass order used to get a Guards Battlegroup up Hells Highway past badly hit and blocking FJ and it really puts a premium on anticipation.
Currently in TOAW, you attack, I watch where it is coming and respond.
In CA I have to anticipate, because (as in real life) if your attack is unexpected, I am already a turn behind when I plan the counter. I think it makes breakthroughs much more likely if well planned than in TOAW where IGOUGO always allows reaction. In my experience, clean breakthroughs in TOAW often rely on the enemy having nothing in range to face you with rather than not having the time to stop you and block you as your forces roar on.
This all sounds roughly like programming the PO in TOAW scenario design, and then watching a PO vs. PO test. That’s not my idea of wargaming. And it produces ridiculous results like enemy forces ignoring each other as they move right by each other.
No, it's not remotely like that, because in TOAW you can't change the objective tracks turn by turn in response to operational conditions. you effectively do that in CA because each move allows you to reconsider and reset orders as appropriate.
Besides, "Sounds like" means you don't really know, do you, whereas I have around ten years with TOAW and 30 months with CA. Is this a debate you really think you can win on that basis?
How do you think this works? Have you checked?
You don't set orders once on 22.06.1941 and then come back five hours later when the game date is 01.02.1942 to see if you got Moscow and can start bragging to your Mates. You can completely reprogam your unit objectives every turn if you so please. It's dynamic, and models friction and the unexpected better than any title I have ever seen.
At the moment, game turns are eight hours long. Exactly how much latitude do you think got used that being able to change your objective three times per day wouldn't be enough?
I get the feeling you are extrapolating the way you think North Africa worked to draw general conclusions about WWII.
Even assuming "Aufstragstaktik" was adopted by everybody (which it certainly wasn't), it still didn't work the way you want it to. Mission orders gave you something to do. Therefore, your response to the unexpected was pretty much pre-planned in many circumstances because all a Commander did was decide what to do next based on his orders. If those orders said stop for nothing, your response to the unexpected is already known before you meet it (i.e. Stop for nothing). therefore, pre-programming your response to the unexpected is very realistic in this sense.
IronDuke
