Matrix Games Forums

I can truthfully say I did not...

ORIGINAL: veji1

that's interesting, out of something like 3000 or 4000 kamikaze attacks between 10 and 15% managed to go through CAP, of which a third hit... this is between a 3-5% hit rate for kamikazes of CAPPED target.

I wouldn't find it so troubling myself, if it hadn't been for the fact that IJ went so much in that direction, and for the fact that in the late war it's really about all you have left to play for. It's also interesting as well, particularly since the IJ player has to decide just which a/c will fulfill the role. I don't think they have any reinforcements that come in as kamikaze do they?

ORIGINAL: Raverdave

Bugger ! I wish I could take my PC screen with me when I sit on the dunny........There is to my way of thinking,  no better place to read this thread than when you are squeezing out a darky.  At least the smell matches what you are reading.    [;)] 

Raver,

It could be a strange day but, but your comment above just made me LAUGH!!!
Larger LAUGHS than the usual Wikipedia entries and comments out of books like "Shattered Swords" being treated as Gospel. What ever happened to real research?

ORIGINAL: veji1

that's interesting, out of something like 3000 or 4000 kamikaze attacks between 10 and 15% managed to go through CAP, of which a third hit... this is between a 3-5% hit rate for kamikazes of CAPPED target.

I'm not sure where I got the numbers on the internet, or in a book I have at home, but IIRC the number of hits, which I believe didn't include near misses, was like 20%-22% of the kamikazes having flown.

ORIGINAL: Big B

ORIGINAL: TheElf

ORIGINAL: Big B

Doctrine? - he was outnumbered flying an escort mission.

Correct, and he was forced to fly with only one division and one half. These numbers were forced on him at the last minute, he wanted 2 full divs in order to test his weave, unfortunately it likely would not have mattered since he had not had more than a few minutes to chalk talk it with the members of his flight.

Later USN doctrine for the F4F held that close escort was not favorable to the F4F's strong points. High escort was necessary to afford the Wildcat altitude from which to dive on the Zero as they had dived on him at 2500'. He never should have been put in the position he was in, but many factors contributed to this particular case, not the least of which was the lack of a clear cut doctrine that highlighted the F4Fs strengths.

By the way, according to Lundstrom [page 351] Thach's 4 plane division was not in fact flying close escort with anyone, they were swarmed by the Zeros who just had finished with Torpedo 6 who had no escort, the battle took place between the attacks of Torpedo 6 and Torpdeo 3. They were attacked from behind without knowledge at 5,500 feet and quickly lost Coral Sea veteran Bassett. It was then the the three survivors of Thach's division formed into his weave formation - attacked by his estimate of 15-20 Zeros taking turns diving on them from above and behind at 20-30 second intervals. This explains the Zeros zooming past so quickly (dive speed), but Lundstrom also states that Thach downed three during the fight [page356].

Now if They weren't flying close escort to anyone in particular - I still don't see this as a mistake of US Navy doctrine?

If the error was having one full division instead of two full divisions - well, you fight with what you have not what you want, that's not an error of doctrine.

Commander John Thach, the leader of Yorktown's fighter pilots, was escorting torpedo planes attacking the Japanese carriers:
Several Zeros came in on a head-on attack on the torpedo planes.... In the meantime, a number of Zeros were coming down in a string on our fighters. The air was just like a beehive. I was utterly convinced that we weren't any of us coming back because there were still so many Zeros.... And then I saw a glint in the sun that looked like a beautiful silver waterfall. It was the dive-bombers coming in. I could see them very well because they came from the same direction as the Zeros. I'd never seen such superb dive-bombing. After the dive-bomber attack was over, I stayed there. I could only see three carriers. And one of them was burning with bright pink flames and sometimes blue flames. I remember gauging the height of those flames by the length of the ship, the distance was about the same. It was just solid flame going skyward and there was a lot of smoke on top of that. Before I left the scene I saw three carriers burning pretty furiously.

----------------------------------

0837 hrs Kido Butai: Japanese carriers turn into the wind to recover returning aircraft from the Midway strike and CAP.
NE of Midway: Yorktown also turns into the wind to launch its strike at one of the two reported CVs. Strike is Massey's 12 TDBs, Leslie's 17 SBD-3s (each with 1000 lbr), and 6 F4Fs for escort. Thach irate; had wanted multiples of 4 to try out his theoretical weave. Worse still, three pilots are new to squadron (Lexington pilots picked up in Pearl Harbor), who are pnly just hearing about this idea.

---------------------------------

When the order came to man our aircraft, Thach gathered us in a huddle outside the ready room. His instructions were short and to the point. "Whatever happens, stick together! None of this "lone wolf" business! "You will only get yourself killed and won’t do the rest of us any good! Another thing–lean your mixture as much as you can--save your fuel!
"Cheek, you and Sheedy stick close to the torpedoes, just astern and about a thousand feet above. Stop anyone trying to get to them. I will be three or four thousand feet above you and give you high cover. Lets go!"


-------------------------------

Yorktown's Torpedo Three, despite the benefit of a small fighter escort led by LCDR Thach, suffered similarly. Only one plane of VT-3's twelve ever returned to Task Force 17; too damaged to land, it ditched near the task force. The pilot was picked up later by destroyer Hammann; the gunner died of wounds before then. Carrier Hiryu evaded the five torpedoes the squadron dropped.

---------------------------

Action report USS Yorktown: Buckmaster to Nimitz

The fighter escort group consisted of 6 F4F-4's of VF-3 squadron, their mission being to protect the torpedo planes' attack. Two VF were placed at 1000 feet above the torpedo planes and the other four VF 3000-4000 feet above them to furnish further protection. When about 4 miles from the Jap outer screen., which in turn was about 10- miles out from the CV's, two AA bursts were fired by a Jap ship. These bursts were used evidently to direct the enemy Combat Air Patrol to our planes, for almost immediately afterwards our VT and VF were attacked by about 18-20 Zero fighters. Our VF formed a line astern formation in order to stay together and give the leader an opportunity to turn and fire at the attacking planes. Soon after this the rear fighter was shot down. The formation twisted and turned to prevent the Zeros from getting on their tails and also to obtain firing position. During the engagement our remaining 3 VF were able to shoot down 5 Zeros. The Zeros concentrated most of their attacks on the rear plane, making beam and astern runs and pulling clear after each run.

The two VF planes directly over the torpedo planes were able to furnish considerable support to the VT during the first part of the approach when there were only 4 Zeros attacking. But later they were joined by 6 more Zeros, and the 2 VF were too heavily out-numbered to be of much help. They shot down one Zero and possibly another, and saw one Zero shot down by the TBD rear seat men. Soon thereafter, they became separated from each other and from the torpedo planes. One of these fighters was badly damaged and crash landed on board the Hornet. The 4 remaining planes of the escort group landed on board. They lost one pilot and two planes and shot down 6 and damaged two Zeros in the engagement.

More from Yorktown's AAR

GENERAL REMARKS
6. Japanese Tactics


(a) Zero Fighters
It was noted that the Jap fighters made runs from all directions against our torpedo planes. This is the first time that we have had any Zero fighters make beam runs on our planes. They appeared to allow insufficient lead. However, it is important that this point be remembered for it shows that the Japanese are quick to learn. In the Coral Sea Battle, they made all their approaches from the rear or high side and did relatively little damage because of our armor. It also is desired to call attention to the fact that there was an absence of the fancy stunting during pull outs or approaches for attacks. In this battle, the Japs dove in, made the attack and then immediately pulled out, taking advantage of their superior climb and maneuverability. In attacking fighters, the Zeros usually attacked from above rear at high speed and recovered by climbing vertically until they lost some speed and then pulled on through to complete a small loop of high wing over which placed them out of reach and in position for another attack. By reversing the turn sharply after each attack the leader may get a shot at the enemy while he is climbing away or head on into a scissor if the Jap turns to meet it.

(b) Approach of Jap Dive Bombers and Torpedo Planes

In the two attacks on June 4th, the Japanese planes apparently came in at low altitude to avoid Radar detection until they were within 40-50 miles and then commenced climbing. This is quite different from the Coral Sea Battle when the Jap Attack Group came in as a unit at high altitude and were picked up 68 miles out. This time we picked the two attacks up at 46 and 33 miles with the Radar comment that they appeared to be climbing.

(c) F4F-4 Airplanes

The fighter pilots are very disappointed with the performance and length of sustained fire power of the F4F-4 airplanes. THE Zero fighters could easily outmaneuver and out-climb the F4F-3, and the consensus of fighter pilot opinion is that the F4F-4 is even more sluggish and slow than the F4F-3. It is also felt that it was a mistake to put 6 guns on the F4F-4 and thus to reduce the rounds per gun. For the opposition now being encountered the combination of 4 guns and 450 rounds per gun is much superior to the 6 guns with 240 rounds per gun. Many of our fighters ran out of ammunition even before the Jap dive bombers arrived over our forces; these were experienced pilots, not novices. It is strongly urged that the Navy be supplied with a fighter that is at least equal of the Zero fighter. It is believed that 4-50 caliber fixed machine guns give sufficient fire power for carrier based fighters, especially in view of the loss of performance involved in adding two additional guns.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

... Hughes fully expected the United States Army Air Forces to embrace his plane's new design and make the H-1 the basis for a new generation of U.S. fighter

Except Hughes went and shot himself in the foot over it. The USAAF general in charge of procurment (Ecchles, IIRC or something like that) wanted Hughes to bring the racer to Ohio so that they could examine it for possible acquisition. Hughes said he would. But Hughes then failed to show and left him standing on the ramp with a large crowd of dignitaries. The general was so livid that he proclaimed Hughes would never get a government contract as long as he had anything to say about it. Hughes explanation was that he didn't want anyone crawling all over his racer and stealing his ideas.
Chez

I guess that was the "However, for reasons that are obscure" part. But I wonder if Howard had a bout of obsessive-compulsive behavior that day and was in no condition to appear publicly, so he needed an excuse and concocted the above "explanation."

ORIGINAL: flipperwasirish
... Larger LAUGHS than the usual Wikipedia entries and comments out of books like "Shattered Swords" being treated as Gospel. What ever happened to real research?

It's Shattered Sword, the sword being the Kido Butai and how it got "broke."

I'm not saying it's gospel -- and neither are its authors -- but translating the legitmate Japanese accounts of Midway -- instead of continuing to rely on Fuchida's nonsense -- was long overdue. This situation reminds me of the when someone finally interviewed the surviving Indian scouts from Custer's last stand; the valuable info they had to share was previously all but ignored.

I've been quoting Sword on the CaW forum to get SSG to decrease the KB's plane count -- by the 20 or so Zeros it was ferrying to Midway -- and give better cloud cover between the IJN and Allied fleets along Midway's East/West axis. SSG has already agreed to decrease the planes in the next patch, but I'm still working on the cloud cover; clouds w/poor IJN recon helped shape that battle greatly, and the CaW scenario needs to be readjusted.

(b) Approach of Jap Dive Bombers and Torpedo Planes

In the two attacks on June 4th, the Japanese planes apparently came in at low altitude to avoid Radar detection until they were within 40-50 miles and then commenced climbing. This is quite different from the Coral Sea Battle when the Jap Attack Group came in as a unit at high altitude and were picked up 68 miles out. This time we picked the two attacks up at 46 and 33 miles with the Radar comment that they appeared to be climbing.

I wonder if this perception is framed within the context of "what I would have done" thinking but might not actually be the result of the Hiryu being relatively close to the Yorktown when it launched its strikes. The bombers simply climbed slowly after launch to conserve fuel and ate up half the distance to Yorktown doing so.

Other than at Philippine Sea the Japanese seem to have made very little use of the range advantage of their aircraft during the war.

Actually I did see your previous post and the point was well-made, but automatic weapons are much less complicated than airplanes, so they all look (somewhat) alike.

In any case, here’s an attempt to briefly wrap-up some of what was said re the A6M Zero. Forgive me for not going back and directly quoting all posters; this uberthread, originally re ubercap/ubercorsairs, has become very long.

Looking at the relevant posts, I have to conclude that the Zero was not copied, but neither was it that original. As someone said, nothing is developed in a vacuum, and the Mitsubishi group wasn’t above licensing other nation’s tech for its planes. There was a time long ago when Nippon banned anything Western, but that changed drastically during the 1930s when it came to obtaining occidental aircraft engines, propellers, etc.

As for effectiveness, Doggie would agree that the A6M’s bark was worse than its bite. And IJ pilots who flew by/a “come home w/your wing or upon it” doctrine disappeared en masse after the Hellcat and Corsair finally appeared, leaving the IJN w/empty CVs.

Finally, re Shattered Sword: WWII IJ warships and aircraft accurately represented its doctrine for fighting; warships emphasized speed and firepower, and planes added range. Conversely, IJ war machines put less emphasis on protection and damage control; its aircraft “were built to dish it out, but weren’t really intended to take it.”

Sorry if I missed anyone’s contribution.

I think in keeping things simple I'd say that Hornet and Lex were effectively sunk by Japanese naval aviation, and Yorktown by a submarine (after all, Yorktown had been recrewed and was in the process of being salvaged when torpedoed). Tracking damaged CVs does illustrate that in the late war <edit> MANY allied ships were hit by and in many cases substantially damaged by kamikazes. I would not suggest that kamikazes were ineffective.

My perception of the kamikaze effort is that on the whole it was the picket ships, auxiliaris, and transports that sustained the brunt of the damage. Of course, picket ships were isolated, and big American CVs tended to have alot more close protection from AAA batteries on BBs and CAs, so that too makes a bit of sense.

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: flipperwasirish
... Larger LAUGHS than the usual Wikipedia entries and comments out of books like "Shattered Swords" being treated as Gospel. What ever happened to real research?

It's Shattered Sword, the sword being the Kido Butai and how it got "broke."

I'm not saying it's gospel -- and neither are its authors -- but translating the legitmate Japanese accounts of Midway -- instead of continuing to rely on Fuchida's nonsense -- was long overdue. This situation reminds me of the when someone finally interviewed the surviving Indian scouts from Custer's last stand; the valuable info they had to share was previously all but ignored.

I've been quoting Sword on the CaW forum to get SSG to decrease the KB's plane count -- by the 20 or so Zeros it was ferrying to Midway -- and give better cloud cover between the IJN and Allied fleets along Midway's East/West axis. SSG has already agreed to decrease the planes in the next patch, but I'm still working on the cloud cover; clouds w/poor IJN recon helped shape that battle greatly, and the CaW scenario needs to be readjusted.

Joe,

I apologise if you thought my comments were directed specifically at you. They were not intended as such. IMHO, There are too many people that take as Gospel (my word) what they read in Wikipedia, and then attempt to pass it off as fact to back up their side of a discussion. While quick and easy, Wikipedia at times lacks for accuracy and/or truth.

As for Shattered Sword (my error this morning after 4 hours sleep). I agree it was a long overdue book, and it is good to look at other points of view in ANY situation. I never like to assume, but I would like to think it took SSG more than one source to change an OOB. The weather issue I will leave out of the WITP board.

Be well,

No need to apologize; I for one didn't take it personally.

In fact SSG did use several disparite sources and had to "guestimate" the difference in the IJN OOB. However, it seems that the more recent sources for the OOB give the KB less planes.

See the CaW forum topic "Nagumo has too many zeros" as the last thing we need on this ubberthread is another topic.

OT: Wicki has been improving its entries, correcting errors in hours instead of days, when they find them. I have even seen "user advisories" on some Wiki posts.

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

Actually I did see your previous post and the point was well-made, but automatic weapons are much less complicated than airplanes, so they all look (somewhat) alike.

In any case, here’s an attempt to briefly wrap-up some of what was said re the A6M Zero. Forgive me for not going back and directly quoting all posters; this uberthread, originally re ubercap/ubercorsairs, has become very long.

Looking at the relevant posts, I have to conclude that the Zero was not copied, but neither was it that original. As someone said, nothing is developed in a vacuum, and the Mitsubishi group wasn’t above licensing other nation’s tech for its planes. There was a time long ago when Nippon banned anything Western, but that changed drastically during the 1930s when it came to obtaining occidental aircraft engines, propellers, etc.

As for effectiveness, Doggie would agree that the A6M’s bark was worse than its bite. And IJ pilots who flew by/a “come home w/your wing or upon it” doctrine disappeared en masse after the Hellcat and Corsair finally appeared, leaving the IJN w/empty CVs.

Finally, re Shattered Sword: WWII IJ warships and aircraft accurately represented its doctrine for fighting; warships emphasized speed and firepower, and planes added range. Conversely, IJ war machines put less emphasis on protection and damage control; its aircraft “were built to dish it out, but weren’t really intended to take it.”

Sorry if I missed anyone’s contribution.

Actually, that's a pretty fair summation though I would disagree about the Zero's effectiveness. It was very effective in the early war however, the Japanese doctrine of "attack, attack, attack" was reflected in its design which greatly limited its survivability. It simply wasn't a defensive fighter and their best pilots died one after another until only the very best and the very worst (new trainees) were left to fly it.

Japanese tactical doctrine in virtually all areas failed to adequately address defensive needs in both aircraft and ships until it was too late. Anthing that hinted of being a defensive weapon was very much frowned upon. They failed to realize the benefit of radar until it was too late even though they had working sets early on. They failed to address their ASW needs until way too late and their merchants went down left and right. They failed to provide pilot protection until late in the war and by then the good pilots were gone. Their AA complements onboard their ships remained pathetically weak... in many cases weaker than early war allied complements.

This war was decided in the halls of Imperial Naval HQ welll before the first shot was fired. Their soldiers, sailors and airmen gave their best but they simply weren't provided with the means to survive, let alone win.

The US on the other hand took every lesson learned (and there were many) to heart and rapidly incorporated changes that resulted in the finest naval force the world had every seen.

Chez

editted for spelling and stupid typing

Your last post is a great summation IMO Chez. Totally agree.

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

The US on the other hand took every lesson learned (and their were many) to heart and rapidly incorporated changes that resulted in the finest naval force the world had every seen.

Well, maybe not rapidly... <cough>Mk 14<cough>...

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I think in keeping things simple I'd say that Hornet and Lex were effectively sunk by Japanese naval aviation, and Yorktown by a submarine (after all, Yorktown had been recrewed and was in the process of being salvaged when torpedoed). Tracking damaged CVs does illustrate that in the late war <edit> MANY allied ships were hit by and in many cases substantially damaged by kamikazes. I would not suggest that kamikazes were ineffective.

My perception of the kamikaze effort is that on the whole it was the picket ships, auxiliaris, and transports that sustained the brunt of the damage. Of course, picket ships were isolated, and big American CVs tended to have alot more close protection from AAA batteries on BBs and CAs, so that too makes a bit of sense.

I agree with these comments though I prefer to think that Yorktown was "scuttled" by a Japanese submarine after being massively damaged by air attack. I think that even if Yorktwon had made it back to port, she effectively would have been out of the war longer than it would take to build a new one.

Kamikazes were effective weapons and they could and did sink ships. However, they were never going to be the saviour Japan hoped for. The US fleet was just too big, too strong, and two resilient to ever let Kamikazes decided the course of the war.

And you are correct in that the pickets were the sacrificial lamb if you will for the carriers. Their job was to provide early warning and soak up as many of the attacks as they could. And in that they were successful though it was certainly duty that I would not have wanted to do.

Chez

ORIGINAL: Terminus

ORIGINAL: ChezDaJez

The US on the other hand took every lesson learned (and their were many) to heart and rapidly incorporated changes that resulted in the finest naval force the world had every seen.

Well, maybe not rapidly... <cough>Mk 14<cough>...

Well, we couldn't be always be perfect now, could we? That would be no fun (just think of all the idiots on the youtube videos we wouldn't get to see!)? [:D]

Chez

LOL[:D]
&nbsp;
Regarding Kami's and picket ships do you/anyone have detailed listings of the 'escort' ships that were sunk/damaged by Kami's?
&nbsp;
Are there any books on this?
&nbsp;
Thanks,
&nbsp;
Steven

Frankly, I think the Zero was a brilliant design. It was a solid performer in the early war, though no "superweapon." Strategically it was ideal.

I think you've hit part of if Chez when you say it was designed as an aggressor with little consideration for defense. But it was also a strategic design. Japan knew that fuel would be a limiting factor, and that imports of almost everything were required to make their weapons of war, and they knew they'd start the war (once the US was in the fray) bereft of sufficient shipping to maintain output.

I know I know the design preceded US entry by years.

But my point is that one could make alot of Zeroes and fly them rather economically and that made the most of the resources to which the Japanese had access. Had it been more defensively designed, adding weight, demanding more horsepower (thereby adding weight), and then fuel (thereby adding weight), so that it came out like some sort of Japanese parallel to the F4F, then I think the early war ability for the Japanese to show up unexpectedly at long range from their own developed logistical sources would have been impaired. Having a heavier, more defensive plane might have slowed down the pace of operations in, say Indonesia.