Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

I wonder how one poster can know what another poster is reminded of?

Nih! Nih!

Ugum Bugum - Uber Alles!!!

ORIGINAL: Mynok

I think most players would prefer some kind of balance more than slavish adherence to history in one aspect of the game, when other, major, factors are hard-coded to be very ahistoric. If we ever get a WITP2 I hope refits and R&R, and historic tube management, are included. Until then, playing with ASW effectiveness variables is an attempt to steer around hard-coded game realities.

Amen. Sanest post (in a pool of very few) I've seen on this thread so far.

Sanest post but i disagree most players would prefer some kind of balance. Some of the AFB are argueing about things in 1945 like B29 performance which has nothing to do with balance... Some players attack Japanese convoys escorted by ( ships that were converted in 41 in game but which werent available historically) and then complain that they dont get historical results (when most allied subs attacked mainly unescorted vessels) .
If you are more aggresive you get higher losses
If your oponent convoys you get more losses
If your oponent uses more escorts you get more losses
etc

They should read some AARs like Ausies vs Joe and Nik.

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

American DD skippers and crews knew EXACTLY what to do with torpedoes when not tied to a gun line. Most of the crews were highly experienced by training, and almost no one got promoted to command a Desron in the USN at any time in the interwar period without exemplifying good knowledge of tactics and a penchant for bringing the enemy to battle.

Bring up another myth, I'm enjoying dispelling them.

Mdiehl , suggestion set all Experience the same and play a game as Japan against a decent allied player ( betetr still post an AAR). I have only tried it against the AI and as Japan i get shredded. Also your assertion that 16 5" is the same as 14 4.7" is not true in the game ... In the Game 14 4.7" are probably equal to 4 5" ( multiply effect by accuract and modify a bit for range) . Since the game uses the same 5"/38 in 41 as the 45 one with radar fire control it needs to find a middle ground.

Many things are bent its a game, its not a simulation by using leadership/ experience tuning the way it is the Allied in 44 crush the Japanese just by gains in experience and better leaders ( or the same as the Japanese) . If you applied that benefit in 41 you will get very ahistroical results. Try it !.

He can't. He doesn't own the game. Never has. [8|]

ORIGINAL: bklooste


(when most allied subs attacked mainly unescorted vessels) .

Do you have a source for this rather incredible claim?

And a quesiton for those who want the IJN to never, or nearly never, fire at escorts. If the sub is bingo fuel tomorrow, and a KV shows up, should the CO shoot at it? How about two days fuel? What parameters would you give the coders if you were doing the system analysis for them? Under what exact conditions should a sub shoot at an escort? Different for each side? (Historically, the USN began going after escorts on purpose in mid-1944. See USS Harder.) Do the players think there should be parallel code bases for the two sub fleets? (Not that this will happen.) Is the issue that they shoot at all, or is the issue that they hit escorts too often? I suspect that code is easier to alter than firing-decision code. Ecorts should be hard to hit for several reasons, primarily short waterlines, fast spins, and more lookouts per ton than merchants. But I sure don't know how to tell a coder how to tweak any of those to be "historic" (Were Canuck lookouts better than guys from Brooklyn?), let alone how to do it and not break something else--like have that I-boat use those four fish on a tanker day after tomorrow that "should have" lived if only that KV had died.

I advocated an AI sub-routine which allowed subs to be controlled by an HQ (like IRL) and the player simply picked doctrines and patrol zones and the AI did the rest. Subs were assigned to squadrons to micromanage various player desires/strategies. Might have worked.[;)]

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Anyone else got a glib nonsequitur that needs to be shot down?

Drawing attention to the fate of USS Duncan was an appropriate and accurate counter to the charge that the Japanese looked like idiots at Cape Esperance. Helena opened fire without authority due to a misunderstood exchange of signals. Duncan was hit by fire from friendly ships – a clear target identification failure. Scott’s order to check fire was disregarded by a number of American ships. The US force squandered an advantage that should have resulted in annihilation of the Japanese bombardment group. I do not disparage either side by suggesting that their performance made them look like ‘idiots’, but it is plain from the above that the Japanese had no monopoly on shortcomings in command, control and target identification that night.

Speaking of disparagement, I note that mdiehl finds my posts so offensive he has blocked them from view. Whilst sheltering behind the green button he still feels free to respond to those posts with inflammatory and offensive remarks such as the above. And does so with impunity, notwithstanding the recent warning that forum rules will be rigorously enforced.

I shouldn’t have to put up with mdiehl’s barbs, and I won’t. If moderators won’t restrain this kind of inflammatory behaviour I shall respond to it as I see fit. Or find a forum for my contributions where such conduct isn't tolerated.

I shouldn’t have to put up with mdiehl’s barbs, and I won’t. If moderators won’t restrain this kind of inflammatory behaviour I shall respond to it as I see fit.

If you don't want a smart ass reply don't make a smart ass remark.

Leaving about the pointless glib sarcasm in your (I'm being generous when I use the term) "rebuttal," Your example of USS Duncan merely proves that if you cherry pick a single incident to make your point (which is presumedly about poor command control) then your opponent in the debate has the license to do the same. If you argument is that the loss of Duncan typifies anything about the USN, then you open yourself up to the rebuttal that the same kinds of friendly fire losses permit the same general conclusions about the IJN. I know that's inconvenient for your position, but there it is.

Cherry pick the data all you want. I can find an IJN example of similar kind. Ultimately though the Japanese were defeated at Esperence.

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel

I shouldn’t have to put up with mdiehl’s barbs, and I won’t. If moderators won’t restrain this kind of inflammatory behaviour I shall respond to it as I see fit. Or find a forum for my contributions where such conduct isn't tolerated.

"Come and see the violence inherent in the system. Help! Help! I'm being repressed!"

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

I advocated an AI sub-routine which allowed subs to be controlled by an HQ (like IRL) and the player simply picked doctrines and patrol zones and the AI did the rest. Subs were assigned to squadrons to micromanage various player desires/strategies. Might have worked.[;)]

Lest I be labeled a sourpuss, or (horrors!) not sufficiently ironic [:)], I realize this proposal is T-I-C.

But, couple of problems with it from my POV.

1) Subs were THE key Allied platform in the PTO war, far more than aircraft in the ultimate outcome. The freakin' game lets you manage a 2Lt's brand of smokes, and we're going to throw the subs into a faceless pool of AI-dom?

2) Lots and lots amnd LOTS of extra code.

3) If you let the player pick the doctrine, and I assume the old no-merchant-attacks-by-IJN is one that seems popular in this thread, what Japanese player in his right mind mind would pick it? If one is no-escort-attacks, the same quesiton.

I'm in favor of a lot more ability to finely manage subs. WITP was an airplane-fest because GG loves the things, and apparently doesn't know a thing about the boats.

In any possible new game successor to AE that I am involved in - there would be a submarine/ASW design driven by knowledgeble SMEs from the start of the design phase. I actually first posted on this forum to "whine" about the submarine/ASW modeling - ran smack into Ron - though we were in pretty much total agreement - probably still are [:)].

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

In any possible new game successor to AE that I am involved in - there would be a submarine/ASW design driven by knowledgeble SMEs from the start of the design phase. I actually first posted on this forum to "whine" about the submarine/ASW modeling - ran smack into Ron - though we were in pretty much total agreement - probably still are [:)].

So, when is hte new game going to be done?[:)]

Good to hear the bubbleheads will be represented.

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58
So, when is hte new game going to be done?[:)]

At this point my best guess would be "some time after it is started" [:D][:D][:D]

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel
I shouldn’t have to put up with mdiehl’s barbs, and I won’t. If moderators won’t restrain this kind of inflammatory behaviour I shall respond to it as I see fit. Or find a forum for my contributions where such conduct isn't tolerated.

Maybe the right choice would be just to green button him like the majority of us have done for years. He is a troll. He's never owned nor played the game.

ORIGINAL: Bradley7735

ORIGINAL: Local Yokel


What, incidentally, were these “faulty doctrines” on which Japanese ASW is said to have been based, and where can I see this documented?

There was a politician who made a speech one day, saying that our (US) subs were doing great in the Pacific because the Japanese were setting their depth charges at 200 feet, and our subs were nice and safe at 350 feet.

That speech made quite a stir at the time, because a politician was announcing war time information that spies could use to help kill Americans. (as far as anyone knows, that information did not make it back to the Japanese, who continued to keep their depth charges shallow.)

Actually, Admiral Lockwood said this speech *was* listened to by the Japanese, who began fusing their depth charges deeper. This speech was by Andrew May IIRC. A very very large blunder.

ORIGINAL: Ron Saueracker

And a quesiton for those who want the IJN to never, or nearly never, fire at escorts. If the sub is bingo fuel tomorrow, and a KV shows up, should the CO shoot at it? How about two days fuel? What parameters would you give the coders if you were doing the system analysis for them? Under what exact conditions should a sub shoot at an escort? Different for each side? (Historically, the USN began going after escorts on purpose in mid-1944. See USS Harder.) Do the players think there should be parallel code bases for the two sub fleets? (Not that this will happen.) Is the issue that they shoot at all, or is the issue that they hit escorts too often? I suspect that code is easier to alter than firing-decision code. Ecorts should be hard to hit for several reasons, primarily short waterlines, fast spins, and more lookouts per ton than merchants. But I sure don't know how to tell a coder how to tweak any of those to be "historic" (Were Canuck lookouts better than guys from Brooklyn?), let alone how to do it and not break something else--like have that I-boat use those four fish on a tanker day after tomorrow that "should have" lived if only that KV had died.

I advocated an AI sub-routine which allowed subs to be controlled by an HQ (like IRL) and the player simply picked doctrines and patrol zones and the AI did the rest. Subs were assigned to squadrons to micromanage various player desires/strategies. Might have worked.[;)]

Interesting idea. Perhaps an option for WITP2?

Perhaps the problem with subs in-game is that, as the player with a 'gods eye view' of the entire battle area, individual hand-placing of subs is too potent? Too easy to swarm an enemy because you will ALWAYS know where they are if any of your air assets detect them - very different probably than what it was in WW2, where I would wager that subs never had that kind of 'instant intelligence'.

However, you would probably get many allied players complaining that the subs arent suitably cutting off the japanese homeland from its sources of supply in 44/45. ;>

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: bklooste


(when most allied subs attacked mainly unescorted vessels) .

Do you have a source for this rather incredible claim?

1. i was reffering to 1941 not teh whole war. Though would say its also true in 42.

2. How many non troop transport convoys did the Japanese run in 41 and early 42 , the sources i read state little convoying was done ? How many escorts are there in the OOB ( if you use historical conversions and when most of the destroyers are mainly used for troop transports) .. Result = lots of task forces with very few escorts. QED. Even players who do lots of conversions and reasonable convoys are struggling with 1 escort per convoy or 2 for high priority.

ORIGINAL: bklooste

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

ORIGINAL: bklooste


(when most allied subs attacked mainly unescorted vessels) .

Do you have a source for this rather incredible claim?

1. i was reffering to 1941 not teh whole war. Though would say its also true in 42.

2. How many non troop transport convoys did the Japanese run in 41 and early 42 , the sources i read state little convoying was done ? How many escorts are there in the OOB ( if you use historical conversions and when most of the destroyers are mainly used for troop transports) .. Result = lots of task forces with very few escorts. QED. Even players who do lots of conversions and reasonable convoys are struggling with 1 escort per convoy or 2 for high priority.

As a data point, this link lists every ship allowed by the JANAC post-war body, by boat, by date, by class, by tonnage. Take a look at how many DD and smaller escorts were sunk. (Also CL and larger, but that's a different point.)

USN subs actually attacked few combat TFs in the war. Most of the DD and smaller vessels in those lists were ASW escorts. There are many of them.

There were fewer escorts sunk in 1942 because of several variables. There were fewer subs on patrol. The torpedoes didn't work. Many of the pre-war COs were too cautious, and were relieved, but not until they'd made a couple of patrols. None of those reasons indicates that the Japanese didn't escort convoys in 1942.

Edit: the links would help, huh?

http://www.valoratsea.com/month1.htm

http://www.valoratsea.com/JANAC.htm

Great links Bullwinkle!

ORIGINAL: Bullwinkle58

There were fewer escorts sunk in 1942 because of several variables. There were fewer subs on patrol. The torpedoes didn't work. Many of the pre-war COs were too cautious, and were relieved, but not until they'd made a couple of patrols. None of those reasons indicates that the Japanese didn't escort convoys in 1942.

Or it could just indicate that the subs preferred shooting at the targets that mattered..., the ones carrying war material, oil, and troops. One of the big problems with statistics has always been figuring out just what the numbers actually meant.

It would also be possible to say that US subs got much worse in 1945..., because after 2 years of sinking a ship for every 21-22 days on patrol, the number suddenly jumps to 1 sinking for every 50 days on patrol. The numbers show this..., but leave out that the Japanese were running out of ships to be sunk.

I don't suppose you have the same charts and breakdowns for the Japanese side? Be nice to have the comparison. But thanks for posting the links.