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STREAM FORD

A ford represents an area within a stream or gully hex where the Depression's sides have a gentler slope and the streambed itself is level and lies near the surface, but the ford is still at the same elevation as that stream hex, and is treated as a stream/gully hex except as amended below.
A ford stream is still at the same elevation as the stream hex.
One stream ford hexside is open terrain for LOS purposes.
A stream ford hexside is not a hindrance or an obstacle to same-level LOS and not causes a degradation effect for every stream ford hexside between same-level targeted and firing hexes.
A stream ford hexside has no TEM for fire traced across it.
The Infantry/Cavalry can cross a hexside of stream ford with a cost of 2 MF.
It cost 1 MP for fulltracked vehicles to cross a hexside of stream ford.
It cost 3 MP for halftracked vehicles to cross a hexside of stream ford.
It cost 6 MP for vehicles with only wheels to cross a hexside of stream ford.

TRAIN BRIDGE

Unlike a railroad bridge, a train bridge is considered wide enough to allow all ground units to transit.
A train bridge is considered as a normal road bridge except what is said below.
A train bridge is a location by itself, since it is located in a hex (unlike the hexside of railway line).
A train bridge hex is a hindrance to same-level LOS and causes a degradation effect for every train bridge hex between same-level targeted and firing hexes.
A train bridge hex has a TEM +1 for fire traced into it.
The Infantry/Cavalry can enter a train bridge hex with a cost of 2 MF.
It cost 2 MP for fulltracked vehicles to enter a train bridge hex.
It cost 4 MP for halftracked vehicles to enter a train bridge hex.
It cost 8 MP for vehicles with only wheels to enter a train bridge hex.
No Fortifications are allowed in a train bridge hex.

Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland Order of Battle 1944_1

Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland Order of Battle 1944_2

Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland Order of Battle 1944_3

Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland Order of Battle 1944_4

Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland Order of Battle 1944_5

Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland Order of Battle 1944_6

Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland Order of Battle 1944_7

Japan Imperial Army

Japan Naval Landing

The Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF), (Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai) were naval infantry units of the Imperial Japanese Navy and were a part of the Imperial Japanese Navy Land Forces. They saw extensive service in the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific theatre of World War II.
Starting in the Meiji Era the navy began to raise units unofficially known as Special Naval Landing Forces. These forces were raised from kaiheidan at — and took their names from — the four main naval districts/bases in Japan: Kure, Maizuru (deactivated following the Washington naval treaty, reactivated in 1939), Sasebo, and Yokosuka. In 1927 some of these SNLF units were unified under command of the Shanghai Naval Landing Force and saw action in China from 1932 in the January 28 Incident. Afterwards the Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force was officially formed in October 1932, signifying the first official SNLF unit. Official SNLF units from naval bases were authorized in 1936. SNLF units would once again see action at the Battle of Shanghai and countless other battles and cleanup operations throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War.
The strengths of each SNLF ranged from the 200 to over 3000 personnel. Almost all units were a single battalion with a varying number of companies.
The SNLF was not a marine force, but was instead sailors who had basic infantry training. In 1941, the 1st and 3rd Yokosuka SNLF were converted to parachute units. The SNLF paratroopers were successfully used during the attack on Celebes and the Battle of Manado. Aside from the paratroopers, there were also planned elite units to conduct reconnaissance and raid operations.
Like all landing forces they often experienced heavy casualties when faced with determined resistance, such as at the Battle of Milne Bay. This was due to their poor training and unwillingness to surrender, and when completely out of ammunition, they may even resort to hand-to-hand fighting with their swords and bayonets. After the failure to capture Milne Bay the Special Naval Landing Forces became a defensive force and very few units were raised. Naval Guard Units became much more common Imperial Japanese Navy infantry units in the Pacific.

Japan Naval Guard

As the war progressed, and the Japanese Navy became more involved in the seizure and defense of Pacific islands, other naval land organizations came into existence. Examples of these are: the Base Force (Tokubetsu Konkyochitai), the Guard Force (Keibitai), the Pioneers (Setsueitai) and the Naval Civil Engineering and Construction Units (Kaigun Kenchiku Shisetsu Butai). Special naval landing forces, or similar organizations, were occupying a number of outlying bases, because the Army was been reluctant to take over the defenses of these outposts. Since Japan has lost the initiative in the Pacific, these forces have been given defensive missions, and the Japanese Navy has changed their organization accordingly. Under Allied pressure Japan saw that it was necessary to increase the defenses of some islands by reinforcing the special naval landing force, or by combining two or more special naval landing forces into a new organization known as a Combined Special Naval Landing Force. In New Georgia the Kure 6th, the Yokosuka 7th, and portions of the Maizuru 4th were combined into the 8th Combined Special Naval Landing Force. In the Gilberts a special naval landing force was combined with a guard or base force to form a Special Defense Force.
The Base force or special base Force (Tokubetsu Konkyochitai) is a unit the Naval Command echelon for the defense forces of a prescribed area. In addition to headquarters personnel, the base force has certain heavy coast artillery and also heavy and medium antiaircraft artillery. It seems there was no fixed organization, and the size of the base force depending upon the importance and extent of the area to be defended. The following units may be found attached to base forces: Aircraft, small naval surface units (patrol boats), one or more special naval landing forces, one or more guard forces, pioneer units, and Navy civil engineering and construction units.
The Guard force (Keibitai) was a unit used for the defense of small installations. It is composed of naval personnel, and has light and medium antiaircraft and heavy infantry weapons. its size, armament, and organization vary, and several guard forces may be attached to a base force.
The function of Pioneers (Setsueitai) unit was the construction of airfields, fortifications, barracks, etc. It were commanded by a naval officer, usually of the rank of captain or commander, with attached officers and civilians with engineering experience. There had 2 types of organization, of 800 and 1,300 men respectively, depending on the size of the job. The unit contained from 1/4 to 1/3 Japanese, and the balance or Koreans or Fomosans. The 15th Pioneers was such a unit.

Japan Firts Line

The rationale behind most of the rules for the Japanese should be based over his incredible courage in the face his willingness to die rather than be taken alive. The Japanese was been raised in a highly regimented society with little regard for the individual, with an iron discipline enforced in the military, and the Bushido, the code of the Samurai. Bushido stressed unquestioning bravery and loyalty, the unimportance of the individual, that failure in battle demanded death, and that capture by the enemy was unthinkable. Together all these produced what some have called the best infantry in history. The Japanese First Line infantry is an example of all this.
The Japanese First Line infantry can be considered as combat engineers in Western armies. It is an elite unit of the Japanese Imperial Army, similar to the Japan Naval Landing infantry of the Imperial Naval Army.
. In theory, Japanese tactical doctrine advocated infiltration, night attacks, speed and surprise at all times, the maximum use of deception, bold outflanking movements, attacks on the enemy's rear and the deployment of snipers behind enemy lines.
Even when Japanese tactics were appropriate (or at least adequate), the advantages of careful reconnaissance and surprise were often thrown away by poor fire discipline or, far worse, by unnecessary noise. Resorting to noisy ruses to generate enemy "jitter" fire, and so reveal dispositions, denies an opponent sleep, generally demoralizes him or causes casualties from "friendly fire" and is a valuable technique and by no means unique to the Japan Army, but the Japanese tended to persist with such ploys long after their enemy was wise to them—with predictable results. Moreover, the Japanese were also indifferent to (and careless in) the need to remain stealthy when preparing to attack; they would blow bugles, shout, sing, chant, chatter, throw firecrackers or taunt their foes, especially at night.
The lack of personal initiative in Japanese soldiers of all ranks was the product of a very rigid social order in which education (increasingly militarized over preceding decades) taught the individual to "obey without question" almost as a religious directive, while bushido's "obedience" ethic also fostered the concept of paternalistic government rendering the individual dependent on the state-and thus conveniently subservient, readily obedient, apt to shirk responsibility and lacking in initiative. These traits were then reinforced by the brutality to which recruits and even veteran soldiers were subjected by their superiors (horses and weapons got better treatment) in order to keep everyone in their respective places within the military hierarchy.

Japan Marine Paratroopers

Japanese parachute units, small in number and involved in no strategic assaults, are rarely mentioned in the battle histories of the Pacific War. Only six airborne "operations" were carried out by Japanese forces during the Second World War. Formal organization did not commence until 1940 and by the time war broke out in late 1941, there were an estimated 14700 Japanese soldiers trained as paratroops.
The first unit activated was a contingent of the Yokosuka of the Imperial Japanese Navy which had undergone recent intensive but short training. Shortly thereafter a second parachute unit, known as the 1st Raiding Flying Brigade (Teishin Hikodan) of the Japanese Army Air Force, was activated. The brigade was composed of a reinforced battalion of infantry, supported by an air regiment of heavy bombers. At the beginning of 1944, the Japanese Army airborne units consisted of a raiding brigade, two independent raiding regiments, and a couple of raiding flying regiments. In the latter part of the year, the Japanese high command raised two raiding groups (a command roughly equivalent to a division in strength) and created an official Table of Organization (T/O). These parent units were known as the 1st and 2nd Raiding Group (Teishin Shudan). Both units had two parachute regiments, although each "regiment" was undersized. Two glider infantry regiments were also seemingly created, each with a manpower of approximately 880 officers and men. The 1st Raiding Group, under the nominal control of the 4th Army and commanded by Major-General Tsukada Rikichi, was sent to the Philippines and fought against the American 6th Army on Luzon as ground troops.
The organization of a Japanese Army Raiding Group shows a relatively small unit that was extremely light in firepower. A Raiding Group had a total manpower of only 5575 officers and men, including flight crews. The Raiding Group HQ and Signals unit had a personnel roster of 220 and 140 men respectively. The main combat component of a raiding group was its Raiding Brigade, with 1475 officers and men organized into an HQ and two Raiding Regiments, each composed of an HQ and signal units, a Heavy Weapons Company and three Rifle companies. Each rifle company had a HQ section of 15 officers and men, a MG platoon of 20 men, and three rifle platoons of 40 men each. Each Raiding Group was also allotted two "Glider Infantry" regiments. Each regiment had two rifle companies of three rifle platoons and a MG platoon, backed up by a combat engineer company, an AT Gun company (with six 47mm AT guns) and a Cannon Company (equipped with four 75mm Infantry guns). Auxiliary units of the Raiding Group also included a machine-cannon unit for base defense, and a "Raiding Engineer" unit of about 250 men.

Japan Imperial Guard

In Japan the Imperial Guard is the name of two separate organizations dedicated to the protection of the Emperor of Japan and the Imperial Family, palaces and other imperial properties. The Imperial Guard of the Imperial Japanese Army became the foundation of the Imperial Japanese Army. Later, the Guards Cavalry Regiment, Guards Field Artillery Regiment, Guards Engineer Battalion, Guards Transport Battalion, plus other Guards service units were added to the Imperial Guard Division.
In September 1939, the division was split into the 1st and 2nd Guards Brigades. The 1st Guards Brigade, which contained the 1st and 2nd Guards Infantry Regiments, the cavalry regiment, and half of the support units, was transferred to South China. Here it became known as the Mixed Guards Brigade. In October 1940, it joined other Japanese units occupying French Indo-China. In April 1941 the Mixed Guards Brigade returned to Tokyo but it did not rejoin the Imperial Guards Division.
The 2nd Guards Brigade, which contained 3rd and 4th Guards Regiments, also went to China. In 1940, it went to Shanghai before being posted to Hainan Island. In June 1941, the 5th Guards Infantry Regiment joined the 2nd Guards Brigade becoming the Imperial Guard Division again. It later saw action in the Battles of Malaya and Singapore with Tomoyuki Yamashita's 25th Army.
In May 1943, all designated Imperial Guard units were renamed again. The Mixed Guards Brigade in Tokyo became the 1st Guards Division (which now consisted of the 1st, 2nd, 6th Guard Regiments) and the Imperial Guard Division became the 2nd Guards Division. The 3rd Guards Division, which never left Japan, was formed in 1944. It consisted of the 8th, 9th and 10th Guards Regiments.
In comparison to the two regular divisions, 5th and 18th, which received intense physical and military training before the campaign that brought them to peak effectiveness, the Imperial Guard did not go through the same tough school. The Guard selected its rank and file based on their height, not experience or ability. This made a Guard unit much taller than the average Japanese battalion, but height is not an indicator of physical strength or fitness — and in the nutritional background of the 1930s, possibly even indicates less stamina than a man of average stature. Guards units in other armies did get first pick of the recruiting pool and often better equipment. This was not true in Japan, and the Guard was no better off than line units in terms of its gear. The Guard selected its officers from families close to the Emperor by birth or social standing.

Japan Marine Gliders

Perhaps the least remembered of the airborne units in World War II is the parachute infantry of Japan. Roughly 3000 volunteers from the 12th and 18th Infantry divisions were trained at Shimonoseki; another 3000 passed through the process at Shizouka, and about 1200 drawn from the troops stationed in Canton received instruction at Hiroshima. Later, another 2000 from the 9th and 11th Infantry divisions would be trained at Himeji. Paratroop training was concentrated at a single base, while jump/combat training of naval personnel was centered on Hainan island.
It was not until late 1941, as plans were maturing for the initial operations, that Japanese parachute units were activated; and then they were designated only for the southern operations against the Netherlands East Indies. The units were typically organized into four companies plus an HQ. The first three companies were organized with four rifle platoons and a MG platoon, while the fourth company included a "heavy weapons" platoon. The weapons platoon typically consisted of four 3" Naval guns, two 75mm Field guns, and two 70mm Infantry guns. Depending on the mission, the naval guns could be replaced with light AA guns. For the 1942 parachute operations, the heavier weapons were not airdropped but transported by other means. Two glider infantry regiments were also seemingly created, each with a manpower of approximately 880 officers and men.
Air transport for the group was provided by an integral Flying Brigade that consisted of two flying regiments (Teishin Hikosentai). Their primary mission was to provide transport for the airborne formations; when not engaged in this, they were at the disposal of the Army Air Force. The organization was similar to that of the normal Japanese air regiments. Each consisted of a headquarters unit and three squadrons, roughly 500 officers and ranks, all under the command of an Air Force lieutenant-colonel or major. Approximate strength was 35 aircraft, usually Topsys, but some converted Sallys were also in service.
There were other raiding units within the Japanese command structure in Manchuria. Many of the Japanese divisions of the Kwantung Army established elite Raiding Battalions so as to have a special unit capability. While most of these raiding battalions of the Kwantung Army were not trained as paratroopers, jump training was occurring in Manchuria in at least two locations, and there are confirmed reports of paratroop training centers being established in North China near Shanghai, Waichang, Nanking and Hsiang Fan. The Russians were to find out the hard way just how elite these raiding battalions were during their August 1945 invasion.

Japan Second Line

The Japanese approach to infantry training had severe weaknesses, especially at the lower echelons. However, these weaknesses were neither readily apparent nor especially important in the jungle fighting in Southeast Asia in 1941, where small unit operations were the only operations that mattered. The Japanese had several clear training strengths that they were able to capitalize on in the early part of World War II in the Pacific. First, despite Japan’s relatively small population, the Imperial Japan Army was better configured than any of the other major combatant nations to rapidly expand into a much larger, but still reasonably well trained force. The Japanese conscription and reserve system obviated the need for the regular establishment to set up large training camps for newly inducted soldiers. Instead, the Imperial Japan Army was able to efficiently double in size, then double again, virtually overnight. There was naturally a point where this seemingly endless well of trained soldiers would run dry, but that was several years into the future in 1941--a future that was not supposed to include further armed conflict.
The "7" morale factor of Japanese Elite squads (Marine Paratroopers, Naval Landing, First Line), suggests the question of why "7" is not more appropriate than "6" for the Second-Line squads. However, the wide gulf in training, competence, leadership, weapons, physical fitness and diet (combat troops naturally got priority in receiving rations and anti-malarial drugs) did have an effect on morale even among the Japanese that were not elite troops. There is little need to dwell at length on the stoicism of their soldiers.
The fanatical resistance and resilience under fire displayed by the Japanese stemmed from a number of factors. In the first place, the bushido spirit demanded that suffering and hardship be borne bravely without complaint, imposing a form of self-discipline. Secondly, many Japanese believed through persistent indoctrination that the greatest personal fulfillment attainable was to die a hero's death in battle and thus be assured a place in Heaven, linked to the old ethos that death was nothing to fear and preferable to dishonor. Thirdly, the brutal discipline of Japanese military life made retreat (let alone surrender) a crime under the Military Penal Code, and demanded suicide even from Japanese POWs who subsequently escaped and regained their own lines. Fourth, the fact that the Japanese would often kill their own comrades if they attempted surrender was a powerful disincentive to be rational and quit. And, fifth, Japanese education and propaganda (the two were almost synonymous) convinced most soldiers that their foes were racial inferiors-or at least barbarians-and should be resisted "tooth and nail". Lastly, regional recruiting fostered strong regimental loyalty and unit cohesion.

Japan Conscripts

Those Japanese soldiers possessing any acceptable firearms could count themselves lucky, for the 1-2-4-4 MMCs represent the dregs of the manpower available (Conscripts Squads): "pressed" civilians (including females) like the Okinawan Boeitai Home Guard, rear area troops, shipwrecked personnel, and hospital patients in varying states of physical integrity summarily turfed out of their beds, all sent into action with little if any training and brandishing whatever "weapons" were at hand. The Japanese were, naturally, aware of their deficient infantry firepower.
The Japanese assigned one or more depot divisions to each divisional district. These were training formations whose function resembled that of British regiments in a number of respects. In peacetime, the depot divisions trained each years' class of conscripts. If war suddenly broke out, the bulk of the depot division was used as cadre and filled out with reservists to create a field division, usually bearing the same number as the depot division, which could quickly be committed to combat. The remainder of the depot division was then rebuilt with other reservists or conscripts. During a more prolonged war, when a new division needed to be raised, a small nucleus of cadre was drawn from a depot division and filled out with reservists and conscripts to create a new field division with its own number. This new division was billeted in its own wartime barracks while undergoing as much training as the situation permitted before being committed to combat. Depot divisions were also responsible for providing replacements to field divisions, usually those that were earlier raised from the same divisional district.
The inadequate training was also a Japanese feature. Pre-war conscripts normally served for two years (later three), but the deteriorating war situation shortened this training period, after 1942, to three months or less before men left for the front. Even in 1941-42, some formations were raw; the 65th Brigade on Bataan had received less than a month's training, and the Imperial Guards Division in Malaya, while expert at ceremonial drill, had last seen action in 1905. In Malaya, complaints were made about poor map-reading, inadequate standards of patrolling and bad artillery-infantry cooperation, together with abysmal leadership and a lack of fighting spirit among both officers and men. All this is a far cry from the stereotyped view of the Japanese soldier as a highly trained warrior.

Japan Naval Base

The Combined Special Naval Landing Force, combined several Special Naval Landing Force units into a brigade sized unit with greater firepower. There were around five of these when the war ended.
The Base Force or Konkyo-chitai and The Special Base Force or Tokubetsu-konkyo-chitai provided a variety of services both administrative and tactical in areas outside Japan proper, Korea, and Formosa. The Japanese raised around fifty of these units which ranged in size from 250 to 1500 men depending on location and function. The Base Force could also include afloat units.
Defense Units or Bōbi-tai: units of from 250 to 2000 men organized for defense of naval installations and areas of strategic importance within Japan. Some Defense Units included artillery emplacements and some controlled the minefields in Japanese waters.
Guard Units or Keibi-tai: 100 to 1500 men units responsible for ground defense of Imperial Japanese Navy facilities. They were frequently assigned to Base Forces and Special Base Forces. The Japanese raised around one hundred of these units. Many of these units played a notable part in the defense of Japanese held islands during the later stages of the war, such as the Iwo Jima Keibi-tai consisting of 1000 men led by Captain Samaji Inouye.
Anti-Aircraft Defense Units or Bōkū-tai: Anti-aircraft artillery units of 200–350 men. There were three types which differed based on the number and kind of anti-aircraft weapons assigned. The Japanese formed over two hundred of these units which were primarily located in areas outside Japan, Formosa, and Korea. They were usually assigned to Base Forces, Special Base Forces, Special Naval Landing Forces, and Guard Forces.
Construction Battalions or Setsuei-tai built and repaired naval facilities of all kinds, including airstrips, barracks, ammunition bunkers, and fuel depots on remote islands as well as Japan's major naval bases. Most personnel were civilian employees and unarmed. The units also included naval engineers overseeing the operations and sailors guarding the unit, both being lightly armed for defense. The Construction Battalions often made use of local labor whose service was compulsory.
The Communications Units or Tsūshin-tai of 100–2,000 men were stationed ashore to provide communications between Japan's widespread naval installations and to and from the fleets and ships at sea.
The Tokkeitai Navy military police units carried out ordinary military police functions in naval installations and occupied territories; they also worked with the Imperial Japanese Army's Kempeitai military police, the Keishi-chō civil police and Tokkō secret units on matters concerning security, intelligence collection, and counter intelligence.
Anti Aircraft Artillery Batteries or Koshaho Chutai were units of forty or fifty men organized for the air defense of important installations and were subordinate to Air Defense Sectors which in turn were subordinate to Defense Units. These batteries were separate from the previously mentioned Bobitai. Several hundred of them were in existence at the end of the war.

Japan Takasago Giyutai

The Imperial Japanese Army was interested in the use of aborigines in special forces operations, as they were viewed as being more physically capable of operating in the tropical and sub-tropical regions in Southeast Asia than ethnic Japanese, and, coming from a hunter-gatherer culture, would be able to operate with minimal logistics support. The Japanese military recruited many young men from friendly tribes into service shortly before the start of World War II.
When Japanese military victims mounted after the Allied start theirs offensives in all fronts, Japan start to thought to recruit Southeast Asians in theirs occupation areas as the replacements. On April 22, 1943, the 7th Japanese Army HQ in Saigon proclaimed that they give a chance for Indonesian youths to join with theirs army as ‘Heiho’. ‘Sendenbu’ (Japan propaganda service) propagandize that ‘Heiho’ would became a chance for Indonesian youths to serve theirs homeland and nation. Those volunteers were called as ‘Heiho’ (auxiliary soldiers). However, ‘Heiho’ wasn’t an individual unit, it was only a commonly name for Southeast Asian volunteers that served in Japan army. They were incorporated into Japanese unit as individual rather than taking the risk of setting-up this kind of a motivated military structure with its more independent character.
Many Indonesian youths listed as volunteers. The total number was confidential and training was under the direction of officers from the Nakano School, which specialized in insurgency and guerrilla warfare. After receive theirs training for some months, thousands of ‘Heihos’ were send to frontline to fight the Allied. Initially assigned to transport and supply units, as the war condition progressively deteriorated for Imperial Japanese forces, the volunteers were sent to front line as combat troops. They were involved in many battlefields, like Burma, Rabaul, Morotai, Balikpapan, etc. According some Japanese sources, ‘Heihos’ usually have more better training and weaponry than theirs PETA (Pembela Tanah Air, or Defenders of the Motherland) counterpart and fought fanatically like theirs own troops.
Units consisting entirely of "Takasago Volunteers" served with distinction in the Philippines, Netherlands East Indies, Solomon Islands and New Guinea, where they fought against American and Australian forces even before Taiwanese volunteers were recruited into service. Towards the end of the war, 15 officers and 45 enlisted members of the Takasago Volunteers were organized into the Kaoru Special Attack Corps for a suicide mission similar to that of the Giretsu Kuteitai, and attacked a United States Army Air Forces landing strip on Leyte. The Takasago Volunteers were well known for their jungle survival ability.