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ORIGINAL: IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

ORIGINAL: Ludovic Coval

Cullie,



Well I dont share your view as Monty being a good planner. Both for Caen and Arnhem, he seems to have badly underestimated German capabilities. For Caen, British operations turned to several mini-"Suprcharge" while Market-Garden saw Allied troops stalled without any options but frontal assault on well prepared German defenses (especially at Nijmegen). But finnally it is probably Monty main 'flaw' to be unable to use Patton like war conduct (in both operations). I always wondered how MG would have turned be US XV corps being in charge of exploitation instead of British XXX corps.

LC

You could be right, but it seemed to me his flaws lied in execution and flexibility. To compare, Rommel was much more willing to deviate from his plans when circumstances and planning didn’t agree, while Montgomery seem more determined to stay the course.

This is historical analysis. If you don't stop, I'll report you to the moderator [;)].

Heheh

Well, Ironduke, unlike Patton, your goal is not to destroy Monty, so it looks as though you can actually have a fairly reasonable discussion about him. [;)]

Culiacan Mexico

I do not disagree, yet I believe (perhaps incorrectly) that Montgomery’s slow purposeful style of battle was better suited to North Africa than the rather pointless blitz of Rommel. Sure those mad dashes that covered thousands of miles looked impressive on the map, but it ignored the realities of logistics in that area. Rommel knew supply was critical, yet repeatedly out run his supply to capture, which in reality was just desert, while depleting his forces. Montgomery would not overextend his forces and allow Rommel the chance to recapture the initiative. By his very nature would have none of that: his advance might be called slow, but it would be irreversible. Operation Torch might speed up the destruction of the Africa Corps, but with or without it General Montgomery was going to slowly grind the German Army into dust.

I feel Montgomery’s abilities and limitations were not well suited for Sicily or France.

Monty is often maligned. However, you do bring out some interesting and positive strengths about him. Monty was well suited for the defensive, set-piece battle.

To be fair to Monty in France:

The British and Canadian troops were attempting to take Caen. Caen, which lay on the edge of flat country opening into northern France, became the hinge of the Anglo-American allies' advance out of their Normandy lodgment area. It was also key to the Germans' defense of their occupied territory.

There was some very tough and brutal fighting for Caen by both sides near, and in, Caen.

By the evening of June 6th, the tanks of the 21st Panzer Division, reinforced later that night by those of the 12th SS Hitlerjugend, had formed a barrier of fire and steel in front of Caen, which stopped the Allies in their tracks and banished all hopes of early deliverance for the thousands of civilians who had not fled the city after the initial bombings. The German commander brought his best divisions into play, notably most of his armoured units. The British and Canadians were pinned down in the cornfields around the city. Caen was to become the linchpin of the Battle of Normandy.

http://www.normandiememoire.com/NM60Ang ... p05_gb.htm

It is hard say how another commander might have handled this area better. Perhaps, as you mentioned, it did require a commander with more imagination. It did turn into a real slugfest with both sides committing their forces in this area.

Cheers!

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Ironduke:

D'Este and Whiting

I took a look at the Whiting books D'Este had listed in his Bibliography.

Of the four Whiting books listed in D'Este's Bibliograpy, D'Este uses only two of those books.

Aha, so you do have a copy. No excuses for ignoring the bad things he has to say about your good General, then.

Sorry to disappoint you - but what D'Este uses from Whiting is basically worthless as far as any evidence or understanding of Patton goes

.

You don't disappoint me, because because firstly, you've been a little economical with the truth (see below) but secondly I used his using Whiting to illustrate that he considered him a useful historian. D'este would only have quoted from a bad historian in order to illustrate the problems with that point of view (as he did when quoting from your Patton uncovered historian Rohmer in "Decision in Normandy".) D'Este clearly values Whiting higher than Patton uncovered.

These two books by Whiting, Patton and Patton's Last Battle, are used for only three small and harmless quotes. Two of these small quotes are attributed to Patton and one quote describes Patton.

I am not a suspicious man. This is just as well, as a suspicious man would suggest you were being a little economical with the truth, here, in order to support your point, hoping I had not actually read the book to contradict you. I don't think the moderators would let me get away with any other description for this. I only had time for a quick check between chapters 40 and the epilogue. I actually found 5 references, which when added to the one in the prologue means at least six references in what amounts to only a third of the book.

He seems to use him as freely as he uses any other historian.

Since one of the ones you've missed I quoted myself earlier in this thread when I was raising the issue of Whiting being used by D'Este, you give the impression of debating without reading what the opposition are saying to you. This will make sustained and meaningful debate between us difficult. (For the record, Chapter 40, note 23, Page 634).

What is further interesting (and would strain even a mildly suspicious man to breaking point) is exactly which two quotes you've left out. If I may be permitted.

Patton's achilles heel (which would be painfully evident later in Lorraine) was that rather than cut his losses, he would attempt to storm his way out of a bad situation in the name of prestige. One of his critics scornfully notes that "the third army's wild rampage through Brittany obscured one central fact - west was precisely the wrong direction...Patton's greatest deficiency as a tank commander was his tendancy to think as a traditional cavalry tactician and to care little what direction he was attacking in, so long as he was attacking." Another biographer has written that Patton was "at his best and most successful only where he could apply his brilliant looose rein cavalry tactics against an already confused and mostly mediocre enemy. This was to be the lesson the Brittany campaign."

You can argue this falls into the small category, but I (and I would hope most forum readers) don't consider this harmless. Strange you did not see this one.

The second is also interesting. It is particularly strange you missed this one, since you have been collecting quotes from German Officers concerning our General Patton. This is note 38, Ch 42 page 669. D'Este reproduces a quote he found in Whiting. I quote:

Patton's senior opponent, Gen Hermann Balck, the Commander in chief of Army Group G, was scornfully critical. Balck freely admitted that his troops were "motley and bady equipped," and ascribed their success in defending Metz "mainly to the bad and timid leadership of the Americans." It was the most scathing criticism ever levelled at Patton by one of his enemies.

Perhaps you could add this quote to your ongoing list of quotes from Germans about Patton, and repost it once again?

For the record, General Balck is a quite remarkable soldier whose opinion we should seriously consider. Commander of an infantry Regiment in 1st Panzer Division during the France campaign, he talents ensured he rose to command an Army Group by war's end.

As for:

Von Rom
One quote appears at the beginning, and two quotes appear near the end, of D'Este's book. They really don't add anything to our understanding of Patton. And they are so inconsequential, I don't know why D'Este even bothered to use these quotes.

As we can see, this is not true.

The first quote you cite is also on the very first page in the prologue, whilst D'Este is setting the scene for his book. A very important section in a literary sense. It's an essential quote because Whiting is describing (correctly in D'Este's view) how Patton passed into the mythology of the second world war after George C Scott portrayed him. This is a key quote to understanding why you can find so many websites about him today. It helps explain his enduring popularity in certain quarters. Whiting doesn't mention any history in this, merely Scott's performance. Interesting.

The second quote is also very revealing. It cites Patton at the time of the campaign in Metz, a low point in Patton's career, condemned by all (except for yourself). D'Este records how Patton began the attacks on Metz which were eventually repulsed. He ordered them to continue because he wanted to present the City to General Marshall during his forthcoming visit to 3rd Army. As these attacks continued towards a place called Driant, Patton ordered the place be took "even if it took every man in XX Corp". This from the General you tell us was careful with his men's lives. Bloody attacks sustained because Patton wanted to impress the head of the US Army.

The section on Metz in this book is also very revealing. I'll quote it elsewhere, but it rather contradicts your assertion that Patton could have ended the war if given all the gas as he dashed across France.

Regards,
IronDuke

Edited as duplicated in error

If you cannot decern the possible conflict between what Whiting/Kessler is writing, then I will save my typing fingers the trouble from having to re-type another answer to you.

One answer would be nice. I do not hesitate to point out your errors, don't do me any favours, point out mine. if there is an obvious conflict of intrerest, put it in and make me look wrong.

As to D'Este and researchers:

Most people are aware of the use of researchers. Didn't you know that? It is a very obvious thing.

This is NO big revelation. Even all your very own favourite historians more than likely use researchers to gather material.

Did you know that judges use law clerks to do most of their legal research?

And that lawyers often use articling students to do legal research for them?

And that professors often get graduate students to do a lot of their research and mark student papers?

This amazes me. You said afterwards:

Whether D'Este looked at Whiting's books or read the material, is for him to say.

So you clearly don't know whether he did or not, and yet you keep repeating this as if you can prove the point with repetition. I repeat, it's irrelevant whether he used researchers because even if he had, he wouldn't have quoted from a book he didn't read. How would he know the quote was relevant or that he even agreed with it without seeing it in context? He lists the people who helped in his acknowledgements section. One is listed as a researcher who researched for him from what I can see, she researched Patton's familiy and it's emigration to Virginia. I don't think Whiting had too much to say about that.

I am only telling you what the COMMON practice is regarding the use of researchers.

Why, if you can't show D'Este used one, this is wild speculation at best, and insulting to D'Este at worst.

When I talk about not wanting to buy Whiting's books, and that I prefer to read other books, I am not just referring to books about Patton. I am referring to history books in general.

If you like to read Whiting, then fine. If everyone on this forum likes to read Whiting's books, fine. I cannot stop you. Buy all of his books you want. Have a Whiting book reading class at the local school if you want.

I merely pointed out what I discovered about Whiting writing under other names, and the types of books he writes.

No, you pointed it out, then used it to attempt to discredit his poor opinion of Patton. That is more than pointing out he has nome de plumes.

If people don't care, then fine - I have no power to stop you or anyone else from reading/buying his books. It's your money and it's your time.

Just don't be surprised if some things you read in his books, conflicts with what other "serious" historians write

We both agree D'Este is a fine "serious" historian who wrote a fine biography. He quotes freely from Whiting. He quotes from Rohmer (from where you get all your Patton uncovered revelations) in order to criticise him. Our D'Este prefers Whiting to Rohmer. Prsumably, you will not return there because serious historians are critical of it.

regards,
Ironduke

I do not disagree, yet I believe (perhaps incorrectly) that Montgomery’s slow purposeful style of battle was better suited to North Africa than the rather pointless blitz of Rommel. Sure those mad dashes that covered thousands of miles looked impressive on the map, but it ignored the realities of logistics in that area. Rommel knew supply was critical, yet repeatedly out run his supply to capture, which in reality was just desert, while depleting his forces. Montgomery would not overextend his forces and allow Rommel the chance to recapture the initiative. By his very nature would have none of that: his advance might be called slow, but it would be irreversible. Operation Torch might speed up the destruction of the Africa Corps, but with or without it General Montgomery was going to slowly grind the German Army into dust.

I feel Montgomery’s abilities and limitations were not well suited for Sicily or France.

There is certainly something to this, although Allied supply difficulties were not nearly as perilous as Rommels. The allies also had command of the sea by the end, so as they retook each major port on the drive west, they would have had a new point from which to draw supply if they did move quickly.

ORIGINAL: IronDuke
In Russia, I think he would have been lost. Without superior numbers, his innate caution would have paralysed him, I think. He might at a pinch have led an infantry army, but never a Panzergroup, and certainly not an Army group.

Perhaps, but let me argue differently.

The German plan for operations inside the Soviet Union were poorly thought out and executed: you either go straight for the Soviet jugular (Moscow) forcing them to defend that object, thus destroying them or you plan on a long campaign. The Germans did neither and got crushed.

Not necessarily, their essential plan was to destroy the bulk of the Red Army in the western theatre of operations, which they did. Their problem was that they woefully underestimated how quickly the Red Army could replace it's losses. That said, I certainly agree with your point that one needed a clear strategy from the beginning and attempting to do first one thing and then the other endangered and then destroyed their chance of doing either (if indeed they ever had a chance).

General Montgomery, if he had planed Barbarossa, would have planned on a multi-year campaign, massive supplies, slowed the advance to keep his troops supplied and from being exposed. A Leningrad/Smolensk/Kiev stop line to allow fortification and resupply for winter, would have preserved the integrity of the German forces and allowed a continuation of a broad front advance in 1942 to Moscow/Rostov… followed by entrenchment/resupply for the winter before continuing in 1943…. Etc.

A good conjecture. I think you are right. The only thing I'd add is that this strategy would never have worked in the long run either, although you paint a convincing picture of how Monty would have attempted it.

regards,
IronDuke

Ironduke:

Aha, so you do have a copy. No excuses for ignoring the bad things he has to say about your good General, then.

And if you have read all 820 pages of D'Este, it is amazing how many good things about Patton you have conveniently ignored [8|]

You don't disappoint me, because because firstly, you've been a little economical with the truth

Careful, my friend. . .[:-]

I am not a suspicious man. This is just as well, as a suspicious man would suggest you were being a little economical with the truth, here, in order to support your point, hoping I had not actually read the book to contradict you. I don't think the moderators would let me get away with any other description for this.

You are stepping close to the edge with me here. . .

Obviously, not only are you calling me a liar, but you are also suggesting I have purposely left out information.

Step up to the plate and be a man and call me what you think I am. . .

I actually found 5 references

Last night I went through ALL 100 pages of footnotes in D'Este's book with a magnifying glass. The print is quite small, and I was a bit tired, so obviously I missed a couple.

That is far cry from calling me what you obviously want to call me [:-]

Since one of the ones you've missed I quoted myself earlier in this thread when I was raising the issue of Whiting being used by D'Este, you give the impression of debating without reading what the opposition are saying to you. This will make sustained and meaningful debate between us difficult. (For the record, Chapter 40, note 23, Page 634).

Ah, and you have read and remembered EVERY word I have written?? [8|]

What is further interesting (and would strain even a mildly suspicious man to breaking point) is exactly which two quotes you've left out.

This is the THIRD time you have implied a disparaging action to me. [:@]

You can argue this falls into the small category, but I (and I would hope most forum readers) don't consider this harmless. Strange you did not see this one.

I will deal with that first quote you have provided below.

But again, you are stepping on very dangerous ground here, my friend, if you are thinking of impinging upon my character. You know absolutely NOTHING about me.

Now, I will deal with the quote you so firmly believe that I lied about and purposely did not include:

Patton's achilles heel (which would be painfully evident later in Lorraine) was that rather than cut his losses, he would attempt to storm his way out of a bad situation in the name of prestige. One of his critics scornfully notes that "the third army's wild rampage through Brittany obscured one central fact - west was precisely the wrong direction...Patton's greatest deficiency as a tank commander was his tendancy to think as a traditional cavalry tactician and to care little what direction he was attacking in, so long as he was attacking." Another biographer has written that Patton was "at his best and most successful only where he could apply his brilliant looose rein cavalry tactics against an already confused and mostly mediocre enemy. This was to be the lesson the Brittany campaign."

First of all, this entire section you have quoted DOES NOT BELONG TO WHITING.

Specifically:

1) The first sentence: "Patton's achilles heel (which would be painfully evident later in Lorraine) was that rather than cut his losses, he would attempt to storm his way out of a bad situation in the name of prestige." This belongs to D'Este himself.

2) The second sentence: "One of his critics scornfully notes that "the third army's wild rampage through Brittany obscured one central fact - west was precisely the wrong direction...Patton's greatest deficiency as a tank commander was his tendancy to think as a traditional cavalry tactician and to care little what direction he was attacking in, so long as he was attacking."" This reference (#22) belongs to Carr, The American Rommel.

3) Finally, ONLY the LAST sentence belongs to Whiting: ". . . Patton was "at his best and most successful only where he could apply his brilliant loose rein cavalry tactics against an already confused and mostly mediocre enemy. This was to be the lesson of the Brittany campaign."" This is reference (#23) from Patton.

So it would appear, my friend, that you, yourself have provided a misleading quote with which you have used to impinge my integrity and my character.

If anything, that last sentence by Whiting only underscores Whiting's criticism of Patton, which I have been saying all along. I would gladly have included it had I noticed it in the footnotes.

The fact that D'Este used that quote, means that D'Este is well aware of the fact that Whiting is a critic and uses him as such.

The second is also interesting. It is particularly strange you missed this one, since you have been collecting quotes from German Officers concerning our General Patton.

I see. So a stamp collector is expected to own all the stamps in the world, too??[8|]

This is note 38, Ch 42 page 669. D'Este reproduces a quote he found in Whiting. I quote:

quote:

Patton's senior opponent, Gen Hermann Balck, the Commander in chief of Army Group G, was scornfully critical. Balck freely admitted that his troops were "motley and bady equipped," and ascribed their success in defending Metz "mainly to the bad and timid leadership of the Americans." It was the most scathing criticism ever levelled at Patton by one of his enemies.

Again, the portion used from Whiting is this sentence: "Balck freely admitted that his troops were "motley and bady equipped," and ascribed their success in defending Metz "mainly to the bad and timid leadership of the Americans."" Reference (#38) in Patton.

The rest is by D'Este, himself.

This quote shows:

First, as I mentioned, it was late and I obviously missed this reference. It was NOT intentional.

Second, this shows D'Este's even-handednes by showing both the good and the bad about Patton.

Third, it underscores that D'Este clearly treats Whiting as a critic of Patton and this also underscores what I have been saying about Whiting. Remember also, that when writing under the pen name Leo Kessler, Whiting writes books glorifying the SS, which was Patton's enemy.

Fourth, the quote from Balck mentions the poor leadership of "the Americans". It does not mention Patton by name. So we can only assume he was referring to Patton. I don't have Whiting's book in question.

Fifth, the reason why Patton was stuck attacking Metz (which was a series of heavily fortified emplacements) is because his units simply ran out of gas just before they reached Metz. At this point Metz WAS ALMOST VOID OF GERMAN SOLDIERS. Rather than giving Patton more gas to continue his drive, supplies were diverted to Monty for Market Garden. As a result of this, the Germans re-groupped, filed back into Metz, and then further fortified Metz. Therefore, for 3 months, Patton was not given proper supplies, and could only attack Metz with infantry and limited armour movement in bad weather.

As for the quotes I provided (see a couple of posts above), the first quote is basically a characature of Patton that D'Este could have found from a number of other books, so it is not all that important that it came from Whiting.

The second quote from Whiting (which is the last part of the paragraph) only illustrates what D'Este, himself, has already concluded about Patton. As I mentioned, Whiting is a critic, and D'Este was able to use him as such. But there are many critics out there, so the quote chosen from Whiting, is nothing new, and is nothing that can't be found in half a dozen other books. In other words, Whiting's quote doesn't reveal anything NEW to us.

The last quote from Whiting (which you don't mention) is simply Patton telling his troops they will fight or die. Again nothing new.

I also should mention that of the four books of Whiting's listed in D'Este's Bibliography, 5 of the quotes come from ONE book (Patton), while only one quote comes from "Patton's Last Battle".

So it seems that only ONE book of Whiting's (out of 4) was of any real use, and even then it was used to illustrate what Patton's critics had to say. Even these criticisms are nothing new.

Finally it also illustrates D'Este's even-handedness in his biography, showing both the good and bad about Patton.

It is unfortunate that the same cannot be said for Whiting's writing about Patton.


Now that that is out of the way, I have a few words to say to you Ironduke:

I have been a member in good standing on this forum for over 4 years. In all that time, I have enjoyed the companionship and discussions with others on a variety of topics. Sometimes discussions became heated; sometimes they were harmonious; but always I enjoyed the discussions. There really is a great bunch of guys here.

Even in this thread, when 4 or more people jumped into the discussion, leaving me all alone to defend myself against them, I tried my best to be honest with them. However, if people treated me flippantly or without respect, then I returned the same to them in kind.

In this thread, I, and I alone, have attempted to represent and defend the memory of General George S. Patton, one of the most maligned, yet misunderstood men, of the past century. A man who is truly worthy of our respect and admiration.

When ganged-up on, I had to use the appropriate tactics (posting books, articles, etc praising Patton). But I was never dishonest, and I always believed in what I posted.

In all the time I have been on this forum, I have sought to represent myself as a decent person, and I have tried my best to be as truthful as I could in discussing matters with others.

Anyone from the UV forum, or who has read the * Must Buy DVD * thread here, I think, can confirm that I am a fair and civil person.

However, in this one post alone you have, three or four times, implied that I am both dishonest and have intentionally falsified information.

I cannot tell you how disappointed I am in your approach, your remarks, and in you.

To attempt to win a discussion by presenting only one side of the issue is one thing, but to impinge my character and integrity to do so (3 times), is going way beyond the limit.

Quite frankly, at this stage I really could care less about continuuing this discussion with you.

Anyway, I have better things to do right now. . .

Von Rom,

Firstly, I apologise for any remarks which offended you. I withdraw any remark which suggests you left the quotes out deliberately. I was overly sarcastic. I was merely frustrated that the two quotes you missed were ones most favourable to my cause, and that as a result of not seeing them, you mistakenly felt that Whiting had not been used by D'Este. Remeber, you used the poor number of quotes to illustrate how little D'Este felt of Whiting. However, I accept your explanation for the omission and apologise.

This however is what frustrates me:

First of all, this entire section you have quoted DOES NOT BELONG TO WHITING.

Specifically:

1) The first sentence: "Patton's achilles heel (which would be painfully evident later in Lorraine) was that rather than cut his losses, he would attempt to storm his way out of a bad situation in the name of prestige." This belongs to D'Este himself.

2) The second sentence: "One of his critics scornfully notes that "the third army's wild rampage through Brittany obscured one central fact - west was precisely the wrong direction...Patton's greatest deficiency as a tank commander was his tendancy to think as a traditional cavalry tactician and to care little what direction he was attacking in, so long as he was attacking."" This reference (#22)belongs to Carr, The American Rommel.

3) Finally, ONLY the LAST sentence belongs to Whiting: ". . .Patton was "at his best and most successful only where he could apply his brilliant looose rein cavalry tactics against an already confused and mostly mediocre enemy. This was to be the lesson the Brittany campaign."" This is reference (#23) from Patton.

So it would appear, my friend, that you, yourself have provided a misleading quote with which you have used to impinge my integrity and my character.

You are making a point criticising me without reading what I have said. If you note from the first time I wrote this, and again the second time I included this the final section was in bold, I make it clear which words are Whitings, I include the others to provide context and show D'Este was making a very general point here most forcefully. If I can quote from the first time I wrote this in this thread:

For those without access to this work, Mr Whiting's words (which Mr D'Este does not contradict but rather presents as evidence), are in bold in the following section quoted verbatim from pg 634 (Harper Collins 1996 paperback edition):

Therefore, do you retract your statement below?:

So it would appear, my friend, that you, yourself have provided a misleading quote with which you have used to impinge my integrity and my character.

As for:

The fact that D'Este used that quote, means that D'Este is well aware of the fact that Whiting is a critic and uses him as such.

It also shows he agreed with it.

Second, this shows D'Este's even-handednes by showing both the good and the bad about Patton.

I have admitted several good things about Patton. I've called him aggressive, I've called him more likely to succeed at Market Garden than Horrocks, I called him a good logistician. I've called him a driver of men.
Up until this point, I don't recall you admitting or accepting anything bad about Patton.

Fourth, the quote from Balck mentions the poor leadership of "the Americans". It does not mention Patton by name. So we can only assume he was referring to Patton. I don't have Whiting's book in question.

I don't accept this. D'Este evidently thought it was aimed at Patton, for (as I quoted) he goes onto say

It was the most scathing criticism ever levelled at Patton by one of his enemies.

Neither of us have read Whiting's book, only D'Este has, so he knew the context of the quote better than either of us and thought it aimed at Patton.

Finally it also illustrates D'Este's even-handedness in his biography, showing both the good and bad about Patton.

It is unfortunate that the same can not be said for Whiting's writing about Patton.

How can you say this when you admit to not having read Whiting's work? We've established D'Este has the good and the bad, why might Whiting not have done the same?

Now that that is out of the way, I have a few words to say to you my friend:

I have been a member in good standing on this forum for over 4 years. In all that time, I have enjoyed the companionship and discussions with others on a variety of topics. Sometimes discussions became heated; sometimes they were harmonious; but always I enjoyed the discussions.

Even in this thread, when 4 or more people jumped into the discussion, leaving me all alone to defend myself against them, I tried my best to be honest with them. However, if people treated me flippantly or without respect, then I returned the same to them in kind.

In all the time I have been on this forum, I have sought to represent myself as a decent person, and I have tried my best to be as truthful as I could in discussing matters with others.

Anyone who has read the * Must Buy DVD * thread, I think, can confirm that I am a civil person.

However, in this one post alone you have, three or four times, implied that I am both dishonest and have intentionally falsified information.

I cannot tell you how disappointed I am in both your approach, your remarks, and in you.

To attempt to win a discussion by presenting only one side of the issue is one thing, but to impinge my character and integrity to do so (3 times), is going way beyond the limit.

Quite frankly, at this stage I really could care less about continuuing this discussion with you.

I do not know you, and so you are right to point this out. I repeat, I withdraw the remarks highlighted above. Please accept they were borne out of a frustration of seeing you go through D'Este as you did, miss (genuinely, I accept) what I considered crucial points, and then post what I considered flawed research in criticism of my argument. It was uncharacteristic of me, I hope you accept my apology. I do not believe I have caused similiar offence in over nine pages of posting, so hope you accept it was a momentary aberration.

However, I feel I owe you honesty in return.

My frustration essentially relates to the way I have felt you have not answered my points in our debate. When I have felt you have been proven wrong (the now infamous 352 argument, position of units at Falaise) you have either continued to claim your position (without evidence, in the 352 argument you just continued to claim "I have shown") or suddenly decided it was not important accusing me of missing the bigger picture. I could quite easily list these points if you would like a final chance to answer them (I would freely answer any specific points you feel I have dodged). However, in these circumstances, where you concede nothing, however precarious your position, it just breeds frustration and cynicism on my part. However, I was wrong to allow that cynicism to spill over the way I did. I was also wrong to imply what I did.

Without this, I agree further debate is futile, as I do not think that any evidence, however good, will change your mind. If others have joined in against you, I believe it is because of reasons like this, I have tried throughout to analyse and present evidence. I do not believe that everyone who turned up to join in the thread was anti-Patton, their merely became it. This is merely my opinion, anyone else in this thread should make up their own minds.

I propose to finish this thread by posting (at some point in the next couple of days) a complete opinion of Patton (strengths and weaknesses). I will cite evidence for everything I write, and allow it to stand as my opinion on the matter. You will be surprised by some of what you read. If you choose to do the same, then anyone in the thread can look at both our posts, assess the analysis, consider the evidence, and make up their own mind.

If not, I hope this experience has not soured us and we can pick up a friendlier debate another time (perhaps over the German combat performance in the early war years which you challenged me over yesterday).

Regards,
IronDuke

von Rom,

In this thread, I, and I alone, have attempted to represent and defend the memory of General George S. Patton, one of the most maligned, yet misunderstood men, of the past century. A man who is truly worthy of our respect and admiration.

Question of point of view I guess. It simply turned that most others posters dont share your views about Patton which were, for me, execessively good for him. Patton was probably not as good you depict him while Bradley and Ike probably better (without speaking of Collins who was likely as good than Patton altough he was never given an army.)

LC

ORIGINAL: IronDuke

Von Rom,

Firstly, I apologise for any remarks which offended you. I withdraw any remark which suggests you left the quotes out deliberately. I was overly sarcastic. I was merely frustrated that the two quotes you missed were ones most favourable to my cause, and that as a result of not seeing them, you mistakenly felt that Whiting had not been used by D'Este. Remeber, you used the poor number of quotes to illustrate how little D'Este felt of Whiting. However, I accept your explanation for the omission and apologise.

This however is what frustrates me:

First of all, this entire section you have quoted DOES NOT BELONG TO WHITING.

Specifically:

1) The first sentence: "Patton's achilles heel (which would be painfully evident later in Lorraine) was that rather than cut his losses, he would attempt to storm his way out of a bad situation in the name of prestige." This belongs to D'Este himself.

2) The second sentence: "One of his critics scornfully notes that "the third army's wild rampage through Brittany obscured one central fact - west was precisely the wrong direction...Patton's greatest deficiency as a tank commander was his tendancy to think as a traditional cavalry tactician and to care little what direction he was attacking in, so long as he was attacking."" This reference (#22)belongs to Carr, The American Rommel.

3) Finally, ONLY the LAST sentence belongs to Whiting: ". . .Patton was "at his best and most successful only where he could apply his brilliant looose rein cavalry tactics against an already confused and mostly mediocre enemy. This was to be the lesson the Brittany campaign."" This is reference (#23) from Patton.

So it would appear, my friend, that you, yourself have provided a misleading quote with which you have used to impinge my integrity and my character.

You are making a point criticising me without reading what I have said. If you note from the first time I wrote this, and again the second time I included this the final section was in bold, I make it clear which words are Whitings, I include the others to provide context and show D'Este was making a very general point here most forcefully. If I can quote from the first time I wrote this in this thread:

For those without access to this work, Mr Whiting's words (which Mr D'Este does not contradict but rather presents as evidence), are in bold in the following section quoted verbatim from pg 634 (Harper Collins 1996 paperback edition):

Therefore, do you retract your statement below?:

So it would appear, my friend, that you, yourself have provided a misleading quote with which you have used to impinge my integrity and my character.

As for:

The fact that D'Este used that quote, means that D'Este is well aware of the fact that Whiting is a critic and uses him as such.

It also shows he agreed with it.

Second, this shows D'Este's even-handednes by showing both the good and the bad about Patton.

I have admitted several good things about Patton. I've called him aggressive, I've called him more likely to succeed at Market Garden than Horrocks, I called him a good logistician. I've called him a driver of men.
Up until this point, I don't recall you admitting or accepting anything bad about Patton.

Fourth, the quote from Balck mentions the poor leadership of "the Americans". It does not mention Patton by name. So we can only assume he was referring to Patton. I don't have Whiting's book in question.

I don't accept this. D'Este evidently thought it was aimed at Patton, for (as I quoted) he goes onto say

It was the most scathing criticism ever levelled at Patton by one of his enemies.

Neither of us have read Whiting's book, only D'Este has, so he knew the context of the quote better than either of us and thought it aimed at Patton.

Finally it also illustrates D'Este's even-handedness in his biography, showing both the good and bad about Patton.

It is unfortunate that the same can not be said for Whiting's writing about Patton.

How can you say this when you admit to not having read Whiting's work? We've established D'Este has the good and the bad, why might Whiting not have done the same?

Now that that is out of the way, I have a few words to say to you my friend:

I have been a member in good standing on this forum for over 4 years. In all that time, I have enjoyed the companionship and discussions with others on a variety of topics. Sometimes discussions became heated; sometimes they were harmonious; but always I enjoyed the discussions.

Even in this thread, when 4 or more people jumped into the discussion, leaving me all alone to defend myself against them, I tried my best to be honest with them. However, if people treated me flippantly or without respect, then I returned the same to them in kind.

In all the time I have been on this forum, I have sought to represent myself as a decent person, and I have tried my best to be as truthful as I could in discussing matters with others.

Anyone who has read the * Must Buy DVD * thread, I think, can confirm that I am a civil person.

However, in this one post alone you have, three or four times, implied that I am both dishonest and have intentionally falsified information.

I cannot tell you how disappointed I am in both your approach, your remarks, and in you.

To attempt to win a discussion by presenting only one side of the issue is one thing, but to impinge my character and integrity to do so (3 times), is going way beyond the limit.

Quite frankly, at this stage I really could care less about continuuing this discussion with you.

I do not know you, and so you are right to point this out. I repeat, I withdraw the remarks highlighted above. Please accept they were borne out of a frustration of seeing you go through D'Este as you did, miss (genuinely, I accept) what I considered crucial points, and then post what I considered flawed research in criticism of my argument. It was uncharacteristic of me, I hope you accept my apology. I do not believe I have caused similiar offence in over nine pages of posting, so hope you accept it was a momentary aberration.

However, I feel I owe you honesty in return.

My frustration essentially relates to the way I have felt you have not answered my points in our debate. When I have felt you have been proven wrong (the now infamous 352 argument, position of units at Falaise) you have either continued to claim your position (without evidence, in the 352 argument you just continued to claim "I have shown") or suddenly decided it was not important accusing me of missing the bigger picture. I could quite easily list these points if you would like a final chance to answer them (I would freely answer any specific points you feel I have dodged). However, in these circumstances, where you concede nothing, however precarious your position, it just breeds frustration and cynicism on my part. However, I was wrong to allow that cynicism to spill over the way I did. I was also wrong to imply what I did.

Without this, I agree further debate is futile, as I do not think that any evidence, however good, will change your mind. If others have joined in against you, I believe it is because of reasons like this, I have tried throughout to analyse and present evidence. I do not believe that everyone who turned up to join in the thread was anti-Patton, their merely became it. This is merely my opinion, anyone else in this thread should make up their own minds.

I propose to finish this thread by posting (at some point in the next couple of days) a complete opinion of Patton (strengths and weaknesses). I will cite evidence for everything I write, and allow it to stand as my opinion on the matter. You will be surprised by some of what you read. If you choose to do the same, then anyone in the thread can look at both our posts, assess the analysis, consider the evidence, and make up their own mind.

If not, I hope this experience has not soured us and we can pick up a friendlier debate another time (perhaps over the German combat performance in the early war years which you challenged me over yesterday).

Regards,
IronDuke

********************************************************

Ironduke:

You are making a point criticising me without reading what I have said. If you note from the first time I wrote this, and again the second time I included this the final section was in bold, I make it clear which words are Whitings, I include the others to provide context and show D'Este was making a very general point here most forcefully. If I can quote from the first time I wrote this in this thread:

With all due respect, but by including that entire quote (most of which does not belong to Whiting) you are giving the reader (who does not own D'Este's book) the FALSE impression that the entire quote belongs to Whiting. If you intented to refer to only the BOLD portion of that quote, you should have informed the reader that that portion, and that portion only, belongs to Whiting.

It also shows he agreed with it.

No, it does not mean D'Este agreed with Whiting's quote. It means he has presented Patton's critics' point of view.

I have admitted several good things about Patton. I've called him aggressive, I've called him more likely to succeed at Market Garden than Horrocks, I called him a good logistician. I've called him a driver of men.
Up until this point, I don't recall you admitting or accepting anything bad about Patton.

That is because you and others have been doing a fine job doing that all on your own. And at times unfairly.

How can you say this when you admit to not having read Whiting's work? We've established D'Este has the good and the bad, why might Whiting not have done the same?

You have Whiting's book "Battle of the Bulge". Post some quotes from that book where Whiting praises Patton.

While you're at it, could you post the reference Whiting uses for that quote you posted a while back about Patton encountering only 3 poor German units when he attacked at the Bulge?

My frustration essentially relates to the way I have felt you have not answered my points in our debate. When I have felt you have been proven wrong (the now infamous 352 argument, position of units at Falaise) you have either continued to claim your position (without evidence, in the 352 argument you just continued to claim "I have shown") or suddenly decided it was not important accusing me of missing the bigger picture. I could quite easily list these points if you would like a final chance to answer them (I would freely answer any specific points you feel I have dodged). However, in these circumstances, where you concede nothing, however precarious your position, it just breeds frustration and cynicism on my part. However, I was wrong to allow that cynicism to spill over the way I did. I was also wrong to imply what I did.

I accept your apology.

As to the 352nd debate:

If you become frustrated when someone else does not share your point of view, then I think you may need to step back for a few minutes and take a few deep breaths. Not everyone in life is going to agree with your opinions.

I did not pursue the 352nd debate simply because I felt it to be an unfair line of debate.

Why?

Because you latch onto things; often small things, which really do not matter in the larger picture.

In other words: You fail to place things into perspective.

Understand?

Anyone, if they have made up their mind to do so, can easily rip apart ANY action or any general, if they choose to do so.

It is clearly evident that this is what you have chosen to do with Patton.

However, I try to balance that view by considering ALL the evidence.

You, however, have chosen to destroy Patton by focusing ONLY on the critics' points while totally ignoring the valid explanations, or even bothering to understand Patton.

It's called having perspective.

The debate over the 352nd is just one example of that approach of yours.


Let's look at the Ardennes for a moment:

The 352nd was not made up of old men. Many soldiers in this unit were from other disbanded infantry divisions. It had the benefit of the knowledge of 5 years' of proven German fighting experience; it was led by experienced officers; it still had good morale. Finally, it had the benefit of the surprise attack. Granted, it wasn't the best German unit. But it certainly wasn't a rag-tag bunch of misfits, either.

Hitler committed a large proportion of all the tank, aircraft and weapon production from 1944 to this Ardennes Offensive. There were 250,000 Germans attacking, by surprise, an ill-prepared American position.

In contrast, the Americans, whom they were attacking, were there resting, and were relatively inexperienced and unprepared.

The three divisions from Third Army (many men had some experience, but many were also inexperienced) had to disengage from the enemy, turn 90 degrees north, travel 100 miles in 48 hours in terrible winter weather and on icy roads and, without the benefit of sleep, hot food or rest, they had to fight an enemy that was prepared to fight, and knew how to fight.

I think this tends to even things out a bit.

Third Army suffered 50,000 casualties in some tough fighting during the Battle of the Bulge. Clearly, someone was firing back at them [;)]

As I previously mentioned, you present only one tiny side of the picture - with the 352nd being only one example of this - and then twist it into some sort of conclusion as to Patton's command abilities.

You will search high and low to find one little speck that you will twist to suit your conclusions, yet ignore a mountain of evidence that gives you a more balanced view of an action or an event.

Metz is another excellent example:

You, along with most of the critics jump on Patton's bloody battles here to show he was a poor general.

What you and Whiting conveniently leave out of the picture, is the fact that Patton was stopped outside of Metz because he ran out of gas. He was then denied gas and proper supplies for THREE MONTHS, so he was unable to maneuver around Metz.

His limited supplies meant severely restricting Third Army's use of ammo, artillery shells, food, gas, etc, which all had a detrimental effect on his performance at Metz. In addition, the weather was lousy. This lousy weather meant limited air support. This lousy weather also caused 18,000 cases of trench foot, flu, etc which helped to reduce Third Army's effectiveness.

The fact that he was denied gas meant that the Germans could then re-group and then man positions in the heavily fortified Metz fortifications.

Denying gas to Third Army was almost bordering on the criminal, since what Patton could have captured at little cost (Metz), he now had to take by assault (with infantry), costing soldiers their lives.

So you see, when placed in perspective, the situation at Metz, rather than indicating poor generalship on Patton's part, instead indicates poor generalship and decision-making on the part of the Allied High Command.

But most critics, such as yourself, leave this type of explanation out when looking at Metz.

I could go on and on about example after example. But I fear it would be of no use, since you are absolutely determined to drive a stake into Patton's memory.

ORIGINAL: Ludovic Coval

von Rom,

In this thread, I, and I alone, have attempted to represent and defend the memory of General George S. Patton, one of the most maligned, yet misunderstood men, of the past century. A man who is truly worthy of our respect and admiration.

Question of point of view I guess. It simply turned that most others posters dont share your views about Patton which were, for me, execessively good for him. Patton was probably not as good you depict him while Bradley and Ike probably better (without speaking of Collins who was likely as good than Patton altough he was never given an army.)

LC

I never judge the correctness of an issue simply by the number of people lined up behind it.

I hope I have more courage and morale fibre than that.

There are over 10,000 members on this forum, yet only 4 or 5 have stated they were against Patton. I don't think the numbers justify your conclusion.

If the rightness of an issue depended on just numbers alone, then clearly Galileo (only ONE person who believed the world was round) was clearly wrong, when he was confronted by ALL the Religious and Civil Authorities (who declared the world was flat).

Have a nice day [:)]

Ironduke:

I am also looking forward to seeing your indepth analysis and explanations about the so-called "brilliant" German BlitzKrieg victories against their inferior opponents between Sept 1939 to Jan 1942.

Cheers!

*** NEWS ITEM ***


PATTON SECOND YANK GIVEN VERDUN MEDAL; PERSHING ONLY OTHER


Metz, France, Nov. 25 -(AP)-

General George S. Patton, former U.S. Third Army Commander, today received the Medal of Verdun, an honor accorded to only one other American, General of the Armies John J. Pershing. The award was part of the military and civil ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Third Army's liberation of Metz and surrounding towns.

Patton was made an honorary citizen of Metz, Thionville, Toul, Verdun, Sarreguemines, and the City of Luxembourg. The U.S. Twentieth Corps Commander, Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, was made an honorary citizen of Thionville.

General Walker gave a cowboy hat to the Mayor of Metz, in the name of the City of Dallas, Texas.

Regarding The Battle of Metz

When Patton died, an “official history” was agreed upon and corroborated by Bradley, Eisenhower and Montgomery. They blamed each other for various aspects, but in the main part "fudged the truth" about the true cause of each’s largest disasters: Market Garden, Caen, Hurtgen, the Battle of the Bulge, the failure to capture Berlin, the failure to keep all of the armies supplied, the failure to take Prague, the failure to close off the Falaise Gap and seal the fate of the 11 German divisions trapped there; each had an “official” cause, an “official” whipping boy. Documents from each of these episodes were fudged while others were removed, destroyed and tampered with; and the generals corroborated each others stories in their memoirs.

The reason why the generals cooperated so well on this issue was because each of them had made mistakes. Each had committed an atrocious disaster which they felt had to be kept from public knowledge. Only one general, Patton, had never lost thousands of men on a hopelessly mismanaged mission. If a spiteful general were to bring up the Battle of Metz, the Third’s most bloody battle, Patton could counter that there were 3 dead Germans to 1 dead American, even in that desperate battle. And the Battle for Metz would never be investigated because investigation would only uncover the damning evidence of SHAEF’s decision to starve Third Army of supplies, and Com Z’s negligence and wastefulness in keeping the armies supplied.

von Rom,

There are over 10,000 members on this forum, yet only 4 or 5 have stated they were against Patton. I don't think the numbers justify your conclusion.

Obviously my conclusion were not that others poster (i.e those who posted in *this* thread) are right or false but that, as you pointed out, you were alone (posting) on *your* side.

Have a nice day

Thanks, you too [;)]

LC

ORIGINAL: Ludovic Coval

von Rom,

There are over 10,000 members on this forum, yet only 4 or 5 have stated they were against Patton. I don't think the numbers justify your conclusion.

Obviously my conclusion were not that others poster (i.e those who posted in *this* thread) are right or false but that, as you pointed out, you were alone (posting) on *your* side.

Have a nice day

Thanks, you too [;)]

LC

Hi [:)]

Well, it's mostly been Ironduke who has been posting for the opposing side, so it looks as though he is also all alone. [;)]

Usually, when a thread hits page 5 new-comers, etc hate to jump into an on-going debate.

I'm the same way - too messy [:'(]

Actually, I'm having a grand 'ol time - enjoying it very much. [:D]

Thanks for stopping by [;)]

You have a nice day now.

Cheers!

I tend to argue with youre opinion of Patton. Compared to Montgomery the panzy, Patton was the greatest thing since sliced bread. Montgomery tended to quibble about his name getting in the paper and how prestigious he and his army were. Patton did not care at all about the politics and red tape. He wanted to end Nazi Germany as quickly as possible and his tactics, while unorthodox and dangerous, saved ultimately a lot of lives by doing just as the Germans had done, advance quickly and smash the opposition into the ground. He was certainly no amateur and he didnt care whether or not his men hated him, he just wanted them to fight. At that time, there was no other general that could have, or even attempted to drive the Germans back after their attacks during the Battle of the Bulge, he moved swiftly and decisively. Thats a lot better than Montgomery, who was winning against the Germans, but if he had been in overall command, the war would not have ended until 1960 (save the Russians)

ORIGINAL: paspunxra

I tend to argue with youre opinion of Patton. Compared to Montgomery the panzy, Patton was the greatest thing since sliced bread. Montgomery tended to quibble about his name getting in the paper and how prestigious he and his army were. Patton did not care at all about the politics and red tape. He wanted to end Nazi Germany as quickly as possible and his tactics, while unorthodox and dangerous, saved ultimately a lot of lives by doing just as the Germans had done, advance quickly and smash the opposition into the ground. He was certainly no amateur and he didnt care whether or not his men hated him, he just wanted them to fight. At that time, there was no other general that could have, or even attempted to drive the Germans back after their attacks during the Battle of the Bulge, he moved swiftly and decisively. Thats a lot better than Montgomery, who was winning against the Germans, but if he had been in overall command, the war would not have ended until 1960 (save the Russians)

paspunxra:

So true.

Patton saw first-hand the horrors of trench warfare in WW1.

That is why he vowed that an army must always be on the attack. Once you have your enemy off-balance, you must keep attacking him so he can't re-group.

Many of Patton's problems occurred when higher Allied Commanders interferred with his operations. Denying Third Army gas and supplies when he reached Metz is just one example.

This is also hard to fathom especially when you consider the astonishing record of success Patton and Third Army had achieved previous to this.

Both the Germans and Patton criticized the Allied Commanders for their timidity. By being cautious; by trying to prevent high Allied casualties; these same commanders caused high casualties.

Again, the example of Metz, where Patton could have easily secured it with few casualties if he had been given the fuel he requested. As a result of NOT getting the proper supplies, Third Army suffered terribly, especially in the very bad weather. According to Patton, Trenchfoot alone was causing more casualties among his men than the Germans. He cursed the boots the GIs were given and tried on numerous occasions to get proper foot wear for his men.

Ironduke:

You are making a point criticising me without reading what I have said. If you note from the first time I wrote this, and again the second time I included this the final section was in bold, I make it clear which words are Whitings, I include the others to provide context and show D'Este was making a very general point here most forcefully. If I can quote from the first time I wrote this in this thread:

Von Rom

With all due respect, but by including that entire quote (most of which does not belong to Whiting) you are giving the reader (who does not own D'Este's book) the FALSE impression that the entire quote belongs to Whiting. If you intented to refer to only the BOLD portion of that quote, you should have informed the reader that that portion, and that portion only, belongs to Whiting.

This is more frustration for me, Von Rom, and I think evidence for why this whole debate has turned sour. Anyone who read the thread this quote was taken from will know you've missed a crucial part of what I said out.

For those without access to this work, Mr Whiting's words (which Mr D'Este does not contradict but rather presents as evidence), are in bold in the following section quoted verbatim from pg 634 (Harper Collins 1996 paperback edition):

I tell people Whiting's words are in bold, I write it in bold, and now you tell me I was attempting to give a false impression????? The truth is staring all thread users in the face, and you still insist on saying the complete opposite is true!

I said:

It also shows he agreed with it.

You said:

No, it does not mean D'Este agreed with Whiting's quote. It means he has presented Patton's critics' point of view.

Von Rom, you have a phrase you use fairly frequently, I've used it in the section below.

When historians write books, they take the evidence and form an opinion. They then marshall the evidence to prove their opinion. (This isn't as evident on websites). When they quote, they do for one of two reasons and two reasons only. Firstly, they quote it to knock it down. Such as D'Este did to your Patton uncovered website in "Decision in Normandy". They quote and then they say "ah, but what this guy hasn't taken into account is..."

The other occasion is when they use someone else's words to describe or highlight something, because they agree with it, and know that the point has been made elsewhere, and by quoting rather than just restating the point, they give it extra weight because they prove other historians agree with them. Alternatively, it may be something outside their sphere of influence and they quote it because the historian is a recognised leader in that field. Did you not know this?

In this case, Whiting's reputation doesn't outshine D'Este, so he has quoted because he agrees with him. D'Este is writing a history, it is an interpretive history where he doesn't just tell you what Patton did, but why he did it, and whether it was any good. He would not quote something unless he either wanted to agree with it, or disagree with it. It is a reasonable assumption that he agrees with Whiting's quote because he did not qualify it in any way whatsoever.

I said:

I have admitted several good things about Patton. I've called him aggressive, I've called him more likely to succeed at Market Garden than Horrocks, I called him a good logistician. I've called him a driver of men.
Up until this point, I don't recall you admitting or accepting anything bad about Patton.

You said:

That is because you and others have been doing a fine job doing that all on your own. And at times unfairly.

Von Rom, another frustrating literary device. Refusing to admit something because of a reason like this is silly. Tell us what you feel, it will improve your impact in this thread if you show your view is balanced. I've tried as the list above shows.

I said:

How can you say this when you admit to not having read Whiting's work? We've established D'Este has the good and the bad, why might Whiting not have done the same?

You said:

You have Whiting's book "Battle of the Bulge". Post some quotes from that book where Whiting praises Patton.

I have two quotes, although not from Whiting, they were made in this thread:

Do I have to find everything for you?

Do some reading. . .

and

And no I am not doing any investigation.

Pretty frustrating isn't it? I can vouch for this.

While you're at it, could you post the reference Whiting uses for that quote you posted a while back about Patton encountering only 3 poor German units when he attacked at the Bulge?

Why would he reference it? Patton said of the three units he took: "Bradley, my best three divisions are 4th Armoured, the 80th and the 26th." Patton's own words.

The units in 352 Volksgrenadier Divisions Corp were 5th Parachute (which wasn't actually a parachute division anymore as it had been destroyed in Normandy and rebuilt from surplus Luftwaffe ground crew) and 79th Volksgrenadier which certainly wasn't rebuilt from veterans because the previous 79th was destroyed (1 man living to tell the tale). It was formed from the 586th Volksgrenadiers. The sources are Nafziger and Mitcham. The same people I used to illustrate the 352nd contained no combat veterans.

Some of these units actually performed creditably despite their various deficiencies.

I said:

My frustration essentially relates to the way I have felt you have not answered my points in our debate. When I have felt you have been proven wrong (the now infamous 352 argument, position of units at Falaise) you have either continued to claim your position (without evidence, in the 352 argument you just continued to claim "I have shown") or suddenly decided it was not important accusing me of missing the bigger picture. I could quite easily list these points if you would like a final chance to answer them (I would freely answer any specific points you feel I have dodged). However, in these circumstances, where you concede nothing, however precarious your position, it just breeds frustration and cynicism on my part. However, I was wrong to allow that cynicism to spill over the way I did. I was also wrong to imply what I did.

You said:

As to the 352nd debate:

If you become frustrated when someone else does not share your point of view, then I think you may need to step back for a few minutes and take a few deep breaths. Not everyone in life is going to agree with your opinions.

I did not pursue the 352nd debate simply because I felt it to be an unfair line of debate.

Why?

Because you latch onto things; often small things, which really do not matter in the larger picture.

In other words: You fail to place things into perspective.

Understand?

Frankly no. This is just frustration for me. Unable to admit you are wrong, you decide instead to change the whole line of argument on the point (which remember originally started because you claimed the unit was made up of combat veterans - without naming a single source to illustrate this). Why is it unfair if I ask you to prove an assertion you make?

Not everyone will agree with my opinion, but the make up of the 352 is a matter of fact, not opinion. If you refuse to accept my facts, how can we believe you would ever accept any argument of mine, no matter how overwhelming, well referenced and incisive? Other forum readers will have to decide whether
this answer of yours is fair, whether it means you now concede the point about 352 but can not admit it, or whether you are right, and I am failing to put things into perspective. I freely admit I don't understand how we get from an argument over a German VG division into one about perspective. It's simple enough to me, you either stand by your comment it was a formation of veterans, or you don't?

Anyone, if they have made up their mind to do so, can easily rip apart ANY action or any general, if they choose to do so.

Nonsense. Some campaigns stand the test of time. Some battles are so brilliant (for historians, not those who fought them) that they can not be undermined. Try finding someone who thinks Napoleon messed up at Austerlitz and got lucky. Try finding someone who thinks Lee fought a poor battle at Chancellorsville.
While you're at it, (because it will be relevant later) try finding someone who criticises the German victory in the west in 1940. Or rather, try finding some one else, as you've posted your thoughts as to why it was lucky. All Leaders can be criticised as few have perfect careers, but not all actions can be criticised, far from it

It is clearly evident that this is what you have chosen to do with Patton.

However, I try to balance that view by considering ALL the evidence.

If so, how come you're yet to post any evidence as to Patton's weaknesses?????

You, however, have chosen to destroy Patton by focusing ONLY on the critics' points while totally ignoring the valid explanations, or even bothering to understand Patton.

I understand him, it's why I have reservations about him.

It's called having perspective.

The debate over the 352nd is just one example of that approach of yours.

I insist that facts used to support arguments are correct, or at least as correct as we can know. If this is an approach you don't like, I can't help that.

Let's look at the Ardennes for a moment:

The 352nd was not made up of old men. Many soldiers in this unit were from other disbanded infantry divisions. It had the benefit of the knowledge of 5 years' of proven German fighting experience; it was led by experienced officers; it still had good morale. Finally, it had the benefit of the surprise attack. Granted, it wasn't the best German unit. But it certainly wasn't a rag-tag bunch of misfits, either.

[&:]You make it easy for me some times. Once again, unreferenced, we have the story about the 352.

The 352nd was not made up of old men. Many soldiers in this unit were from other disbanded infantry divisions.

For the benefit of the forum, I will once more demolish this with references.

Nafziger "The German order of battle: Infantry in World War II" Page 310.

Formed as part of the 32nd wave on 21 September 1944. from the 581st Volksgrenadier Division (32nd wave).

If any other forum user has this book, I'd appreciate it if you'd confirm my quote for Von Rom. Likewise for the others.

Samuel Mitcham "Hitler's Legions: German Army order of battle: World War II"

It was reconstituted as a separate division in August [1944] and was rebuilt as a Volksgrenadier unit in the Schleswig-Holstein area of Germany"

In case you're thinking, well he doesn't say it didn't have combat veterans, Mitcham has this to say about the neighbouring 353rd Division.

Cadres from the veteran 328th Infantry division were used to form this division in October 1943.

So, Mr Mitcham knows and tells us when veterans were involved in a division's creation, and doesn't say anything when they weren't.

Ah, I hear you cry, maybe the 581st had veterans in it? So I looked up the 581st.

Created in the 32nd mobilisation wave, the 581st Grenadier was not allowed to complete it's training.

Probably not....

Finally, Charles B MacDonald. "The Battle of the Bulge". I remember you stating you used reviews to help you decide whether to read something. Here's one: "Mr MacDonald...unarguably knows it all and gets it right."

He said:

"Reconstructed almost from scratch with a great influx of Luftwaffe and Navy replacements to a strength of 13000. The division was poorly trained and lacked experienced offices."

Now, I can't force you to admit you are wrong, I can however post all the information I have and invite other forum readers to make up their own mind.

Hitler committed a large proportion of all the tank, aircraft and weapon production from 1944 to this Ardennes Offensive. There were 250,000 Germans attacking, by surprise, an ill-prepared American position.

The relevance of this to Patton? None of the ill-prepared troops belonged to him. The vast majority of these 250 000 Germans didn't stand in his way as he set off the Bulge either.

In contrast, the Americans, whom they were attacking, were there resting, and were relatively inexperienced and unprepared.

None of who'm belonged to Patton or were used by Patton. His troops were experienced as per his own words.

The three divisions from Third Army (many men had some experience, but many were also inexperienced)

Patton thought them his best. 4th Armoured and 80th Inf arrived in Normandy in early August and fought across France, into Lorraine etc. 26th arrived in Early Sept and went into action in early October fighting in october and November before joining the battle in the Ardennes. You can say replacements may have been inexperienced, but the majority had seen combat, in some cases a good deal of combat.

had to disengage from the enemy, turn 90 degrees north, travel 100 miles in 48 hours in terrible winter weather and on icy roads and, without the benefit of sleep, hot food or rest, they had to fight an enemy that was prepared to fight, and knew how to fight.

A magnificent achievement by the men of third Army. One of the better achievements of western Allied arms in Europe during World War II. I've previously said Patton was an exellent Logistician and knew how to motivate men. Even if it was Koch (?) who thought the Germans likely to attack in the north, Patton deserves credit for ordering plans be made on the strength of Koch's hunch. I don't accept he was some form of operational Genius, though, having achieved this miracle of manouvre, he fought a poor battle when the shooting started.

The only part of your quote that I'd argue is in error is the last bit. Some of the men facing Patton didn't know how to fight. Elsewhere in the Bulge facing Hodges, there were Germans who still knew how to fight well, less so in front of Patton's drive on Bastogne.

I think this tends to even things out a bit.

In terms of the Bulge, less so for Patton, because some of the things you cite didn't apply to him, but to elsewhere in the Bulge.

Third Army suffered 50,000 casualties in some tough fighting during the Battle of the Bulge. Clearly, someone was firing back at them [;)]

Undoubtedley, they fought for several weeks.

As I previously mentioned, you present only one tiny side of the picture - with the 352nd being only one example of this - and then twist it into some sort of conclusion as to Patton's command abilities.

You will search high and low to find one little speck that you will twist to suit your conclusions, yet ignore a mountain of evidence that gives you a more balanced view of an action or an event.

You will present a mountain of evidence that is often wrong, (eg 352) is usually not relevant (EG most of the stuff about the bulge), and comes from poor sources (Patton fansites and that book about Corporate leadership for example).

Metz is another excellent example:

You, along with most of the critics jump on Patton's bloody battles here to show he was a poor general.

What you and Whiting conveniently leave out of the picture, is the fact that Patton was stopped outside of Metz because he ran out of gas. He was then denied gas and proper supplies for THREE MONTHS, so he was unable to maneuver around Metz.

His limited supplies meant severely restricting Third Army's use of ammo, artillery shells, food, gas, etc, which all had a detrimental effect on his performance at Metz. In addition, the weather was lousy. This lousy weather meant limited air support. This lousy weather also caused 18,000 cases of trench foot, flu, etc which helped to reduce Third Army's effectiveness.

The fact that he was denied gas meant that the Germans could then re-group and then man positions in the heavily fortified Metz fortifications.

Denying gas to Third Army was almost bordering on the criminal, since what Patton could have captured at little cost (Metz), he now had to take by assault (with infantry), costing soldiers their lives.

So you see, when placed in perspective, the situation at Metz, rather than indicating poor generalship on Patton's part, instead indicates poor generalship and decision-making on the part of the Allied High Command.

But most critics, such as yourself, leave this type of explanation out when looking at Metz.

I was hoping we could get onto Metz at some point. Firstly, lets see exactly what you are saying: The story goes that Patton could have taken Metz easily had he been given the gas to reach it when it was undefended in late August and early September.

This I freely concede, had Patton arrived outside it with no Germans inside it, he would have inflicted a heavy defeat on the Germans.

The story continues that Patton was then forced to fight in poor weather, against strong defences, with no gas.

All very true, apart from the the very first bit "Patton was then forced to fight".

What the Patton homepage ignores about this battle is that it was completely unnecessary. Think of this. You're facing tough fortified positions, you've limited ammo and gas, the weather is so poor, your soldiers have trenchfoot in massive numbers. The weather is so poor, it's hard for your infantry to move, much less vehicles, and air cover is restricted.

Military commonsense dictates you stop. It doesn't insist you plough forward throwing unit after unit into a grim attritional battle without the necessary support to get the job done. Some thoughts from Carlo D'Este's excellent biography of Patton(the one point on which we all seem to agree) will serve to illustrate the point.

Patton's years of study ought to have convinced him of the folly of siege warfare in the hostile environment of a place like Lorraine, which he knew well from first hand experience in 1918. Between his frustration at third army's dilemma and his insistence that he could win the war single handed if given the means, the attacks on Fortress Metz went forward. Yet he seemed reluctant to accept the fact that the great pursuit had ended and he now faced circumstances of "Too little gas and too many Germans, not enough ammo and more than enough rain." Patton's later claims that in Lorraine he had held them by the nose and kicked them in the rear end rang hollow.

In other words, no Military Commander should have fought in Lorraine in those circumstances. It made no military common sense, yet Patton chose to fight anyway, not least because as D'Este points out

Patton wanted to present Metz to Marshall as a trophy during his impending visit to third army.

He wasn't being ordered to attack, Bradley ordered him to halt them. "For God's sake, George, lay off."

Yet after stopping them (after this plea from Bradley), he later restarted them throwing green units into the fray this time, using the excuse that they needed blooding. All green units have to be introduced into combat. But the wise commander does it, where possible, in circumstances that are favourable, as no unit learns anything getting slaughtered. These attacks were unnecessary, the conditions were (as you point out, Von Rom) dreadful, so why on earth did he mount the attacks in the first place??? He wasn't ordered to.

I could go on and on about example after example. But I fear it would be of no use, since you are absolutely determined to drive a stake into Patton's memory.

If your examples are all like this, then I would not post them either, as it does your case no good.

Respect and regards,
IronDuke

ORIGINAL: Von Rom

Regarding The Battle of Metz

When Patton died, an “official history” was agreed upon and corroborated by Bradley, Eisenhower and Montgomery. They blamed each other for various aspects, but in the main part "fudged the truth" about the true cause of each’s largest disasters: Market Garden, Caen, Hurtgen, the Battle of the Bulge, the failure to capture Berlin, the failure to keep all of the armies supplied, the failure to take Prague, the failure to close off the Falaise Gap and seal the fate of the 11 German divisions trapped there; each had an “official” cause, an “official” whipping boy. Documents from each of these episodes were fudged while others were removed, destroyed and tampered with; and the generals corroborated each others stories in their memoirs.

The reason why the generals cooperated so well on this issue was because each of them had made mistakes. Each had committed an atrocious disaster which they felt had to be kept from public knowledge. Only one general, Patton, had never lost thousands of men on a hopelessly mismanaged mission. If a spiteful general were to bring up the Battle of Metz, the Third’s most bloody battle, Patton could counter that there were 3 dead Germans to 1 dead American, even in that desperate battle. And the Battle for Metz would never be investigated because investigation would only uncover the damning evidence of SHAEF’s decision to starve Third Army of supplies, and Com Z’s negligence and wastefulness in keeping the armies supplied.

I've seen this about three times before in this thread. I'll say what I said the last time. It is fantasy to suggest that Monty and Ike and Bradley made a pact in this way. Monty resented Ike, Ike was infuriated by Monty, Bradley felt betrayed by Ike and detested Monty. Monty blamed everone else for everything, he would never have made any kind of pact. Ike became President of the US, yet here is decried as a man hiding his mistakes in a seedy way.

This is from the Pattonhomepage, and yet you present it as some sort of unbiased comment. Where is the evidence? Where were the meetings? Where is the correspondence to show this? The fact is there isn't any, so overactive imaginations seeking to glorify Patton at everybody else's expense make stuff up like this knowing that it is as hard to prove a conspiracy wrong as it is to prove a conspiracy right. You can say what you like, tag it with the word conspiracy, and sit back smugly knowing that people might swallow it because "It's a conspiracy".

Regards in exasperation,
IronDuke