RE: How to judge Japan's attack without the benefit of hindsight?
Posted: Mon Aug 09, 2010 8:12 am
The US granted a plan to increase the 5-3-3 ratio in major combatants to 10-5-3 (US-UK-IJN) in 1944 a couple of months
before the war started. (could be that I´m wrong on the latter numbers, I´m at work now so cannot take a look).
Restrictions were already put on Japanese economy as early as 1939, which at that time already relied heavily on imports (IIRC they had to import about
80% of tungsten, rubber and oil from areas such as the DEI´s and the US - at least before the trade embargo was in effect because of
their China adventure).
The US condition for reentering a trade agreement with Japan was retreat to their pre-1937 borders which was deemed unacceptable.
The close distance to the Phillippines which had the potential of growing into a US military bastion soon was a threat to any southern expansion.
It is plausable that they decided to strike now, not later, and to eliminate the US Pac Fleet as a militarey threat even though there were always doubts that
a sustained war could be won. The outlook to try something similar later would have looked even bleaker.
All in all Japan was a country just recently emerging as an industrialized nation but acting like a major power, with many social and economical elements still not far away
from a middle age rural society. Their economy could not sutain their population.
Happened often enough in history that such factors combined ended in war.
before the war started. (could be that I´m wrong on the latter numbers, I´m at work now so cannot take a look).
Restrictions were already put on Japanese economy as early as 1939, which at that time already relied heavily on imports (IIRC they had to import about
80% of tungsten, rubber and oil from areas such as the DEI´s and the US - at least before the trade embargo was in effect because of
their China adventure).
The US condition for reentering a trade agreement with Japan was retreat to their pre-1937 borders which was deemed unacceptable.
The close distance to the Phillippines which had the potential of growing into a US military bastion soon was a threat to any southern expansion.
It is plausable that they decided to strike now, not later, and to eliminate the US Pac Fleet as a militarey threat even though there were always doubts that
a sustained war could be won. The outlook to try something similar later would have looked even bleaker.
All in all Japan was a country just recently emerging as an industrialized nation but acting like a major power, with many social and economical elements still not far away
from a middle age rural society. Their economy could not sutain their population.
Happened often enough in history that such factors combined ended in war.