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Nemo,

what's happening in your AE war ? Please keep us informed...

Hartwig

Well we've played a couple of turns. The biggest news really is as follows:

1. B17s, LB30s and B 24s don't need escorts at all.

2. The CD routine is not working as was historical but it is broken in a predictable and reliable way and thus cam be compensated for. I ran a little in-game test with three TFs, one comprising 2 BBs only, one comprising CAs, CLs and lots of DDs and another comprising BBs plus escorts.

End result. BB only TF had 1 BB trashed and only took out two enemy guns. Escorted BBs set to escorts do not bombard did poorly also and BBs rook too many hits, DD TF took very little damage ( 1 CA on fire, total of under twenty hits vs about eighty hits on the two unescorted TFs ) Nd took out twenty defending enemy guns and trashed the airfield and defending troops.

So, overall, I tried three solutions against a single island on the same day. CL TF went in first then unescorted BBs then escorted BBs. The Cl/DD TF took the least damage and destroyed the most guns. So if sending in shipping set escorts to Bo bard and load up on he fast small ships which can dodge a bit.

3. Wotje fell. I shot down quite a few more Netties and Zeroes than I lost over the Marshalls.

4. Beating up of the IJA Imperial Division continues. I got one to two odds in japans favour but still managed to destroy many more squads than I lost. Gonna keep the pressure up here.

5. Still no sign of KB. Unloading of forces in the aleutians continues and netties sank a DD here today. Not much else of note.

The CD findings are conclusive, non-confounding and consistent with the identified flaw in the CD system working itself out in he game results. As such they can be allowed for and worked around.

2. The CD routine is not working as was historical but it is broken in a predictable and reliable way and thus cam be compensated for. I ran a little in-game test with three TFs, one comprising 2 BBs only, one comprising CAs, CLs and lots of DDs and another comprising BBs plus escorts.

End result. BB only TF had 1 BB trashed and only took out two enemy guns. Escorted BBs set to escorts do not bombard did poorly also and BBs rook too many hits, DD TF took very little damage ( 1 CA on fire, total of under twenty hits vs about eighty hits on the two unescorted TFs ) Nd took out twenty defending enemy guns and trashed the airfield and defending troops.

So, overall, I tried three solutions against a single island on the same day. CL TF went in first then unescorted BBs then escorted BBs. The Cl/DD TF took the least damage and destroyed the most guns. So if sending in shipping set escorts to Bo bard and load up on he fast small ships which can dodge a bit.

Yes, it could be worse, but being a BB fanboy, I'm not happy with the situation. It sounds very much like the only thing slow BB's are good for is as part of transport TF's to soak up air attacks and the occasional SCTF that gets in among the merchies.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121

Well we've played a couple of turns. The biggest news really is as follows:

1. B17s, LB30s and B 24s don't need escorts at all.

2. The CD routine is not working as was historical but it is broken in a predictable and reliable way and thus cam be compensated for. I ran a little in-game test with three TFs, one comprising 2 BBs only, one comprising CAs, CLs and lots of DDs and another comprising BBs plus escorts.

End result. BB only TF had 1 BB trashed and only took out two enemy guns. Escorted BBs set to escorts do not bombard did poorly also and BBs rook too many hits, DD TF took very little damage ( 1 CA on fire, total of under twenty hits vs about eighty hits on the two unescorted TFs ) Nd took out twenty defending enemy guns and trashed the airfield and defending troops.

So, overall, I tried three solutions against a single island on the same day. CL TF went in first then unescorted BBs then escorted BBs. The Cl/DD TF took the least damage and destroyed the most guns. So if sending in shipping set escorts to Bo bard and load up on he fast small ships which can dodge a bit.

3. Wotje fell. I shot down quite a few more Netties and Zeroes than I lost over the Marshalls.

4. Beating up of the IJA Imperial Division continues. I got one to two odds in japans favour but still managed to destroy many more squads than I lost. Gonna keep the pressure up here.

5. Still no sign of KB. Unloading of forces in the aleutians continues and netties sank a DD here today. Not much else of note.

The CD findings are conclusive, non-confounding and consistent with the identified flaw in the CD system working itself out in he game results. As such they can be allowed for and worked around.

is this whilst the CA/CL/DDs are in a transport TF providing shore cover or when the TF is actually set to a bombard mission?

Set to bombard missions. All test were conducted with ships in bombardment TFs. FWIW the BB in the BB TF which got trashed and had 50 sys and 50 fires eventually rose up to 90 fires and then sank while docked in Roi-Namur. So far enemy naval activity has sunk 2 USN BBs and the smallish CD guns at Wotje and Maloelap have sunk 1 apiece.

A few days have passed. Allied PBYs are beginning strikes on enemy shipping around the DEI and are hitting a ship a day on average. Enemy CVs still remain hidden having intervened in neither the Pacific nor the DEI. The USN has largely withdrawn from action to repair at PH or CONUSA before being redeployed to their new theatre while Allied BFs, AAA units and CD units ( the 2nd wave of forces basically ) are unloading at or making their way towards the Marshalls. I have about 500 planes in the Marshalls area and while the IJN Zeroes and IJAAF Oscars continue to take a toll that toll is pretty much at a rate of 1:1. Since my airfields are overstacked I'm quite happy to allow 5 or 6 fighters to get downed a day as that trains my pilots and helps decrease my overstacking.

In other news: ANother 20 IJA units are making for Sian via the northern route. Soon the IJA will have 4,000 AV available and will try to push me out. They may even succeed. This is what Mike wanted when he asked for the freedom to redeploy units from Manchuria into China without paying PP. It is a gain for him in China but a major gain for me in Thailand/Burma.



I want to talk about the perils of aggression and what a pity it is that unfettered aggression is often mistaken for good play. It is not, in fact it is usually plainly bad play. However, that's a second-tier issue and one which a host of people will, no doubt, intentionally misinterpret and misrepresent. In the meantime there's an interesting discussion to be had in an area they neither care about nor understand- that of grand strategy. This is the topic of force correlations, loss rates vs loss percentages - particularly as this applies to and explains the conduct of Montgomery in Northern Europe 1944 ( I'm no fan of Monty but I do think that only one work I've read, and no post on this forum, has ever managed to show why Monty's grand strategy in Northern Europe was absolutely and utterly correct - with the proviso that I consider operation Garden to be a grand operational and grand strategic Operation ( the clue is in the name ) ), the lanchester laws as they apply to the strategies of attrition vs annihilation and the disproporionate benefits which can accrue if the Allies accept battles of annihilation in early 1942. I know the conventional wisdom is that the Allies must avoid losses and contact in 1942 and while it is true that they should avoid loss unaccompanied by damage inflicted to the enemy it is also true that the Allies avoiding losses in 1942 actually harms their ability to advance quickly in 1943 and onwards --- something we see quite clearly in several AARs in 1943.

Unfortunately that's a pretty dense topic but there's no point discussing these issues in isolation as they are all interrelated and synergistic and, I believe, only by explaining them as an inter-related mass ( sometimes messily inter-related [8D] ) will it be possible to show the underpinning of the next phase of my strategy. Simply put my strategy will be the antithesis of what Montgomery had to adopt because of National Policy Issues in the United Kingdom relying on the Lanchester Laws and Operational Art to achieve synchronous loss numbers which, by their very nature will be dyssynchronous loss rates for the Allied Navies vs IJN and will, combined with dyssynchronous and unfavourable relative replacement rates for the IJN result in increasingly favourable Lanchester Correlations along and at any point in the front ( and that's the key since low-grade attritional losses may yield a favourable Lanchester correlate along the front but don't prevent enemy concentration of force overmassing friendly forces at a particular point ) which should yield significantly increased opportunities for simultaneous or phased operations in motion at a tempo which helps the enemy experience "paralysis by over-analysis" and a gradually worsening Boyd cycle in which the decision to intervene and oppose an operation will be as unfavourable as the decision to not intervene.

So, as you can see the goal is, by 1943, to create a situation in which enemy intervention plays into my hands and enemy non-intervention plays into my hands. In effect I'm trying to create a naval no-win scenario for Mike by 1943.

Right now I'm enjoying the UK election debate though so this little piece of writing will have to wait for another time.

In the meantime, even though I've recommended it before, a must-read AAR for anyone interested in strategy and by far the best and understated example of effective play on the forum is Aussies vs Amis tm.asp?m=2200574 Simple, understated, effective and direct in its presentation. Far better than flashy, logistically inept and ineffective albeit masked by propaganda.

I'm bored after the debates so time to define some terms while I watch Terminator the Sarah Connor Chronicles....

1. Lanchester Laws. A set of laws which argue that in ancient battles where men could only kill eachother in close proximity ( often only the man in front of you ) exchange rates tended to be linear --- at least until the enemy broke and you ended up with a situation like at Issus where Alexander was able to ford small rivers over the bodies of the fleeing Persians his troops slaughtered --- while in more modern conflicts since the advent of gunpowder the correlation of forces ( and thus exchange rates ) is proportional to the square of the "power" ( power being defined either as pure numbers or numbers adjusted by a combat effectiveness rating ) of the two forces.

E.g. A force of 10 DDs facing a force of 3 should be able to sink all three at the cost of a single one of their own DDs assuming equal tactical position, technology and training. 10 x 10 = 100, 3 x 3 = 9. Thus the 10 DDs will inflict damage a rate of 11 : 1.


What the Lanchester Laws really speak to is the fact that a relatively small advantage can result in a large disparity by the end of the battle. Its most famous application is to the battle of Trafalgar where the division of Nelson's forces and the enemy battleline fits the Lanchester Law equations perfectly if Nelson assumed all of his ships were exactly equal to the enemy. Basically Nelson divided his force into a holding force equal to the main body of the enemy fleet and concentrated all his other ships against a smaller portion of the enemy fleet. This allowed him to rapidly destroy that portion of the enemy fleet ( as he significantly outnumbered it ) while the main body was engaged in an even fight. He then applied his now freed force to the enemy main body and outmassed that also.

In effect he turned a meager advantage overall into :
a) one even battle against most of the enemy fleet and
b) one very favourable battle against the rest of the enemy fleet before
c) combining his force once the small portion of the enemy fleet was defeated and overmassing the enemy more than he initially did.

Lanchester Laws in action. Effective and simple.

Trafalgar isn't the first example of the Lanchester Laws being used like this it is just the most easily accessible to the modern reader which is properly documented. Personally I think a better example is the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC while the earliest example I'm aware of is probably Kadesh although the paucity of 19th Dynasty documentation makes it a little less clear that the Lanchester Laws were in effect. I think though that Rameses II's deployment of his personal guard and elements of the Amun Division against the over-extended Hittites clearly show some Lanchester Effects. Anyways, that's just a historical aside. The point is that the Lanchester Laws have applied since time immemorial, applied in WW2 and apply, albeit imperfectly, in the tactical resolution in WiTP and AE. They apply much more perfectly to the operational and strategic layers.



2. Attrition vs annihilation.
Annihilation rarely involves the utter destruction of the enemy in modern parlance. What it does imply is a rate of loss so great that over a small period of time a force loses so much of its strength as to be, for the purposes of combat effectiveness, rendered incapable of meaningful resistance/action.

At a strategic level this translates as destroying such a degree of the enemy force that it is no longer capable of meeting the tasks required of it. The implication is that such a loss has occured relatively rapidly and resulted in a significant reduction in the overall enemy force. Certainly attrition can result in annihilation if the attrition is continued over time but in common parlance the difference between attrition and annihilation is the RATE of loss.

So, when I say attrition I am talking about a low rate of loss and when I talk of annihilation I imply a large rate of loss..


3. When is a force combat ineffective?
Generally the rule of thumb is that if a force has lost more than 30% of its combat power/manpower in a single engagement ( a single engagement for a platoon might be 1 hour, for a division might be a day, for an Army 4 days ) then it becomes combat ineffective. This pretty much explains how Alexander the Great was able to defeat the Persians. He fought holding actions along most of his front, concentrated a superior force in a small portion of the front, destroyed 30% of the enemy force at that poing of contact and began a cascade of enemy groups breaking and running.

By having a Bn-equivalent break after his 1,000 men had slaughtered a company's worth ( 150 men ) he was at the point where the Regiment-equivalent was almost at 30% casualties, had their line dislocated and began seeing the fleeing men being cut down in droves - inculcating in their minds that maybe they should start running now... A few more casualties and the regiment-equivalent might break leaving the division-equivalent looking at a repeat of what made the regiment break. Rinse and repeat and eventually a small Macedonian force which inflicted grievous losses on a concentrated portion of the Persian army could create a cascade of ever-larger formations panicking and running. Add in the drive to get Darius to flee by making for his chariot ( which Alexander single-mindedly used to try to make for ) and the morale loss which accompanied seeing their king flee and it becomes possible to easily explain the Macedonian victories achieved at such low cost through a combination of Lanchester Laws, the Sarissa's superiority over Persian spears and psychology.

At the tactical level AE models the Lanchester laws very imperfectly but at the strategic level psychology still applies and thus a high rate of loss requires rapid analysis by an opponent, analysis which is prone to OODA loop errors.


4. OODA loop.
Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. A loop in which a commander ( or any person ) observes an enemy or friendly action, orients to it ( which means processing its implications etc ), decides what to do about it and then puts that decision into action. The more pre-cognitive bias someone has the more likely they will apply that bias to what they observe and mis-interpret it ( orient inappropriately ). Since poor orientation will lead to poor decisions, actions and an ever-worsening situation this shows why it is so important to observe events with as little bias as possible. Very few people achieve this.

Decisions follow on from what someone believes has happened. If what they observed is incomplete or their orientation biased their decisions will be inappropriate and lead to inappropriate actions. This tends to lead to the spiral of ever-worsening situations to which the person has more and more difficulty appropriately orienting in a timely fashion. Why is this? Simple, it is because, as humans, we have limited computational power and thus use "rules of thumb" for most things. These rules of thumb are called mental schema and are simple shortcuts we use every day in order to react appropriately without having to consider every aspect of a situation.

Ever found yourself at a door pushing at it when a nearby sign clearly reads pull? You did that because the door reminds your brain of one you normally push and so your brain saw it and decided "that's like the doors I push, let's push it and see." Only after that failed did your brain kick in, start observing everything around it and see the "pull" sign and react appropriately. Same sort of thing is why so many people die in airplane crashes while still strapped into their seats. When the plane hits and they try to evacuate their "mental schema" for getting out of the belt they are in reverts to the belt they most commonly use, their car belt. Unfortunately that belt opens differently than the airplane belt. End result people who panic and haven't fully oriented to the situation "I'm in a plane and this belt opens a weird way" fall back on the mental schema which normally works when they're belted into a seat in their car and are found still in their seats having died of smoke inhalation while trying to undo the belt as they would the belt in their car. Panic and smoke prevented them from having enough time to properly re-orient and make the right decision on how to open the belt. OODA loop in action.

More later.

Interesting discussion Nemo. From what I have observed of your AAR's you use the OODA concept extensively. You have a real knack for getting your opponents to react inappropriately. This then leads to the Lanchester laws. The inappropriate reactions lead to lessening resistance where it really matters giving you a big advantage when you square the force.

I would also mention that Gary Grigsby's models lead to changing conditional probabilities with regards to the Lanchester laws. If you have a 10-3 advantage (100-9 when squared) when you sink a DD it is now 10-2 (100 vs 4). This can often be observed in the air war. Most people think in statistical averages, but the Grigsby model will produce extreme results more often than people's intuition leads them to expect. Generally people do not process the concept of conditional probability very well.

Added in edit: I guess that what I am saying is that you are very good at using the OODA loop concept to achieve local advantage under the Lanchester Laws. Those laws and the games statistical model often leads to a snowballing effect where the side at the disadvantage often gets dismantled more severely than they expected. I think this is a pretty reasonable model and your ability to use these concepts makes you a formidable opponent indeed.

Always good to have a bored Nemo... that leads to interesting posts [:)]

My response may turn out to be lengthy, thus I will edit several times to expand rather than typing a long post and then face a breakdown of the connection... but now, it is complete.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121
What the Lanchester Laws really speak to is the fact that a relatively small advantage can result in a large disparity by the end of the battle. Its most famous application is to the battle of Trafalgar where the division of Nelson's forces and the enemy battleline fits the Lanchester Law equations perfectly if Nelson assumed all of his ships were exactly equal to the enemy. Basically Nelson divided his force into a holding force equal to the main body of the enemy fleet and concentrated all his other ships against a smaller portion of the enemy fleet. This allowed him to rapidly destroy that portion of the enemy fleet ( as he significantly outnumbered it ) while the main body was engaged in an even fight. He then applied his now freed force to the enemy main body and outmassed that also.

In effect he turned a meager advantage overall into :
a) one even battle against most of the enemy fleet and
b) one very favourable battle against the rest of the enemy fleet before
c) combining his force once the small portion of the enemy fleet was defeated and overmassing the enemy more than he initially did.

Lanchester Laws in action. Effective and simple.

Whereas I am familiar with the general concept of Lanchester Laws, I am not sure Trafalgar is a good example, but of course you know my standard statement that I am always willing to accept a good explanation why I am wrong.

My problem with this example is based on the fact that one has to explain why the superior French-Spanish main force proved unable to deal with the holding force more quickly than the British main force could deal with the cut-off parts of Villeneuve's battle line. I think that strictly applying Lanchester Laws, not considering other factors, should have lead to a defeat of the British - both ship numbers and gun numbers favored the French-Spanish fleet.

Therefore, I believe that Nelson did not base his strategy on the assumption that the ships were equal in terms of combat value but rather think Nelson's Trafalgar strategy is based on a) proper analysis of strengths and weaknesses of the combatants (sp?) and b) proper application of the OODA circle, which was partly made possible because of a).

As a side note, it surprises me that I stress psychological aspects here stronger than you do [8D]... but let me explain my position, so you get a chance to prove me wrong:

b) was done in two ways: one directed at the head and one directed at the members.

What Nelson did was against the prevailing tactical orthodoxy of the time (much like you are frequently playing against the prevailing orthodoxy of WitP/AE). He presented Villeneuve with a situation that he did not expect and that he was not prepared for. And in addition, he intended to cut off the isolated ships from coordinating action, i.e. from receiving orders from their commanding admiral. As a matter of fact, that may be responsible for the relative success of his holding force compared to the situation of the cut-off parts of the French-Spanish battle line - the Bristish captains were acting on orders/a script (=short processing time), the others were thrown into an unexpected situation. The result is confusion on the one side, order on the other - a breakdown of a unit induced not by exposure to physical losses but by psychological impact before the losses actually occur.

I believe that the same action performed by Villeneuve would have lead to a British victory as well, and that is where a) comes into play. In order to execute his plan, Nelson put himself deliberately into a position where the T was crossed on him - in a time where this meant not only giving up 50% of one's fire power. You can do that if you can rely on poor quality gunners on then Enemy's side and if your crews are more disciplined and thus can stand the psychological impact. I believe that Nelson's approach executed by the Frech-Spanish fleet would have lacked these requirements. The British would have severely damaged the approaching enemy by superior gunnery, and the French and Spanish crews would have had problems to absorb the damage induced.

As always, just my take on things and not an argument against Lanchester laws - just against the example you picked. Feel free to tell me why psychology is overrated [:D]

Hartwig

2 major advantages possessed by Nelson:

(1) far superior gunnery expertise
(2) unity of command backed up with good delegation (Collingwood and individual ship captains), not being hampered by coalition command/doctrine friction


Alfred

Very interesting points Nemo! That was a very educational read.
Thanks for that.
 
2c´s (3 tbh):
- I think the AAR that really teaches the advantages of an early Allied fighting retreat, without being overagressive, that benefits
the later part of the game (and therefore brings it closer to historical) is Aussies vs. Amis and its counterpart.
This is not to say that luck did not play a part in the developement of their war but isn´t this always the case?
 
- The worst thing to do is playing a "no contact with the enemy" strategy as Allies in ´42 and then complaining
that Japan is ahistorically strong in ´43.
 
- Overaggressive strategy can have an advantage if it leads to false conclusions on the side of the defender.
I would not underrate that psychological effect, although it naturally diminishes with the experience or ability of
the opponent.

Sorry, this post was in error.

Tuna ,
I think you are right about Grigsby's modles but I think that what you are describing appears to occur in real life also. I do think that things tend to snowball as force correlates tend towards greater and greater disparities.

Hartwig,

Trafalgar as a bad example? No, I can't agree. You and Alfred are looking at the realities of the situation we know now ( better British gunnery etc ) and applying them to the battle instead of applying the Lanchester Law model to the situation Nelson found himself in. I'll explain:

1. Nelson found himself going into battle and needed a plan which would succeed. Sure he had superior gunnery etc BUT if I were going into battle I'd try to come up with a plan which would win it irrespective of said qualitative superiority so that IF my assumption was wrong my plan wouldn't fail utterly. If my gunnery was as superior as I thought then it would simply act to reduce my losses once the plan was sound ( this is what actually happened ).

2. Nelson was facing into the battle and what can seem foregone now wasn't then. He came up with a plan to succeed even if quality was, at best, even. That's the way to plan for things. If you have a plan which can succeed in the face of a worst case estimate then you're onto a winner if anything goes your way.


So, let's assume a battle in which 10 RN ships face 10 French ships. You could go 10 on 10 with the end result that both forces would be mutually annihilated or you could split your force vs a portion of the French fleet, seek to destroy that portion of the fleet so quickly that you would be able to turn on the rest of the French fleet before it destroyed your holding force.
Assumption: Square Law applies and forces apply damage in proportion to the square of their numbers. Neither side has a qualitative advantage ( this didn't apply at Trafalgar but is accounted for in the conclusion I will draw... but you'll have to wait for that ).

So, let's look at the interesting things which happen when we split an enemy force:
Unsplit 10 -> 100 adjusted combat power ACP
9/1 split -> 81 / 1 - reduction in ACP of 18%
8/2 split -> 64 / 4 - reduces ACP by 32%
7/3 split -> 49 / 9 - reduces ACP by 42%
6/4 split -> 36 / 16 - reduces ACP by 48%
5/5 split -> 25/25 - reduces ACP by 50%

So, splitting the enemy force 5/5 yields the greatest reduction in ACP it is also pretty difficult to overmass one portion without excessively undermassing the other side. What you're really looking to do is split the enemy and your own forces in such a way that the relative undermassing ( the ratio between your holding force and their main body ) is proportionally less than the relative overmassing ( the ratio between your annihilatory force and their cut off force ).

E.g. splitting the enemy 7/3 and your own force 5/5 results in a 7 vs 5 matchup and a 3 vs 5 matchup.
Matchup 1 ( 7 v 5 ) = 49 vs 25 while matchup 2 ( 3 v 5 ) = 9 vs 25

Assuming that per unit time the forces inflict damage in proportion to their ACPs you can see that in Matchup 2 the 5 ships will inflict 2.5 units of damage ( 1/10th of their ACP ) in the same time as the enemy takes to inflict 0.9 units of damage ). In matchup 1 the 7 ships will inflict 4.9 units of damage while the 5 ships will only inflict 2.5.

The French are inflicting 5.8 units of damage per unit time vs 5 units of damage per unit time inflicted by the RN BUT while in Matchup 1 the French are reducing the British fleet portion at a rate of 20% per round the British are reducing the French fleet at over 30% per round in Matchup 2.

The end result is that the British will finish annihilating the French in Matchup 2 long before the French annihilate the British in Matchup 1 and will be able to switch those 5 ships there in sufficient time to overmatch the French main fleet and overmatch it significantly.


At Trafalgar if you assume that ships would be exchanged on a 1:1 basis then Nelson's fleet division is almost mathematically perfect according to the Lanchester Laws - that's why I say it is the best example... well, that and the fact that we have good sources for it.

Now, some have pointed out that the British had technological advantages also. That's true but I don't think that Nelson took that into account when dividing his force. I think he took a pessimistic view of his ship quality, designed a plan which would work in that worst case scenario and then totally crushed the French when he combined a Lanchester-obedient plan with technological superiority.

If you look at the battle his dispositions follow the Lanchester Laws but his victory and losses don't. I think the discrepance can be explained by the superiority in gunnery etc which he didn't rely on in his pre battle planning ( in which I'm convinced he used the Lanchester Laws ).

So, I don't say the Lanchester Laws explain everything about the battle but I do believe they were used to determine how Nelson split his forces and the splitting succeeded spectacularly and in a manner which all but one history of the battle I've read have failed to really explore.

Now as to Hartwig's view that the OODA cycle and Alfred's view that he took into account command confusion on the enemy side etc... Of course. On the other hand taking it into account doesn't explain the mathematical perfection of his force correlations. The Lanchester Laws do.

Also, I would point out that I was merely explaining a term, not writing a treatise on Trafalgar. If I was writing a treatise on Trafalgar I'd have gone into the other factors but, here, I focussed on the salient point - Nelson's dispositions show how he split what should have been a superior force to allow him to defeat one small portion of it with a locally superior force and then turn on the larger portion with his surviving force which now was stronger than the enemy main body and defeated that in turn - since that sort of operation is relevant to my explanation of future plans.


LoBaron,
1. Aussies vs Amis... I agree, I've linked to it a few posts above as an example of that.

2. Aye, but it doesn't stop people following conventional wisdom even when that wisdom isn't supported by independent analysis and then claiming the game is "broken" when their sub-optimal strategy doesn't magically result in a winning position in 1943. Just because the Allies won doesn't mean that every Allied player is pre-destined to win. If they mess up enough they will find themselves stymied.

3. I disagree with this. I think that anything one can do can be misinterpreted by a poor player. I'm fond of the saying that against a poor strategist one merely needs to wait and allow them to defeat themselves. I've won many chess games etc by just waiting and letting the other person make some monumental blunder they never had to make. Once the opening's there I pounce with all the nicety of a chainsaw attack in a phone box and dismember them. Minutes later it is all over.

I'm interested in playing skillfully and winning with a bit of art. Working myself to death to beat someone who is a poor player isn't appealing to me. If they are prone to serious strategic miscalculation then I'll work to create a situation in which I encourage that and then sit back as the situaiton snowballs and they continue to work hard to continually worsen their strategic position through inappropriate decisions and actions - all with minimal input from me.

So, yes, poor players can misinterpret an over-aggressive strategy but poor players can be relied upon to defeat themselves so long as you aren't even more incompetent than them [:D]. I think it is a bad habit to get into to start doing things which will lead poor players to fall into traps. No, do what will confound a brilliant player and if it all goes over the head of your opponent then that's fine. After all your opponent isn't actually your opponent. Your only opponent is your own expectations of yourself. The person you are playing is merely the vessel by which you test yourself. That's my view in any case... when it comes to games. In real life when lives are on the line obviously one needs to do whatever works and artfulness comes secondary. I think though that playing to the best of your ability is useful as you can never know when you'll run into the next Balck.


Also I would argue that over-aggressive strategy is a hugely misunderstood thing on the forum. Most people here, from what I can see, applaud aggression and view all aggression as being the same. Attacking something is often greeted with laudatory posts which can be summarised as, "Aren't you a great fellow for attacking that. You can always be relied upon to push, push, push." Those posts are actually intended as congratulation and receipted by the AAR writers as such.

In reality I think that those posts are immensely strong critiques of the play and signs of significant flaws. I may attack but I only do so in the pursuit of vital strategic objectives and advantage or as part of a greater plan to gain same. I am never over-aggressive. I'm as aggressive as is necessary to gain the advantage I wish to gain.

I think that players who are aggressive not in the pursuit of suitable strategic gains within the context of an overall logistical goal are, by definition, poor players.

All of the above, however, is a side issue... I'll get back to defining terms over the next day before I get to post the main outline of plans.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121
I think that players who are aggressive not in the pursuit of suitable strategic gains within the context of an overall logistical goal are, by definition, poor players.

I like this statement, it sums up a truth that applies to many situations. [:)]

re: 3: Admittedly you proved me wrong, more so in context of the above sentence.

I might add though that I defined "overaggressive strategy" more as display of strenght to keep the initiative without the force to back it up
but still maneuvering within the limits of your locistical goals. But I accept that in the context you are adressing, my definition is not correct
and is classified better as a method of deception rather than as a general strategy.

Thanks for your detailed response, you got a reader.

Well LoBaron, I don't think it is about proving you or anyone else wrong, just clarifying my assumptions. I fully agree that under a different set of assumptions your initial view would be correct. It is all about context. Probably a bit later I'll post the rest of the definitions and assumptions. Probably get into the meat of it tomorrow.

Mental Schema - rules of thumb which cut down on the processing time a human requires to reach a decision. If food is brownish and smelly it is probably bad. Best to throw it away without wasting time and processing power on examining it carefully to be sure. Schema work well in situations where previous assumptions are valid. Once situations begin changing rapidly mental schema are simply good ways for old, inappropriate assumptions, to lead us astray. My contention is that the conventional wisdom of the forum, combined with the lack of rigorous independent analysis leads to inappropriate orientation by opinion formers and a slavish adherence to the conventional wisdom which actually runs in the face of what unbiased analysis reveals.

Schema are invalidated by OODA loops and an opponent who clings to schema is more easily manoeuvred into errors by a quickening in the pace of OODA loops. Why? Well, because as has been said by some rather famous philosophers, " We see things not as they are but as we are or would like them to be". It takes pretty good self-control and self-awareness to realise that just because you want something doesn't mean that's the way it will be. I point anyone who disbelieves that statement to the current pre-CAP FlAK discussion ( and various other discussions ) in which several individuals seem to be incapable of understanding that merely because something doesn't conform to their desires/bias/pre-conceptions is no proof that that thing is in error. Why is this? Simple, they insist on seeing what they wish to see and not what is truly there. They are failing to orient properly. However since they see what they want anyone arguing against them isn't arguing facts but is arguing for them to not only accept a fact BUT also to accept that the world doesn't work the way they want it to work. That's an argument of beliefs and feelings and is why those individuals are so shrill and unwilling to brook compromise. They are not concerned, in the final analysis, with being correct but are more concerned with being "right" and justifying their current reality filters.



Marshalls Operation:

So this operation was designed to take away the strategic initiative etc from the Japanese, get Mike reacting to me and get him into a situation where he reacts increasingly inappropriate but it was also designed to destroy a significant portion of the IJN forces committed both to ensure it could be done and as part of a strategy to draw down the IJN.

The outcome has been almost complete strategic success with all enemy bases targetted taken except for Eniwetok and the sinking of 4 IJN CAs, 4 IJN BBs and a whole gaggle ( about 15 or 16 DDs ). I am taking this as verification of the practicability of the next phase of the strategic plan to write down the IJN throughout 1942 - said writing down to occur in the DEI and nearby environs.


Assumptions for the next phase:
1. At present the RN and USN combined are at least as strong as the IJN - Given that the IJN is down by 4 BBs, 4 CAs and about 20 DDs by this stage in the war I believe that to be a reasonable assumption, especially since any paucity in CAs on the Allied side can be compensated for by the Allied superiority in BBs ( I can mass about 12 BBs at present in the Pacific ).

2. I am assuming 1:1 parity in terms of quality. So, an RN BB = a USN BB = an IJN BB etc. I'm fudging a little by saying that since IJN BBs are actually worth a bit more than a USN BB but I am assuming cross-compensation where the excess USN BBs overmatch a the smaller number of IJN BBs and some of the IJN CAs I don't have CA numbers to match up with RN and USN CAs.

3. My land-based air in Sumatra and the DEI in general should be able to fend off his land-based air easily and withstand KB for a couple of days. If the planning is right a few days is all I'll need once the metal starts clashing and rending. Even if I'm a little wrong with that observant readers will remember the multiple operations I conducted in the waters of the DEI in late December and early January with SC TFs operating within strike range of KB for days at a time using avoidant routing and weather to get away without being struck. Those operations were designed to be effective but also to act as testbeds for my ability to sustain SC TFs in the presence of enemy aerial superiority should the need arise.

4. He has to invade Sumatra and is unlikely to come ashore at Palembang as that's rather heavily defended ( 1300 AV, Level 5 forts and swamps - which should equate to about 3500 adjusted AV ). He should arrive at either Benkoenen or Oosthaven and that's what my planning will favour. Obviously I'll have a plan in place should he opt for Palembang instead.

5. Allied replacement rates for naval vessels are much greater than the replacement rates the IJN can manage through 1942/43 and, indeed, so much greater than if both navies were completely annihilated in mid-42 it would serve the Allied cause much better than the IJN cause... Why? Simple, when a force is annihilated in combat or rendered ineffective through an advance in technology both opponents start afresh with neither side having a numerical advantage, irrespective of whatever numerical advantage before the battle/tech advance. For a very interesting exploration of the effects of this I'd suggest people read about the introduction of the HMS Dreadnought and how the British had to balance its introduction making the rest of their fleet obsolete and giving the Germans a level playing field with the ability to have first adopter benefits through being the first to introduce it and rebuild their numerical superiority in the Dreadnought class. Anyone interested in the rather fascinating story behind the economic, political and military considerations inherent in such a step change would do well to read Massie's excellent "Dreadnought".



Ok, so what's the overall concept:
The basic idea is that a 1:1 exchange of forces when both forces are numerically/ACP equal in early to mid-42 will, by virtue of the greater Allied naval replacement rates, result in an ever-increasing dyscorrelation of forces favourable to the Allies.

E.g. If both sides lose 80% of their combat power by the end of 1942 but the Allies get reinforce by 40% and the IJN by 10% the IJN will end up with 30% of their starting strength while the Allies end up with 60%. That correlates into a 4:1 advantage under Lanchester Laws for the Allies at the beginning of 1943 ( I'm picking dates purely for illustrative purposes ).

The Lanchester Laws really don't take into account replacements usually but when you do you get some very interesting results where replacement rates can create changing correlations even if the loss rates and initial matchip are identical.


Interestingly when a force has superior replacement rates over its opponents it is actually in that force's interest to engage in even greater annihilation. Let us use the above example and assume that the Allies follow two different approaches, the first will be no contact, the second will be 100% annihilation

1. 0% loss in 1942. By the beginning of 1943 the Allies will get 40% reinforcements while the IJN will have 10%. So, in 1943 the force correlation will b 140% of pre-war force vs 110% of pre-war force for a force correlation of 1.96 : 1.21, far, far inferior to the 4:1 advantage which would accrue with 80% losses to both sides.

2. 100% losses to both sides in 1942. By the beginning of 1943 the Allies will have received 40% reinforcements while the IJN will have 10%. This will mean that the Allied fleets will be at 40% of pre-war levels while the IJN will be only at 10%. This will give a force correlation of 16:1, far far superior to the 4:1 advantage gained from 80% mutually annihilation.

Obviously wags will point out that it is possible the IJN would kill at better than a 1:1 ratio but I would point you to the underlying assumptions ( 1:1 exchange rate and equal forces as of today). I would also point you to the fact that 9 times out of 10 despite the fact that I might seem to take heavy losses in an operation my opponent takes more AND takes the strategic loss. So, assumptions and a bit of good play should, I think, take care of that point.


Basically the mathematics of the Lanchester Laws combined with replacement rates and equal skill levels mean that the Allied strategy of running away in 1942 merely results in much, much more difficult naval combat in 1943.



Further implications of the 1.96 : 1.21 ( 1.6 to 1 ) correlation of forces if no combat occurs vs the 16:1 correlation if 100% annihilation of pre-war fleets occurs in 1942 is that it is MUCH easier for the Japanese player to achieve a local superiority of forces which makes the Lanchester Laws work in their favour if strategically they are only outnumbered 1.6 : 1 ( I have, for example, carried out successful invasions with significant local superiority when strategically I've been overmassed by much more than 1.6 : 1 ) than if they are outnumbered 16 : 1 in ACP.

In essence the difference between a 1.6 : 1 ACP and a 16 : 1 ACP is that at 1.6 : 1 Allied operations in 1943 need to be very well covered with naval forces and cannot take full advantage of simultaneity, thus slowing down the advance while with a 16: 1 ACP the Allies should be able to cover multiple operations simultaneously safe in the knowledge that the IJN cannot achieve local superiority. Actually with a 16:1 ACP the Allies could run 4 simultaneous ops in the certainty that each op will be as escorted by a force as strong as the entire IJN. With a 1.6 : 1 ACP this would not be possible.


This speaks to the naval force correlation. The aerial force correlation is quite different and the most interesting strategic problem posed by Scenario 2 in AE is actually tieing the dyssynchronous strategies for aerial forces ( where the Allies should avoid confrontation until they have 65+ A2A Exp pilots and a steady and reliable stream of replacements --- something most AARers simply haven't done and thus they find themselves blaming the game when they can't go toe to toe with Japan. In reality the problem lies in their poor strategic appreciation and inability to re-orient when faced with clear evidence that their initial conclusions were incorrect. I won't name the most egregious examples of this as it seems people on this forum react very badly to any negative commentary, even if the commentary is factually correct. They are more concerned with being seen to be "right" than with being correct, a most regrettable situation.) and naval forces ( where mutual annihilation is very much in the Allies favour ).


Normal disclaimer: Mathematics are pretty and theoretical and I use the mathematics there to illustrate the example clearly. In the real world all of this stuff is inestimably messy, confused and inter-related and with even the worst force correlation a nice it of operational art and strategic deception can cnacel everything out. The above is theoretical and designed to be a relatively simple ( in fact deeply over-simplified ) explanation of the basic thinking underlying my desire for a mutually annihilatory battle around Sumatra --- something which flies in direct contravention of the conventional wisdom of the forum... which is, to put it simply, flawed and based on a rush to conformity and the acceptance of the perceived without ever conducting independent analysis.

It wouldn't be so bad if the opinion formers actually conducted the individual analysis themselves and could be relied upon to arrive at the appropriate conclusions but from what I've read of their posts they either:
a) haven't done the analysis and have just relied on their mental schema ( inappropriate ) or
b) have conducted the analysis but have not had the orientation necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions.

In effect when AE came out they didn't observe or orient properly and thus their decisions and in-game actions are inappropriate. Since most of the forum doesn't engage in significant levels of independent analysis or if it does engage in independent analysis doesn't do so in any rigorous, reliable and unbiased manner most of the forum has then adopted these inappropriate views. Essentially their mental schema, which serve them well in the real world where situations are largely unchanging have failed them now in AE because the crowd's opinion formers have failed to orient appropriately.


P.s. I trust that the clear implication of dyssynchronous naval and aerial strategic stances is clear and thus the apposite and converse aerial approach is clearly seen to be necessary. As such the initial Allied strategy promulgated in most AARs actually plays directly into Japan's hands. One reason I so enjoy the Aussies vs Amis AAR is that they've pretty much taken a sub-optimal approach to the naval war but optimal approach to the air war ( based on the assumptions outlined above ) but have, through good play and some outfoxing of their opponents, created a major win out of it. I believe the underlying lesson from Aussies vs Amis is that, as Napoleon said, "The moral is to the physical as three is to one". A partially wrong strategy applied consistently, aided by a few enemy mistakes and with the right logistical backing will tend to succceed once the enemy's nerve breaks - as we are seeing in that AAR.

No its not about whos right or wrong. [:)]
I just lacked the words to formulate, I noticed that my interpretation of "overagressive strategy" differed from yours and naturally you
are the one who is bringing up the context to define that term. If I did not accept this we´d be talking about two different things and this
would make any discussion useless.


Very impressive read again.

Just one comment to your rating of BB´s at the current time of war: (2))
Did you include the superior Allied damage control into your BB ratings? How I interprete your situational analysis your plans naturally include the destruction of assets.
This should give the Allies the small bonus so the USN/RN BB´s can be rated a bit higher than a comparable IJN BB already at this date.



And one question: I re-read your comments on Trafalgar.
I agree with the conclusions you are coming to, but could you see a situation where a split force can gain an advantage through that split?
I am a bit lost translating the pure mathematical results into tactical concepts as they are an abstraction of force coordination without including the implications.

LoBaron, you're right about it being useless if we were using different terms. That, on the other hand, doesn't stop a very large number of people from insisting to continue "discussing" when their terms are utterly different and thus they are talking past and not with eachother.


USN BBs vs IJN BBs taking into account superior damage control. Well, I take the Nelsonian approach. Assume a BB is a BB is a BB and if mine are more survivable etc then that'll just mean my plan works even better than I expect.


A split force enemy force almost always implies a split friendly force. If the friendly CO got the split ratio wrong then it might end up benefitting the enemy force as the enemy main body might destroy the friendly holding force more quickly than the friendly main body defeats the enemy smaller portion. In that situation Trafalgar would be reversed. Obviously there are also situations where a split force could simply be a maskirovka suckering the friendly force into an ambush which would be highly unfavourable to the friendly force.


Without including the implications? In what sense. I'm confused by this...


P.s. Tuna - Best sig EVER !!! [:D]

Nemo,

re. Trafalgar, we are not going to agree. The problem with your projection of Lanchester laws onto that event is that you assume that in a sea battle in the age of sail you could actually control where you could/would cut the enemy line. I don't think that is the case (in my opininon, e.g. the first part of the battle of Camperdown, in which a similar application of the Lanchester laws may seem to appear, may serve as a good example for problems faced when trying to execute such a plan). IMHO you interpret a random event which happens to match what you want to illustrate as the perfect example, because the numbers match.

As a matter of fact, you probably needed some degree of cooperation from your enemy - a tight line was quite difficult to break. Nelson counted on the fact that there would be a lose line and that the opponent's gunnery would be sub-standard, when coming up with a plan that required just that (the ships at the front of his line were exposed for about 45 minutes to enemy fire without the chance to respond), and he felt save in these assumptions because he had faced these navies before (Cape St. Vincent/Battle of the Nile).

As always, just my view - no need to agree here. We do agree on the Lanchester Laws.

Hartwig

Hartwig, don't sweat the justifications and need to say its ok to disagree. Both of us are embedded in relatively evidence-based fields where disagreement is allowed without necessitating anything personal.

I think your last post makes the issue clearer. My contention would be that intention, while important to a study of the battle of Trafalgar, is irrelevant when it comes to using Trafalgar as an example of the Lanchester Laws. Whether or not Nelson intended it ( I think he did, you think he didn't and that's fine ) the KEY point is that the sub-component matchups ended up being a brilliant example of a pretty much perfect Lanchester Law study. Whether he intended it or not has no impact on whether or not the battle highlights the applicability of the Lanchester Laws.

That would be my contention in any case.

ORIGINAL: Nemo121
Without including the implications? In what sense. I'm confused by this...

It was an absolute integral part of my still unfinished quest to formulate my qestion as undeniable exact, but also surprisingly long...ah what the heck...

Please ignore. It didn´t make much sense when I read it now. You have answered my question. [:)]


I like the two points of view hartwig.modrow and you have. Its an interesting discussion and I think you both are right though what really really would be interesting
how these points of view combine over AE.