Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: Chickenboy

Warspite1,

Weren't there a number of rubber, tin, metal and other fund drives in 1941 in the UK to provide for the USSR? Uncle Joe was portrayed sympathetically in the press and domestically for some time between June 1941 and January 1942 if memory suits.

I bring this up to reinforce the notion that the UK was supporting the USSR in all manner possible whilst just the two of them were co-belligerents against Germany. With this background, it's not at all a reach to presume that Soviet material needs superseded any potential future belligerents in the far East.

warspite1

There was a rather naively rosy view of Stalin's Soviet Union amongst certain sections of the community so yes they were fully behind this development.....

Whilst in other sections, the view of Communism was anything but. Cabinet papers reveal Churchill's concern at 'selling' getting into bed with the Soviets to the wider public.

At the end of the day though, after almost two years of war, and one year alone, I think the British generally were probably glad of some company [:)]

Let's face it - if Adolf and Uncle Joe could sell the Nazi-Soviet pact to their peeps then its easy to see why WSC found no problem - that's realpolitik.... [:)]

July 8, 1941
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM STALIN TO Mr CHURCHILL
"A front in the North of France, besides diverting Hitler's forces from the East, would make impossible invasion of Britain by Hitler. Establishment of this front would be popular both with the British Army and with the population of Southern England. I am aware of the difficulty of establishing such a front, but it seems to me that, notwithstanding the difficulties, it should be done, not only for the sake of our common cause, but also in Britain's own interest. The best time to open this front is now, seeing that Hitler's forces have been switched to the East and that he has not yet been able to consolidate the positions he has taken in the East."

September 3, 1941
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PREMIER STALIN
TO THE PRIME MINISTER, Mr CHURCHILL

"Please accept my thanks for the promise to sell to the Soviet, Union another 200 fighter aeroplanes in addition to the 200 fighters promised earlier. I have no doubt that Soviet pilots will succeed in mastering them and putting them to use.

I must say, however, that these aircraft, which it appears we shall not be able to use soon and not all at once, but at intervals and in groups, cannot seriously change the situation on the Eastern Front. They cannot do so not merely because of the scale of the war, which necessitates the continuous despatch of large numbers of aircraft, but also, and chiefly, because during the last three weeks the position of the Soviet troops has considerably deteriorated in such vital areas as the Ukraine and Leningrad.

The fact is that the relative stabilisation of the front, achieved some three weeks ago, has been upset in recent weeks by the arrival of 30-34 fresh German infantry divisions and enormous numbers of tanks and aircraft at the Eastern Front, and also by the activisation of 20 Finnish and 26 Roumanian divisions. The Germans look on the threat in the West as a bluff, so they are moving all their forces from the West to the East with impunity, knowing that there is no second front in the West nor is there likely to be one. They think it perfectly possible that they will be able to beat their enemies one at a time— first the Russians and then the British.

As a result we have lost more than half the Ukraine and, what is more, the enemy is now at the gates of Leningrad.

These circumstances have led to our loss of the Krivoi Rog iron ore area and a number of iron and steel works in the Ukraine, to the evacuation by us of an aluminium plant on the Dnieper and another in Tikhvin, a motor plant and two aircraft plants in the Ukraine and two motor and two aircraft plants in Leningrad, which cannot begin production on their new sites before seven or eight months.

This has resulted in a lessening of our defence capacity and has confronted the Soviet Union with mortal danger.

Here it is pertinent to ask—what is the way out of this more than unfavourable situation.

I think the only way is to open a second front this year somewhere in the Balkans or in France, one that would divert 30-40 German divisions from the Eastern Front, and simultaneously to supply the Soviet Union with 30,000 tons of aluminium by the beginning of October and a minimum monthly aid of 400 aeroplanes and 500 tanks (of small or medium size).

Without these two kinds of aid the Soviet Union will be either defeated or weakened to the extent that it will lose for a long time the ability to help its Allies by active operations at the front against Hitlerism."




The read and later burned letter from Stalin to Churchill:

Thanks for the trinkets, however, GET YOUR OWN FRONT

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

The read and later burned letter from Stalin to Churchill:

Thanks for the trinkets, however, GET YOUR OWN FRONT

warspite1

I've dug out from the archives the response from WSC. This was never sent in the interests of Anglo-Soviet relations....

Uncle Joe

Perhaps you will permit me to take your letter with your patently absurd suggestion, roll it up in a ball, stick it in your pipe and set fire to it. Perhaps, if I may make so bold, you will further permit me to then shove said lit pipe where the sun don't shine. Enjoy.

Kind regards

WSC

ORIGINAL: warspite1
The point I was trying to make is this:

- I do not have access to those discussion documents and so in the absence of you being in a position to post any relevant extracts you think worthwhile, I cannot comment specifically – only in general terms about what I believe they contain, and the (likely) views of certain members of the cabinet.

- However, I suspect that sight of the discussion papers would not alter my position as previously summarised, namely:...

And we're back to a sweeping general summary of why the British could only make difficult decisions, not bad ones except in hindsight.

Okay, I tried. Most of the documents should've been available online through your own National Archives under Air Ministry and War Cabinet records as
well as the papers and minutes of the Chiefs of Staff and the Defence Committee(Supply). However, I wasn't going to plod back through them again to
gather, summarise and then present to the class. If it was all there in one neat document, signed off by all participants as to being a true and correct
view of history, I'd happily wave it around (the document, that is).

But you'd mentioned you wanted to learn and since general arguements are only right in general, I suggested a primary document exercise that might
have given a more detailed insight into the historical thinking during this critical time for the Far East.

Unless there is a smoking gun somewhere that blows the assumptions above out of the water, then the fact that the needs of the Far East were over-ridden is, in my view, entirely understandable.

As you said at the start, you are unlikely to alter your view regardless, so we'll just let the gun go cold. It's not a major issue, your general view
of British decision making will hold true anyway in the majority of cases. But every now and then, the devil can be in the details.

ORIGINAL: warspite1
I've dug out from the archives the response from WSC....

So you'll go to the archives for MakeeLearn but if I ask you to...

Buckrock I really don’t understand these sort of comments....

So you'll go to the archives for MakeeLearn but if I ask you to...

The reason I have referred to those documents is, quite obviously, that I have been able to come across them. Cabinet summaries are easier to come across than whatever it is you are referring to – and particularly so when books that I have read refer to specific primary documents. But why on earth would you suggest I purposely haven’t looked for the documents you refer to? Sadly, I am unable to find those documents hence the couple of requests for you to provide some selected key quotes that you believe pertinent to the point you are making. Trawling through the archives is a time consuming and often frustrating process and so if you can’t, or won’t that is entirely up to you.

and we're back to a sweeping general summary of why the British could only make difficult decisions, not bad ones except in hindsight.

As for this, this does you no credit. Again a sweeping statement that is totally false and completely misrepresents my position despite all the evidence in black and white across this and previous online discussions. I have made quite clear in this and other threads that the British were perfectly capable of making bad decisions – as just one example, post 289 confirms that. I am therefore at a loss as to your motivation for writing that…..

If you're misreading things this badly, perhaps it's time to just let it go. There was no criticism of you not going through the documents. I'd just
mentioned that it would be well worth looking at them to get a full insight into the decision process. You said you couldn't and went back to saying
what you thought would be behind the decisions. That's why I said "Okay, I tried". Nothing more to it.

As for my "So you'll go to the archives for MakeeLearn..", since you were joking about retrieving a Churchill document from a pretend archive, I simply
showed faux outrage at the fact you hadn't chased mine down. That's all it was, a joke since I'd already accepted you couldn't access the documents I'd
originally suggested.

Well if I mis-read this....

So you'll go to the archives for MakeeLearn but if I ask you to...

...I certainly apologise, although a [:)] would have been helpful given the opening line which I did not mis-read....

And we're back to a sweeping general summary of why the British could only make difficult decisions, not bad ones except in hindsight.

But yes, I think we have reached an end point in the debate on reinforcing Malaya so thank-you (and to other contributors) for another stimulating, enjoyable debate.

[:)]

Stalin Letter to Churchill

If the war is getting to you, take some time off... relax....looks like some nice peaceful beaches at Gallipoli.

Dear Uncle Joe.

You mention Gallipoli. Thank-you. I am sure you mentioned it because, in a war that was little more than a slaughterhouse, there were very few quality strategic ideas to end the deadlock. As has been recognised by proper historians, Gallipoli was one of those. Yes, thanks to the campaign being badly mis-handled by incompetent military commanders, it turned into the Western Front - but with more flies and disease - but the military failings were not actually my fault and did not stop the idea from being sound. As the man at the top I carried the can of course (something routinely done in my day (and which politicians nowadays would be well to remember)) and so is always associated as my mistake by lazy historians - but there you go, c'est la vie.

By the way, when you write next, you must tell me the story of how you were repeatedly warned of the build up of 3 million Germans on your borders and you completely ignored the threat - even when said Germans had actually crossed over the border you refused to believe that Hitler was attacking you and you ordered only limited reaction which cost further Soviet lives. Alternatively, perhaps you can tell me the story of how 170 million Soviets were beaten by 3.5 million Finns in 1939?

Fun times

Kind regards

WSC

Dear Churchy,


I only mention Gallipoli beaches to inform you of upcoming "Life is a Beach" tiki torch party being thrown by Kitchener and Hamilton next week. They send best wishes and to remind you that if the first Gallipoli beach party had been a success that you would have wanted all glory for it and still not help clean up.

Evening with Hitler was nightmare. He show up late, take me to Polish restaurant, spills drink on my new clothes and then want me to pay half check. He then takes me to see "All Quiet on the Western Front" I not enjoy movie as Adolfy is all han(d)s on me. First date and he trying for Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad. Rest of night a blur, must have been that 5th Vodka Stuka.


No other stories to tell... in Russia best story tellers in Siberia, or laying somewhere on way there.

I send you pic from Red October days, it give you vigor for second front.

Your Man of Steel, Iosif

Hey Vozd, my man!

Looking good Joe - I'm lovin' the abs - you really had it going on back in the early jours.

What the hell happened between then and WWII when you became a stunted dwarf with a pock marked face and bad breath?

BTW tell Hamilton I'm looking forward to the hip hop musical when it comes out in a few decades.

Luv ya

Winnie the winster - by the way, do you like my impromptu Zaphod Beeblebrox impression

Just to say a big thank-you to those that recommended The Hollow Legions. Read the Introduction and the Appendix items and am hooked. Great book [:)]

About half way through Hollow Legions now and I have to say this is an excellent book - spoiled only by the lack of maps. As with the Nomonhan Campaign, the Winter War and the Norwegian Campaign, these oft overlooked campaigns are hugely interesting.

It makes a pleasant change to read about an early war operation that was a total balls up and it WASN'T the British and French who were responsible [;)].

There is a suggestion in the book (not a view promoted by the author I hasten to add) that certain high ranking Italians may have actually encouraged this operation, knowing it would fail and help bring about a quicker end to the war. While there appears no evidence for this - and is instead wishful thinking of those trying to make sense of something so incomprehensible - one can see where such conspiracy thinking may originate from. I mean this was one ****ed up operation..... and then some.

The Italian attack on Greece - and the laughable...ahem.... planning behind it, makes the Anglo-French action in Norway appear like the very model of a sound military operation. Yes. It was that bad...

ORIGINAL: MakeeLearn

Dear Churchy,


I only mention Gallipoli beaches to inform you of upcoming "Life is a Beach" tiki torch party being thrown by Kitchener and Hamilton next week. They send best wishes and to remind you that if the first Gallipoli beach party had been a success that you would have wanted all glory for it and still not help clean up.

Evening with Hitler was nightmare. He show up late, take me to Polish restaurant, spills drink on my new clothes and then want me to pay half check. He then takes me to see "All Quiet on the Western Front" I not enjoy movie as Adolfy is all han(d)s on me. First date and he trying for Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad. Rest of night a blur, must have been that 5th Vodka Stuka.


No other stories to tell... in Russia best story tellers in Siberia, or laying somewhere on way there.

I send you pic from Red October days, it give you vigor for second front.

Your Man of Steel, Iosif

An evening of bonding at Yalta:

Brooke: (on Stalin) "Calm, laconic, and often courteous, with a military mind of the highest caliber, also vindictive, enigmatic, and a murder to rival Hitler"

FDR: (on Stalin to his lieutenants) "I can handle Stalin"

Stalin: "Churchill is the kind of man who will pick your pocket of a kopeck......Roosevelt is not like that. He dips his hand only for bigger coins."

Feel the love. [:'(]

Nice to see you around Nik.

Thx. Still alive and kicking, despite all my bad habits.

ORIGINAL: warspite1

So back to In Passage Perilous and there is another point raised in the book within the conclusion that is worthy of mention and posts 104 and 105 refer to this. O’Hara again makes the point that the Mediterranean was the British main effort and that while Italy used the majority of its navy, most of its air force and a small portion of its army, for Germany the numbers were: less than 2% of its army, circa 15% of its air force and a “small fraction” of its U-boat arm. He rounds off this analysis with this conclusion: Every day it could deflect its enemy’s main effort with tiny forces in Africa or anywhere along the Mediterranean shoreline was a successful day for the Reich [my italics].

Lebensraum was Hitler’s raison d’etre and it does not take the powers of hindsight to know that this war was where Germany would succeed or fail and the last thing he needed when warring with the USSR was his southern flank being exposed.

Indeed, after the losses suffered in the first 9 months, in order for Army Group South to launch Operation Blue, the Germans needed to raid the assets of the other two Army Groups, for most of their .....air assets.

Given such a situation, ANY German assets being expended anywhere but in the east was, far from being a success, actually helping Germany to lose the war. O’Hara likes to repeat the mantra that North Africa was Britain’s main focus (as though the Italians were holding off the entire weight of the British Empire forces) but in reality situation was very different.

Similarly given the colossal losses of Luftwaffe aircraft in the USSR during that period, ANY aircraft assets being utilised in the Mediterranean rather than in the east was nothing short of a disaster and 15% is not insignificant.

And all this ignores the fighter strength and AA units that were defending Germany from Bomber Command (and from 1942 the USAAF)

warspite1

I have recently read the very good Eagles Over The Sea - Luftwaffe Maritime Operations 1939-1942.

Reading the book brought to mind the discussion on the performance of the Regia Marina from a couple of years ago; and specifically O'Hara's rather disappointing quote from In Passage Perilous that 'Every day it could deflect its enemy’s main effort with tiny forces in Africa or anywhere along the Mediterranean shoreline was a successful day for the Reich'.

The description of the German air forces, allocated to naval war, being pulled from pillar to post - to western France, to the Baltic and the Black Sea, to the Mediterranean and to the Arctic just helps reinforce how faintly ridiculous this assertion was.

It reminded me of a scenario I read elsewhere too. In The Fast Carriers Reynolds vividly describes how the Japanese had to remove their carrier aircraft from their carriers in the defence of Rabaul so short were they of aircraft. I mentioned during the initial discussion how much the Germans needed aircraft in the Soviet Union - where the war was to be decided - but this was also true of the Atlantic (and Arctic at least until the Persian and Pacific routes opened up). The book makes clear just to what extent the need to bolster the Italians, far from being a successful day for the Reich as O'Hara so falsely states, was actually a disaster in terms of Germany's two main wars - The Eastern Front and the Battle of The Atlantic.

IIRC, the Regia Marina suffered from a severe shortage of fuel oil. Pretty sure that there just isn't much crude oil in Europe in general and although it was controlled by the Axis Germany pretty much allocated it. The heavy oil needed by RM ships would be a "leftover" (I believe) after refining but what did German industry burn?

Battleships burn lots of fuel per mile moved so they wouldn't move much if fuel was short. Even the US kept its older BBs out of the South Pacific through the end of 1942 since fuel was short in that area.