Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
OT but worth a thought ...

OT? What hasn't been OT on this uberthread? There are so many different concurrent threads here we could weave a rug!

The original thead went from WitP Corsair combat results/algorithms to Zero vs. Corsair to Zero development, ad infinitum.

And I have no clue what game we're talking about now: ETO?

ORIGINAL: spence

Bad English speaking Kraut!

Non German speaking Yankee Doodle[;)]

I wonder if you both realize that English is a Teutonic (Germanic) language, despite all the French after the Norman Conquest and all the scientific Latin and Greek.

ORIGINAL: Historiker

In Spring 44, we still had a powerful army and the Luftwaffe hit the Allied AFs still hard. In the East, we were still able to match the Red Air Force.
The turning point came later, the war was not finally lost before mid of August 44...

The turning point came in September of 1939 when the policy of short limited wars fell apart, after this there was little chance of victory; and after June of 1941 defeat was inevitable.

In the spring of 1944 the Germany was incapable of holding off the Soviets alone; add the Western Allies and it wasn’t even close.

At least by the summer of 1943 if not earlier the Luftwaffe had lost its ability to maintain air superiority, the result was devastating to the combat ability of the infantry divisions.

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Frankly, I think the Zero was a brilliant design. It was a solid performer in the early war, though no "superweapon." Strategically it was ideal...

Just to stir the pot.

I think it was an incredible stupid design that ignored most of the lessons of air to air combat; and was strategically unsound.

Game wise as the Japanese, I am thankful when this ‘design concept’ is replaced by more sound aircraft designs, which I quickly take advantage of.

[:D]

Would too many heads explode in complete confusion if I mount a defense of the Zero?

It wasn't an aircraft that would win a long war. It was an aircraft that gave the Japanese the ability to extend air superiority to some pretty distant places during the "expansion period" from Dec 1941 through April 1942. You don't need to shoot down enemy fighters to be effective, you merely need to provide good cover for your own operations (so that enemy bombers can't show up) and be able to strategically isolate enemy forward bases (so that you can grind them down by whatever means). If the Japanese had fielded a.c. like the ones the Allies used, their ability to strategically isolate places like Indonesia, the Philippines, and lower Burma (with Ki-43s) would have been greatly reduced. I think their losses to grinding attrition would have been far more damaging from the outset.

Not to mention that raids like Pearl Harbor and Darwin would have been far less likely. Kido Butai did not use the zero's surplus combat radius (as compared with American a.c.) against American TFs largely because the farther you have to fly the less likely you are to find your target. But when your target is fixed and immobile, like a port or an airfield, that range makes a big difference. Had KB to sail closer to Hawaii, its odds of detection would have been far greater, and the odds of taking the US Pacfleet (and more importantly, Ford and Hickam fields) by surprise that much lower.

At least that's how I see it.

For a nation that started the war with inadequate shipping to meet production goals and also provide logistical support, the Zero was a pretty good choice because it economized materials and fuel, while providing great strategic offensive flexibility. The one thing it did not economise on was pilots, but Japan wasn't going to win a long war anyhow, not even with any of the a.c. that they deployed later in the war.

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

For a nation that started the war with inadequate shipping to meet production goals and also provide logistical support,

Interesting. You might want to have a look at these threads in the scenario forum:

tm.asp?m=1557366
tm.asp?m=1560509&mpage=2 (post #47)

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico
I think it was an incredible stupid design that ignored most of the lessons of air to air combat; and was strategically unsound.

Actually, that's an incredibly stupid statement..., and I asssume it was made "tongue in cheek". The Zero was designed around the requests and demands of Japanese pilots who were fighting in China. It was from the "lessons" they had aquired in combat that most of the Zero's weak points derived. The Combat Pilots demanded "ultra-manueverable" over all other considerations..., because this matched their experiance against the Chinese. Worked pretty well in the opening months of the Pacific War as well, because Allied pilots originally tried to "dog-fight" against it.

It's failings only came to light when the Allies stopped "playing the dogfight game", and began to use the strengths of their own A/C against the Zero's weaknesses. Strategically it was one of the soundest designs of the Pacific War because of it's great range, arguably THE single most important strategic consideration in that theatre.

ORIGINAL: trollelite

The game balance is very poor. I think, as a successful game, it should at least provide a what if scenario that could provide some balance play. If every Japanese player get disgusted with this fact and simply quit ( they can do that, while their historical counterpart cannot), then what's the use to allies even F4U as strong as F-22? If with corsair even morons can win battle, then the game is dead.

I think your confidence to the game already shaken by those invincible corsairs....

It's a part of the game, that Japan will finally loose. So why whining about that? The challenge is, to fight better than they historically did...

ORIGINAL: witpqs

ORIGINAL: Historiker

There were also two peace offers to Germany by Stalin, both delivered by Bulgaria. One shortly after the war began, another when the German troops got close to Moskau. In both offers he was willed to give Germany a massive amount of territory...

Wow! First I've heard of that. Thanks for the info. I wonder if he meant it to be a 'temporary peace' until SU was more ready?

Which is indeed no wonder. As you shurly can imagine, Russia wasn't proud of that, so it was kept in secret after the war.

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: spence

Bad English speaking Kraut!

Non German speaking Yankee Doodle[;)]

I wonder if you both realize that English is a Teutonic (Germanic) language, despite all the French after the Norman Conquest and all the scientific Latin and Greek.

English isn't a teutonic language. It is a mixture of gaelic, latin and the language of the angles and the saxons, which have spoken some kind of germanic language.
This is the reason why there is no shureness for someone with another mother language than english, how to spell it everey time and why some words are similar to french and some to german...

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

ORIGINAL: mdiehl
Frankly, I think the Zero was a brilliant design. It was a solid performer in the early war, though no "superweapon." Strategically it was ideal...

Just to stir the pot.

I think it was an incredible stupid design that ignored most of the lessons of air to air combat; and was strategically unsound ...

We've already discussed this at great length in this very long thread; the Zero fit in w/the Japanese doctrine of maximum offense at the expense of pilot/plane protection.

ORIGINAL: Mike Scholl

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico
I think it was an incredible stupid design that ignored most of the lessons of air to air combat; and was strategically unsound.

Actually, that's an incredibly stupid statement..., and I asssume it was made "tongue in cheek". The Zero was designed around the requests and demands of Japanese pilots who were fighting in China. It was from the "lessons" they had aquired in combat that most of the Zero's weak points derived. The Combat Pilots demanded "ultra-manueverable" over all other considerations..., because this matched their experiance against the Chinese. Worked pretty well in the opening months of the Pacific War as well, because Allied pilots originally tried to "dog-fight" against it.

It's failings only came to light when the Allies stopped "playing the dogfight game", and began to use the strengths of their own A/C against the Zero's weaknesses. Strategically it was one of the soundest designs of the Pacific War because of it's great range, arguably THE single most important strategic consideration in that theatre.

How many German, British, America, etc designs followed the same logic?


---It's failings only came to light when the Allies stopped "playing the dogfight game"---

A lesson from WW1... is it not?

ORIGINAL: Joe D.


We've already discussed this at great length in this very long thread; the Zero fit in w/the Japanese doctrine of maximum offense at the expense of pilot/plane protection.

A flawed philosophy... was it not and one quickly learned by the Japanese. How many Japanese designs that went into production after the start of the war followed this design belief?

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

ORIGINAL: Historiker

In Spring 44, we still had a powerful army and the Luftwaffe hit the Allied AFs still hard. In the East, we were still able to match the Red Air Force.
The turning point came later, the war was not finally lost before mid of August 44...

(1)The turning point came in September of 1939 when the policy of short limited wars fell apart, after this there was little chance of victory; and after June of 1941 defeat was inevitable.

(2)In the spring of 1944 the Germany was incapable of holding off the Soviets alone; add the Western Allies and it wasn’t even close.

(3)At least by the summer of 1943 if not earlier the Luftwaffe had lost its ability to maintain air superiority, the result was devastating to the combat ability of the infantry divisions.

ad1 The first point can only come from a German [:D] With our tradition of selflaceration after the war, it is of course impossible that there has ever been any hope for Germany, there can't be anything good in Germany between this 12 years that dominate our history (for ourself) much more than all the other 1000 years...
And of course, the war was so defenitly lost in June, that Stalin submitted peace offers, providing much of the intended "Lebensraum".

ad2 and? who cares? It isn't necessary to hold all the ground. Especially on foreign ground, it is possible to use it for a manuever warfare. Have you ever heard of Erich von Manstein? And do you know what he did to the russians when he was allowed to retreat? Even Russia doesn't have endless abilitys. The casualties the Russians suffered through von Manstein where such horrible, that the abilities for offensives were in concrete danger. Of course, slowly retreating to the Cruzon-line doesn't make Germany to win the war, but if Manstein would have been in charge...
It has a reason why I said "august 44". In August it was certain, that the allied troops will not be thrown back to the sea, wich was indeed possible in June 44. But much more important than this, while this point allone decides the war, in august 44 Operation Bagration had ended and the Heeresgruppe Mitte has collapsed, which took germanys power to fight back in the east.
This two points, the loss of our tanks and of nearly 700.000 men together with the established second front (with even more massive losses) broke our neck. Before it was definitly not broken, yet!

ad3 The loss of air superiority didn't affect the production, but with it's affect on the ground forces, you are right. While this is really annoying, it doesn't decide the war, if the allied attempt to establish a second front would have been repelled successfully. Without an allied front in the east, marching by night is a good possibility to avoid attacks. At the estern front local air superiority was established again and again even until 45.

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

How many German, British, America, etc designs followed the same logic?
---It's failings only came to light when the Allies stopped "playing the dogfight game"---
A lesson from WW1... is it not?
[/quote]


Actually, quite a few..., but they didn't push it to the extremes the Japanese did. And most of those A/C were designed without "combat experiance" well before the war started.

ORIGINAL: Historikerad1 The first point can only come from a German [:D] With our tradition of selflaceration after the war, it is of course impossible that there has ever been any hope for Germany, there can't be anything good in Germany between this 12 years that dominate our history (for ourself) much more than all the other 1000 years...
And of course, the war was so defenitly lost in June, that Stalin submitted peace offers, providing much of the intended "Lebensraum".

During the early critical years the Germany economy was under horribly under utilized... you can’t win a long war that way. Economically, the Germans were poorly organized… way too many competing designs, lack of standardization, poor designs, etc. Politically, attacks on to many different ‘enemies’ lead to a disruption of force… Balkans, Norway, etc.

Poor leadership doomed any chance of success.

ORIGINAL: Mike SchollActually, quite a few..., but they didn't push it to the extremes the Japanese did. And most of those A/C were designed without "combat experiance" well before the war started.

They didn't push it to extremes because of the lessons of WW1. The Japanese ignored these lessons and suffered for it.



The highly maneuverable concept of fighter wasn’t new at the time (pre-WW2), in 1916 it reached the pinnacle of it dominance with the fielding of the DR.1 (turn 82 ft per sec), but in one year it was superceeded when it was found that superior climb and speed would be a greater asset then superior maneuvering. SPADs using ‘dive-and-kill’ tactics (turn 73 ft per second) dominated the DR.1.



----------------------------------------------------------------


"During 1916 fighter design focused maneuverability. By 1917 this was giving way to
climb and speed as the central focus of airplane design. The famed Fokker Dr.1, was a highly maneuverable airplane, which was superior in close in dog-fighting, but had a low top speed and poor rate of climb."

"The progress in engine performance cannot be ignored. Since climb is a function of excess power larger engines made the later airplanes far superior. The success of the SPAD XIII can be attributed to its great performance in “slash and dash”

ORIGINAL: Historiker

ORIGINAL: Joe D.

ORIGINAL: spence

Non German speaking Yankee Doodle[;)]

I wonder if you both realize that English is a Teutonic (Germanic) language, despite all the French after the Norman Conquest and all the scientific Latin and Greek.

English isn't a teutonic language. It is a mixture of gaelic, latin and the language of the angles and the saxons, which have spoken some kind of germanic language.
This is the reason why there is no shureness for someone with another mother language than english, how to spell it everey time and why some words are similar to french and some to german...

Please refer to your own quote; I took the liberty to bold the pertinent part.

Teutonic (Germanic) in origin, English is now a mixture of almost everything.

ORIGINAL: Culiacan Mexico

ORIGINAL: Joe D.
We've already discussed this at great length in this very long thread; the Zero fit in w/the Japanese doctrine of maximum offense at the expense of pilot/plane protection.

A flawed philosophy... was it not and one quickly learned by the Japanese. How many Japanese designs that went into production after the start of the war followed this design belief?

In general, culture influences military doctrine, from which weapons and tactics are developed. The sammurai carried two swords, but no shield; the Japanese incorporated this offensive tradition into their technology, i.e., the Zero. This philosophy worked very well at Pearl Harbor and other raids, but not the invasion of Midway.

However, Shattererd Sword was more specific, claiming that IJ doctrine was directly developed to offset US advantages in men and material; " ... striking first, at longer range and with more powerful weaponry, was seen as the only possible antidote to American numerical preponderance."

I don't know enough re IJ aircraft to comment on their later designs, but their industrial base could never produce these aircraft fast enough to turn the tide.

In regards to Uber-CAP, can it be mitigated by house-ruling a maximum CAP percentage setting of the Allied CV fighter groups? (Basically, reduce the max possible size of the CAP.)