Matrix Games Forums

ORIGINAL: mdiehl

Tertio: Quoting "Legend of Zorro" at defenceless civilians should be beyond the pale.

He was quoting The Princess Bride, not the Legend of Zorro, so he's off the hook on that charge.

"YOU KILLED MY FATHER< PREPARE TO DIE!!!!"[:D]

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: Dili

In daylight, Sodak/Iowa fire control was vastly superior to Japanese optical fire control.

What optic or non optic have to do with it in daylight? Was round splash already radar detectable at that time?

They could actually detect the shells in flight and dodge them (done against Scharnhorst)... also, radar would be more accurate than optical in determining initial range.

They were so good , they could dodge, and attack ships that weren't even there! Don't forget the "Battle of the pips!".[:D]

[>:]

ORIGINAL: Tiornu

Under the right conditions, US radar could spot 16in salvos out to maximum range.

the emphasis being on, the "right conditions" Even latewar US radar was no magic pill.

ORIGINAL: mikemike

Returning to the subject matter of the argument, the book I'm using as reference (the original version of "Anatomy of a ship: The Type XXI submarine") contains a schematic of the Type XXI hydraulic system, and the only parts of it outside the pressure hull were the drives for the 20mm turrets and the forward dive planes. During acceptance trials, there were all sorts of trouble with these, starting with contamination of hydraulic fluid by sea water. The dive plane and rudder control system didn't work properly in the original form, causing a total redesign. In the final series configuration, the turrets had their own, separate, hydraulic circuit and would anyway have been irrelevant for submerged operation. The rudder and dive plane system obviously worked fine on the completed boats, and the only part of the hydraulics outside the pressure hull (I'll say that again: the only part) were the forward dive plane actuators. I know there is some US publication that says differently, but I take the word of people who worked on the design themselves over the opinion of somebody who may have worked from dodgy, misunderstood or wrongly-translated documents or may have seen a jury-rigged system after bomb damage. You say that absurd things were done, but when the Kriegsmarine, who was in a tearing hurry to get those boats to the front, spent all the time needed to eliminate bugs of lesser significance, nobody would have left part of such an indispensable system dangling out in the breeze, just for lack of time.

This is interesting and provides an interesting contrast to Clay Blair's analysis of the Type XXI. I got the impression that it was a bit on the harsh side (as are many of his viewpoints in his two book series. Here's what he said about the Type XXI's flaws based on a US analysis of the U-2513. (highlights)

1) Poor Structural Integrity

due to hurriedly prefabrication of hull sections from up to 32 different factories that had little experience in building submarines. He claims each section was crudely made and didn't fit well together therefore led to weak pressure hulls.

he cites a German report that simulated tests failed at 900 feet. A British report - 800 feet. I'm guessing the "poor" rating comes from Blair's concluding statement that the 800 foot rating was less than the failure rate of a conventional uboat.

2) Underpowered diesel engines.

Blair says the superchargers of the new model six cylinder diesels were so poorly designed that they could not be used. The alleged failure reduced HP to 1200 leaving the Type XXI underpowered.

3) Impractical Hydraulic system.

(I'll quote this in full given the detailed info you've provided)

The Main lines, accumulators, cylinders, and pistons of the hydraulic gear for operating the diving planes, rudders, torpedo tube outer doors, and anti-aircraft gun turrets on the bridge were too complex and delicate and located "outside the pressure hull." The gear was therefore subject to saltwater leakage, corrosion, and enemy weaponry. It could not be repaired from inside the pressure hull. (obviously.....[:D])

4) Imperfect and Hazardous Snorkel.

This is a long standing Blair jump up and down point. He thinks the device was overblown in it's potential.

specifically, it dunked often, even in moderate seas which in turn caused auto closure of intake exhaust ports. This caused Carbon Monoxide buildup in the pressure hull which led to sickness and ill health effects. (headaches, eye discomfort etc) While closed the diesels would also suck internal air from the boat. He calls using the snorkel on a type XXI a "nightmarish experience" (or in any other U-boat for that matter)

Ironically, in the next paragraph he does admit that the US Navy "did" in fact incorporate "some" of the features of the Type XXI electro boat for it's new sub designs in the immediate postwar years.

I'd be interested in your opinions on Blair's analysis. (Tironu feel free to jump in too) I've always wondered if there were more than a little sour grapes in the above. His viewpoint on Germany's uboat force was very different at the time he wrote Silent Victory.

You know I've never understood what this thread was about anyway. If you carefully consider the words "Best Designed Ship of WWII" - gee that's quite a complex set of topic specifications.

Best - by what criteria? Needs a lot of definition. Unfortunately this usually just boils down to "what do you like" which is probably too broad a question to be of interest.

Designed - so this seems to be driving to separate the implementation from the design - so we need to consider this intent when answering

Ship - as opposed to vessels not normally considered to be ships - so PT boats and probably even submarines would not be included.

WWII - so this probably means any ship which operated between 1 Sep 39 and 15 Sep 45.

When we take all these words together - we seem to be interested in good designs - versus good ships. If we decide we are talking about warships, and we are not talking about submarines - which are usually called boats - then maybe we are talking about carriers or surface warships - though this implies we assume we are ruling out all manner of auxiliaries and non-combatants.

Of course carriers and surface combatants are very different creatures - and it does not necessarily seem to make sense to include both together in the discussion - so if I was asking the question - I would specific one or the other.

So, if we are talking about surface combatants then I think there is room for a discussion - if we are talking about carriers the number of possible answers is tiny.

But I'm mostly just trying to squeak from the sidelines about the nature of the question and how difficult it would be for me to even begin to participate.
[:)]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

You know I've never understood what this thread was about anyway. If you carefully consider the words "Best Designed Ship of WWII" - gee that's quite a complex set of topic specifications.

Best - by what criteria? Needs a lot of definition. Unfortunately this usually just boils down to "what do you like" which is probably too broad a question to be of interest.

true. I'm interested though in some rebuttal for the Type XXI. [8D]

ORIGINAL: jwilkerson

You know I've never understood what this thread was about anyway. If you carefully consider the words "Best Designed Ship of WWII" - gee that's quite a complex set of topic specifications.

Best - by what criteria? Needs a lot of definition. Unfortunately this usually just boils down to "what do you like" which is probably too broad a question to be of interest.

Designed - so this seems to be driving to separate the implementation from the design - so we need to consider this intent when answering

Ship - as opposed to vessels not normally considered to be ships - so PT boats and probably even submarines would not be included.

WWII - so this probably means any ship which operated between 1 Sep 39 and 15 Sep 45.

When we take all these words together - we seem to be interested in good designs - versus good ships. If we decide we are talking about warships, and we are not talking about submarines - which are usually called boats - then maybe we are talking about carriers or surface warships - though this implies we assume we are ruling out all manner of auxiliaries and non-combatants.

Of course carriers and surface combatants are very different creatures - and it does not necessarily seem to make sense to include both together in the discussion - so if I was asking the question - I would specific one or the other.

So, if we are talking about surface combatants then I think there is room for a discussion - if we are talking about carriers the number of possible answers is tiny.

But I'm mostly just trying to squeak from the sidelines about the nature of the question and how difficult it would be for me to even begin to participate.
[:)]

Ahem, quoting the Evil Doctor, it looks like 'great,' (or at least rational?) minds think alike [:D]

Wow, never knew about this thread . . . What amazes me, as a social scientist without a lot of expertise in naval design or the actual history is what appears to be a more or less _total_ lack of consensus among you guys! A bunch of very smart, very knowledgeable fanboys of the period!? That in itself is interesting.

Let me make a suggestion, define "best design" in some measurable, testable way?

For example: (1) enemy losses inflicted per dollar cost or /operating costs (including crew) etc.
(2) survivability divided by mission effectiveness (ala Terminus' point about RN CVs not carrying enough planes)?
(3) strategic impact?

Thinking in terms of (1), I would guess that the earlier German U-boats sank pound-for-pound more than any other class? Sure there may have been more cool or advanced designs later in the war, but if there is not real proof of being 'best' how can you objectively say as much . . . not to say having a 'favorite' design is invalid, but not exactly the same thing as 'best design.'

In terms of (2) weren't American CVs pretty legendary? In fact, weren't most US ships pretty well off in terms of survivability as a result of damage control?

For (3) what about the "Liberty" ships? They were cheap, and did the job well!

One of the points that occurred to me is that: a piece of technology like a ship could be a "great" design, but if it is poorly used, "implemented" as you say, because of either wrong-time/wrong-place, or just bad doctrine, or political impediments, then a great design might have been a worthless asset in realworld terms.

A related point is that of policy, procedure and doctrine. Good example being U.S. damage control procedures (along with ship design and technology). A good "design" necessarily has to go hand-in-hand with good policy and procedure or more specifically strategic and tactical doctrine. A related example (might) be that of Japanese sub-war doctrine, i.e., ignoring "low-value" ships in favor of always attacking high-value warships.

At the end of the day, in a war in which one side achieves a massive unconditional surrender from the other, is it really rational or logical to conclude that ANY of the losers "designs" or "strategies" or any other aspect of their warfighting was anything better than mediocre?

Example: U.S. torpedoes pre-1942, classic example of "bad design." They were fraught with duds for Pete's-Sake! No doubt, in the short-term that lead to more U.S. losses, and less damage to Japanese warfighting capability than if there had not been those problems with those torp contractors in that period. BUT! (and here I admit to be speculating wildly, for the sake of trying to show in this example the incredibly contingent nature of history) perhaps the myriad lessons of the Dud Torpedo period had long-term benefits to a wide array of other dimensions of US warfighting? Maybe it made mid-level officials realize that certain procedures or policies about reviewing weapons contractors or quality-control needed to be revised, therefore preventing OTHER latter war Dud issues that would otherwise have occurred with other weapons systems.

What optic or non optic have to do with it in daylight? Was round splash already radar detectable at that time?

By 1944, splash and splash size (could differentiate between 8" and 16" and 5") were detectable. US fire control also provided perfect range (distance solution), better azimuth than optical control, and better solutions on a target vessel's course and speed than optical control. US optical directors were more or less there to backstop the radar solutions in the event of electronic wierdness or failure.

The difference between radar and optical was light years of quality. As long as the set was working (which in the US was "pretty much always" after 1943), a US ship could maintain a constant range, bearing and speed solution on a target even as the US ship maneuvered radically to avoid incoming rounds. With optical control you could choose between reasonably decent solutions (although not as good as radar) on the target or radical maneuvering to avoid incoming rounds, but you could not have both.

That's why I think Yamato was doomed. I might have said "if the US radar set was working" but after the trouble with SoDak in 1942, the emphasis on keeping your electronics working took on a whole new priority in the USN. To have a prayer, Yamato would have to catch a US BB entirely by surprise and at close range, or else it'd have to steer a very straight, predictable, and cumbersome course and speed just to try to maintain a solution on a US ship. And the Yamato would have been a very easy, relatively soft target for a USN 16" rifle.

Really, all Yamato had going for it was displacement. As did all BBs. Yamato, Bismarck, Musashi, Prince of Wales, all took a substantial pounding primarily because there was alot of space that had to be flooded in order to put the beasties underwater.

Radar bearing data was inferior to optical bearing data.

No way it wouldn't be, with 1940's technology.

1) Poor Structural Integrity

Assembly yards resorted to mixing/matching hull sections to find ones that went together properly. You could argue that this was not a feature of the design.

2) Underpowered diesel engines.

Eventually the Germans started removing the supercharges because back pressure from the snorkel obviated any boost. The final diesel output was 1050hp rather than the intended 1700hp.

3) Impractical Hydraulic system.

Intrusion of seawater into the hydraulics took place mostly at the bow-plane rigging piston, gun mounts, and joinery through the pressure hull. The Americans went so far as to conclude the design was the work of people with little experience in such things. There simply wasn't sufficient concern given to ruggedness. Even the boats roll action was enough to interfere with hydraulics compnents.

4) Imperfect and Hazardous Snorkel.

The Americans found ventilation standards to be inferior, but no more so than in other U-boat types.

Thx.

So it would appear that Blair's objections had some merit. I agree on Point 1. Like other designs impacted by quality control (Ki-84 comes to mind), I don't consider that a ding on the design itself. I assume Blair brought it up to emphasis the point returned too later in his volumes that the Type XXI had little chance of changing the course of the war by itself.

Do you know the reason why the mentioned hydraulic components were placed outside the pressure hull? Space maybe? It seemed strange even on first read but then again, i'm not a naval engineer. [:)]

ORIGINAL: AW1Steve

ORIGINAL: rtrapasso

ORIGINAL: Dili



What optic or non optic have to do with it in daylight? Was round splash already radar detectable at that time?

They could actually detect the shells in flight and dodge them (done against Scharnhorst)... also, radar would be more accurate than optical in determining initial range.

They were so good , they could dodge, and attack ships that weren't even there! Don't forget the "Battle of the pips!".[:D]

Hey, this STILL happens (from what i've read).

ORIGINAL: Tiornu
1) Poor Structural Integrity

Assembly yards resorted to mixing/matching hull sections to find ones that went together properly.
[/quote]
What? No. We can't even do that today. Under War pressure, maybe you could, but the investment cost is huge and the resultant output is correspondingly small. No, mixing/matching is an intellectual exercise, nothing more.

even in a situation where industry is dispersed and poor quality labor is being used? (including slave labor in some cases)

Well, one might aver that Type XXI output was, in fact, quite small...

ORIGINAL: Nikademus
even in a situation where industry is dispersed and poor quality labor is being used? (including slave labor in some cases)

That kinda makes the point, don't it. Dispersed industry, poor quality labor, and somebody wants to start mixing/matching boat components?? Woof !!

suppose. This is interesting. Here's Blair's exact quote for intellectual digestion (alka seltser on the ready)

"Hurriedly prefabricated in 32 different factories that had little or no experience in submarine building, the 8 major hull sections of the Type XXI were crudely made and did not fit together properly. Therefore the pressure hull was weak and not capable of withstanding sea pressure at great depths or the explosions of close depth charges. The Germans reported that in their structural tests the hull failed at a simulated depth of 900 feet. The British reported failure at 800 feet, less than the failure rate of the conventional U-boats."

*****

maybe the key factor was in the "hurriedly" made part. Rush jobs usually breed QA issues.

Radar bearing data was inferior to optical bearing data.

I don't think that is entirely accurate. Bearing data on shell splashes was very good (better than optical) but radar bearing on a large target was center of mass. Ironically, the smaller the target, or the narrower the, errm, silhouette (ex foreshortened target approaching bow-on) the more accurate the radar bearing.

Thing is, the bearings by radar were still extremely accurate by 1944.